

The Emergence of Reflexivity in Greek Language and Thought

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The Emergence of Reflexivity in Greek Language and Thought

From Homer to Plato and Beyond

By

Edward T. Jeremiah



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CONTENTS

Figures	VII
Acknowledgements	IX
Notes	XI
Sigla	XIII
Abstract	XV
 Introduction	 1
 I. Thought and Language	 11
1. The Controversy of Homeric Psychology	11
2. Pronouns Constructing Identity	15
3. Grammaticalisation	22
4. Semantic Motivation in the Shift to Heavy Pronominal Reflexivity	24
5. The Transcendental Self Generated by Pronominal Reflexivity	30
 II. Homer	 43
1. Typology of Homeric Reflexives	43
2. Semantics of αὐτός in Homer	54
3. The Idea of ψυχή and Its Connection to the Reflexive	61
4. Conclusions	65
 III. Early Lyric, Iambus and Elegy	 67
1. Preliminaries	67
2. Complex Reflexives in Early Poetry	70
3. Simple αὐτός As Reflexive (Theognis and Pindar)	77
4. Conclusions	81
 IV. The Presocratics	 83
1. Preliminaries	83
2. Heraclitus	83
3. The Cosmology/Ontology of Parmenides and Anaxagoras	88
4. Antiphon the Sophist	94

5. Democritus	100
6. The Roots of Reflexive ἀρχαί in the Presocratics and Their Legacy	110
7. The Gnostic Tradition	115
8. Conclusions	122
V. Conscience and the Reflexivisation of σύννοτα.....	127
VI. Tragedy and Comedy	139
1. Preliminaries	139
2. Tragedy	141
3. Comedy.....	182
4. Conclusions	192
VII. Plato	195
1. Preliminaries	195
2. The Being of the In-Itself.....	196
3. Building a Reflexive Subject	206
4. The Reflexivity of Macrocosmic Beings	236
5. The Science of Science and Care of Self in <i>Charmides</i> and 1 <i>Alcibiades</i>	240
6. The (Im)possibility of Holistic Reflexivity.....	255
7. Conclusions	259
VIII. Conclusion	261
Bibliography	269
Index Locorum	283
Index Nominum et Rerum	293

FIGURES

1. Society of mind vs. transcendental self	35
2. External vs. internal ontological differentiation	59
3. The production of reflexive meta-concepts	243
4. Care of self	254
5. Parallel development of heavily marked reflexive system and reflexive ideas	266
6. Induction of selfhood from reflexive acts	268

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NOTES

Unattributed translations from Greek are my own. Greek and Latin text is read according to OCT edition unless otherwise stated.

SIGLA

BU	<i>Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad</i> , ed. Olivelle
CU	<i>Chandogya Upaniṣad</i> , ed. Olivelle
CW	F.H. Colson and G.H. Whitaker, <i>Philo</i>
DK	H. Diels and W. Kranz, <i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i>
LSJ	H.G. Liddell, R. Scott and H.S. Jones R., <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i>
LP	E. Lobel and D. Page, <i>Poetarum Lesbiorum fragmenta</i>
L&S	C.T. Lewis and C. Short, <i>A Latin Dictionary</i>
PCG	R. Kassel and C. Austin, <i>Poetae Comici Graeci</i>
TrGF	B. Snell, R. Kannicht and S. Radt, <i>Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta</i>
TU	<i>Taittiriya Upaniṣad</i> , ed. P. Olivelle

ABSTRACT

The leading claim of this monograph is that the development of heavily marked reflexive pronouns in Ancient Greek is linked to changing notions of self, and that the formation of reflexive concepts using this pronominal system contributed in an important way to the thought and culture of Greek society. According to Lehmann's (1974) reconstruction, PIE had no reflexive pronouns. Sometime during the Archaic age Greek grammaticalised a specialised reflexive comprising a synthetic fusion of a personal pronoun and the intensifier αὐτός. Previously αὐτός had been added independently to mark unexpected coreferential use of the simple pronoun, but through comparison with better documented cases of the same grammaticalisation process in English and other languages, we can extrapolate yet an earlier stage in which the personal pronouns could on occasion function reflexively without the addition of the intensifier. This development indicates an increased use of the pronominal reflexive system as an extension of, and alternative to, the timeworn verbal approach of middle reflexivity inherited from PIE. There are subtle but crucial semantic differences between heavy reflexive and middle reflexive representations which must be grasped if we are to appreciate the implications of the new strategy. This monograph looks at the way in which the Greeks, and in particular the early philosophers, exploit this system and its capabilities to form fundamental and culturally important reflexive concepts such as political autonomy, self-respect, care of self, and conscience.

As the English word *self* suggests, in origin a nominalisation of its reflexive morpheme, reflexivity ties in closely with views on the nature and identity of the person. Ultimately I argue that the development of the heavily marked reflexive system, and the Greeks' experimentation with it, assists the construction of the self as a concept rather than a complex, and as a being whose agency is typically directed towards itself in various ways. This new construction is supported by changes in the socio-economic structure of Greece that promote a sharper individuation of the human agent. My approach is therefore a productive avenue for accessing and characterising the development of the Greek genius. Within the wider framework these results bear on current debates concerning the relation of language and thought, and here I weigh in, with

qualification, on the side of neo-Whorfianism; within Classics they seek to substantiate and elaborate in grammaticalisation theory Gantar's speculation (1980: 41) that '[d]ie Entdeckung dieser inneren Welt scheint mit dem Vorkommen der Reflexivpronomina auf das engste verbunden zu sein'; within intellectual history they reveal the way in which the Greeks' use of reflexivity has influenced and conditioned the emergence of subjectivity in the Western tradition.

INTRODUCTION

Ancient Greek psychology, and more particularly Greek concepts of soul and self, have enjoyed a healthy share of scholarly attention.¹ But the pickings for that word which translates *self* in English most literally, the intensifier and reflexive morpheme αὐτός, have been slim.² Unfortunately, the rather uncritical use of modern Indo-European words such as *self* when interpreting Greek psychology—with little mind for its quite narrow historical conditioning, the semantic influence of its etymology, and the peculiar meanings it has accreted through the development of modernity—has obscured important differences between the lexicalisation and construction of self in these two worlds. Some form of comparative method is needed to coax us from the comfort of our native categories, which otherwise blind us to the uniqueness of our own sense of self while also clouding our view of Greek personhood.³

In an attempt to fill this breach, this monograph will explore the conceptual and linguistic development of Greek reflexivity as it relates to self. This approach is recommended by the fact that the English word for self is in origin a nominalisation of its marker for syntactic reflexivity,⁴ which began its life as an intensive adjective virtually identical to Greek αὐτός. As complex reflexives developed in English via a grammaticalisation of the combination of simple pronoun plus intensive adjective, e.g. *him* plus *self*, the *self* component was nominalised as the essential form of the human being and the unity of personality and consciousness.⁵

¹ For recent general treatment see especially the excellent work of Sorabji (1999), (2006), (2008) and Gill (1996), (2008).

² The attention given the reflexive pronoun has been almost exclusively syntactic, e.g. Dobrov (1988) and Woodard (1990). Notable exceptions that consider the semantic import of the development of the pronominal reflexive system are Gantar (1966), (1980), Seel (1953) regarding *conscience*, Bolling (1947) 29 n. 4 in a footnote, and Havelock (1972) 6, who suggests that Socrates' use of the reflexive is novel in light of its early history.

³ For an overview of current interest in the comparative method, see Farenga's (2006) introduction.

⁴ Cf. French *le soi* and German *das Selbst*.

⁵ The nominalisation happened during the grammaticalisation process. The form that grammaticalised first, *himself*, retains *him* as a nominal head, whereas forms that grammaticalised later have turned the pronoun into a possessive pronoun modifying *self* as a noun: *myself*, *yourself*, *ourselves* instead of **meself*, **youself*, **usselves*. See van Gelderen (2000) 102 ff.

In taking the reflexive morpheme and turning it into a noun, English thus joins modern thought's conceptualisation of the self as an inherently reflexive structure. It is the being which engages in reflexive acts, whether it be thinking about itself, helping itself, promoting itself, determining itself, challenging itself, being with itself, fashioning itself, etc. As Foucault, Giddens and others have argued, this reflexivity is a central feature in the spirit of modernity.⁶ To what extent does this apply to the Greeks?

Linguistically speaking, Greek develops complex reflexives in exactly the same way as English. The process unfolds in three stages: simple pronouns functioning reflexively, increasing addition of the intensive adjective αὐτός, and finally, fusion of the two into a single form.⁷ We find too that during the latter stage of this development αὐτός is nominalised in Aristotle: a friend is another αὐτός, another self. Furthermore, this nominalisation is foreshadowed by Plato's development of αὐτός to mark essential ontological form (with or without the prepositional reflexive phrase καθ' ἑαυτ-), and by his characterisation of the soul and the human being in reflexive terms.

But there are at the same time some important differences. Surviving nominalisations of αὐτός are exceedingly rare (the Aristotelian example appears a somewhat bold innovation). The preferred Greek word for *self* is overwhelmingly the independent noun ψυχή and this is not without its conceptual consequences: where in English *self* as a nominalised reflexive morpheme bears a deep syntactic connection to the subject,

⁶ Foucault (1966) 310 transforms this reflexivity into a socio-epistemological structure, defining the modern age as one in which man shows himself 'as the difficult object and sovereign subject of all possible knowledge.' Cf. Giddens (1991) 32: 'the self [of late modernity] becomes a reflexive project.' Note also Sartre (1943) 76: 'By nature [the *self*] is a reflexive, as syntax sufficiently indicates—in particular the logical rigor of Latin syntax with the strict distinctions imposed by grammar between the use of *ejus* and *sui*. The *self* refers, but it refers precisely to the subject. It indicates a relation between the subject and himself, and this relation is precisely a duality, but a particular duality since it requires particular verbal symbols.' Sartre is building on Kierkegaard (1849) 13: 'But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation's relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but is the relation's relating itself to itself.' This formulation suggests that the self refers to the actualisation of a generalised reflexive relation of the form xRx , where R is a verbal idea bearing x to x —an idea we will return to, neatly expressed in Sartre's designation of the human consciousness as being-for-itself.

⁷ With the addition of an earlier stage in the case of Greek, inherited from PIE, where reflexivity is encoded verbally (see Lehmann (1974)). Cf. Hock (2006) for the development of a pronominal reflexive strategy in early Sanskrit from the same verbal heritage.

there is no such connection necessary in the case of *ψυχή*. It, rather, is hypostasised as an entity in its own right more or less independent of the subject.⁸ Modernity's tendency to understand the human being in terms of abstract grammatical relations, namely the subject and self, and also the 'I'—and, conversely, the relative indifference of Greece to such categories—creates some of the most important semantic contrasts between our and Greek notions of self.

Nevertheless, reflexive predications develop considerably from the time of Homer to Plato and beyond, and this I will argue is linked to both the linguistic evolution of a pronominal reflexive system (PRS) and changing notions of self. The human being begins to enter into, and become defined by, a wide variety of reflexive constructions. From a developmental perspective, such a move would be necessary for any later redefinition of the soul as an inherently reflexive entity. For the human subject or soul could not be conceptualised as just such a reflexive entity unless it had come to be associated with reflexive predications in such an intimate way that these were interpreted as definitional and absorbed by the subject as identifying descriptions. This is the process by which a subject's *semes*, as Barthes called them, come to determine and constitute the subject.

Thinking of self in terms of reflexivity gives us a new way of thinking about some old problems in classical scholarship. Many have tried to pin down the revolutionary changes in thinking and society which turned out Classical from Archaic Greece. These changes have often been held to entail a fundamental shift in psychology, the most infamous example of which is Snell's thesis that the developments that produced fifth century Greece unified the fragmented mind of earlier Greek society into a

⁸ Thus, in the view of contemporary thought, ancient psychology falls prey to the substantialist illusion. To borrow the terminology of Sartre (1943) 84, 103, it seeks to make the for-itself into an in-itself, to treat it as a phenomenal object that, as created, participates in the contingency of created reality (*ens creatum*), rather than apprehending it as a non-thing that founds itself. I agree with Sartre's distinction between these two views of the human being, yet disagree with his evaluation of the former as a mistake: in its relevant cultural context the substantialist view is an experienced reality, providing, in extreme cases, the physical manifestation of psychic substances—as in certain forms of shamanism—or more loosely a general economy of the human being as a dividual substance. Rather than seeing himself as some kind of limit of the world, the ancient sees himself as another of its creatures. For him the notion of a being-for-itself founding itself is nonsensical since one is firmly founded in the being of god(s). For the radically different epistemological frameworks of different historical epochs, and especially those of premodern and modern thought, which naturally influence their respective views of the human subject, see Foucault (1966), (1981–1982).

single holistic principle. I defend Snell's claim that there is something fundamentally different about the sense of self in these two periods, while arguing that he did not quite find the right terminology and framework for elucidating just what composes this difference. I argue that innovative application of the PRS, along with the development of the very system itself, is important evidence for new conceptions of self. In particular, it is argued that a transcendental notion of self, adapting Kant's terminology, is generated by the semantic effects peculiar to encoding reflexive events using a transitive conceptual structure as opposed to encoding them using other strategies, for instance middle reflexivity.

This approach brings with it the welcome bonus of connecting territories that might otherwise seem distinct. For we will see how the use of reflexivity in three of the dominant realms in philosophy—ontology (which for ancient philosophy is barely distinguishable from cosmology), epistemology, and ethics—feed into, and are in turn contingent upon, a burgeoning category of self *qua* reflexive structure. The thing-in-itself of fundamental ontology comes into being alongside the soul as that which moves itself, and these two, together with yet other reflexive concepts, are mutually dependent within a general system of reflexivity. This approach is also fertile beyond the practical limits of this monograph. It follows from the comparative method that in illuminating the Greek notion of self we illuminate our own. Greece did not knit a connection between the human being and reflexivity as closely as we do, but in many ways it laid the groundwork for our current obsessions. At points throughout this monograph we will have time and space to prefigure some of these movements. It seems that a reflexive meme was initiated in Greece that now, operating the recursive machine of language, is working its way deeper still into our thought. In its more ambitious moments, this monograph thus seeks to make a three way comparison: classical Greece vis-a-vis Homeric and archaic Greece on the one hand, and modernity on the other.

The method followed in pursuit of the argument is a colloquium of three disciplines: philological interpretation, linguistics, and philosophy. As philology it is a survey of the thematic use of extant reflexive constructions from Homer to Plato. Linguistics is needed to supplement the philological interpretation in both a synchronic and diachronic way. Synchronically, it is argued that the semantic features of the novel reflexive concepts derive in each case from the more general semantic features of the PRS, and diachronically, that the system's development bears the footprint of its broadening use for novel concept-building. Lastly,

philosophy makes its entrance because it has a particular predilection for reflexive constructions, and these require a more technical discussion. Furthermore, we will often wield this philosophy from a position of intellectual history, as it is suggested that the development of the PRS, and its associated semantic feature—what I call a transcendental construction of the agent/subject—condition the birth and ongoing legacy of philosophy in a way that is still felt today.

The argument's interdisciplinary nature has necessitated the inclusion of a lengthy introductory chapter laying out the relevant philosophical and linguistic background material. I make use of work by the linguist Lakoff which explores the semantic fertility of the English reflexive system and how it encodes different psychological models of self-relation, before making my way towards Kemmer, who has shown subtle but significant semantic differences in the diverse strategies of reflexive encoding. Once it has been shown that (a) reflexivity and psychology are deeply related and (b) different reflexive systems do different things semantically, then it is a plausible hypothesis that (c) a large shift in reflexive strategy will correlate with a shift in the idea of self. I then suggest approaching this shift in terms of Gill's distinction between subjective-individualist and objective-participant models of personhood—which he developed to aid the differentiation of the Greek and modern views of self—and the idea of the transcendental subject well-known from Kant.

Since the mechanism for diachronic language change is grammaticalisation, I also outline a theory of it. The theory is conceived within the functionalist school but extrapolated to what might be called a neo-Whorfian perspective. This is perhaps the most controversial stage of my argument.⁹ Though it has spent the better part of more recent years in the academic wilderness, exiled by those linguistic brands which draw a formal line between syntax and semantics—and so *a fortiori* cultural semantics (there are subject-verb-object word order languages, but not subject-verb-object cultures)—there has recently been something of a renaissance of Whorfian thought.¹⁰ As Evans argues, a functionalist theory of grammaticalisation implicitly allows the encoding, in time,

⁹ However, since there is semantic variation in different reflexive strategies, they are not arbitrarily equivalent ways of doing the same thing—as may be said of many of the variable parameters of grammatical structure—and so the argument from syntax to semantics, and vice-versa, should in this case not be so controversial.

¹⁰ See Evans (2003) 13–16, and especially Enfield (2002), whose volume is a selection of essays considering links between grammar and culture.

of culturally specific patterns of language use, so that certain grammatical structures may in part be motivated by the peculiar semantic needs of a particular culture. I thus argue that the cultural innovation of the transcendental reflexive subject, against a backdrop of key socio-cultural changes in Greek society, shaped the grammaticalisation of the Greek complex reflexive system. This culture-specific adaptation of a functionalist theory of grammaticalisation, in which the specific forms of expression used by speakers who frequently talk about reflexive beings sediments into the linguistic macro-structure of a complex reflexive pronominal system, allows us to tie together the linguistic and philosophical threads of my argument.

Given (c) above, and the grammaticalising mechanism that formalises a favoured semantic strategy, in this case a reflexive strategy, it remains to propose and show the following:

1. That there is formal linguistic evidence for a move from one reflexive strategy, middle reflexivity, to another, pronominal reflexivity, or at least a considerable growth in the latter. Given the paucity of data, much of the growth can be inferred from the fact of the grammaticalisation of the complex reflexive itself, since frequency is a key factor in this process.¹¹
2. That this relatively new strategy, pronominal reflexivity, is indeed put to interesting new uses that concern the nature of the person and instantiate culturally important categories.
3. That these categories are becoming important because of a wider sociological transformation that serves as a crucible for the complex reflexive's grammaticalisation and its accretion of new meanings, especially its involvement in new psychological models of the person.

For the thematic discussion I have limited myself to literal reflexivity and hence discuss reflexivity only insofar as writers use reflexive constructions. Any detailed discussion of the self is thus kept to a discussion of the self *qua* explicit reflexive being, though scholarly work on other aspects of the self are brought in where they bear on my argument. Points of key philosophical and linguistic interest are discussed on a case by

¹¹ This paucity is also the reason for an absence of rigorous statistical analysis. Increasing use of the PRS is inferred not from statistics, but from the fact of grammaticalisation itself—a useful indirect indicator of statistical frequency when sufficient data are unavailable.

case basis and often referred to the background introductory material. Sometimes a point is postponed because it is better dealt with in concert with another author's use of a similar reflexive idea. Though the bulk of the monograph concerns writers from Homer to Plato, on occasion I will consider the reception and further development of reflexive ideas in thinkers beyond this scope in order to properly contextualise the significance of reflexivity in this early period and the developmental trajectory begun therein.

I have replicated the argument's diachronic arc in the structure of this monograph by dealing with the material chronologically. It may therefore feel that the argument gathers momentum as historical time and the monograph itself progress. While earlier chapters are relatively sparse and speculative, there is more to sink our teeth into as we approach and finally arrive at the Classical era. This effect is in fact a corollary of my main point: besides the patchier literary record of the archaic period, there is less to talk about in the early stages since the reflexive system does not yet deeply engage with ideas of self. The majority of the linguistic discussion takes place in chapters 2 and 3 because this was the period during which the complex reflexive grammaticalised. By the time of chapters 3–7, the complex reflexive is in common use and we can focus on the increasingly rich applications of the reflexive system and their philosophical consequences.

Since my argument makes claims concerning intellectual development, some clarification of the term 'development' is required. According to Gill, both he and Williams take issue with Snell and Adkins' vision of 'a step-by-step evolution towards the modern concept of self'.¹² But I think that if we reason carefully about the idea of 'evolution', with special attention to how this word is used in biology, some reconciliation is possible. What is usually objected to in the notion of 'step-by-step' is that it implies some sort of teleological progress, a groping after some final state of Hegelian realisation. However the language of biological evolution has discovered a way of talking about step-by-step developmental dependency without connoting teleology. For example, the differentiation of modern humans from chimps is the result of cumulative adaptations since our last common ancestor. If any of these had not occurred, we would not be who we are today. Yet this does not in any way entail that the modern human was somehow destined to evolve, that having stepped

¹² Gill (2008) 39.

through the first stages of this developmental chain, reconstructed from hindsight, our ancestors were fated to follow the remainder of a path laid before them by nature. At any point a different route could have been taken. But, crucially, none of this vitiates the claim of detailed structural dependency between each step once a certain path has in fact been taken. If we remove the tone of normative teleology from Snell and Adkins' argument, the general architecture of their view, that when given the historical sequence *a-b-c-d-e-f*, *f* would not be *f* without each of the previous steps, and owes its current form to the vast conspiracy of historical movements that preceded it, can to my mind hardly be doubted.¹³ And one might expect this conditionality to be especially powerful in the case of philosophy, because its major thinkers have consciously steeped themselves in their tradition's history and responded quite explicitly to the ideas of their predecessors.

The Presocratics conditioned Platonism conditioned Stoicism etc., with innumerable other conditions also factoring into this equation. One does not leap from the Presocratics, over a byzantine skein of intervening conditions and *sine quibus non*, to existentialism, anymore than one leaps immediately from the common ancestor of chimps and humans to either of these contemporary species. Development is in fact radically stepwise, provided that we understand by that conditional and cumulative. In terms of our argument, I am suggesting that the later tradition's use of reflexivity builds upon its use in the period under study. Since reflexivity is a tool especially suited to a subjective-individualist articulation of personhood, the development of reflexivity is an important conditional 'step' in the eventual emergence of this articulation.

Let me close this Introduction with an overview of the argument's unpacking in the body of the monograph. Chapter 2 argues that the pronominal reflexive system as we find it in Homer is both a relatively new strategy and restricted in its semantic use, and that these facts are related. Significantly, the Homeric notion of dialogical personhood avoids subjective representations by eschewing both psychological uses of the reflexive and the use of $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ in the sense of a unified psychological subject.

Chapter 3 considers the grammaticalisation of the complex reflexive in early lyric, elegy and iambus, and the first uses of the reflexive in a

¹³ I have put this unilaterally, though of course the situation in reality is of an almost infinite variety of variables working in a combination of succession and confluence, with new influences always arriving from different directions.

psychological sense, and in richer semantic contexts more generally. I contend that the extension of reflexive use of the personal pronouns into new other-directed scenarios encouraged their marking with αὐτός.

Chapter 4 shows that the Presocratics explored the semantic potential of the reflexive system in the various fields of philosophical inquiry, and that Democritus in particular was instrumental in internalising its signification. It is argued that the Presocratics' reflexive characterisation of foundational entities points to the reflexive construction of the human being itself via the macro- microcosmic analogy that is a common heuristic in Greek thought. I propose that this construction rests upon the emergence of a number of socio-cultural categories increasingly important in the context of the Greek city-state, among which figure the ideas of *πρᾶξις τῶν ἑαυτοῦ* and a self-regulating human subject.

Chapter 5 considers one reflexive category of special developmental and historical consequence, the lexicalisation of conscience as 'knowing with oneself', and its deployment in legal and ethical argument. I argue that this lexicalisation is typical of the development of ideas of personhood in Greece in that it reduces what was traditionally a dialogical ethical relation to a relation of the subject with itself. This reduction focuses a person's attention on the state of his soul as the most important consequence and criterion of ethical action.

Chapter 6 argues that Greek drama, but especially tragedy, responds to the development of the reflexive subject so crucial to democracy and political autonomy by problematising it and exposing its negative manifestations. I claim that tragedy's obvious concern with reflexivity corroborates its emergence as a cultural movement and object of fascination, but at the same time spotlights the difficult challenges posed by this new way of understanding the human subject.

Chapter 7 deals with Plato and his extensive use of reflexivity. I argue that he cements and further develops the connection between personhood and reflexivity while also deepening the space of internal subjectivity through the reflexivisation and internalisation of other-directed socio-political relations, and a new interpretation of the reflexive as soul. I propose that he continues the project of refounding ethics in the self and makes the critical move of interpreting both the human subject and its objects of thought conceptually as *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά*, 'entities in relation to themselves'.

The trend of argument in these chapters culminates in the conclusion that reflexive categories are, throughout the historical period of this study, becoming increasingly central to Greek culture and ideas of

self; that such categories are articulated through novel application of the reflexive system; and that these novel applications are possibly one contributing factor in the emergence of heavily marked reflexives.

CHAPTER ONE

THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE

1. *The Controversy of Homeric Psychology*

Since this monograph seeks to spin together two developmental trajectories, one linguistic and the other intellectual, the present preliminary chapter has been devoted to a consideration of the relation between language and thought as it concerns ideas of personhood. Scholarship often takes its coordinates from controversial figures, and in studies of Greek intellectual history Bruno Snell stands tall for his seminal treatment of Homeric psychology. Despite the growing disparagement of *Entdeckung des Geistes* since its appearance—a fact which in itself may, like the meteoric rise of a momentum stock, raise suspicions of fair weather and modish critical investment—I am in conditional agreement with Snell that Homeric psychology is different from later Greek ideas in philosophically interesting ways that demand critical evaluation. Yet for me this difference is best thought in different terms, those of Homer's dialogical and non-reflexive conception of personhood.

Arguments that downplay the apparent distinctiveness of Homeric psychology assume a psychological universalism that questions inferences from Homeric language to Homeric thought. They impinge on my own argument in holding a) that one cannot conclude that if a culture does not have a word for something, then for them it does not exist, and b) that the language one uses to narrate internal experience is simply a manner of speaking with little ontological traction.

Point a) is mustered against the claim that since in Homer there is no one word to capture the psychological unity of the person, he has no concept of the person as a psychological unity—*ψυχή*, the word which later takes on this meaning, is never used in a psychological sense in Homer. One grants that Snell may exaggerate his interpretation of this absence by advancing a straightforward Whorfianism: what a culture does not have a word for, for them does not exist.¹ But if we weaken the

¹ What Pelliccia (1995) 20 n. 18, following Evans-Pritchard, criticises as 'laundry list' anthropology. Yet Evans-Pritchard devoted himself to elucidating cultural ideas which

correspondence between language and thought a little, a milder version of his thesis should, to my mind, be uncontroversial: what a culture does not have a word for is not important for them as an object of inquiry or socio-cultural signifier. Accordingly, if Homeric psychology does not have a lexicalised short-cut for the person conceived of as an essentialised unity, we infer that such a unity was not a popular topic of investigation and discussion. Nor then would it have been a prominent signifier in any complex socio-cultural discourse that builds on it as a well-established and familiar element.² To be sure, recognition of a unity of person is evident in the use of personal pronouns and names, but they are used uncritically and never become an object of reflection.³ The unity of the person insofar as it is indexed by these pronouns is assumed by a fundamental, habitual level of discourse, but is not objectified as a curiosity of thought for transparent circulation and discussion, and cannot become part of any further and derivative discourse which requires such objectification before its construction.

Point b), which is related to a), mistakenly takes psychic reality to be independent of human subjectivity. But a universalism which treats the experience of consciousness as an independent reality in the manner of trees, rocks and tables—which are what they are regardless of our understanding of them—is in fundamental error, since '[h]ow we understand

had no simple equivalent in the Western tradition. At 17–27 Pelliccia is scathing of Snell and the undue influence of Lévy-Bruhl's anthropology on classicists, but fails to take into account the broader anthropological literature. He misses the point on the correlation between language and thought by choosing poor counter-examples, and would have done better to consider that Greek culture lacks, say, a catchphrase for historical materialism or the decentred subject, just as the West lacks a word for the Yolgnu concept of *djalkiri*. It is self-evident that none of these ideas is culturally important to those that lack them. The status of *ψυχή* in Homer is considered in more detail in Ch. 2.3.

² How, for example, could the discourse of Christianity have been formed without a word for soul as the personal and moralised essence of the human being, a concept required for the articulation of many of its important ideas?

³ Indeed nominalisation of pronouns (e.g. the 'I') for the purposes of philosophical inquiry is for the most part a modern conceit. Before Aristotle (see below pp. 40–41) no essential connection is conceived between the use of these pronouns and the form of the human being; they do not become a staple of human ontology until much later. The preference for words like *soul* obviously influences the direction of ancient inquiry into the human being. Due to the life-force connotations of soul words, and their connection to an (often divine) source, ancient psychology does not seek an account of a unique human subject abstracted from dependent relations so much as an understanding of her *qua living* being in relation to a source of life.

and are aware of it is constitutive of how we feel.⁴ And how we understand consciousness relates to the particular lexical resources we use to narrate that experience. Such a universalism is often motivated, if only implicitly, by a quarrel with the attitude of colonial anthropology. Anthropological difference has often been surveyed from the vantage point of cultural chauvinism: the Homeric Greeks, for example, or the members of a technologically primitive tribe, are not to be dignified with so progressive and noble a concept as the self or individual. An implicit distaste for such chauvinism has, I think, swung many critics of difference to a position of rather extreme universalism.⁵ It is a shame that often this universalism seems to me to be stirred more by a difficulty with the historical narrative of progress than by a consideration of whether any difference is radical or not. That is, it has an ethical problem with the position, not a factual one, which is understandable given the misuse of radical difference to justify sundry items on the crime sheet of colonialism. But another view of radical difference holds that cultures can construct human identity and experience in such vastly different ways that a hiatus may arise between one culture's notion of self and another, such that application of a universalist vocabulary becomes highly problematic.⁶

Furthermore, the corollary of Snell's thesis, that the Homeric self is somehow fragmented since it is divided into a number of more or less discrete psychic agents, is not ludicrous when situated in its broader anthropological context. On the contrary, perhaps what is most bizarre in the long scheme of human history is modernity's subjectivisation of virtually all psychological predication—that is, its reduction to a transcendental subject indexed by the personal pronouns, and above all 'I', and its peculiar fascination with detailing, narrating and theorising internal

⁴ Taylor (1989) 262. He goes on: 'We can't interpret consciousness on the model of a representation, where this means representation of some independent reality. For there is nothing which our awareness of our feelings could represent in this case. There is no core of feeling *an sich*, separable from how we understand it.'

⁵ Which is not without its own ethnocentrism, since the sense of self universalised is most often one limited to a particular historical conditioning, that of modernity.

⁶ Such a position need not make any evaluative claims whatsoever, and can even invert the traditional ranking. Schmitt (1990) has argued that Homeric psychology captures some essential truths of consciousness omitted in more modern models, for example the interleaving of emotion and reason, and Naas (1995) has rubbed together Snell and Derrida to praise the absence of the concept of a psychological subject in Homer. There is also a degree of affinity between the multiplicity of Homeric psychology and postmodern views of self.

life.⁷ Outside of classics, anthropology has developed and applied the concept of a 'dividual' self to great effect in describing ideas of self in traditional societies, many of which are sociologically comparable to early Greece. Snell's critics underestimate the extent to which a society's mode of material and social organisation is productive of certain types of personhood and consciousness. Though, in the anthropologist Beidelman's words, 'Classicists have developed a useful picture of Homeric society that approximates the accretive and dissolving kin and client groups made famous in ethnographies of Evans-Pritchard and Lienhardt writing about the Nuer and Dinka of the southern Sudan',⁸ Snell's critics have not availed themselves of anthropological work on the psychological models that complement these forms of society, namely small-scale societies with little to no literacy functioning through face-to-face relations.⁹ Take as an example Ilongot narrations of mental life, which reveal a certain

⁷ By contrast, traditional societies as a whole are unconcerned with giving detailed accounts of internal experience and introspection (see Hallpike (1979) 392–393; cf. Lee (1950) 543), in which regard the Homeric epics are typical, especially in their focus on the outward manifestation of emotive states.

⁸ Beidelman (1989) 230. Beidelman is here referring particularly to the influential work of Moses Finley (1977). See also his introduction in Easterling and Muir (1985) xiii–xx.

⁹ The notion of the dividual as opposed to the individual person has become a popular anthropological term in the analysis of personhood in traditional societies (see e.g. Strathern (1988) and LiPuma (1998)). Snell's critics have also failed to avail themselves of studies in Greece's ancient neighbourhood. Ancient Jewish psychology in particular shows remarkable correspondence with Homeric views, as in Wright (1952) 88: 'There was no separation of body and soul, and man was conceived as a unified psycho-physical organism in which the psychical functions of the ego were conceived as finding expression in the various parts of the body.' For this understanding of Jewish psychology, see especially Robinson (1913), (1925), who also observes that there is no word for the body as a whole in Hebrew since it is not consciously contrasted with a psychic totality—just as, we should add, there is not one in Homer either (there *σῶμα* only refers to the corpse), nor for that manner in many traditional cultures. Note also Leenhardt (1979) 165, who emphasises the importance of a concept of body as a unified and independent entity in the process of individuating a self. Lee (1950) 539 writes of the Wintu Indians that they use the phrase *kot Wintu*, meaning the whole person, instead of a word for body, and that they similarly do not have a word for the self as an established separate entity. Furthermore, in Jewish thought the various parts of the body, for example the lips, eyes, bowels etc., are also endowed with consciousness and take psychological predicates (see Owen (1956) 176; Johnson (1964) 45–48, 87), just as Snell and Onians argue that Homeric man as a psycho-physical fusion is divided into different psychic organs. Cf. Read (1955) 265 of the psychology of the Gahuku-Gama: 'To an extent to which it is perhaps difficult to understand, the various parts of the body, limbs, eyes, nose, hair, the internal organs and bodily excretions are essential constituents of the human personality'.

harmony with Homeric idiom in avoiding subjective predications of the personal pronouns, favouring instead the relative externalisation of thought to personified agents:

nu kunidetak 'away 'adun 'enu'nu nitu rinawak, 'empēpedeg dēken ma rinawak 'away nemnementun bēkir—when I am lazy, discouraged, there is little movement in my heart, my heart just stays with me and thinks of nothing else.¹⁰

If anything, the drift of Ilongot psychology goes further in its concrete externalisation of thought and its use of talking organs than Snell ever claimed for Homer, so that we should be armed against appeals to putatively counter-intuitive bizarreness. Since these and other expressions of a dividual self are everyday, cross-cultural parallels undermine the dismissal of comparable psychological representations in Homer as artificial figures of speech, poetic products of the conventions of the epic genre and metrical demands.¹¹

In sum, what I retain of Snell is that how we theorise and talk about the reality of our internal subjective experience, as opposed to the reality of the world “out there”, is more than just a manner of speaking and contributes substantively to the construction of this reality. As I outline further below and argue in Chapter 2, psychological representations in Homer steer clear of reflexive characterisation and avoid essentialising the person as a unitary soul, and this an important difference between Homeric and later ideas of personhood.

2. *Pronouns Constructing Identity*

It may at first seem farfetched to propose that reflexive pronouns, or pronouns more generally, may encode culturally specific notions. That the various lexicons of the world's languages divide the world into different

¹⁰ Rosaldo (1980) 246, s.v. *kidēt*. See also p. 245, s.v. *kalikal* for an example of direct speech attributed to the heart in quotidian fashion. Cf. also similar ascriptions of psychological activity to the heart by the Dinka (Lienhardt (1985) 149).

¹¹ Apropos the latter, cf. Jahn (1987), who treats the different psychic organs and their phrases as useful metrical alternatives for the same idea. One must carefully observe that metrical felicity does not determine semantic/idiomatic felicity, meaning that listeners will not accept a strange psychological expression simply because it satisfies metre. Though in time metre may well have facilitated the production of synonymy between the terms, their provenance must ultimately have been outside the epic language.

semantic spectra is obvious, but this phenomenon, following Chomsky's well-known separation of syntax and semantics, is usually seen as confined to the more obviously denotative areas of the lexicon—words for things, ideas, etc., and their combination into various complexes. But for the more purely syntactic features, such as word-order and pronominal indexing, the possibility of culturally-specific encoding is usually underplayed, or rejected outright.¹² The various sets of syntactic features just represent so many arbitrary ways of skinning the grammatical cat. However, while it is far more plausible that a parameter such as grammaticalised word-order is minimally semantic,¹³ pronouns occupy a far more ambiguous position, somewhere between syntax and semantics. We are all aware of the distinction in German and French between formal and informal forms of the second-person pronoun, the so-called T-V distinction. One can argue over whether this means that such a distinction is any more important for German and French society than for one which does not employ such a distinction, but in other cases the cultural connection is far clearer. The best examples are the pronominal systems of various Australian indigenous languages which encode complex kinship relations, the bedrock of their cultural social life.¹⁴

But since we are concerned with *reflexive* pronouns, before jumping straight to the possibility of culturally-specific semantic variation, it must first be shown that they have any semantic content at all beyond simply marking for syntactic coreference. Here we may follow the lead of Lakoff who, drawing on the work of two of his undergraduates, has analysed the rich array of conceptual models that different reflexive constructions

¹² However, as Evans (2003) 37 points out, Chomsky's view seems to have softened of late.

¹³ Though even here, the fact that in non-configurational languages the word order is heavily influenced by semantically motivated hyperbaton, and that some such languages fixed their word-order over time, leaves open the possibility that what began as a favoured type of hyperbaton (for whatever semantic reasons), eventually formalised as the default word-order. Though the particular formalised word-order may lose these semantic features as it conventionalises (the 'semantic bleaching' that usually accompanies grammaticalisation), it is quite possible that they were an initial factor in its production.

¹⁴ For the encoding of kinship relations in grammar, sometimes called 'kintax', see Hale (1966) and Evans (2003); for the importance of pronouns in constructing personal identity, and cultural variation thereof, see Muhlhausler and Harré (1990), and also Lee (1950). Note also Kashima and Kashima (1998), who demonstrate a correlation between pronoun drop (the ability for a language to omit pronominal subjects) and lower levels of cultural individualism. When omitted, the subject's self is not the focus of conceptual attention; rather, it is deemphasised and merges with its context.

employ.¹⁵ Towards the end of his paper he compares the sentences ‘I found myself in writing’ and ‘I lost myself in writing’. He writes:

Although in surface form these sentences differ minimally in the choice of the verbs “lose” versus “find”, they are understood in utterly different ways—in terms of different models of the Person. The first sentence uses the Loss-of-Self model, while the second uses the First True-Self Model. This difference in models of the Person also has a reflection in syntax. Compare the following sentences.

He found his true self in writing.

He lost his true self in writing.

The first is a paraphrase of the corresponding sentence above, while the second is ill-formed, since “true self” requires a True-Self model, while “lose,” which can occur with a Loss-of-Self model, cannot occur with a True-Self model. The conclusion: Reflexives are not necessarily instances of co-reference with an antecedent; reflexives and their antecedents may refer to two different aspects of the same person. Thus, grammars must not only make reference to a split of the Person into Subject plus Self, but must also refer to different metaphorical models of the Person.¹⁶

As Lakoff observes, the two sentences are syntactically identical reflexive constructions. Yet the reference of the reflexive in each case is radically different, and in combination with its governing verb calls upon a specific conceptual model of self-relation. The first reflexive may be glossed as a true self, spiritually satisfied and convinced of life’s meaning, but one which is easily alienated by the demands of a dissatisfying job, indifferent friends etc., while the second refers to a self that is involved in the worldly concerns and everyday maintenance of an interactive life. These are not the only two possible models, and Lakoff’s paper does a good job of setting out the semantic diversity of types of self relation. Here, for example, are two others:

Wash yourself!

Control yourself!

The first reflexive in this instance indexes a bodily self. One certainly is not washing a true self or a socially-involved self! By contrast, the second refers to a psychological agency, whether expressed in a set of behaviours, desires, or thoughts, that is to some degree at odds with the subject, but which may be brought under its dominion.

¹⁵ Lakoff (1992).

¹⁶ Ibid.

Now returning to the original question of cultural specificity, not all languages use their reflexive pronouns, or their functional equivalent, in each of these senses and within the corresponding model of a particular subject-self relation. Homeric Greek does not use the reflexive in psychological models at all, and Greek more generally does not make extensive use of the true-self model. It has no natural reflexive equivalent, for instance, of 'he found himself in writing', a phrase which is perfectly ordinary and transparent in English.¹⁷ One might offer 'He found happiness in writing' or some such paraphrase where the reflexive is substituted by a term denoting contentment—but while we get the picture, the meaning is in a subtle way quite different. The Greek in no way presupposes the existence of some metaphysical true self whose realisation will bring fulfilment.¹⁸ Nor could one find a Greek equivalent for the expression of the same idea with a different sort of reflexive construction, 'He is only himself when writing'. There are in Greek similar expressions such as 'he is not himself', but these apply to extraordinary states of madness. It is bizarre to say the least for the Greek not to be himself because he is dissatisfied by his job, say, or the lack of a fulfilling hobby, as though Greek society could so easily fail in providing one with a proper sense of being. These expressions in English mark a typically modern project, the quest for individual authenticity in a society where it is up to the individual to find meaning for herself through a process of self-fashioning.¹⁹

¹⁷ The individualised true-self model is particularly productive in English, e.g. 'I need to get in touch with myself', 'She has finally woken up to herself', etc. On the other hand, the Greek finds ample meaning in his absorption into a complex system of other-relations, including those of kin, religion, and social duty. There is not a single example in extant Greek literature of someone attributing unhappiness to a failure 'to get in touch with oneself'. Lack of wealth, human ignorance, the gods, the injustice of others, failure to act morally oneself, even the poor condition of one's soul—all the usual scapegoats are sufficient targets for blame without needing to postulate a metaphysical being such as an authentic self over and above them.

¹⁸ Indeed the phrase *true self* does not have a convenient, direct translation in Greek. ἀληθὴς ψυχή is utterly without precedent. This is because ψυχή may refer to the true essence of the human being understood *generically* but not to some personalised self that may only be realised by the individual herself. Moreover, since it always retains its original sense as the principle of animate life and, after Homer, of psychic experience—connotations absent in the case of *self*—the sort of alienation from one's self required for such English expressions as 'she is not her usual self' is impossible in the case of ψυχή—it would absurdly entail unconsciousness or even death. The abstraction of individualised models of the person from any life force allows moderns to enter into various complex relationships with self without this affecting their vitality.

¹⁹ Cf. Gill (1996) 109–113, 125–129, 446 on the radically subjective interpretation of expressions like 'be yourself' and 'be true to yourself'.

There are, however, other models of subject-self relation that do become popular in Greece, especially among intellectual circles. One would be the notion of self-control, which gives rise to related ideas such as 'conquering oneself'. This model presupposes an unruly, intemperate self, which may bring social shame as well as destroy the equanimity required for psychic happiness. Another is the Delphic prescription to 'know yourself'. While a modern reading of this advice might naturally interpret 'yourself' as 'your true self', this is not the original sense of the reflexive in this context. It refers, rather, to a self enmeshed in a set of social relations (including relations to gods). What one is being exhorted to know is one's proper place relative to others, whether in respect of knowledge, wealth, birth, beauty etc.²⁰ Both these relations require a disjunction between the subject and the reflexive. The dictum 'know yourself' only makes sense on the assumption there is an aspect of myself that is not completely transparent to me and which one must work at to comprehend fully, while the split in the case of 'conquering oneself' is self-evident.

Neither of these subject-self relationships is present in Homer as a reflexive construction. On the rare occasion that Homer does use a reflexive, its reference is either the person as a vaguely defined whole, just as the personal pronouns in ordinary usage, or more particularly the outward and bodily self. It never refers to some predominantly psychological aspect of the person, let alone a metaphysical being like a 'true self'. As the point has often been made, a Greek hero does not talk to himself but to his θυμός. Neither, it can also be said, is thinking located in himself as a kind of psychological container. Homer does have available to him a number of ways of representing the types of relation above, but they do not use reflexive constructions and the semantics are subtly but critically different. He might use, for example, one of the various nouns that stand for aspects of the psyche, the so-called psychic organs, in place of the reflexive. He might say 'control your θυμός' instead of 'control yourself', where θυμός stands for overly passionate inclinations; or 'he said to his θυμός' instead of 'he said to himself', where θυμός refers to a psychic conversational partner. Is θυμός, then, just the Homeric Greek

²⁰ See Wilkins (1917), discussed further below. Note that Plato seeks to reinterpret the reflexive more along the lines of a 'true self'. He analyses knowing yourself as knowing your soul, a move which was possibly anticipated by Heraclitus. This is an historical development within Greece itself, and evidence that the reflexive has taken on new referential possibilities as the concept of the person has changed.

equivalent of self? Despite some degree of semantic overlap, θυμός is not possible in other contexts where the reflexive is, or at least would have a different meaning.²¹ For instance, to say in Greek ‘Know your θυμός’ would naturally mean to know your desires, perhaps similar to English ‘Know your heart’—though the latter would normally refer to a deep, almost spiritual desire that has been concealed and waylaid by other superficial and distracting desires, whereas I doubt that for the Homeric Greek θυμός would ever refer to something so opaque. But above all, as Havelock notes,²² when one compares the representation of self-dialogue in the Homeric expression θυμός ἄνωγέ με with the later Herodotean φροντίσας πρὸς ἑωυτόν, one sees that the former leaves the subject and object conceptually distinct as two relatively independent beings, while the latter attempts to identify and integrate the subject and object by deploying the reflexive.

Perhaps another of the organs will substitute adequately for the reflexive here. But these face the same problem as θυμός in that they would most naturally refer to a particular aspect of the person rather than the person *per se*. For example, ‘Know your φρένες or νοῦς’ might mean ‘Know your mind’s content’, ‘Be clear about what you think’, or, if the function of these organs is meant, ‘Learn to exercise shrewd thought’. These substitutions become even more impossible if we attempt to construe them in the original sense of the dictum and make them pick out the person as a node of social relations. None of them could refer to the person in this capacity—they are all far too partial and psychological. But the reflexive pronoun is perfectly suited to this role because it is just that, a pronoun, whose reference can easily take on the open-ended totality that constitutes the human agent.

There is another way one can go about demonstrating the difference between the reflexive pronoun and the psychic organs, and which also turns on the pronominal nature of the former. The reflexive pronoun exhibits an unparalleled polysemy, so that it can stand in a given context for just about any aspect of the person, whether it be *qua* part or whole. It can refer, for example, to my bodily self, as in the expression

²¹ It is also capable of hypostatisation as a *particular* emotion or inclination, as in ‘another θυμός held me back’ (*Od.* 9.302), where words such as self or soul are not. According to Macdonald (2005) 225, following Vygotsky, this ability characterises complexes rather than concepts, which often merge with the particular concrete elements that compose it, while concepts maintain themselves as abstract entities apart from the concrete experience in which they are embedded. See further pp. 212–213 below.

²² Havelock (1972) 9, n. 23.

'I washed myself', where a substitution like θυμός would produce nonsense. This polysemy, by which it may pick out virtually any mode of human existence, yields almost unbounded interpretative possibilities. It is why a dictum such as 'Know yourself' can and was taken in a variety of ways, where 'yourself' may refer, for example, to a point defined by a field of social relations, within which one should know one's place, or, via Platonic reinterpretation, to the soul as the essential form of the human being. Indeed the reflexive pronoun is so protean that it may even appear to shift its reference within the space of a single thought. We find, for instance, a fragment of Antiphon referring to 'conquering oneself' and then directly after to 'blockading oneself against desires'. In the first idea the self invoked is one to be victorious over, while in the second it is one whose victory is to be ensured by protecting it. In crude terms, the former is the person in his objectionable, the latter in his commendable aspect.

The reflexive's polysemy may also exhibit a developmental dimension, meaning that the default interpretation, or possible interpretations, given to a reflexive construction may change over time. As ideas of what constitutes a person change, indexicals such as the reflexive pronoun will change their reference. For example, interpretation of 'Know yourself' as 'Know your soul' owes to the idea, prominent in Plato's *1 Alcibiades*, that equates a person with her soul. This is, largely, a historically innovative interpretation of the dictum that reflects the endeavour of intellectuals to essentialise the notion of the person. Without a historical context, most moderns (as I first did) would probably interpret the reflexive's reference as some version of a true self, which must be known and discovered if one is to lead an authentic and deeply satisfying existence. The dictum speaks to us according to our own preconceptions of what most fundamentally constitutes the person, preconceptions which are influenced by our particular intellectual and cultural history.

I have suggested that what these different interpretations of the reflexive share, however, as opposed to a substituted psychic organ, is that they may stand for the open-ended totality that constitutes the human subject. This contributes to the mystery of expressions such as the Delphic dictum because it means that somehow, more than one or two parts being unknown, an entire unity of personhood has somehow been ignored. What one is seeking to know is thus one's identity as a whole. This is a radical task, because it assumes that for some reason or other the whole of what one is has escaped notice. To emphasise, one could transform it into an indirect question as follows:

γνῶθι σαυτὸν → γνῶθι σαυτὸν ὅστις αὐτὸς εἶ.

“Know yourself” → “Know yourself, who you yourself are.”

We may compare a construction with θυμός, which could not stand for the identity of the person as a whole but is moved away from the personal subject to the third person:

γνῶθι θυμόν → γνῶθι θυμόν ὅστις ἐστί.

“Know your *thumos*” → “Know your *thumos*, what it is.”

We see similar semantic effects in other uses. In the call to ‘Conquer yourself’, for example, it is not just a particular unruly part of oneself or desires *per se* that are to be conquered but rather an entire version and instantiation of the subject that is in the habit of indulging them. The reflexive has the flexibility to refer to a particular form of the subject and not one of its states, properties, parts etc. Of course, this is precisely because the reflexive is a pronoun that indexes the subject. Here we hit on an important difference between the psychic organs and the reflexive which enables one to see the significance of a shift from the use of the former to the latter. Namely, in moving to the latter what is being reflexively engaged, and called into question, is the subject as a whole rather than a restricted part thereof. This is a reflexivity that is far more radical, striking at the foundations of what it is to be a subject. At the same time, because of the conceptual separation between the reflexive and its antecedent generated by the PRS, the divisions within the subject become more profound and problematic. For what we now have is not the hairline fracture of a subject differing from some aspect of its psyche, as in the case of ‘I’ in contrast with my θυμός, but the chasm of a subject differing from another subject, ‘I’ from ‘myself’, though each of these may substitute for the other with a greater degree of completeness.

3. Grammaticalisation

It is one thing to argue that psychological uses of the reflexive differ semantically from similar uses of psychic organs. But I am claiming further that these uses influence a change in the reflexive system itself, namely the formation of the heavily marked complex reflexive. How then does one get a cultural phenomenon, in our case a certain construction of self, into a grammatical phenomenon, the emergence of the complex reflexive? I propose a functionalist account of grammaticalisation, that

grammars code best what speakers do most.²³ As Evans argues, the functionalist approach of repeated patterns of use ritualising as grammar

can be as readily adapted to culture-specific patterns as to those patterns that are universal. In cultures that talk frequently about kinship, for example, kin-based categories could be structured into the core grammar, as brute frequency of token appearance leads to phonetic erosion through Zipfian effects, resulting in the reduction of free words to grammatical morphemes.²⁴

Just as highly developed kinship grammars emerged in Indigenous Australian languages as a cumulative result of the individual speech acts of persons embedded in a social structure of kinship organisation,²⁵ it is our argument that a heavily marked reflexive syntax emerged in the course of Greek social development because individuals frequently referred to the various reflexive categories promoted by their society. The marked pronominal system therefore developed as a way of efficiently encoding the semantic properties of such categories. The innovative reflexivisation of other-directed relations necessitates the addition of αὐτός as a heavy reflexive marker. A 'phonetic erosion' brought about by Zipfian effects eventually reduces the combination of pronoun and intensifier into a single reflexive form.

Admittedly, that part of this thesis which connects the use of reflexivity to the formalisation of the PRS will be met by the card-carrying generativist with incomprehension at best, and at worst, outrage.²⁶ The generativist-functionalist divide is as entrenched and polarised a division as has ever cleaved an academic field, and for the most part each party ignores the other. If I cannot consider the arguments of both sides without entering an interminable and perhaps irresolvable battleground that would more than exhaust this monograph, I can do little more than place myself in the functionalist camp and refer the reader to the wider debate.²⁷

²³ This statement is in many ways the motto of the functionalist school, coined by Du Bois (1985) 363 but incorporated by functionalists more generally. For the influential functionalist idea of the 'emergence' of structured forms of mental representation that are constantly adapting themselves to usage, see Hopper (1987), (1988), (1998). Important works in the functionalist school include Bybee (1985), Comrie (1989), Croft (1990), Givón (1995), Hopper and Thompson (1980), and Haspelmath (1999).

²⁴ Evans (2003) 16.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Cf. n. 45 for a weaker and potentially more palatable formulation of my argument.

²⁷ Newmeyer (1998) is a rare Chomskyan who attempts to bridge the divide, but only admits a relatively weak form of functionalism. See Haspelmath (2000) for a lengthy

Evans also proposes another way in which culture-specific meanings can grammaticalise, the process known as semanticisation. Given that a sign's meaning is enriched by contextual inferences, if these inferences become frequent enough they may be absorbed into the sign as a context-free lexical meaning. Connotations a word previously carried only in a given context are then carried inherently regardless of context. Applied to our study, semanticisation occurs in the increasing use of certain models of self-relation, which will in time shape the denotation of the reflexive, and especially in the nominalisation of *αὐτός* from reflexive contexts. Likewise, the idea of self in English has acquired some of its semantic force from the many constructions in which the reflexive must refer to a personalised true self.²⁸

4. *Semantic Motivation in the Shift to Heavy Pronominal Reflexivity*

As stated above, the functionalist hypothesis is only plausible if the PRS is sensitive to semantic motivation. Linguists have argued that the heavy marking of complex reflexives flags that the pragmatic expectation of a non-reflexive argument has been violated.²⁹ The expectation is a semantic property of the governing verb: if a verb prototypically takes a disjoint object, or in other words is other-directed (OD), then a coreferring object runs counter to expectation and hence requires additional marking; conversely, for a prototypically self-directed (SD) verb, a simple pronoun will do as coreference is already expected. This principal is neatly illustrated in the case of Standard Dutch, where the simple reflexive *zich* and the complex reflexive *zichzelf* are in more or less complementary

functionalist review. Every functionalist admits that there exists *some* arbitrariness in syntax, and that syntax is to a degree autonomous (cf. Newmeyer (1998) 23–28), but typically claims that regularities of semantically motivated language use can in some cases lead to regularities in grammatical structure.

²⁸ Note for instance the possibility of the reflexive's decomposition in certain self-models, e.g. 'I need to get in touch with myself/my musical self'. In fact in the case of the reflexive system grammaticalisation and semanticisation likely interact. The reflexive never becomes a purely grammatical element that has lost almost all its content; it remains semantically affluent, as this study will show. Cf. Safir (1996), who shows that the semantic content of reflexives affects their use. The reflexive's ambivalence as a grammatical and semantic constituent is one obstacle to an excessively generativist treatment of it.

²⁹ Sinar (2006) 94–98 provides a good summary of the argument with references to previous scholarship. The Dutch example is hers.

distribution between SD verbs and OD verbs; in verbs which are ambivalent between the two (neutral-directed or ND), both are possible:

- a. Max_i gedraagt zich_i/*zichzelf_i (SD verb)
Max behaves himself.
- b. Max_i haat *zich_i/zichzelf_i (OD verb)
Max hates himself.
- c. Max_i wast zich_i/zichzelf_i (ND verb)
Max washes himself.

Sinar shows that as with Dutch and other languages, in English the complex reflexive is a grammaticalisation of pronoun plus the intensive adjective *self*.³⁰ The intensifier *self* is used to force a coreferential reading where it is not expected. The semantics of *self* as an intensifier are primarily those of focus. It contrasts the intensified element with an implicit set of alternatives in respect of some particular value or context relative to which it is central and the alternatives peripheral. For an OD verb, a coreferential object is more significant than other peripheral disjoint objects. For an SD verb, there is no set of alternative others so a contrastive intensifier is not called for. A large amount of variation between different languages' approaches to reflexivisation will thus consist in the pragmatic expectations that must somehow be encoded in nodal connection with each verb in the lexicon.

These expectations will be to some extent socially constructed, as Sinar speculates.³¹ The question is why speakers start using OD verbs with unexpected coreferential objects with enough frequency for the *x-self* form to eventually grammaticalise. One infers that they are reflexivising ideas that have not been reflexivised before, or only infrequently. This is a move towards subject-centrism, as in reflexivisation the subject claims for itself and its own instantiation roles that originally belonged to a *bona fide* other. It effectively 'colonises' these roles. In the broadest terms, this innovative reflexivity is thus another expression of the individual as it comes to differentiate itself in a new cultural context where various kinds of self-relation have become vital.

³⁰ Ibid. For a briefer survey, see König and Siemund (2000) 44ff.

³¹ Sinar (2006) 97: 'A system along these lines makes several predictions. Firstly, it predicts that in a society where shaving and washing are always performed by others it would not be possible to say *He shaved*, since the verb would require further encoding to mark that the intended interpretation was contrary to expectations. In such a society, *shave* would belong to the class of OD-verbs'.

The complex reflexive's development in Greek interacts with an alternative system of reflexivity, the middle voice, which is not present in Dutch but may function as a light form of marking. Above all, the semantic feature of middle morphology is affectedness. It denotes that a subject/agent is affected in or by the process of an event rather than the effect of an action being confined and limited to another external entity. The notion of affectedness can include such reflexive notions as the following:³²

- Motion, emotion and cognition: e.g. κλίν-ε-σθαι 'lean', πορεύ-ε-σθαι 'march', ἡδ-ε-σθαι 'rejoice', οἶ-ε-σθαι 'think'.
- Inherent reciprocals: e.g. ἀγωνίζ-ε-σθαι 'compete', φιλεῖ-σθαι 'kiss'.
- Inherent self-directed action: e.g. λού-ε-σθαι 'wash', κοσμεῖ-σθαι 'adorn oneself'.
- Goal in the sphere of the subject, as either part of her body or when it is owned by her: e.g. λού-ε-σθαι τὰς χεῖρας 'wash one's hands', περιβάλλ-ε-σθαι φάρος 'put on a cloak'.
- Indirect reflexive. The agent is the beneficiary of the action: παρασκευάζ-ε-σθαι ναῦν 'prepare a ship for oneself' vs. παρασκευάζειν ναῦν 'prepare a ship', ποιεῖ-σθαι εἰρήνην 'make peace' (with one's enemy) vs. ποιεῖν εἰρήνην 'bring peace' (to others).

In the terminology of Suzanne Kemmer, Greek exhibits a two-form non-cognate system in the way it expresses middle and reflexive events.³³ These two forms are the middle verbal endings and the reflexive pronouns respectively. Though they are morphologically distinct, there sometimes seems to be overlap in the events they represent. That is, in certain cases roughly the same event can be expressed using a reflexive pronoun with a transitive verb, or an intransitive middle: ἔγειρω ἐμαυτόν 'I raise myself', ἐγείρομαι 'I arise'. As discussed above, where two or more strategies of reflexivisation coexist, there are predictable semantic rules determining which system takes on which events. Generally put, the rule is that the more heavily marked system (in the Greek the reflexive pronoun) takes on those events which are not expected to be reflexive, whereas the light system (in the Greek the middle voice) takes on those which are.³⁴ Since people do not, as a general socio-cultural rule, kill

³² The following is excerpted from Bakker (1994).

³³ Kemmer (1994).

³⁴ This rule is in turn derivable from the general law that heavier morphological

themselves, then Greek will say κτείνω ἑμαυτόν rather than *κτείνομαι.³⁵ On the other hand, since grooming and motion are often self-directed, Greek will often use the middle for these events: λούομαι 'I wash', ἀλείφομαι 'I anoint myself', τρέπομαι 'I turn'.

Moreover, where the same event can be represented either by a middle marker or a reflexive marker, Kemmer shows that there is a subtle but important semantic distinction.³⁶ Compare the following examples from Russian, a language which like Greek is also a two-form system and exhibits a verbal/pronominal distinction between middle and reflexive markers:³⁷

Ja každyj den' moju+sja
I every day wash+MM
'I wash every day'

Ja myl sebja
I washed self
'I washed myself' (not someone else)

Citing the work of Haiman, she writes that the heavy form is used in the second case 'because there the object is being treated in parallel fashion to some other potential object in the discourse which is completely distinct from the subject.' Thus the heavy form adds contrastive emphasis to the second example: *myself* and not some other potential entity. From her own study of Haiman's contrast of heavy- and light-marked situations, Kemmer infers a general law from which the various semantic differences between these situations flow:

[Heavy-marked situations involve] in one way or another a **conceptual separation** in the mind of the speaker between the acting and acted-on participants, a separation which is not part of the meaning of the light-form cases. Such a conceptual separation arises in association with grooming and change in body posture actions only under certain specific semantic/pragmatic conditions, as for example when another actual or potential object is being contrasted with the object, or when two potentially

material (in length or accent) is more informative; something is informative only if it is not expected.

³⁵ This is also the reason why, cross-linguistically, we do not find forms such as *κτείνομαι 'I kill myself', *ὁράται 'I see myself', *μισοῦμαι 'I hate myself' as deponents. In the case of Greek a further fact results: where these forms do exist alongside a present form, they cannot be interpreted reflexively and so are interpreted passively.

³⁶ See further Kemmer (1994) 202–209. Kemmer's examples ultimately derive from Haiman (1983).

³⁷ But unlike Greek its two markers are cognates: *-sja, sebja*.

separable aspects of a human Agent, the physical and the mental, are in opposition to each other. The light forms appear where there is no special reason to make such a distinction between initiating and affected entities. In the latter case, the nominal referent in the event is treated as a single holistic entity.³⁸

The conceptual separation arises precisely because the heavy-marked situation keeps an underlying transitive structure, and with it this structure's prototypical semantic properties. Among these features the differentiation of subject and object.³⁹ Particularly intriguing is Kemmer's point that this separation may take place within the agent itself and so create various shades of a physical/mental dualism. Compare the following:

He got up.
He lifted himself up.

He grew weary.
He exhausted himself.

Though English lacks middle markers, it can often reproduce the distinction between heavy and light-marked situations by contrasting intransitive and transitive constructions. The transitive reflexive sentence in both these pairs creates a division within the subject between mind and body. As Kemmer notes, in the first example the reflexive form 'implies a physical barrier between the person intending to carry out the action and the body on which it is carried out'.⁴⁰ It might be said, for instance, of someone who is handicapped or physically exhausted and whose condition requires a mind-over-matter attitude. In the second example, the dualism takes a similar but slightly different form. The reflexive sentence is more volitional and purposeful: the subject is an agent who has deliberately pushed himself and his body to its limits. In the intransitive

³⁸ Kemmer (1994) 206. It should be said that the great Indo-Europeanist Delbrück (1888) 262 f. seemed to conceive a similar distinction when comparing the semantic difference of active and middle construction with *ātman*-, stating that the active diathesis is used 'wenn die Gegenüberstellung von Subject und Object besonders deutlich empfunden wird, also *ātmānam* ganz so wie ein anderes Object behandelt wird'. Kulikov (2007) 1423 identifies the semantic force of the active reflexive construction with the early Vedic collocation of *svā* (/ *svayam*) *tanū*, thus interpreting it as a functional equivalent of the heavy reflexive.

³⁹ For an exploration of the conceptual structure of transitivity, see Hopper and Thompson (1980).

⁴⁰ Kemmer (1994) 205.

sentence, on the other hand, the subject grows weary as a unit, in unison with her body. When it grows weary she does not take charge of it and drive it further. The semantic difference also entails a typological constraint on the encoding of some of Lakoff's self-models. In other words, if you put a middle-reflexive ending on a verb meaning 'to find', it will never mean 'to find one's true self', because this event requires a conceptual separation of subject and object.

The fact of a semantic difference between middle and pronominal reflexivity, or light and heavy-marked reflexivity, is of considerable import if it is remembered that in early Greek the pronominal system is only just getting underway, but is radically extended in the Classical age. Since the particular semantic force of the pronominal reflexive construction derives from the unexpected reflexive application of the transitive structure, the growth of this system contributes to the same interpellation and marking of a category of increased transitivity (and its associated semantic features, especially volitional agency) that is also marked by the σ -aorist, κ -perfect, and inversely, by the η - and θ -passive.⁴¹ Apropos the PRS, this particular semantic feature suggests the conclusion that the *Greeks themselves are, by expanding their use of the pronominal reflexive, exploring new concepts of unexpected, emphatic reflexivity that also, in certain contexts, generate complex models of self-relation and express a subject marked by increased reflexive agency*. The development of the pronominal reflexive system and its use of transitivity thus help create, together with the other developing verbal derivations, a category of the *wilful* subject.⁴² This links us with Vernant's exposition of the cultural correlates of the linguistic encoding of what he calls the category of the will:

⁴¹ For the σ -aorist and κ -perfect (cf. $\delta\lambda\omega\lambda\alpha/\delta\lambda\omega\lambda\epsilon\kappa\alpha$, $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\iota\theta\alpha/\pi\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\iota\kappa\alpha$ etc.) as transitivising suffixes that developed late in the language, see Drinka (1995) and Chantraine (1927) 47–70 respectively. The use of suffixes $-\eta$ - and $-\theta$ - to mark passivity (which originally marked simple intransitivity) are also relatively late innovations; their development naturally complements the development of the σ -aorist and κ -perfect as their inverse, since all passive constructions imply an agent.

⁴² Note especially Seel (1953) 307, who, quoting Snell (1952) 107, ensconces the development of transitive reflexivity within the verbal system's wider trend towards the construction of events as the issuance of a highly active subject: 'ähnlich die Entwicklung von $\eta\delta\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ zu $\eta\delta\omega$ und weiter zu unserem „ich freue mich“, so daß die—in diesem Betracht einheitlichen—modernen europäischen Sprachen die begleitenden „Gemütsbewegungen nicht als eine Art von innerer Wallung oder von innerem Wellenschlag bezeichnen, sondern als eine Tätigkeit des Menschen auf sich hin“. With this shift emotional states are not conceived as an affective wave that envelops the subject, but rather as the outcome of the subject's exercise of its agency upon itself.

What we see, ... through language, the evolution of law, the creation of a vocabulary of the will, is precisely the idea of the human subject as agent, the source of actions, creating them, assuming them, carrying responsibility for them.⁴³

One aspect of the human subject as agent, the source of actions, is the human subject as a source of action onto itself. Comparatively, it has been argued for Latin that Seneca's introduction of the reflexive as an argument of verbs which are classically intransitive engenders new ways of thinking about the subject's relation to himself.⁴⁴ I will be investigating the cultural and conceptual changes that accompany the development of reflexive arguments in Greek. On the one hand we consider the various semantic uses the pronominal reflexive is put to as it develops, on the other we sketch the cultural practices that sponsor such expressions.⁴⁵

5. *The Transcendental Self Generated by Pronominal Reflexivity*

Of course, one may again question whether there is a semantic distinction between 'He cheered his heart up' and 'He cheered himself up'. If not, it could be argued, constructions such as the latter do not indicate a reconceptualisation of the self but simply paraphrase the same event. Let me restate the following. The reflexive pronoun and independent nouns denoting psychic agents have come to their positions in the lexicon in different ways, and each has been semantically affected by its particular history. The reflexive pronoun is, to a degree at least, not in the same syntactic category as a word like *heart*. It cannot be the subject of a sentence. It is in origin a product of two already highly grammaticalised

⁴³ From the discussion of a paper by Roland Barthes (1970) 152.

⁴⁴ Setaioli (2007) 340, building on work by Traina, Foucault, and Lotito. An example is *acquiescit sibi*, where the reflexive 'expresse[s] both the active and the passive role of the human subject in its relationship with itself.

⁴⁵ Lehmann (1992) 143 seeks to explain the move from middle to pronominal reflexive markers within some languages (e.g. Semitic) in the context of a broader shift from VSO to SVO syntactic order, the latter requiring that reflexive objects pattern with other objects such as nouns and pronouns. However no similar word order shift is apparent in Greek for the period under study, where another explanation is needed. Even in cases where the primary motor of change is syntactic, nothing rules out there being semantic consequences (e.g. the increased conceptual differentiation of the PRS) which then become available for exploitation. Also, as a noun rather than an affix incorporated into a verbal process, pronominal reflexives may easily take on semantic properties just like other nouns, and in time be understood to denote a certain philosophical concept. A weaker form of my argument therefore claims that there is a causal connection without fixing its direction.

elements, a pronoun and an intensifier. Like the pronoun its reference is relatively undefined and open-ended. It may thus shift its particular meaning according to context, at different times taking on the meaning of 'body', 'true self', or 'subordinate psychic agent'. Furthermore, the agreement of gender and person between the subject and reflexive suggest the operation of an identity function between the two that is not present between the subject and a noun like *heart*. As a result, the statement 'He is himself' claims analytical truth, or truth by virtue of syntax, in a way that 'He is his heart' does not and cannot.

But if an identity function is supposed to hold between the subject and the reflexive pronoun, how can the transitive reflexive event schema create a conceptual separation of the two? It is in fact the very attempt to satisfy both these conflicting conditions, one of identity and another of conceptual separation, that brings forth the reflexive pronoun's peculiar effect. For the contradiction can only be settled logically by splitting the subject into levels, and then claiming identity with the reflexive pronoun on one of these and non-identity on the other.⁴⁶ We then have a process which generates another level of the subject. (On the other hand, since the subject and heart do not enter into so formal an identity relation, no level of the subject is generated beyond that which already exists and in which it is happily different from heart.) This other level of the subject can be linked to that part of it which forever eludes objectification. If on a certain level it cannot equate with the reflexive pronoun, it cannot be fully captured even by self-directed predicates. One has thus arrived via a linguistic route at a Kantian thesis:

⁴⁶ The classicists Snell (1930) and Seel (1953) 302, 313 have stressed the splitting and layering of the subject (*Spaltung und Schichtung*) caused by reflexive relation apropos conscience as τὸ ἐαυτῷ συνειδέναι. The phenomenon is explored abstractly and in depth by Sartre (1943) 77: '[T]he subject can not *be* self, for coincidence with self, as we have seen, causes the self to disappear. But neither can it *not be* itself since the self is an indication of the subject himself. The *self* therefore represents an ideal distance within the immanence of the subject in relation to himself, a way of *not being his own coincidence*, of escaping identity while positing it as a unity—in short, of being in a perpetually unstable equilibrium between identity as absolute cohesion without a trace of diversity and unity as a synthesis of multiplicity.' Sartre invokes the notion of haunting in order to convey this strange dyad of an absent-presence. Cf. also Hegel (1832) §871, who sees this contradiction of self-differing self-identity in everything: 'a consideration of everything that is, shows that *in its own self* everything is in its self-sameness different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of one of these categories into another, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the opposite of itself.' And finally, Derrida (1981) 29: 'the subject is constituted only in being *divided* from itself'.

It is ... very evident that I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose to know any object ...⁴⁷

What then of the maxim 'know thyself'? If in the statement 'I know myself' there is a necessary conceptual separation between 'I' and 'myself', the myself which is known can never reach identity with the 'I' which knows, hence leaving the function of knowing incomplete. The 'myself' is only identical with the 'I' insofar as the subject is objectifiable—or, to put it in different terms, a patient. Indeed if one substitutes the terms acting and acted-on in Kemmer's formulation of the transitive reflexive event's conceptual separation, for determining and determined, a further point of Kant's appears derivable:

Not the consciousness of the determining, but only that of the determinable self, that is, of my internal intuition (in so far as the manifold contained in it can be connected conformably with the general condition of the unity of apperception in thought), is the object.⁴⁸

The determining self is 'I' *qua* 'the determining subject of that relation which constitutes a judgement', as for example of knowing. This 'I' occupies an extremely privileged position in Kant's system. It is a transcendental category, in fact the ultimate transcendental category,⁴⁹ and as such is the condition of the possibility of knowledge and experience. With it also goes the state of self-consciousness, but this is not, importantly, consciousness of itself as an object:

In attaching 'I' to our thoughts, we designate the subject only transcendently ... without noting in it any quality whatsoever—in fact, without knowing anything of it either directly or by inference.⁵⁰

In this act of attachment, Kant argues, we demonstrate a self-consciousness that does not consist in noting certain descriptive properties that

⁴⁷ Kant (1787b) A402. This argument is taken over by others following Kant, e.g. Schopenhauer (1844) vol. 2, 287: 'That which precedes knowledge as its condition, whereby that knowledge first of all became possible, and hence its own basis, cannot be immediately grasped by knowledge, just as the eye cannot see itself.'

⁴⁸ Kant (1787a) 241.

⁴⁹ As Rotenstreich (1981) 195 puts it, 'the "I" is ... the form of the form of forms.' We will later see that it is precisely the reiteration of the transitive reflexive scheme that produces recursive reflexive concepts like this.

⁵⁰ Kant (1787b) A355. From the viewpoint of intellectual history, note especially the new interest in the reference of the first person pronoun—which has now become a valuable term of human ontology—as the most fundamental designation of the human subject. *Soul* is still retained, but only to refer to the object of empirical self-consciousness, which is consciousness of what we undergo as we are affected by the play of our own thoughts. It is the self in its determined rather than determining aspect.

may be ascribed to oneself, as one might do when conscious of and identifying any other object. This act of self-consciousness is empty of such identifying descriptions and is a mere transcendental designation.⁵¹ It is given before all else, and in particular before the presentation of any object within one's intuition.

I bring up Kant here because I believe that something very similar to a transcendental category of self is generated through constructions with a reflexive pronoun whose field of sense is psychological. Thus I differ from Kant in proposing that this category is not given as a universal *a priori* condition of experience but is created or constructed by certain types of events, namely reflexive psychological acts.⁵² It is only in these contexts, which form a subset of possible human experiences, that the subject takes on a transcendental character; elsewhere the subject is not transcendental, or at least not to the same degree. This might lead one to suppose that Kant has simply universalised a type of experience particular, in the first instance, to a certain cultural fixation with the self, and in the second, to a certain being within that tradition that practices this vocationally, the philosopher, as the determining subject of thinking. Following Foucault, an exposition of the immanent reflexive practices that sustain the idea of the transcendent ego helps 'put the subject back into the historical domain of practices and processes in which he has been constantly transformed.'⁵³ Yet *qua* reflexive these practices are beholden to a more general reflexive mechanism which, under certain conditions, creates the impression of a transcendental category.

A preliminary sketch of the mechanism that will be put forward here has already been suggested: the transitive construction with a reflexive pronoun generates another level of the subject that cannot be determined in any predicate. This happens as a combined result of the conceptual separation inherent in the transitive structure between actor and acted-upon, and the syntactic need, owing to agreement between the reflexive pronoun and its antecedent, to still keep some relation of identity between the referent of the reflexive pronoun and the referent of

⁵¹ It is empty of them precisely because they are irrelevant to such an attachment. According to Shoemaker (1968) 558, in a statement such as 'I feel pain' the attachment of 'I' is not due to my having identified as myself something of which I know, or believe, or wish to say, that the predicate of my statement applies to it. I am already given to myself *before* the need for any such identification.

⁵² Or more weakly, that reflexivity amplifies interest in it in such a way that it is taken to be the real self.

⁵³ Foucault (1981–1982) 525.

its antecedent. This relation of identity takes place on one level, while another, transcendental level of the subject is brought into being over and above it.⁵⁴

One may take as an example of the sort of reflexive construction which constructs a transcendental subject a famous Heraclitean fragment:

I searched for myself.

Interpreted psychologically, certain facts are immediately apparent. The 'I' is not wholly 'myself', or otherwise it would already have what it is searching for. But 'myself' is also not just any other thing of passing interest to the 'I', but something with which it is to a degree potentially identical and substitutable. Moreover, in addition to the question of the 'myself' which it searches for, we may also question the peculiar nature of an 'I' that goes looking for an authentic version of itself. This 'I' must be a very curious thing indeed, if it is differentiable from some true self. It defies objectification and therefore is the subject proper; where it seeks to be reflexive, the object of its intention is not strictly identical with itself, and it becomes something transcendent over and above this object.⁵⁵ It is, in other words, something very like the subject of modernity. I thus propose that reflexive constructions like that above contribute to the construction of a transcendental subject through the simultaneous operation of the transitive conceptual scheme and the identity function that binds the reflexive to its antecedent.

⁵⁴ A similar idea is also present in Sartre's (1943) ontology, where 'each *for-itself* [i.e. each instantiation of the being of consciousness] is a lack of a certain coincidence with itself' (p. 100), and contrasts with the complete self-identity of *being in-itself*—the being of the objective world—which is not a connection with itself but *is* itself (p. xli). At xxvi–xxxii he examines the structure of what he calls the *positional* mode of consciousness, which posits objects to reflect upon and thus works within the familiar knower-known duality; his use of 'positional' is therefore equivalent to our use of 'transitive'. As Jopling (1986) 77 writes: 'Both Kant and Sartre hold that the fundamental asymmetry between the being of man and his selfhood, (and, derivatively, the self-dirempting and self-distancing characteristic of self-knowledge), are to be explained in terms of a given structural disequilibrium or split at the heart of human being.' However, this division has not to my knowledge been connected to the semantic properties of the PRS. The notion of a subject divided from itself is also prominent in several of Heidegger's concepts, e.g. in his definition of care (*Sorge*) as being-ahead-of-itself, and Dasein's flight from itself as comprehension (*Verstand*).

⁵⁵ If one sought to capture this searching subject, then a new, even more abstract subject would be generated: I searched for the 'I' that searches for itself. This recursion is considered further below.

Kant's argument has an ancient precedent in the Upaniṣads:⁵⁶

You can't see the seer who does the seeing; you can't hear the hearer who does the hearing; you can't think of the thinker who does the thinking; and you can't perceive the perceiver who does the perceiving. (BU 3.5.2)

Yājñavalka's reasoning to get to this point is very important.⁵⁷ 'When, however, the Whole has become one's very self, then who is there for one to smell and by what means?'⁵⁸ If one translates Yājñavalka's argument from the macro- to the microcosm, one sees that this problem only emerges when all acts of thought and perception have been grounded in a unified subject, since only then is there no other psychic agent left over which might perceive this subject. If, however, there was another psychic agent present, it could make any other subject an object of consciousness in its own cognitive act. Figure 1 depicts the difference between these two psychological models:




Figure 1. Society of mind vs. transcendental self.

The birth of the transcendental self is thus accompanied by a conviction that it cannot be an object of consciousness.⁵⁹ It is my claim that we see

⁵⁶ See Ganeri (2007) 27–29, 217–223.

⁵⁷ It is similar to that employed in the West by Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Log.* 1.311–312 Bury) to deny the possibility of mind as a whole apprehending itself. See further pp. 256–257 below.

⁵⁸ BU 2.4.14.

⁵⁹ It is interesting that the reduction of the human being to a unified self accords with

the preliminary stages for the emergence of this kind of self take place in Greece, and that its construction is facilitated by reflexivity.⁶⁰

Our argument here perhaps gains surer footing when accommodated to theoretical terminology developed by Christopher Gill. Gill's methodological approach is comparative and '[combines] the exploration of Greek thinking about selfhood and personality with the re-examination of our own ideas on this subject.'⁶¹ He is thus concerned with theorising the differences between the Greeks' and modernity's view of selfhood. He deploys the distinction between objective-participant and subjective-individualist concepts of self to articulate this difference, arguing that the former best describes the Greek view while the latter has arisen in the development of modernity where it competes with the objective-participant view.⁶² In the concluding section of his study Gill writes:

I have argued in this book that modern thinking contains (at least) two strands of thinking about the person, the objective-participant and the subjective-individualist, whereas Greek thought is pervaded by one conception, the objective-participant ... [I]n so far as my account implies any larger pattern, it is that the combined influence of thinkers such as Descartes and Kant introduced a distinctively new focus on the individual subject or agent as the locus of psychological and ethical life, a focus which ran counter to much earlier Western thought as well as the predominant patterns of thinking in Antiquity.⁶³

Gill enumerates the content of these two conceptions as follows. I have reprinted it verbatim as the scheme proves quite useful:

the reduction of the cosmos to the influence of a single god. Hence a monism of the human subject is homologous to a cosmological monism. For the development of an increasing propensity for monotheism among Greeks, and especially intellectuals, see West (1999). This correlation is one of many instances of a structural homology between the macrocosm and human microcosm, explored further below.

⁶⁰ Note however that while I am claiming that such a subject is an effect of certain forms of self-relation that emerged in Greece, it never became an explicit theme of reflective discourse as it has in modernity—a second-order self-consciousness which led to its intensification—but remained an implicit category.

⁶¹ Gill (1996) 4.

⁶² It does not need to be a question of either-or, but rather the relative weighting of the two approaches (Gill (2008) 39). More particularly, there has in recent times been a resurgence of the objective-participant view within the anti-Kantian milieu of much contemporary thinking on the subject. We may place Gill's study within this trend in so far as it seeks to rescue Greece from an excessively Kantian interpretation.

⁶³ Gill (1996) 466.

The Subjective-Individualist Conception:

1. To be a 'person' is to be conscious of oneself as an 'I', a unified locus of thought and will.
2. To be a 'person' is to be capable of grounding one's moral life by a specially individual stance (for instance, that of 'autonomy', in one of the possible senses of this term). To treat others as 'persons' is to treat them as autonomous in the same sense.
3. To be a 'person' is to be capable of the kind of disinterested moral rationality that involves abstraction from localised interpersonal and communal attachments and from the emotions and desires associated with these.
4. To be a 'person' in the fullest sense, is to exercise one's capacity for autonomy in establishing moral principles for oneself or in realizing one's own (authentic) selfhood. Those capacities, in turn, presuppose a special kind of absolute or 'transcendental' freedom.
5. To be a 'person' is to understand oneself as the possessor of a unique personal identity; this necessarily raises the question of the relationship between having personal identity and being human.

The Objective-Participant Conception:

1. To be a human being (or a rational animal) is to act on the basis of reasons, though these reasons may not be fully available to the consciousness of the agent.
2. To be a human being is to participate in shared forms of human life and 'discourse' about the nature and significance of those shared forms of life. The ethical life of a human being is expressed in whole-hearted engagement with an interpersonal and communal role and in debate about the proper form that role should take. The ultimate outcome of these two types of participation is both (a) objective knowledge of what constitutes the best human life and (b) a corresponding character and way of life.
3. To be human is to be the kind of animal whose psycho-ethical life (typically conceived as 'dialogue' between parts of the psyche) is capable, in principle, of being shaped so as to become fully 'reason-ruled' by (a) the action-guiding discourse of interpersonal and communal engagement and (b) reflective debate about the proper goals of a human life.
4. To be human is to be capable, in principle again, of becoming fully 'reason-ruled'. But the extent to which any given human being is able to develop in this way depends on the extent to which she is able to participate effectively in these types of interactive and reflective discourse.
5. To be human is to understand oneself as, at the deepest level, a human being. The fullest possible development of human rationality involves reflective understanding of what 'being human' means, and how this relates to participation in other kinds of being, such as being animal and divine.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Ibid., 11–12.

Gill's distinction is in tune with previous anthropological work on traditional societies' concept of the person, in which the notion of the 'dividual' person was formulated to contrast with the paradigm of personhood predominant in the West.⁶⁵ In many ways his category of objective-participant repeats many views associated with a dividual understanding of personhood. Though I largely assume the validity of this contrastive scheme, whose two conceptions may be seen as complexes of mutually-supporting views that tend to crop up together, there is one important difference in my and Gill's application of this distinction. While I agree that it deftly grasps many of the key differences between Greece and modernity when Greece is thought of *as a whole*, the distinction may also be applied internally within Greece itself. Applied thus, we see that the concept of self emerging in the Classical age among the philosophers and tragedians is subjective-individualist relative to the Homeric age, though not to the degree, say, of Kant's conception. Treating Greek thought as a whole, if left unqualified, risks understating the changes in the conception of the person wrought by the various radical socio-economic developments of Greek history, and also the developmental connection between Greece and modernity.⁶⁶

First we must establish a ceiling to my claim. As Bartsch and Wray explain, scholars like Gill, Inwood, Taylor, and Williams, have, in timely and influential fashion, 'defamiliarize[d] for students of antiquity the widespread and nearly axiomatic modern acceptance of the Cartesian ego: a model of the self as private, interior, discrete, and possessing a uniquely privileged (because "subjective") access to itself.'⁶⁷ On the whole, the self that interests the Greeks and Romans is one representative of universal reason,⁶⁸ and is valuable insofar as it is an image of this universal. The ancients do not seem so concerned with a radically individual self, personalised and unique to me, and its private sense of *me-ness*,⁶⁹ though

⁶⁵ See above n. 9.

⁶⁶ Sorabji has been in dialogue with Gill over the nuances of his scheme, and rejects an excessively dichotomous application of it. He argues instead that interpretations may freely combine different aspects of each pole, and that in an important sense each pole presupposes and does not discount the other. For example, '[a]ny attempt to include pictures of self must recognise the element of participation in society' (Sorabji (2008) 15). Yet his claim that interest in the subjective individual increases in the later period seems to require an emphasis on one aspect of personhood at the expense of another, for the idea of *increase* only makes sense relatively.

⁶⁷ Bartsch and Wray (2009) 4.

⁶⁸ Hadot (1995a) 211.

⁶⁹ See Clay (1990).

according to Sorabji there was an increasing interest in this aspect of personhood in late antiquity.⁷⁰ Granted that we must agree with Mauss in supposing ‘that there has never existed a human being who has not been aware, not only of his body, but also at the same time of his individuality, both spiritual and physical,’⁷¹ the sense of *me-ness* has not been a universal object of philosophical reflection, and nor has it been uniformly elevated, as it has in the West, to so privileged a position. The Greeks use phrases such as αὐτὸς ἕκαστος (“each one himself”), but they are deployed simply to distinguish one person from another; the quiddity of the conscious quality of being αὐτὸς ἕκαστος is never considered, especially the personalisation of self-consciousness as the sense of being ‘I’.

Despite this threshold, the formation of reflexive pronouns and compounds⁷² using αὐτός, and their use to depict the behaviour of persons and the cosmos, begins to construct them as beings whose agency is essentially self-directed. Greek αὐτός is the structural equivalent of English *self* in almost every way, and the fact that it becomes central to various aspects of classical culture should not be overlooked. Indeed Gill suggests that the word *self* is in a way typically Western:

The terms ‘personality’ and *self* are modern English terms with no obvious equivalents in ancient poetic or philosophical Greek. They are also terms which are often associated with certain well-marked features of modern Western thought, notably the placing of a high value on personal individuality and uniqueness.⁷³

But if *self* is in origin a nominalisation of the reflexive morpheme and keyed to the aforesaid features of modern Western thought, does not then the growth of αὐτός, the most literal translation of English *self*, as a category of Greek language and culture, point to the development of some of those same features—namely, a subjective-individualist conception of selfhood? One could include as an extra entry in Gill’s definition of the subjective-individualist concept that ‘to be a “person” is for one’s activity as an agent to be essentially self-directed, i.e. reflexive.’

⁷⁰ Sorabji (2008) 15–16, contra Gill.

⁷¹ Mauss (1938) 3.

⁷² Cf. Chantraine (1968) 144 s.v. αὐτός, who observes that αὐτο- as the first member of a compound ‘a connu dans le grec posthomérique, et surtout dans le grec tardif, une énorme extension (environ 400 termes dans *LSJ*).’ I would argue that the increased productivity of reflexive compounds reflects an increased intellectual interest in reflexive categories and self as a driver of lexicalisation.

⁷³ Ibid., 2.

Reflexivity belongs to the subjective-individualist conception because it negates the various participatory relationships that define the objective-participant model. Gill views the objective-individualist conception through the figure of ‘the self in dialogue’. The image has two aspects, that the self is not a solitary centre of consciousness but partakes in dialogue with differentiated parts of the psyche, and that ‘the ethical life of a human being is, at the most fundamental level, shared rather than private and individuated.’⁷⁴ In general, these relationships, insofar as they are participatory, are other- rather than self-directed. But in time pronominal reflexivity begins to appropriate the various structures that underlie such participatory relations and through replacing the other participant with a reflexive pronoun transform them into relationships with self. This helps create the solitary world of the highly individuated subject of consciousness, in which it is the only dweller and other dialogical participants have been erased and substituted by itself. Otto Seel’s observation anticipates our argument:

Gerade das Reflexiv aber treffen wir in der homerischen Sprache an in *statu nascenti*, unfertig ... und erst allmählich werden die Beziehungen auf den θυμός, die ψυχή, das σῶμα abgelöst durch das sich langsam verfestigende Reflexivpronomen.⁷⁵

Looking ahead, the increasing reduction of other-directed relations to self-relations involved in the subjective-individualist view is plainly demonstrated by Aristotle’s analysis of friendship in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, normally understood as a relationship between one person and another, as an extended form of reflexive relationship. He argues that the specific relations that define friendship—such as spending time with one’s friend, sharing pain and pleasure with him, and being of the same mind as him—in fact derive from homologous relations one has with oneself (τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας ... ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι⁷⁶). The virtuous man, for instance, is of like mind with himself and enjoys spending time with himself in contemplation. Viewing human interaction through the prism of reflexivity even leads Aristotle to the first extant nominalisation of the reflexive morpheme αὐτός as

⁷⁴ Ibid., 15.

⁷⁵ Seel (1953) 307.

⁷⁶ “The friendly relations towards one’s neighbours ... seem to have come from those towards oneself.” Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1166a1–2.

self. Since relation with a friend is really a derivative reflexive relation, the friend must be another *self*, that is, another instance of the subject (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός⁷⁷).

Especially remarkable is the later nominalisation of the entire complex reflexive in Epictetus:

ἐλοῦ οὖν πρότερον θέλεις, ὁμοίως φιλεῖσθαι ὑφ' ὧν πρότερον ὁμοίως ὦν
τῷ πρότερον σεαυτῷ ἢ κρείσσων ὦν μὴ τυγχάνειν τῶν ἴσων.

(Arr. *Epict.* 4.2.3–4 Schenkl)

Choose then whether you want to be loved in a similar way by those you were loved by previously, being similar to *your former self*, or, by being better [than your former self], to miss out on equal affection.

The articulation of the reflexive and the insertion of the attributive modifier πρότερον clearly show that the reflexive is here being treated as a noun and has become an independent concept. I should stress that this novel move arises in a writer particularly focussed on self-care and, similarly to Aristotle's nominalisation of αὐτός, seems to emerge from a contextual network of reflexive relations that characterise the reflexive subject. Standing like boundary stones in the intellectual history of selfhood, both these passages mark the incorporation of reflexivity into the concept of the person in a way that is both linguistically and conceptually interesting. In a sense, this study will address the antecedent factors that comprise a necessary prelude to the placement of these stones.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 1166a31–32. He elsewhere (*Mag. Mor.* 1213a13) defines the great friend as an ἄλλος ἐγώ. The use of ἐγώ and αὐτός in this way signals the introduction into human ontology of terms connected to the abstract category of the subject, and moves away from the hypostatisation of the human being as an objective substance or thing. Cf. the objective, externalised representation of the individual in Middle English phrases such as 'his own body' and 'his own person' where we would use a pronoun, e.g. *the kyng his owne persone brought and ladde this worthy lady to the bisshops place of Wynchestre* (see Mustanoja (1960) 148–150). Aristotle's nominalisation of αὐτός is diachronically comparable to nominalisation of *self* in English: both appear when the human being has been constructed as essentially reflexive. For a later example cf. *M. Aur. Med.* 8.40.1 Farquharson.

CHAPTER TWO

HOMER

1. *Typology of Homeric Reflexives*

a. *Preliminaries*

Our purpose in this chapter is to review the state of the PRS in Homer and to propose a connection between the Homeric idea of personhood and the semantic restriction of the reflexive. The status of the third person pronoun in Indo-European, especially whether it is reflexive or pronominal in origin, has always divided scholars.¹ The stem forms *sewe-se-*, which seem clearly modelled after the second person *tewe-twe-te-*, are well represented throughout the Indo-European family, and must be distinguished from other third person pronouns that develop from demonstratives (for example, Latin *is*, *ea*, *id*). The unstressed enclitic forms *se soi* (cf. first person *me moi*, and second person *te toi*) are also attested, and even better circulated. The principal difficulty is that these forms seem to be put to both reflexive and non-reflexive use—usages which many think ought to be kept distinct and must in fact have been so.

The predominance of non-reflexive use has not prevented many Indo-Europeanists from claiming that the third person pronoun, unlike the first and second persons, which can be either pronominal or reflexive, is exclusively reflexive. Perhaps they have been unduly influenced by the reflexive use of the stem in contemporary European languages, as in the case of *soi* in French and *sich* in German. Yet despite the various ingenious, stipulative definitions of reflexivity to account for the instances of non-reflexive use, the simple fact remains that in the older languages the pronominal use of these forms, if anything, on the whole predominates. Avestan has the pronoun *a* which on occasion is used reflexively; Old Persian has an enclitic genitive form *-saiy* derived from *soi*, which out of

¹ The matter was already a bone of contention among the ancient grammarians. See A.D. *Synt.* 2.98–102 Uhlig. The following review draws heavily on the excellent article of Hahn (1963).

its fourteen occurrences is reflexive only once; in Hittite, meanwhile, the third person pronoun *se* may be reflexive but generally is not.²

In Homeric Greek this pronoun (οὔ οἷ ἔ) is also mostly non-reflexive but can be used reflexively.³ The prescription of early grammarians such as Aristarchus and Herodian, that when reflexive it carries the accent but when non-reflexive it is enclitic, cannot be taken as anything more than orthographic convention, with a dubious connection at best to how Greek actually sounded in Homer's day. Herodian's formulation of the rule, that when this pronoun translates a form of αὐτόν it is enclitic, but when it translates ἐαυτόν orthotone, betrays a need to assimilate the strange and archaic pronoun of its Homeric ancestor to the familiar distinctions of the current tongue.⁴

Brugmann and Delbrück advance an unfalsifiable thesis in claiming that the reflexive and non-reflexive uses of what appears to be the same pronoun in Homeric Greek are actually distinct, and that the non-reflexive uses are traceable to a separate demonstrative *so-* stem.⁵ The reflexive and demonstrative stems are conveniently similar enough for any problematic data to be subsumed by the latter. Besides the suspect nature of its methodology, this position is made untenable by Hahn's point that this non-reflexive pronoun from a demonstrative stem should inflect for gender and also be found in the nominative case, neither of which occurs. She also notes that '*so-* demonstrative pronouns normally, indeed almost invariably, form their oblique cases, and their entire neuter gender, from the *to-* stem and *not* from the *so-* stem'.⁶ Hahn's view on the matter is entirely reasonable: if the *se* pronouns are clearly patterned with the *me* and *te* pronouns, it is most natural to assume that like them it was originally mostly non-reflexive but on occasion reflexive.⁷ Wackernagel, for his part, contends that the reflexive meaning was original and the simple pronominal usage secondary, while Delbrück maintains the opposite.⁸ Given that the non-reflexive use of this pronoun predominates while reflexive uses are few and far between if distribution is any guide to the pattern of development then there is more reason to

² Hahn (1963) 91–92.

³ The former is much commoner than the latter. See Monro (1882) 220.

⁴ So Laum (1928) 269.

⁵ Brugmann (1911) 319, 390; Delbrück (1893) 482–483.

⁶ Hahn (1963) 98.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Wackernagel (1926–1928) 2.601–603, Delbrück (1893) 481.

side with Delbrück than Wackernagel on this particular point. Moreover, there are other good reasons that this is the case.

As it happens, Hahn's position concurs with the great grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus, whose insights anticipate our own position. Importantly, the oxytone pronouns, including the third person, are in the first instance emphatic: 'the most general reason for accentuation [of oblique cases of pronouns] is when there is emphatic contrast of one person with another.'⁹ Reflexivity is a subcategory of emphatic usage and therefore a secondary and derived property. This is corroborated by the possessive pronouns (ἐμός σός ὅς/ἐός), which are never enclitic and allow both reflexive and non-reflexive interpretation. There was no natural necessity 'establish[ing] a law that accented forms of the third person pronouns invariably required reflexive interpretation.'¹⁰ Emphatic and reflexive usage are distinguished not morphologically but by context.¹¹ Viewing reflexives in this way enables one to properly understand reflexivity as a special case of emphasis. It also means that many reflexive uses inherit emphatic (often contrastive) semantics, especially where there is a choice between reflexive and enclitic forms.¹²

Persuasive comparative evidence for the non-reflexive origin of *swe*-is found in those Germanic languages which initially used the simple pronoun reflexively before developing specialised reflexive pronouns.¹³ PIE originally constructed reflexivity verbally through various intransitivising strategies that use bound affixes—for example, by deriving reflexive verbal conjugations such as the middle—rather than analytically and pronominally via the use of free-floating reflexive pronouns with transitive verbs. Hence as a member of this family switches from the former to the latter strategy, there will inevitably be a stage in which verbal forms still continue to carry a significant portion of the reflexive workload while the reflexive use of pronouns is being explored to an ever increasing degree. At this point the reflexive workload of the pronouns will not be great enough to force morphological specialisation into

⁹ A.D. *Synt.* 2.58 Uhlig, tr. Householder (1981).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 99. Apollonius also recognises (§101) that it would be a particularly useful invention in the third person if accented pronouns were always reflexive, to disambiguate between reflexive and non-reflexive uses without the need of context. The need for a clear syntactical distinction would become ever more pressing as the use of the PRS increased and expanded into novel territory.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 102.

¹² So also Sinar (2006) 97.

¹³ König and Siemund (2000) 44.

differently marked simple pronouns and reflexive pronouns. So in Homer the rarity of the reflexive use of the third person pronoun enables the one form to do double duty.

In a note, George Bolling suggests an interesting reason for the rarity of reflexive constructions in Homer beyond the contribution of the middle voice, of which this monograph is in many ways an in-depth examination:

[The rarity] is due partly to the competition offered by the middle voice, partly to the psychological beliefs then current. In Homeric Greek one does not speak to *himself*, he speaks to his θυμός; one does not bid *himself* act, his θυμός bids him.¹⁴

What we would describe reflexively—that is, as a relation between two coreferential arguments—Homeric language describes as a relation between two more or less distinct entities. In the terminology introduced earlier, the same situation can be construed by a self- or other-directed predicate. I have offered some preliminary arguments that suggest that in construing the same situation in such different ways we are in an important sense not dealing with the same situation at all—rather we are faced here with different models of psychological reality that cannot be reduced to semantically equal translations of the same set of facts. One can thus bring the avoidance of pronominal reflexives to bear on the wider debate concerning Homeric psychology in general. It is my view that this phenomenon is far from peripheral and in fact crucial to conceptions of self.

Bolling has surveyed the use of personal pronouns in reflexive situations in the *Iliad* and I will be following his analysis closely, while also considering data from the *Odyssey* and giving further discussion to the paucity of reflexive constructions in both works. For his part, Bolling is quite aware of the grammaticalisation process, remarking that the later contrast between the simple pronoun and specially marked reflexive (αὐτόν/ἑαυτόν) is ‘just beginning to emerge. The *Iliad* would then record a transitional stage in the development of the language.’¹⁵

b. *Non-Possessive Reflexives*

1. The third person pronouns ἑ and μιν, when bound by the subject of their governing verb (whether as a direct or indirect object), must be

¹⁴ Bolling (1947) 29 n. 4.

¹⁵ Ibid., 23.

intensified with αὐτός.¹⁶ By contrast, in the same syntactic context first and second person pronouns may appear in their emphatic, oxytone forms, without the addition of αὐτός.

ἔε δ' αὐτὸν ἐποτρύνει μαχέσασθαι (Il. 20.171)
He spurs *himself* on to fight.

αὐτόν μιν πληγῇσιν ἀεικελίησι δαμάσας (Od. 4.244)
having subjected *himself* to shocking blows.

ζωγρεῖτ', αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ἐμὲ λύσομαι. (Il. 10.378)
Take me alive, and I will ransom *myself*.

2. However, unintensified forms of the third person pronoun are permitted in prepositional phrases. Indeed unintensified pronouns predominate in this context.

ἀμφὶ ἑ παπτήνας (Il. 4.497)
having peered about *himself*.

3. In the *Odyssey*, and possibly in the *Iliad*, αὐτός by itself may be reflexive, in which case it seems to have dropped its pronominal focus.

ἄλλω δ' αὐτὸν φωτὶ κατακρύπτων ἦϊσκε (Od. 4.247)
By concealing he made *himself* like a different person.

4. Within the wider syntactic domain—for example, where a pronoun in a subordinate clause refers not to the immediate verb's subject but to the subject of the main verb—sometimes αὐτός is added, sometimes it is not.

κέκλετο δ' ἄλλους | ὀτρηνοὺς θεράποντας ἅμα σπένσθαι ἐοῖ αὐτῷ (Od. 4.37–38)
He called the other attentive servants to follow along with *him*.

ἧ τ' ἐκέλευσεν ἔο μνήσασθαι ἀνάγκη | καὶ μάλα τειρόμενον καὶ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ πένθος ἔχοντα (Od. 7.217–218)
which [hungry belly] commands a person to remember *it* by compulsion, even if he's very distressed and has grief in his heart.

¹⁶ A complicating instance is found in the *Odyssey* (11.433), where an indirect object does not take αὐτός: ἡ δ' ἔξοχα λυγρὰ ἰδυῖα οἷ τε κατ' αἴσχος ἔχευε “But she, exceptionally knowledgeable in all things destructive, shed disgrace on *herself*”. It is likely that in this sentence οἷ is being influenced by the tmetic verbal prefix κατά. Reflexive prepositional phrases typically take unintensified pronouns, as stated in (2).

5. Reflexives are very often contrastive. Here their intensification with αὐτός is quite appropriate, since contrastive emphasis is one of its main semantic functions.

μέγα μὲν κλέος αὐτῇ | ποιεῖτ', αὐτὰρ σοί γε ποθὴν πολέος βιότοιο.
(*Od.* 2.125–126)

She makes great glory for *herself*, but for you longing after much lost livelihood.

The person split noted in (1) has the concise pragmatic explanation alluded to above. Since more than one third person may participate in a clause, specially-marked reflexives are more useful in the third person as disambiguators.¹⁷ There is therefore a greater pragmatic incentive to develop special reflexives in the third person first.

As to the reflexive use of intensified μὴν, we see a form which is on the whole overwhelmingly non-reflexive, and which has no connection to a putatively reflexive Indo-European root, being recruited for reflexive constructions. One concludes that Greek, at least in its earlier stages, is largely indifferent to an outright distinction between reflexive and non-reflexive pronouns. It is instead happy to press any available pronoun into reflexive service. In other words, as far as reflexives goes, the relevant condition is pronominal status rather than any inherent reflexivity. This in turn puts the supposed original reflexivity of the *sewe- swe- se-* stem on even shakier ground: if other clearly non-reflexive pronouns can be put to reflexive use, what's to say that the same strategy is not being employed for the set of pronouns grown from these stems: an extension of general pronominal usage to reflexive usage?

There is also an evident pragmatic explanation for the second observation. Actions that originate from the subject's body and take that same body as their reference point must be a prominent part of any human life-world—actions like shoving away, pulling towards, etc. With verbs of this sort, the reflexive interpretation of a pronoun in a prepositional phrase is obvious. Indeed these reflexive prepositional phrases are the most prevalent form of reflexive construction in the *Iliad*. English too regularly uses simple pronouns instead of the complex reflexive in such contexts, and these naturally translate the Greek orthotone pronoun: 'Having peered about him', 'He clasped his innards to him', etc. One could also tender a syntactic explanation, that the pronouns in such

¹⁷ Cf. Faltz (1985) 43, 120, and Comrie (1999) 337.

prepositional phrases are outside the governing category of the verb and therefore do not require reflexive marking. However, when the complex reflexive develops further it replaces the simple pronoun in these prepositional phrases. Either the category of governance has suddenly been widened, or, in my view, it is not the most important factor for reflexive marking in this context. Alternatively, since reflexivity within the governing category of the verb was originally covered by the middle voice or a similar verbal derivation, originally the reflexive use of pronouns would only have been needed outside of this domain, in adjuncts such as prepositional phrases. These prepositional phrases would therefore represent an ancient form of reflexive construction.¹⁸

To explain (3) we have two options. Either it is a simple case of pronoun ellipsis, and/or a relatively late usage that also appears in Theognis and Epicharmus. Αὐτός frequently drops its focus in non-reflexive usage, so option one is completely plausible. Yet Theognis and Epicharmus use αὐτός reflexively but never in combination with ἔ or μίν, suggesting that this lone form has grammaticalised in some dialects as the sole reflexive for the third person. It is therefore possible that its use in Homer is connected to its later use in Doric dialects, either as its developmental antecedent, or as an incursion of that later use. It is perhaps not coincidental that two novel reflexive strategies, μίν plus αὐτός and αὐτός by itself, appear in the same passage from the *Odyssey*. They may well be evidence of comparatively late composition. These questions bear on the reading of a vexed passage from the *Iliad*:

ᾠς τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους μάκαρες θεοὶ ὀτρύνοντες | σύμβalon, ἐν δ' αὐτοῖς
ἔριδα ῥήγνυντο βαρεῖαν. (Il. 20.54–55)

In this way the blessed gods roused the two sides and threw them together in battle, and caused deep conflict to break out among *them/themselves*.

The difficulty here is that if αὐτός refers to the Trojans and Greeks, then it is unusually weak, since there is no natural contrast present. The non-configurationality of Ancient Greek, especially in its early stages, means that word order is often pragmatically motivated. Here the fronted material bears sentence focus; the clauses are designed to give information

¹⁸ Bolling (1947) 27–28 notes that reflexive prepositional phrases can be prosodically distinguished from non-reflexive ones. Connective particles often intervene between the preposition and the pronoun in non-reflexive cases, whereas in reflexive instances the pronoun always immediately follows its preposition.

first and foremost about the Greeks and Trojans.¹⁹ But there can be no contrast if the focus of both clauses, τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους in the first and ἐν αὐτοῖς in the second, refers to the same set of entities. If αὐτός is strong, which it most usually would be, then it would naturally mean the gods themselves, triggering the appropriate change of focus and contrasting the conflict among men with a conflict among the gods. Leaf himself notes that the reflexive meaning is most natural, ‘but the reflexive use of αὐτός is so doubtful in Homer that we must hesitate to adopt this rendering.’²⁰ Yet if one cites *Od.* 2.125, 4.247, 14.251, this usage becomes less doubtful.

Moving to (4), things become hazy. Outside the immediate governing category of the verb, αὐτός appears somewhat optional. Whether it is added because it is syntactically required or for emphatic contrast is hard to say.²¹ It is well known from evidence in English that various types of emphasis wreak havoc with the binding conditions and allow reflexives to be bound over longer distances than they otherwise would be:²²

John_i thinks that Mary is in love with himself_i not Peter.

With this we may compare the following instance:

δίδου δ' ὃ γε τεύχεα καλὰ | Τρωσὶ φέρειν προτὶ ἄστν, μέγα κλέος ἔμμεναι
αὐτῷ.²³ (Il. 17.130–131)

He gave the beautiful arms to the Trojans to carry to the city, to be a great glory to *himself*.

Here αὐτός is clearly emphatic and expresses heroic self-interest: the arms are to be a glory to *him* alone as opposed to any other Trojan. In fact every instance which does add αὐτός is highly suited to an emphatic reading, so that emphasis is likely the key factor determining

¹⁹ For the semantic motivation of word order in Greek, see esp. Devine and Stephens (2000).

²⁰ Leaf (1900) ad loc.

²¹ Simple pronouns and reflexives also alternate in English, and often with semantic distinction, when just outside the verb's governing category or even further afield.

²² See e.g. Zribi-Hertz (1989).

²³ The reflexive is also possible in English constructions of a similar type: ‘I gave them the picture to hang up in the boardroom, to bring glory on myself.’ There is argument over whether these reflexives are in fact the intensive pronoun with a dropped pronominal focus or LDB reflexives proper. Against the former view is that these reflexives may appear even where there is no contrastive emphasis, but instead encode subjective point of view as so-called logophors.

its realisation in this syntactic context.²⁴ Except for *Od.* 4.38, given above, and the following:

πτωχὸν δ' οὐκ ἄν τις καλέοι τρύξοντα ἐ αὐτόν. (*Od.* 17.387)

No one would invite a beggar to come and harass *him*.

To claim emphasis for this instance would be to so weaken its definition that it covered virtually any reflexive use—in which case *Od.* 7.217–218, quoted above, should have αὐτός too. There thus seems to be a modicum of arbitrariness to the addition of αὐτός in these cases, although it is certainly heavily influenced, though not completely determined by, the semantics of emphasis. It is likely that Greek is in the process of setting a syntactic requirement for reflexive marking in participial and infinitival clauses, since in later Greek the complex reflexive appears in these constructions. At this point reflexive marking is not yet obligatory.

This leads into consideration of (5). Reflexivity and emphasis very often coincide. Firstly, there is an expectation against coreference that the realisation of a reflexive emphatically violates. The expectation varies with where exactly on the scale of other-directedness a particular verb sits; reflexivisation of verbs high on this scale often produces a rich effect, especially when the verb in question is already semantically interesting. On other occasions the reflexive forms one branch of a rhetorical contrast between self and other; both elements are realised and the full scope of a particular action's effect is contrastively presented, as in the example given above. Sometimes this other is present but only implicitly. The three examples below compare these various semantic effects of reflexivisation.

ἐλθεῖν εἰς Ἰδην εὖ ἐντύνασαν ἐ αὐτήν (*Il.* 14.162)

to go to Ida having decked *herself* out well.

ὅς τις κε τλαίη—οἷ τ' αὐτῷ κῦδος ἄροιο—| νηῶν ὠκυπόρων σχεδὸν ἐλθέμεν (*Il.* 10.307–308)

whoever should venture (and win kudos for *himself*) to go near the ships of swift passage.

στέλλομαι γὰρ ὁ κακοδαίμων ἐγὼ τρόπον τινὰ νεκροφορῶν ἐμαυτὸν ὥσπερ εἰς ἡρίον. (Philo *Flacc.* 159 CW)

For I, a man ill-starred, set out on my journey as though carrying *myself* as a corpse to the tomb.

²⁴ See *Od.* 14.251, 20.213–214.

The first example reflexivises a banal verb, and the action presented is the everyday one of the cosmetic adornment of one's body. The verb ἐντύνω is other-directed enough to require additional marking with αὐτός when reflexivised, but it carries a minimum of emphasis since the action constitutes a natural kind of human behaviour. Any emphasis is, as it were, purely syntactic. In the second example, however, the reflexive is clearly semantically emphatic. The point is that the glory one would win on getting near the ships would be entirely his own and no one else's, and this is precisely why the hero would venture such an attempt in the first place. The third example, taken from Philo, reflexivises the extreme other-directed verb νεκροφορέω, 'to carry a dead body to burial'. It crafts the surprising and piteous trope of a living exile carrying himself to his own metaphorical burial.

Reflexivisations such as the last, as well as those like 'Know yourself' which reconstitute the nature of the person, are entirely absent in Homer. So too are uses of the reflexive which reference some psychological aspect of the subject. Indeed the reference of reflexives directly governed by verbs in Homer is overwhelmingly bodily: 'adorning oneself', 'covering oneself', 'defending oneself', 'debasing oneself physically', 'arranging themselves in a certain formation', 'stirring oneself', and all the prepositional phrases. The usual reference for indirect arguments is the self interested in its own advantage. We do not find in Homer any of the psychological models of self-relation discussed by Lakoff.

c. *Possessive Reflexives*

There is a particular possessive construction in Homer that connects via αὐτός to the later complex reflexive. In later Greek the complex reflexives are used in the genitive case instead of possessive adjectives to denote possession. Cross-linguistically, use of complex reflexives in this way is relatively rare. Before the development of the complex reflexive, Homer uses the possessive adjectives ἐμός σός ὄς/ἑός, cognate with the pronouns we have been discussing.

Compared with the pronoun, the possessive adjective shows a far greater proportion of reflexive uses. As Bolling notes, only ten out of 164 instances of ὄς/ἑός in the *Iliad* are non-reflexive. It is assumed that the non-reflexive uses are a later extension, just as others have claimed that the reflexive use of the pronoun is primary. I have disputed this above in the case of pronoun, and it is similarly disputable with the possessive. The discrepancy in the frequency of reflexive and non-reflexive

uses is not to be explained diachronically but functionally. As Haspelmath has shown, possessive pronouns are far more likely to be subject-coreferential than disjoint.²⁵ The asymmetry is due to the stereotypical way in which humans interact with the world: humans, along with their communicative acts, are more concerned with those things which exist in a close relation of possession to them than in things in which they have comparatively less vested interest—in much the same way as I would spend more time talking about family and friends than relative strangers.

Now if Homeric Greek wishes to be particularly emphatic, then it can combine a possessive adjective with αὐτός (it always drops its pronominal focus in this context) in the genitive case:

σῶ δ' αὐτοῦ κραάτι τίσεις (Od. 22.218)

You will pay with *your very own* head.

So too with the third person:

Ἰθάκης ἐξαίρετοι, ἧ ἑοὶ αὐτοῦ | θῆτες τε δμῶές τε; (Od. 4.643–644)

Select men from Ithaca, or *his very own* hirelings and slaves?

These early uses of the possessive plus the intensifier in the genitive case doubtless feed into the later usage of the complex reflexive for possession. Not every use of this combination is technically reflexive. The reflexive at Od. 4.643 does not have an explicit antecedent. One could either adopt an approach like that of Zribi-Hertz and argue that reflexives can be bound by prominent discourse subjects (here Telemachus, the immediate topic of conversation); or one could argue that the association of αὐτός as a reflexive-marker when combined with either the pronouns or possessive adjectives is not yet so fixed as to prevent non-reflexive uses.²⁶ Both add αὐτός to an adjective or pronoun derived from the same root.

The pronoun plus αὐτός can also be used possessively:

ἔο δ' αὐτοῦ πάντα κολούει. (Od. 8.211)

He cuts off all *his own* interests.

²⁵ Haspelmath (2008) 53. In his count of German *ilr*—('her', 'their') in 19 of Grimm's fairy tales, 68 % are subject-referential and 31 % disjoint (1 % are conjunct coreferential).

²⁶ As the possessive adjectives are cognate with the pronouns, both of their combinations with the intensifier are morphologically similar, which would only have encouraged analogical treatment of the two. This would be an example of what Faltz (1985) 118–119 calls strategic streamlining. The eventual reflexive pronoun and the reflexive possessive are outcomes of a single strategy that patterns one after the other and finally assimilates them.

However this possessive reflexive use of a pronoun plus αὐτός is as rare as other reflexive uses.²⁷ In both these cases αὐτός contrasts what is possessed by another with what is possessed by oneself. These facts again suggest that reflexivity and the pragmatics of contrast are connected. In the case of the possessive adjectives, an interpretation of αὐτός as solely marking reflexivity would be problematic—as stated above, these are by and large interpreted reflexively anyway, and additional marking would be redundant. The presence of αὐτός triggers an emphatic reading alongside ordinary reflexivity. The contexts for this are various. In *Od.* 22.218 the emphasis is obvious: ‘you yourself and no one else will pay for this act.’²⁸ In *Od.* 4.643–644 the emphasis is slightly weaker; αὐτός plays a less forceful contrastive role in discriminating between the subject of the previous clause, over which Telemachus has no claim of ownership, and those of the second clause, over which he does.²⁹

2. Semantics of αὐτός in Homer

a. External Differentiation

Homer deploys αὐτός chiefly to distinguish an important, central actor or object (or group thereof) from more peripheral actors or objects. The classical construction is one in which he shifts attention from the latter to the former, leaving peripheral participants aside and bringing protagonists into focus as he keeps the narrative on track. It often takes place within a μέν/δέ contrast.

τεύχεα μὲν οἱ κείται ἐπὶ χθονὶ πολυβοτείρῃ,
αὐτὸς δὲ κίλος ὥς ἐπιπωλεῖται στιχὰς ἀνδρῶν (Il. 3.195–196)

His *arms* were left lying on the much-nourishing earth, but *he* went like a ram ranging through the ranks of men.

The exclusionary intensifier works by calling and then denying a set of alternatives. Its use is important for the conception of the person since

²⁷ There are only two other instances: *Il.* 19.302, *Od.* 11.369.

²⁸ The head, as the most important part of the body, is often made to stand for the person as a whole in critical contexts where the very lives and fortunes of interested parties are at stake. As one’s most cherished possession, it stands for everything which a person values, and so is often addressed and appealed to in supplications as a kind of touchstone for empathy. Cf. *Od.* 15.262 for the combination of head, possessive adjective and αὐτός in this context.

²⁹ The contrast is aided by the disjunctive coordination. So too at *Od.* 1.409.

it differentiates self from other and demarcates the individual. Things become more interesting than the example above when the differentiation excludes those aspects of the person that merely respond to external compulsion and social pressure, and highlight instead the individual as an independent agent whose acts arise from himself:

τὰ φρονέων νήεσσιν [Ζεὺς] ἔπι γλαφυρῇσι ἔγειρεν
Ἔκτορα Πριαμίδην, μάλα περ μεμαῶτα καὶ αὐτόν. (Il. 15.603–604)

With this in mind Zeus stirred Hector son of Priam against the hollow ships, though *he himself* was champing at the bit.

The Homeric poems are careful not to reduce heroes to puppets manipulated by the gods against their will; even when the gods stir them on, it is said that they themselves are eager.³⁰ Here the differentiation intersects with the larger issue of ‘double determination’, the well-known narrative device by which any given event is both divinely and humanly motivated; when applied to the human side of the equation, αὐτός thus delimits a field of human as opposed to divine agency.³¹

Such a form of differentiation is also important in human-to-human interaction, especially in cases of conflict resolution. In these cases the parties to be reconciled are at pains to claim their contribution to rapprochement, whether it be the giving of a gift or a cessation of rancour, as offered autonomously and not under coercion. So, when Antilochus

³⁰ Αὐτός is similarly used to distinguish internal motivation from the external influence of other humans, eg. Il. 10.388–389: ἢ σ’ Ἐκτωρ προέηκε διασκοπιᾶσθαι ἕκαστα | νῆας ἔπι γλαφυράς; ἢ σ’ αὐτὸν θυμὸς ἀνῆκε; “Did Hector send you forth to the hollow ships to gather detailed intelligence, or did your own heart prompt *you yourself*?” So too Il. 15.43, 22.346; also with αὐτός as possessive genitive at Il. 6.439; Od. 2.138, 4.712, 7.263. For the redundancy of motivation by another human since one is himself already willing, see Il. 3.32, 8.292, 15.599, 16.548, 16.600. Especially noteworthy is the scene in Book 10 (vv. 234–239) where Diomedes is told to choose a companion for the espionage mission *himself*. Agamemnon advises: ‘And you must not let respect for persons make you leave the better man and take the worse. Do not be influenced by a man’s lineage, even if he is more royal than that of your choice.’ The intensification separates Diomedes from those peripheral parts of him which are socially constituted, more particularly those socially conditioned responses and feelings such as shame which do not arise from the individual proper but are elicited, even at times extorted, by the social body—to use Mead’s (1934) terms, one might think of this separation as a differentiation of the autonomous ‘I’ from the socialised ‘me’. Diomedes is being asked to choose free from the expectations of the social body.

³¹ Zanker (1994) 120 (with references) also connects αὐτός to the human side of double determination.

and Menelaus dispute over foul-play in the chariot race at Patroclus' funeral games, in the end Antilochus makes an overture with the following words, in which αὐτός plays a key role:

ἵππον δέ τοι αὐτός | δώσω, τὴν ἀρόμην (Il. 23.591–592)

I will give you *myself* the horse I won.

Menelaus reciprocates in similar fashion:

Ἀντίλοχε νῦν μὲν τοι ἐγὼν ὑποείξομαι αὐτός | χωόμενος. (Il. 23.602–603)

Antilochus, I will now yield to you *myself* though angry.

Through their use of αὐτός each portrays his contribution as an act of gracious supererogation.³² Conflicts must be resolved as individuals, as a negotiation between one self and another, because they represent a breakdown or lacuna, even if it is only temporary, in the system of social regulation. In the absence of an automatic social solution the individual is for a time brought into starker relief and must assume responsibility. This autonomous self is marked with αὐτός.

As another form of going beyond what is socially required or sanctioned, transgression is supererogation's flipside, and in this case too a more differentiated self comes to the fore. As suggested, when persons operate within the bounds of society they are more or less subsumed by the working whole and comparatively invisible. But by stepping outside of these bounds, whether in transgression or supererogation, their presence becomes marked. So αὐτός characterises Agamemnon's seizure of Briseis that begins his feud with Achilles.³³ It is an act of bald self-assertion that exploits a grey area in the heroic code.³⁴

³² Cf. the use of αὐτός in the reconciliation scene between Priam and Achilles (Il. 24.558, 589), particularly as applied to Achilles when he lifts Hector's corpse onto the barrow *himself* as an act of supererogation. The importance of this word to the characterisation of Achilles' autonomous magnanimity is pointed out by Zanker (1994) 120f.

³³ Il. 1.130, 150, 345. Teffeteller (1990) shows that αὐτός in these instances signifies Agamemnon's autocratic imposition on Achilles. Note that while Agamemnon depicts his seizure as an act of self, committed on his own agency and authority, he will later scapegoat ἄτη. His about-face becomes an episode of classic tragic irony, as we see him desperately trying to evade responsibility for what he was initially so keen to claim it.

³⁴ Viz., how does the leader's claim for the best share of the spoil balance against the claim of others to be compensated according to their merit? The code offers no prefabricated solution to this problem.

One also sees that αὐτός is applied more regularly to some individuals than others. Indeed its application is in many ways scalar. We may borrow Bakker's definition of scalarity:

Scalarity is a semantic notion which applies when entities or properties can be ordered on a scale, like gods, men. We may say that between 'gods' and 'men' a scalar relationship obtains. Gods have strength, power and immortality and these properties are frequently measured against the weakness and mortality of man ... Scalarity and scalar relationships can be encoded in language by a number of 'scalarity markers'.³⁵

When used as a scalarity marker, αὐτός typically differentiates beings at the top of the hierarchy. Hence gods are very often intensified with αὐτός, as are kings and other important humans that for whatever reason stand apart from the rest.³⁶ Such beings often have increased agency, so that this use (often called the adnominal intensive) links up with the adverbial sense of doing something (by) *oneself*.³⁷ Recognition of this bias in the distribution of αὐτός is important for it suggests that within the Homeric worldview the dominant selves are gods and heroes. One should keep this in mind as we will see that the marked level of selfhood limited to these beings is later liberalised through certain sociological and intellectual developments. Properties such as τὸ αὐτοκρατέες and αὐτοπραγία become available to the average citizen and are upheld as ethical ideals to be cultivated by the good man.³⁸

³⁵ Bakker (1988) 28–29. Likewise, König and Siemund (2000) 41–43 analyse intensifiers as differentiating central from peripheral elements.

³⁶ Intensification of Zeus with αὐτός is so standard as to be almost epithetical (see *Il.* 2.301, 4.127, 10.295, 12.230, 13.29, 13.32, 14.27, 14.292, 15.220, 15.592, 15.696, 16.659, 17.140). Of the other gods, but not as frequently, cf. Apollo (*Il.* 2.819, 5.416, 17.319) and Poseidon (*Il.* 12.1, 13.673, 20.309).

³⁷ In English the adnominal and adverbial uses of the intensive are easily distinguished by position: the adnominal sits right next to its focus, while the adverbial is free floating and typically accompanies the verb. Cf. 'Zeus himself ordered me' and 'Zeus did it himself'. Note that the former very often implies the latter: 'Zeus himself sent the omen' → 'Zeus sent the omen himself'.

³⁸ The liberalisation of these qualities is in large part enabled by redefining them as a state of the soul rather than the license of privileged political power. The story of Diogenes' encounter with Alexander (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 4.55–59 von Arnim) depicts the difference concisely. Flabbergasted when it is suggested that he is not the most powerful man in the world, Alexander asks who there is left for him to conquer, to which Diogenes replies, 'Your greatest enemy—yourself'.

b. *Internal Differentiation*

We have been considering cases where αὐτός contrasts self and other *externally* within a social domain. But when it is applied *internally* within the domain of a certain entity, it has the interesting effect of contrasting the central, more essential aspects or versions of that entity from those that are less essential, and promoting these more essential instances, as paradigms, to the status of universals.³⁹ The real versions of a type are set apart from those that are less so. This usage is close to its usage in Plato to mark forms.

The two different domains of contrast may be elucidated by the following pair:

1. We don't like the idea, and the prime minister *himself* doesn't like it either.
2. Though they seem courageous and expect a reward, courage *itself* can never be compensated.

In the first sentence the contrast takes place within a contextually defined domain—those that have an opinion concerning the proposed idea—that is not coextensive with its focus, the prime minister, but rather with a class of which the prime minister is a member. However in the second sentence those with specious claims to being instances of the type of courage are contrasted with that which has the only true right to be called courage. The domain here is coextensive with the intensive's focus, courage. Compare also the following:

3. Someone else must have done it. I *myself* would never do that.
4. I don't know what came over me. I *myself* would never do that.

In (3) the contrast is between myself and everyone else, with the class of human beings as the domain; in (4) the implied contrast is between a being which is essentially me and the actions of something which is only me in a superficial or shallow sense, where the type 'I' or 'me' is the domain. Both these contrasts represent the same process of individuation, albeit applied in domains whose limit is in differing proximity to the focus, and coextensive with it in differing degree. Below I have compared the two contrastive domains of (3) and (4) diagrammatically:

³⁹ The internal application of the centre-periphery distinction is not considered by König and Siemund (2000) in their brief analysis.




Figure 2. External vs. internal ontological differentiation.

The application of contrastive αὐτός in a range close to the domain of its focus, which in effect essentialises the focus (or, if one prefers to think in terms of scalarity, sorts between entities with competing claims to the identity of a thing) is rare in Homer, and even rarer in the case of abstract objects. The only proximal domain it uses with any frequency is in contrasting a hero with his possessions. There is however a contrastive use of αὐτός in the fourth line of the *Iliad* that applies in a very intimate domain, making a distinction as to what constitutes the real person. It deserves consideration since this ontological use of αὐτός is a precedent for its later philosophical employment:

πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν
 ἡρώων, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐλώρια τεῦχε κύνεσσιν (Il. 1.3–4)

He sent many mighty souls of heroes to Hades, and made the men *themselves* prey for dogs.

Commenting on the use of αὐτός here, Leaf notes that ‘the *body* is to Homer the real self, the *psyche* is a mere shadow’.⁴⁰ He cites the use of a similar contrast at 4.257 (the body as against the θυμός) and 23.65 (the real living body as against the dream shade of Patroclus, his ψυχή).⁴¹ In *Odyssey* 11, where Odysseus journeys to the underworld, the same distinction is made:

τὸν δὲ μέτ' εἰσενόησα βίην Ἡρακλεΐην,
 εἶδωλον· αὐτὸς δὲ μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι
 τέρεται ἐν θαλίῃ καὶ ἔχει καλλίσφυρον Ἥβην (Od. 11.601–603)

⁴⁰ Leaf (1900) ad loc.

⁴¹ See also Il. 22.351 and *ibid.* ad loc.

After him I made out the might of Heracles, a mere image; the man *himself* is taking pleasure in feasts among the immortal gods and possesses beautiful-ankled Hebe.

The genuineness of this passage has been disputed by both ancient and modern commentators; the ancients were troubled by logical problems (how could the same person be in both Hades and heaven?) and inconsistencies (Hebe is a virgin elsewhere in Homer), and moderns are convinced that the apotheosis of Heracles, albeit an old legend, is nevertheless post-Homeric.⁴² Whether interpolation or not, the metaphysical contrast employed in this passage between body and soul is traditional to the core. Body is above soul on the ontological hierarchy—the reverse of the Platonic and Christian situation.

The Homeric ontology of the human being manifests clearly in eschatology. There is no concept of a rich immortality *qua* soul separated from body in Homer and the wider epic tradition. If there is to be everlasting life, it is within a body that does not perish. Just as Heracles goes to live with the gods, it is prophesied to Menelaus that he will be transported alive to Elysium at what would otherwise be the moment of his death.⁴³ The individual personality in Homer, just as in old Judaism,⁴⁴ is a

⁴² See Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 86–87, who agrees that these lines are an interpolation ‘inspired by the desire to reconcile Herakles’ presence in Hades in this *Nekuia* with the fact that in the assumptions of the interpolator and his society his apotheosis was so well established as to raise problems in the reading of the Homeric text.’ These lines later sparked discussion among the Platonists of what Heracles’ true self was (Sorabji (2006) 34, with references).

⁴³ *Od.* 4.561–569. Other heroes of the Epic Cycle also receive an embodied after-life, including Iphigeneia, Achilles, and Penelope, Telegonus and Odysseus (Proclus *Chrestomathia* 141–143, 199–200, 327–330 Severyns). Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 52 argues that these beliefs developed together with hero cults.

⁴⁴ Cf. above Ch. 1 n. 9. The development from Jewish to Christian eschatology parallels, in important ways, the transformation from Homeric to Platonic thought, with similar consequences for human ontology. As Boyarin (1994) Ch. 3 n. 8 writes, since in old Jewish thought the soul has no individual personality, and is not the essence of the self, there can be ‘a fortiori no notion that an individual could be rewarded with a disembodied bliss after death. To the extent that such ideas appear widely in Hellenistic Judaism and to some extent in rabbinic Judaism ... they are indeed, it seems, a product of the Hellenistic culture of which Judaism was a part at that time.’ See also Jeremias, s.v. “Hades” in Kittel (1964). For the development of belief in an immortal disembodied soul in the deep sense and the eschatology of individual salvation, see Burkert (1977) 285–301 and Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 173–172, esp. 413–441 where she demolishes Morris’ (1989) criticism of her earlier work (1981, 1983) examining the shift in Greek attitudes to death that arose in the Archaic period and the emergence of the Eleusinian Mysteries—Morris sees no change and thinks the idea of individual salvation is ancient. Note that

fusion of body and soul, not soul alone. This naturally affects the semantics of soul, as we will now consider.

3. *The Idea of ψυχή and Its Connection to the Reflexive*

Soul's secondary place in Homeric ontology is borne out in the fact, no stranger to comment, that ψυχή never stands for the psychic unity of the person in either of the two poems. It means either simply 'life', stripped of any affective or cognitive capacity, or the shade of the individual that leaves the body at death for Hades, where it ekes out an intellectually impoverished existence. In later Greek ψυχή may be used in much the same way as the psychic organs are in Homer, with the notable difference, however, that it may be subject to all the psychological experiences that characterise the conscious life of an individual and in this sense is identical to the person *qua* psychological subject. The absence of a word for the psychological subject as a whole in Homer is to be linked to another datum, the matching absence of instances of the reflexive pronoun referring to just such a subject. One gathers the reflexive pronoun cannot take on these references because they have not yet lexicalised. Therefore, as ψυχή does begin to develop the sense of the psychological subject, we see a parallel development in the referential possibilities of the reflexive.⁴⁵ Both the reflexive and ψυχή reference this new concept of the person.

Let us then summarise Bremmer's work on the development of the concept of ψυχή in Greece. Bremmer applies the work of Swedish anthropologist and Sanskritist Ernst Arbmán to systematise the Homeric account of the soul and bring the semantics of ψυχή into relation with those of the other soul words. Arbmán's work was first concerned with India, where he found that the concept of the soul was preceded by a duality where eschatological and psychological attributes of the soul had not yet merged. He found a similar development in Christian Scandinavia and Classical Greece. Bremmer writes of Arbmán's study as follows:

In his analysis Arbmán distinguished between body souls endowing the body with life and consciousness and the free soul, an unencumbered soul representing the individual personality. The free soul is active during

she emphasises (420–421) the role of urbanisation and the rise of individualism in this transformation, themes we will return to.

⁴⁵ To the degree that Plato interprets certain types of action towards oneself as action towards one's soul.

unconsciousness and passive during consciousness when the conscious individual replaces it. It is not exactly clear where the passive free soul resides in the body. The body souls are active during the waking life of the living individual. In contrast to the free soul the body soul is often divided into several parts. Usually it falls into two categories: one is the life soul, frequently identified with the breath, the life principle; the other is the ego soul. The body soul, or several of its parts, represents the inner self of the individual. In the early stage of the development of Vedic soul belief the free soul and the body souls did not yet constitute a unity; later the concept of the Vedic free soul, *ātman*, incorporated the psychological attributes of the body souls, a development that occurred among a number of peoples.⁴⁶

Bremmer borrows Arbman's scheme and associates the *ψυχή* of Homer with the free soul, and *θυμός*, *νόος* etc. with the body soul. In his view the Homeric *ψυχή* bears the following similarities to Arbman's description of the free soul:

1. Both are located in an unspecified part of the body;
2. Both are inactive (and unmentioned) when the body is active;
3. Both leave the body during a swoon;
4. Both have no physical or psychological connections;
5. Both are a precondition for the continuation of life;
6. Both represent the individual after death.

⁴⁶ Bremmer (1983) 9–10. As Bremmer notes, 'Arbman's views have been elaborated by his pupils in two major monographs on the soul beliefs of North America and North Eurasia, confirmed by the studies of other scholars, and widely accepted by anthropologists.' One may add also the Akkadian notion of *etemmu* (Abusch (1995)) and the Dinka notion of *atyep* (Lienhardt (1985) 148), both of which, like Homeric *ψυχή*, are ghostly doubles of the individual primarily active when one has died, and do not represent a unified centre of consciousness and personality when one is alive and active. On the other hand, Claus' (1981) neglect of cross-cultural evidence is a major flaw in his attempt to explain the developing psychological qualities of *ψυχή* as the natural outgrowth of its 'ability to be felt as a life-force word' (181). Appeal to the notion of life-force alone is idle since a culture can simultaneously hold two distinct conceptions of animating force, the body-soul and the free-soul, without one having to encroach on the other. His idea that the absence of *ψυχή* from psychological contexts in Homer is attributable to the Homeric preoccupation with the *ψυχή* as 'shade' (181) has some merit, but only if it is added that this restriction is not the result of a convention of a specific genre outside of whose bounds *ψυχή* would have been used psychologically, but representative, given the cross-cultural anthropological evidence, of a culture-wide psycho-eschatological system. Nonetheless, if there is a supposed incompatibility between the *ψυχή* that survives death and the *ψυχή* involved in emotional life, then contrary to what we observe, this should be even more of a problem in the post-Homeric landscape where there is an *increased* interest in the eschatological *ψυχή* as part of the burgeoning discourse of individual salvation.

The one correlation missing, as Bremmer notes, is the agency of the $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ in dream states.⁴⁷ The various parts of the body soul are denoted in Homer by psychic organs, $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$, $\varphi\rho\acute{o}\eta\nu$, $\nu\acute{o}\sigma\varsigma$, $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha$, etc. Following Homer, $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ takes over the semantic field of body soul as well, while these others fall out of use or are subordinated as parts of $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$. Thus the body soul and free soul were united in Greek $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ just as they were in Sanskrit *ātman*. Scholars have often viewed the rise of the mystery cults, with their emphasis on the soul's salvation and its moral care, as a factor in this evolution.⁴⁸

Now *ātman* is also the pronominal reflexive in Sanskrit. Moreover, in much of Hindu thought and its various philosophical traditions, as well as those of Buddhism, it figures as the higher, true self of pure consciousness with which one ought to cultivate identity. As a reflexive pronoun, *ātman* can thus easily partake in models of self-relation that require psychological interpretation of the reflexive or a well-formed concept of true self. Crucially, just as I am proposing for Greek, the development of a unitary conception of body and free soul in Sanskrit is complemented by a development in its pronominal reflexive system. The old reflexive of Vedic Sanskrit, *tanū-*, which, just as in the early stages

⁴⁷ Probably more attributable to the stylised nature of literary dream accounts than to non-existence of this belief; we know from post-Homeric sources that both dreams and shamanistic out-of-body voyages were attributed to the $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$. None of the other soul words are capable of acting outside of the body, so that unless there is some mysterious word lost to us and to later Greeks, it can only have been the $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$.

⁴⁸ The argument was pioneered by Rohde (1894) 253–389. See also Jaeger (1947) 83, Burkert (1972) 134. Claus' scepticism at (1981) 111–121 seems to me to abuse the argument from silence. If $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ names what survives death before this period, and is frequently used by later writers when discussing Orphic and Pythagorean eschatology, then it would be bizarre indeed if in spite of both the tradition that precedes and that which follows these cults chose some other word to denote the free soul as that which survives death. Even if another word could be used in this sense—Claus suggests $\delta\alpha\acute{\iota}\mu\omega\nu$, which Empedocles (B115) employs—the well-established place of $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ as the free soul would allow for an easy transference of semantics from one to the other to the point of synonymy. There is a purely logical aspect to this relation. If the soul which alone survives death is to become fully conscious, then it must become the psychic organ principally responsible for such experiences, and thus commandeer or subsume the psychic activities of the other organs of the body soul. As is often the case in sociological matters, the precise direction of causality—whether both the new interest in individual salvation on the one hand and the condition of the soul on the other are symptoms of a sharper socio-economic differentiation of the individual in general, or whether one leads more or less directly to the other—is impossible to establish. It is perhaps best to understand all these movements as interacting in a feedback system (similarly Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 420–421).

of pronominal reflexivity in Greek, does a limited amount of reflexive work, leaving much of it to the verbal system,⁴⁹ is pushed out of this role by *ātman* as Vedic morphs into Classical Sanskrit.⁵⁰ It remains in use but is restricted to its corporeal sense of ‘body’, often opposed to *ātman* within a dualistic framework, just as σῶμα and ψυχή in Greek.⁵¹ We may thus propose that in both these languages a development in the reflexive system is linked to a development in the conception of the person, and also the development of culturally important reflexive categories.⁵²

⁴⁹ Hock (2006) sets out the evidence for the scholarly consensus that reflexive *tanū-* is a recent innovation that signposts an emerging distinction between pronominal and verbal reflexivity. For the move from middle to pronominal reflexive markers, see Lehmann (1992). In both Greek and Sanskrit, this new pronominal strategy will come to have semantic implications as the reflexive pronoun develops a referential connection to the ‘self’ of the human being.

⁵⁰ See Kulikov (2007) 1429–1431 for overview and further bibliography. *ātman-* is attested as a reflexive from the late R̥gveda and gathers steam to completely oust *tanū-* in vedic prose (which includes the earliest Upaniṣads). The development of *ātman-* as the reflexive of choice accompanies an increased interest in the self as a philosophical and religious topic. We see this especially in the Upaniṣads, whose new focus upon Adhyātmavidyā (‘self-knowledge’) heralds a paradigm shift in the conception of knowledge in ancient India (Black (2007) 2). As Vedānta they represent the end or culmination of Vedic thought, the earliest of which are dated to around the seventh and sixth centuries BCE (Olivelle (1998) 12). These were written either within an urban environment or during the process of urbanisation, and contain reflections of a change in the socio-economic base of India (Olivelle (1998) 6–7, drawing on Erdosy (1988)). In both Greece and India then we see three facts linking up: a socio-economic transformation from village-based to urban society, the development of a new reflexive pronoun, and a new interest in the reflexive as the essence of a person and a focus of thought and action.

⁵¹ As the most prominent word for the individual in Early Vedic, *tanū-* represents a fusion of corporeal and non-corporeal aspects (just as the psychic organs do in Homer), until *ātman* takes over the more abstract qualities of personhood. See Gardner (1998) § 5g, 6c–f.

⁵² Since *tanū-* and *ātman-* are both body-part reflexives, it is possible that as *ātman* grew to be regarded as constituting the real person it became a more salient candidate for standing for that person in a reflexive relation. It should also be said that the degree of correspondence in the two languages’ generation of reflexive concepts is quite remarkable. Cf. αὐτοκράτωρ and ātmeśvara (‘master of self’); αὐτονομία and ātmavaśaḥ (‘self-control’, ‘self government’); τὸ ἑαυτὸν νικᾶν and ātmajayaḥ (‘victory over oneself’); and τὸ ἑαυτὸν γινώσκειν and ātmajñānam (‘knowledge of self or the supreme spirit’, ‘true wisdom’); φιλαυτός and ātmakāma (‘loving oneself’, ‘possessed of self-conceit’, ‘loving Brahma or the supreme spirit only’); αὐτογενής, αὐτοφυής and ātmayonih, ātmabūh (‘self-born’, ‘self-generated’, epithets of Brahma, Vishnu, Siva, and Cupid god of love; ‘talent’, ‘understanding’). Taken from Apte (1970) s.v. *ātman*.

4. *Conclusions*

The gulf between Homeric and later Greek representations of psychology, and their encoding in the reflexive system, is illuminated by a fortunate piece of evidence. In Apollonius' *Argonautica* we have a good measure of how things have changed in reflexive usage and the psychological models supporting it. Though written in the third-century BC, its diction is consciously epic and a testament to the Homeric *Kunstsprache*. The ancient form of the reflexive, in which the pronoun and intensifier are yet to fuse, is also retained. But though the forms are old the usage is new. Thus we find ἐν plus the reflexive being used to delimit the internal psychological space of the subject:

Ἐνθ' αὖτ' Αἰσονίδης μὲν ἀμήχανος εἰν ἑοῖ αὐτῶι
 πορφύρεσκεν ἕκαστα, κατηφιόντι ἑοικώς·
 τὸν δ' ἄρ' ὑποφρασθεὶς μεγάλῃ ὀπί νείκεσεν Ἴδας. (A.R. 1.460–463)

Meanwhile, however, the helpless son of Aeson kept pondering deeply *within himself* the details of the mission ahead, looking like someone dejected; but Idas took note and rebuked him in a loud voice.

As the Argo sets sail on its maiden voyage, Jason falls to brooding upon what lies ahead. He ponders each thing *in himself*. If this were Homer we would expect a locative expression with one of the psychological organs (e.g. ἐν θυμῷ) instead of the reflexive pronoun, which never appears in this usage. One infers that either Homer had a personal aversion to the reflexive used in this sense even though it was diachronically available to him, or—in my view the far more likely explanation—semantic development in the centuries after Homer produced new uses of the reflexive that were absorbed into epic diction. To the retort that Apollonius is not Homer and Homer not Apollonius, let it be said that Apollonius is not Homer precisely because he adopts the reflexive psychological models current in his day and so injects the inherited epic morphology with new semantic content.

To summarise the situation in Homer, then, we conclude the following:

The pronominal reflexive system is relatively unmarked—evidence that it is a new strategy. The complex reflexive does not yet exist, but is in the process of grammaticalisation, as shown by the obligatory addition of αὐτός in the third person when within the governing category. By comparison with English and other languages, we can extrapolate an even earlier stage of the language in which simple pronouns were used

reflexively without intensification. This usage still survives in Homer in the reflexive prepositional phrase, where the simple pronoun reigns.

In my view Bolling is right in attributing the dearth of Homeric reflexive constructions to (a) the health of the middle-reflexive system and (b) certain psychological beliefs then current. There are only eight examples where a reflexive is governed by a verb. Moreover, none of the reflexives refer to a distinctly psychological aspect of the person; they refer in the main to the person as a physical body.

The bias in the reference of the reflexive reflects a similar bias within the Homeric conception of the person, which takes the body, or a body-soul fusion, rather than a disembodied soul as the real self, and marks it with αὐτός accordingly. Similarly, the absence of a word for a unified psychological subject reflects the absence of reflexive constructions portraying a relationship with this psychological subject. Where referral to the body soul is required, instead of the reflexive the various psychic organs are used. It was noted that Hebrew follows the same strategy in the Old Testament.

We introduced evidence from Sanskrit to demonstrate a similar structural link between the conception of the person and the reflexive system. One will remember that there was also a link in the case of English, suggesting that this is a cross-linguistic phenomenon.

The use of αὐτός as an ontological differentiator was discussed, especially its use to mark out the autonomous and responsible subject which disentangles itself from time to time from the web of Homeric social life. This type of self will subsequently become increasingly significant as a more permanent state of disentanglement is objectified as a good. I also drew attention to the highly internalised application of this marker to differentiate a being's essential identity from its non-essential parts or aspects. We note this now as this use is later commandeered by philosophy's essentialist project; in cases where αὐτός as the second element of the complex reflexive is taken to perform just this function, it also influences some of the reflexive's new interpretations.

CHAPTER THREE

EARLY LYRIC, IAMBUS AND ELEGY

1. *Preliminaries*

Between epic and the prose, tragedy and comedy of the fifth century stretches the patchy terrain of lyric, iambus and elegy, and the fragments of the Presocratic philosophers. The fragmentary nature of this period leaves much to reconstruction. This is unfortunate, since this age must have been the crucible for the complex reflexive: by the fifth century it is frequently attested in the Ionic prose of Herodotus and its possessive use especially has been conventionalised.¹ Significantly, innovative use of the reflexive to denote the psychological subject parallels the semantic development of *ψυχή* as a body-soul term, each capable of substitution for the other.²

The first well-attested instance of the complex reflexive is in Hesiod's *Theogony*: Γαῖα δέ τοι πρῶτον μὲν ἐγένεατο ἴσον ἑωυτῇ | Οὐρανὸν ἄστερόενθ'.³ The -ω- in the Ionic form leaves behind an important trace

¹ There is some dialectal variation in the form of the complex reflexive: Cretan *φαινο-τοῦ*, Ionic *ἑωυτοῦ*, Attic *ἑαυτοῦ*. There is also a Doric form which reiterates *αὐτός* to give *αὐταυτοῦ*. The important thing to remember is that these are all morphologically *heavy* reflexives. They therefore (generally speaking) bear emphasis and signal the unexpected reflexivisation of an OD verb.

² For the evolution of *ψυχή* into a psychic organ in the lyric age see Darcus (1979a) 34–39, Claus (1981) 69–102. It may be asked why the reflexive cannot substitute for the other psychic organs. But in Homer these are simply too differentiated from the psychological subject for such substitution to take place, and none of them has the required scope to stand for it as a whole. The attempt to conceive of the subject as a psychic unity underpins both the developing sense of *ψυχή* and the reflexive's use in psychological self-relation. One notes however that at this stage the Greeks' relatively 'objective-participant' view of personality still wishes to maintain a distinction between person and *ψυχή*. Cf. Darcus (1979a) 39: 'a person remains distinct from *ψυχή* but acts in harmony with it'.

³ Hes. *Th.* 126–127. "Gaia first gave birth to one equal to *herself*, starry Heaven." Also possessively in fr. 45. At *Op.* 265 he uses the separated form as in Homer. According to Janko (1982) 224, who fixes Hesiod's works after Homer's, the contracted form is only to be expected in post-Homeric diction. Some manuscripts and witnesses have *αὐτῷ* for *αὐτός* at *Op.* 293, 296. If correct, this means Hesiod also uses simple *αὐτός* reflexively in a non-possessive sense like Homer at *Od.* 4.247. The complex reflexive also occurs at

of its origin: it must have arisen in the genitive case through a contraction of ἑο αὐτοῦ and spread from there.⁴ It is therefore likely that the emphatic combination of the possessive adjective and the genitive of αὐτός in Homer is an influential precursor to the complex form. In anticipation of an argument in subsequent chapters, the use of this marked form to set apart what belongs to oneself from what belongs to others, and with enough frequency to stimulate contraction, was perhaps central to the crystallisation of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ as a central category of Greek society and thought. Apollonius Dyscolus had already realised that as a possessive the complex reflexive regularly differentiates self and other in a marked fashion. He compares the emphatic expression πρὸς ταῖς ἑμαυτοῦ νῦν θύραις ἔστιν ἐγώ with the weaker alternatives πρὸς ταῖς θύραις μου ἔστινα and πρὸς ταῖς ἑμαῖς θύραις ἔστινα. The strong implication in use of the former is *not by someone else's door* (ἐμφασιν γὰρ ἔχει ὥς οὐ πρὸς ταῖς ἄλλου).⁵

The standard collections of fragments of other poetry contain precious few reflexive constructions, and many of these do not come from original papyri but from the quotations of later authors, outside of whose pages there is no further textual history. Even where a reflexive is clear, scholars disagree on whether to read it synthetically, as in later writers, or *divisim*, as in Homer.

Indeed the majority of instances for lyric come from a single passage of Apollonius Dyscolus' treatise on pronouns in which he considers precisely the issue of synthetic and *divisim* readings of the reflexive:

It was also read separately among the Aeolic Greeks: ἔμ' αὐτὰ τοῦτ' ἔγων σύννοια, ἔμ' αὐτῷ παλαμάσσομαι. But against this was νόον δὲ φαύτῳ πάμπαν ἀέρρει, unusual in its simple form without the addition of ε. Likewise in *Book 7* of the same Alcaeus: σὺν δὲ σαύτῳ τόμιας ἔσθι, ἀλλὰ σαύτῳ μετέχων ἄβας πρὸς πόσιν. For how do these come to be composite when the first are separate? It is clear that the reading of the first (two) passages is inconsistent with that of the following passages.⁶

Of the first two passages, the first has been attributed to Sappho; the pronoun is feminine and the phrase perfectly supplements a lacuna in an Oxyrynchus fragment otherwise known to be Sappho. As the

h.Merc. 239; Janko demonstrates that these hymns are contemporary with Hesiod's works or later.

⁴ So West (1966a) 81.

⁵ A.D. *Synt.* 2.107 Uhlig.

⁶ A.D. *Pron.* 80 Schn., tr. Campbell (1982–1993) 1.365 ad. Alcaeus fr. 317.

most obvious masculine Aeolic candidate, it has been presumed that the second belongs to Alcaeus. According to Apollonius, the other three also belong to Alcaeus.

We also find the Lesbian poets still using the simple, unintensified pronoun reflexively alongside the intensified and complex forms, which is to be expected in this transitional phase:⁷

Κύπρι καὶ Νηρηΐδες, ἀβλάβη[ν μοι
τὸ κασί]γνητον δ[ό]τε τιδ' ἔχεσθα[ι
κῶσσα ε]οι θυμῶ[ι] κε θέλη γένεσθαι
πάντα τε]λέσθην (Sapph. fr. 5.1–4 LP)

Cypri and you daughters of Nereus, grant to me that my brother make it here unharmed, and that everything which he wishes to happen for *himself* in his heart is brought to pass.

ἀμφὶ δ' ἄβροιοι' () λασίοιο' εὔ[ε] ἐπύκασσεν (Sapph. fr. 100 LP)
She covered *herself* well about her delicate ... with shaggy ...

φαίνεται ε]οι κῆνος (Sapph. fr. 165 LP)
That man seems to *himself*

If the editors are correct in their supplementation of the first two fragments,⁸ then it is possible that we see preserved here the very first stages of the PRS, since in Homeric constructions analogous to the first two the pronoun is intensified,⁹ and is orthotone instead of enclitic. The third fragment reflexivises a verb of perception and is comparable to the popular δοκῶ μοι locution of later Greek,¹⁰ which is unusual for allowing reflexive use of an enclitic pronoun. Impersonal construction with the dative, such as δοκεῖ μοι, is very common (so too in the case of φαίνω), and the reflexive use likely developed by simply switching the subject and retaining the enclitic dative pronoun, rather than, as when reflexivising personal verbs, by substituting an emphatic reflexive for a normally disjoint direct or indirect object, which would then have required heavy marking.¹¹ There are no examples of reflexivised cognitive acts in Homer,

⁷ Note too that a poetic language well adapted to the vicissitudes of metre will often acquire a metrically varied morphology by telescoping different historical periods of the language.

⁸ See Voigt (1971) ad loc. for the different proposals.

⁹ Respectively, *Il.* 16.47, 17.551. Note however that the dative of advantage in *Il.* 16.47 is ironic and thus requires intensification for semantic reasons.

¹⁰ E.g. *Hdt.* 2.93.6. See LSJ s.v. δοκέω I 3 for further examples.

¹¹ A similar way of looking at it is to view the enclitic as the logical or semantic subject

but post-Homer we find a number of such locutions develop, not least Sappho's reflexivisation of σύννοια.¹² It is this chapter's main argument that these changes, and the reflexivisation of traditional OD relations more generally, take part in the incipient construction of the individual as a reflexive intellect and subject, encourage heavy reflexive marking, and support the reflexive's acquisition of new psychological meanings.

2. Complex Reflexives in Early Poetry

Let us now come to the meaning of the fragments containing intensified reflexives quoted by Apollonius. The first four are relatively transparent:

ἐμ' αὐτᾶ τοῦτ' ἔγων σύννοια (Sapph. fr. 26.11–12 LP)

I know this with *myself*/am conscious of this

ἐμ' αὐτῷ παλαμάσομαι (Alc. fr. 378 LP)

I will deftly manage for *myself*

νόον δὲ φαύτῳ¹³ πάμπαν ἀέρρει (Alc. fr. 363 LP)

He lifts up *his own* mind completely

σὺ δὲ σαύτῳ τόμαις ἔση (Alc. fr. 317a LP)

You will be steward to *yourself*

The reading of the last Alcaeus fragment is trickier:

ἀλλὰ σαύτῳ μετέχων ἄβας πρὸς πόσιν (Alc. fr. 317b LP)

but sharing with *yourself* in the youth of the present/the youth suited to drinking

If σαύτῳ is interpreted as the dative σαύτῳ, then when put together with the genitive ἄβας (Aeolic for ἥβης), the construction follows a common syntactic projection for the verb μετέχω: genitive of thing and dative of

and the impersonal syntactic subject as the semantic object in a cognitive act. The enclitic thus follows other subjects in not being reflexive-marked.

¹² Cf. also λανθάνω, where the substitution of a reflexive can have a comic effect, e.g. at Ar. *Pax* 32: ἔως σπαντὸν λάθοις διαρραγείς. That one could be split in two without being aware of it! Comic application of the PRS is explored further in Ch. 6.

¹³ The form φαύτῳ appears to be a reduction of φεαύτῳ, analogous to αὐτοῦ from ἑαυτοῦ in Attic. For the digamma see LSJ s.v. ἑαυτοῦ, οὗ, ἱ. Aeolic loses the rough breathing of the original *swe-* stem and retains the digamma.

person, in the sense ‘to partake of something in common with another’.¹⁴ The phrase *σαύτω μετέχων ἄβας* thus means ‘sharing in youth with yourself’. The final phrase *πρὸς πόσιν* has been variously interpreted. Edmonds proposes that *πόσιν* is accusative of *πόσις* (‘drinking’), so that the youth taken part in is that which is given and suited to drinking. Bergk on the other hand takes *πόσιν* as dative plural of *πούς* (‘foot’) and interprets the prepositional phrase as meaning *in praesentia*.¹⁵ For this metaphoric use of ‘at one’s feet’ he compares S. OT 130: *τὸ πρὸς ποσὶν σκοπεῖν*. Bergk’s interpretation certainly fits the very Greek sentiment of youth’s evanescence. The youth one shares in is not *πρὸς πόσιν* for long, and exists only in and for the present.

This fragment shares an important structural similarity with the fragment from Sappho.¹⁶ Both take common other-directed syntactic structures—*μετέχω* plus genitive of thing and dative of person; *σύννοῖδα* plus accusative of thing and dative of person—and substitute a reflexive pronoun for that other person. What is normally a relationship with another is transformed into a relationship with oneself. These are precisely the sorts of constructions which I think contributed to the grammaticalisation of the complex reflexive. They are highly novel and semantically loaded, and as such require the intensifier *αὐτός*. At this early stage of grammaticalisation, the reflexive would doubtless have been read emphatically in such innovative contexts. But subtending these new uses is a changed conceptual structure. We see uncovered a new way of interpreting certain event types. One does not simply know something *tota persona*, but knows something with oneself; one does not simply share in something, but shares in something with oneself.

Fragments 317a and 378 of Alcaeus both seem to be expressions of self-interest. Regarding 317a, self-directed metaphoric use of *ταμίας* (Aeolic *τόμιας*), meaning ‘steward’ or ‘dispenser’, is common in poetry of this period.¹⁷ Usually, one is steward to another as their servant, and thus dispenses food from the storehouse or money from the household treasury in the interest of their master. To be steward to oneself implies a certain subversion of traditional power relations. In Aristophanes a similar effect is achieved through the reflexivisation of the vocabulary

¹⁴ LSJ s.v. *μετέχω*.

¹⁵ (1882) ad loc.

¹⁶ This fragment is further discussed in Ch. 5.

¹⁷ Cf. Hesiod’s unexpected reflexivisation at fr. 245: *ἴν δ’ αὐτῷ θανάτου ταμίης* ‘dispenser of death to himself’.

of service, which is humorously applied to the opportunist who is more concerned with his own interests than those of his betters.¹⁸ In Theognis ταμίας takes as its object various possessions of the self and almost comes to mean ‘owner’:¹⁹

Οἶνοβαρέω κεφαλὴν, Ὀνομάκριτε, καί με βιάται
οἶνος ἀτὰρ γνώμης οὐκέτ’ ἐγὼ ταμίης
ἡμετέρης ... (Thgn. 503–505 West)

I am heavy in the head with wine, Onomacritus, it’s overpowering me and
I’m no longer the dispenser of my own judgement.

The speaker is drunk and no longer in charge of his critical faculties. Self-directed metaphoric interpretation of the prototypically other-directed ταμίας, either as steward to oneself or steward of what belongs to the self, is thus comparable to reflexivisation of similarly other-directed verbal concepts of sharing and knowing-with.

Interpretation of Alc. fr. 363 is helped by constructions of αἰῶ with other psychological parts to express feelings of euphoria.²⁰ The reflexive here is likely emphatic and highlights elation as a private and intimate feeling, or individual arrogance which is egoistic and conflicts with the sentiments of others.²¹

I now turn to reflexive instances quoted by ancient scholars other than Apollonius. We have a scholiast on Hesiod’s *Theogony* (v. 767) quoting a line from Anacreon to support the notion that the adjective χθόνιος may mean στυγνός:

χθόνιον δ’ ἐμαυτὸν † ᾔρεν. (Anacr. fr. 405 Page)
† He lifted up † myself earthly.

Bergk corrects ᾔρεν to ᾔρον in his first edition,²² while others favour the variant reading ᾔρον. Campbell adopts the latter and translates ‘I behaved sullenly’. To bring out the reflexive construction in English, one could instead render ‘I used to conduct myself sullenly’.²³ However reading ᾔρον neatly dovetails the literal and metaphorical senses of χθόνιος.

¹⁸ E.g. reflexive use of θεραπεύω at Ar. *Th.* 172 and διακονέω at Ar. *Ach.* 1017.

¹⁹ Cf. the couplets 1185–1186 and 1241–1242.

²⁰ E.g. with θυμός at S.OT 914.

²¹ For the latter cf. Simonides *Epigram* XXVIa Campbell, which passivizes the verb: οὐκ ᾔρθη νοῦν ἐς ἀτασθαλίαν ‘She was not lifted up in her mind to arrogant folly’.

²² In later editions, e.g. at (1882) 3.272, he abandons his emendation of ᾔρεν to ᾔρον, writing that *gravius vitium latet* and proposing various conjectures that do away with a reflexive construction altogether.

²³ So West (1966b) 154, no. 19.

As noted just above, the verb αἴρω is often used in the psychological sense of raising one's spirits, so that construal with an earthbound object encapsulates and unites the double sense of both the verb and the adjective. We have the image of one lifting up his earthly self, terrestrial under the weight of gloom, into ethereal joy.

Whatever the correct verb, reflexive use of either in a psychological sense is unusual. To this point in time Greek has various ways of denoting behaviour, and usually conceives it as a middle activity or else as an intransitive active. Similarly, to denote the event of cheering oneself up Greek would ordinarily use a psychological part (e.g. φρενές) as object and not the reflexive pronoun, or else construe the verb in the middle voice. Yet, following Kemmer, intransitive middle reflexives are semantically distinguishable from the use of reflexive pronouns with a transitive verb, so that the use of the latter in place of the former reveals a difference in the conceptualisation of a given event. This has been generalised as an increased degree of conceptual separation between the acting and the acted-on participants that may manifest itself in a number of different semantic distinctions, often as a contrast between mind and body. But the particular dualism can be enacted in any domain, including within the psyche itself, where the contrast is then between one psychic agent and another. For example, in the phrase 'she cheered herself up', it is decidedly not her body that is being cheered up. Rather, one aspect of herself—a highly active and purposeful entity exemplifying the properties that usually characterise the subject of a highly transitive event—directs its action in a self-conscious and determined way towards another part of herself that is brooding and refusing to cheer up. This action requires some effort on the part of the agent, so that there is no seamless transference of intention to desired result. It is not seamless precisely because the two are, to a degree, distinct and individual agents. One is not automatically governed by the other, but that other may enforce itself on it given its superior level of agency.

Now these observations bring one to the following generalisation, that a psychological transitive construction with a reflexive pronoun divides the subject into two more or less distinct entities, one of which is referenced by the subject and the other by the reflexive pronoun. Though distinct, these two entities are not created equal, but the subject, by virtue of the various semantic properties that belong to it as the actor in a transitive event schema, is positioned higher on a scale of agency. It may force and cultivate the object, and subject it to its ends. Thus we may say generally that such a use of the reflexive pronoun as object

generates a category of self of increased agency that dominates other psychic aspects. This notion, the recursive generation of a differentiated and highly agential subject (and the correlated subordination of other psychic agents) through reflexivisation in psychological contexts will be explored more fully when we come to a discussion of the thematic use of reflexives in Plato. It is crucial to the construction of the semantic properties of the modern subject, and epitomised in the practice of care of self. But in this fragment from Anacreon we see the beginnings of the type of use that will conventionalise such a distinction. The self is something to which the subject, through self-determination, may give a certain behavioural deportment. Read with the verb ἄγω, one is not so much behaving sullenly as managing oneself in a sullen way. From this verb's gamut of sense, from 'lead', through 'manage', to 'maintain', one gains the impression of an individual wilfully adopting and maintaining a particular deportment, perhaps, if we may conjecture a context, in spite of social expectations, exhortation to the contrary by others, or his more natural inclinations.

There appears to be an instance of the reflexive used possessively in the elegy of Mimnermus:

[μήτε τινὰ ξείνων δηλεύμενος ἔργμασι λυγροῖς
μήτε τιν' ἐνδήμων, ἀλλὰ δίκαιος ἑών,
τὴν σαντοῦ φρένα τέρπε· δυσηλεγέων δὲ πολιτῶν
ἄλλος τοί σε κακῶς, ἄλλος ἄμεινον ἔρεϊ.

(Mimn. fr. 12 Edmonds = fr. 7 West)

[doing harm by destructive acts to neither stranger nor local, but being just,] please *your own* mind. Citizens are cruelly capricious and one will no doubt speak badly of you, another more highly.

The first couplet is bracketed since it is only the second which is ascribed to Mimnermus in the *Palatine Anthology*.²⁴ The whole passage is found in the *Theognidea*, a collection of elegy attributed to Theognis but interpolated with lines from earlier and later poets. It is thus quite probable that the passage is originally Mimnermus' and in the course of time found its way into the *Theognidea*. As in the case of *φαύτω* above, scholars differ over the precise reading of the reflexive. Some have suggested correction into a bare intensifier (Ahrens, and Bergk as a possibility), with or without conversion of the article into the possessive adjective σήν.²⁵ Either

²⁴ AP 9.50.

²⁵ The same phrase with σὴν αὐτοῦ instead of σαντοῦ occurs at *h.Merc.* 565. There too the possessive seems to be emphatic, contrasting Hermes' use of oracular bees in the first instance to please himself, and then his passing on of that knowledge to others.

idiom is attested and entirely possible here. The diachronic question is when these were replaced by a genitive complex reflexive, and if this instance, together with that of *φάυτω*, is one of the earliest examples of such an incursion.

Linguistics aside, it can be said that thematically speaking the passage foreshadows what will later become a philosophical pursuit. One should pay little attention to the variable moral judgment of others, among whom there will always be found some who condemn and some who praise, and concentrate instead on cultivating and satisfying one's own sense of justice. A citizen should conduct himself morally primarily to please himself and for the most part close his ear to the *vox populi*. How you stand in your own eyes is more important than how you stand in others'.²⁶

There is a shift in moral thinking here from what may be called, in the most generic terms possible, an other-centred to a self-centred system. This is a reversal in the being to whom one owes their first moral obligation. It need not have anything to do with selfishness or egoism. If the cultivation of an inner conscience leads to the aphorism that one is one's own harshest critic, then justice in the eyes of oneself will be the most rigorous standard of justice. This idea is prominent in modern culture and voices the popular cliché 'be true to yourself'—the implied conclusion being that if one is, one will *a fortiori* be true to others. We can also compare a dictum of pop psychology that says you cannot love others if you have not learnt to love yourself first.

This idea anticipates Democritus and Plato's redirection of moral attention towards a person's essence, that is, towards cultivation and moral purification of the soul. Indeed Plato reinterprets the proverb *προὔσσε τὰ σάντοῦ* as counselling management not of one's own miscellaneous interests but of the self's most intimate and true possession, the soul. Good or evil begins with the state of the soul and flows from there outwards; there can be no order in the world of men if there is none in the soul. The passage from Mimnermus expresses a folk version of this idea in its embryonic stage, without philosophical ornament and theorisation. In the phrase *τὴν σάντοῦ φρένα τέρεπε* is suggested the notion

²⁶ Cf. Plutarch's emphatic reflexive formulation of this idea at *De prof. in virt.* 81a Babbitt. A sign of progress in virtue is a person's relative indifference to others' opinion of him; he should concentrate instead on ensuring that "he himself is in good standing with *himself*" (*αὐτὸς εὐδοκίμων παρ' ἑαυτοῦ*). The reflexivisation of other-directed projections of moral evaluation like *δόξα* is comparable to the reflexivisation of *αἰδώς* by Democritus, discussed below Ch. 4.5.

that at the very least a person can content herself with the knowledge that she has acted justly no matter what others say. This private sense of justice is the most important thing. The reflexive *σαυτοῦ* is thus given an appropriately emphatic and contrastive reading: please your own *φρένα*, your own moral sense, rather than the tongues of hard-hearted fellow citizens. Tied up here is also a subjective ontological bias. Constancy can be achieved in and belongs to the self, yet the world of others is the flux of relativity, where the same act, so true to the self, can be praised by one and censured by another. If one's ontology displays such a bias, then the fulcrum of concepts such as justice will in time shift in the direction of the realm of constancy, so that being true becomes being true to oneself, or caring for others becomes caring for oneself through others.

A further instance of the complex reflexive construed with an interesting verb is found in a quotation attributed to Xenophanes of Colophon. The source is a gloss of the word *βληστρισιμός* in Erotian's *Glossary to Hippocrates*:²⁷

ἐγὼ δ' ἐμαυτὸν ἐκ πόλιος πόλιν φέρων
ἐβλήστριζον (B45 DK)

But I went tossing *myself* from city to city.

The fragment presumably depicts Xenophanes' wanderings as an itinerant sage and refugee.²⁸ Syntactically speaking it is ambiguous whether the reflexive should be construed with *φέρων* as well as *ἐβλήστριζον*. LSJ note the not infrequent combination of the participle *φέρων* with reflexivised main verbs denoting motion to express 'wholehearted action', so we are dealing here with a peculiar syntactic idiom.²⁹ The verb *βληστρίζω* seems to have been a favourite of Xenophanes'. Diogenes Laertius quotes the following in his *Lives of the Philosophers* as evidence of his longevity:³⁰

ἦδη δ' ἐπτά τ' ἔασι καὶ ἐξήκοντ' ἐνιαυτοὶ
βληστρίζοντες ἐμὴν φροντίδ' ἀν' Ἑλλάδα
ἐκ γενετῆς δὲ τότε ἦσαν ἑξήκοσι πάντε τε πρὸς τοῖς,
εἶπερ ἐγὼ περὶ τῶνδ' οἶδα λέγειν ἐτύμως. (B8 DK)

²⁷ The quotation is usually, as here, rendered in iambic trimeter.

²⁸ Xenophanes was apparently driven out of his homeland of Colophon in Ionia by the invasion of Harpagus the Mede in 546–545 BC. He is also said to have spent time in Zancle and Catana, two Greek settlements in Sicily (D.L. 9.18).

²⁹ S.v. *φέρω* X 2b.

³⁰ D.L. 9.19.

Sixty-seven years have been tossing my troubled thought throughout Greece, and there were twenty-five in addition to these since my birth, if indeed I am capable of speaking accurately about these matters.

The passage becomes highly impressionistic due to the metonymical substitution of his psychological activity for his bodily person and the depersonalisation of the subject into time. Edmonds interprets ἐμὴν φροντίδ' rather concretely as Xenophanes' philosophic poetry, but there is no reason why it should not be left as an expression of the sympathy of wandering feet to the wandering of the mind, travel as a spur to thought. Also, if βλήσσειζω is psychological here it is quite possible that it carries this connotation in the other fragment: 'I was tossing myself about in mind and body.'³¹

The former fragment succinctly illustrates Kemmer's point concerning the semantic inequivalence of middle and transitive reflexives. 'I tossed about from city to city' as opposed to 'I tossed myself about from city to city'. The transitive ἐβλήσσειζον ἐμαυτὸν denotes a subject imposing its will on itself, more particularly on a part or version of itself which is at least mildly resistant or indifferent to that subject's concerns. It also suits the connotation of wholeheartedness contained in φέγων. Xenophanes is self-determining in his wanderings, impelling himself from city to city despite that version of him which wishes to stay—either, we may speculate, in knowledge of impending war or in quest of wider wisdom. On the other hand the middle formulation would denote a person moving with the vicissitudes of fortune, kicking with the wind of fate and not manhandling his destiny.

3. *Simple αὐτός As Reflexive (Theognis and Pindar)*

Beside use of the complex reflexive in this period we find αὐτός being used reflexively by itself without a pronominal focus (or perhaps better as an emphatic pronoun in its own right). As we have seen, this use is as early as Homer and Hesiod, but usually confined to the possessive genitive. In the *Theognidea*, however, it alternates with the complex reflexive in the dative case:³²

³¹ Alternatively, the similarity of the two passages suggests contamination to Meineke, who proposes that the former originates from an alien prose source (perhaps a letter) and became mixed up with the latter. Bergk (1882) 3.116 agrees that these words were taken from a letter but leaves the question of authenticity open.

³² As a possessive genitive it occurs at lines 480, 955, 1009, 1218.

Οὗτος ἀνὴρ, φίλε Κύρνε, πέδας χαλκεύεται αὐτῷ,³³
εἰ μὴ ἐμὴν γνώμην ἐξαπατῶσι θεοί. (Thgn. 539–540 West)

This man, dear Cyrnus, forges fetters *for himself*, unless the gods deceive my judgement.

Πολλοῖς ἀχρήστοισι θεὸς διδοῖ ἀνδράσιν ὄλβον,
ὅστις μὴτ' αὐτῷ βέλτερος οὐδὲν ἐὼν
μήτε φίλοις. (Thgn. 865–867 West)

God gives prosperity to many good-for-nothing men, the sort of man who, amounting to nothing, is of no service to either *himself* or his friends.

Γνώμης δ' οὐδὲν ἄμεινον ἀνὴρ ἔχει αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ
οὐδ' ἀγνωμοσύνης, Κύρν', ὀδυνηρότερον. (Thgn. 895–896 West)

A man has nothing better in *himself* than intelligence, Cyrnus, nor more painful than lack of intelligence.

All the reflexives here are emphatic and reverse an other-directed expectation. In the first example a man is paradoxically forging fetters for himself instead of for another.³⁴ In the second self is contrasted with others, and the useless man is of help to neither. This idea, that a man, paradoxically, can even be an impediment to himself, becomes important to Plato and theories of self-development. In an orthodox interpretation of human nature it is almost axiomatic that, if someone can

³³ There being no metrical reason for the complex reflexive here, it seems to me that it should be left unaspirated as in all the other examples. So Edmonds (1931) ad loc.

³⁴ This idea will be explored at greater length in Ch. 6 under the rubric of tragic reflexivity, defined as the unexpected return onto the self of an action, often malicious, intended for another. It is first evoked by Homer at *Il.* 16.46–47: ὦς φάτο λισσόμενος μέγα νήπιος· ἦ γὰρ ἔμελλεν | οἷ' αὐτῷ θάνατόν τε κακὸν καὶ κῆρα λιτέσθαι “So he prayed, blind fool! For in truth he was destined to have prayed for evil death and destruction *for himself*” Cf. Hes. *Op.* 265–266: οἷ' γ' αὐτῷ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλω κακὰ τεύχων, | ἦ δὲ κακὴ βουλή τῳ βουλεύσαντι κακίστη “A man makes trouble for *himself* by making it for another, and an evil plot is worst to he who planned it”, and this notion's inverse at Men. *Mon.* 741 Edmonds: φίλος φίλῳ γὰρ συμπονῶν αὐτῷ πονεῖ “In working with a friend one works for *oneself*”. These latter two frame ethics as a question of the good or not to the self; a certain treatment of another is justified or rejected depending on what it ends up bringing to the self. On the other hand, within a collective consciousness the identity of one person's interests with those of another is so assumed that it does not become a matter to be debated and explicitly asserted or denied—which is not to say that people within such a culture do not argue about the course the collective should take, but rather do not frame the debate in terms of good or not to a particular self decontextualised from the relations that constitute the collective. Cf. esp. Leenhardt (1947) 153–155 for the contrast between the relational tribal self and the decontextualised self of modernity. The reflexivisation of ethical relations is considered further below, especially in the section on Democritus.

be counted on for anything, it is to help themselves. It seems natural that one should know their own needs and advantage and be able to see to them better than to those of others. Plato reverses this intuition: the no-good, immoral man, when acting out of apparent self-interest, is in fact not acting in his own self-interest at all but is corrupting his soul and thereby his very principle of being. Put differently, we could say that being αὐτῷ βέλτερος is traditionally almost true by definition, so that the Platonic negation of it is a powerful conceptual iconoclasm. So too Theognis' denial of it within this traditional context amplifies the emphasis of αὐτῷ: 'He is not even of service to himself.' Coupled with the fragment of Mimnermus considered above, both these fragments are inchoate forms of what will later become important philosophical ideas. Both involve innovative contextual use of the reflexive and suggest a rethink of the relation between self and value.

In the third couplet, if it is authentic, we have the first example in Greek literature of the emphatic combination of αὐτός as intensifier and the reflexive.³⁵ The usual argument is that poems addressed to Cyrnus are by Theognis,³⁶ and thus quite ancient, which would suggest that this is indeed an historic couplet. The phrase αὐτός ἐν αὐτῷ seems to designate a particularly innate form of possession. The best thing to possess in and of oneself—i.e. independent of wealth, friends, or generally of anything originating outside the individual—is intelligence.³⁷ Anticipating the use of the intensified reflexive in Plato to distinguish forms, one could of course be more philosophical: man αὐτός ἐν αὐτῷ is man in the abstract, man divested of external adventitious characteristics and in his essence, whose γνώμη is his best property. Thinking man in this way certainly begins to sketch the outline of a self as an abstract philosophical category—a formal concept rather than a complex.³⁸ Also significant is the prepositional phrase 'in oneself', which delimits an internal

³⁵ For the idiom we may compare the combination of *svayam* (analogous to αὐτός) and *tanū-* (analogous to ἐαυτ-) in Vedic Sanskrit, for which see Pinault (2001) 188f. The construction in both is especially emphatic. Other early examples are found in Epicharmus (fr. 158.4, 264.1, 279.2, 295.2 PCG; the first is genuine, the others doubtful).

³⁶ Edmonds (1931) 7–8.

³⁷ Given Theognis' aristocratic sympathies, this interpretation would be particularly apt.

³⁸ Note especially the use of αὐτός as ontological intensifier to mark out the *idea* of man—rather than, as in Homer, an embodied instantiation of man as opposed to his disembodied ψυχή. The distinction between concept and complex, and the consequence of the turn towards a *conceptual* anthropology, is discussed below, pp. 212–213.

psychological space. This place becomes home to essential properties and psychological activities and as such defines a domain of the self.³⁹

Like Theognis, Pindar too does not know the complex reflexive and uses αὐτός instead. He infers this moral from a catalogue of the hubristic crimes of Ixion, with special view to his attempts on Hera:

χρὴ δὲ κατ' αὐτὸν αἰεὶ παντὸς ὄρᾱν μέτρον. (P. 2.34)

One must always observe the measure of everything in accordance with oneself.

Pindar seems to have generalised the marriage advice of Pittacus, given by way of analogy and narrated in an epigram of Callimachus quoted by Diogenes Laertius, into a universal principle:⁴⁰

τὴν κατὰ σαντὸν [βέμβικα] ἔλα. (D.L. 1.80)

Whip the spinning-top that's in your own area.

The advice to pursue a bride who lies within your own limits and accords with your social station, is thus transformed by Pindar into an epistemological principle to be applied in every quarter of life. Gildersleeve glosses the phrase in more pragmatic terms: 'to take one's own measure in every plan of life.'⁴¹ On one level Pindar's advice may be read as yet another paraphrase of an entirely traditional idea, namely the need to know one's inferiority, be it to gods or other men. It is a notion that found expression in as many and variegated ways as the Greek genius could afford. Yet the particular formulation offered here is perhaps novel in its use of a reflexive and may pave the way for an expression of epistemological relativism. For removed from its context, and shifting the modality of χρὴ from deontic to epistemic, this verse of Pindar's could well be a relativistic slogan: 'it is a matter of factual necessity, i.e. it has to be the case that one measures things not objectively but according to oneself.' One's self influences the outcome of the measurement.

In the thirteenth Olympian ode, wherein Pindar celebrates the various myths that touch on the city of Corinth, he names Medea in the following fashion:

³⁹ It also opens up a space for the housing of essence generally. Cf. e.g. Juv. 1.3.12–13: *nil habet infelix paupertas durius in se | quam quod ridiculos homines facit* "luckless poverty has in itself nothing harsher than the fact that it makes men the object of ridicule."

⁴⁰ See Gildersleeve (1895) ad P. 2.34.

⁴¹ Ibid.

καὶ τὰν πατρός ἀντία Μήδειαν θεμέναν γάμον αὐτᾶ (Pi. O. 13.53)
and Medea, who against her father's will made a marriage *for herself*.

Here the reflexive is clearly unexpected and emphatic, appearing despite the cultural custom that a woman ought never to contract a marriage for herself against the will of her father. In fact all the uses of αὐτός as a reflexive in Pindar and Theognis are emphatic/contrastive; since these appear the only type of reflexive in either author, it is a reasonable inference that reflexives are usually emphatic. Superficially the emphasis is a product of αὐτός' intensive semantics. But the reason why we have an emphatic form in the first place is because the construction depicts an event-type which, according to conceptual and cultural conventions, is not normally reflexive. The use of the complex reflexive is often emphatic when construed with certain verbs it is rarely object to.

4. Conclusions

The first use of a reflexive pronoun psychologically occurs in this period, ἔμ' αὐτὰ τοῦτ' ἔγων σύνοιδα (Sapph. fr. 26.11–12 LP).

In the dialects of some writers the complex reflexive has grammaticalised, in others αὐτός by itself is used reflexively. The grammaticalisation strongly suggests increasing use of the reflexive. This is possibly due to the rise of individualism in this age which promotes emphatic distinction between self and other and the appropriation of other-directed structures by the self.

Reflexivisation of other-directed verbs such as σύνοιδα and μετέχω points to the conception of new kinds of self-relation. In these cases the reflexive can be omitted and the general sense still maintained, so that the reflexive's presence proposes a subtly different event structure. When we compare the notions of 'sharing in something' and 'sharing in something with oneself', or 'knowing something' and 'knowing something with oneself', we see that the latter of each pair portrays a relationship between the subject and a differentiated self while the former does not. This distinction may be referred to Kemmer's distinction between middle and direct (in our terms, pronominal or transitive) reflexivity.

The reinterpretation of such events as comprising a relation with an abstract self is evidence for the construction of a new type of subject for whom pronominal reflexive acts are becoming essential.

We witness the first combination of the intensive and reflexive—in Theognis, where it refers to an internal space within the subject for the containment of abstract ideas. As above, we must distinguish between ‘The best thing a man may possess is judgment’ and ‘The best thing a man may possess αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ is judgment’. The former does not abstract the subject, while the latter seeks to essentialise it as a concept or form. Theognis thus anticipates the philosophers’ investigations into the subject conceived as just such a space, usually hypostasised as soul.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE PRESOCRATICS

1. *Preliminaries*

I consider in this section thinkers found in Diels and Kranz's edition of the Presocratic fragments. I have already suggested that the growth of the PRS was to prove particularly fertile for philosophy. It is in this field, and in its literary incarnation as the subjective narration in which a subject is prone to muse at length on its own psychological condition, that the reflexive pronoun has prospered more than any other. It has been suggested too that the pronominal nature of this reflexivity, and its partaking of transitive structures, has determined in no small way the nature of the reflexive being so constructed, as a transcendental entity directing action towards itself. The myriad philosophical applications of reflexivity will be considered more deeply in the chapter on Plato, but a start must be made here with the Presocratics.

Although surviving material is very fragmentary, enough remains to get a sense of reflexivity's important role in the thought of the Presocratics. I argue here that their creative and diverse use of reflexivity in interesting new ways, and especially their use of it in depicting foundational entities and the normative human subject, evinces the semantic productivity of the PRS and the development of a new type of self-interested subject for a new type of socio-economic structure, the urban city-state. The reflection of man's reflexivity in his idealised objects of thought and philosophical ἀρχαί demonstrates his new conception of himself and the further reduction of other-directed to self-directed relations.

2. *Heraclitus*

A good place to begin is an enigmatic saying attributed by Stobaeus (3.1.180a Wachsmuth) to Socrates, but which Diels reattributed to Heraclitus on the basis of apparent derivations of the saying in the Hippocratic corpus and recurrence of the concept λόγος τῆς ψυχῆς in B45. It reads:¹

¹ For further discussion of its attribution see Kahn (1979) 237, with references.

ψυχῆς ἐστι λόγος ἐαυτὸν αὖξων

(B₁₁₅ DK)

Soul has a *logos* which increases *itself*.

Λόγος is for the moment best left untranslated as its precise meaning is a matter of some controversy. The difficulty lies in its historical semantic development. Indeed there is scarcely another word in the Greek lexicon that goes through so transformative a semantic odyssey as λόγος, and in a way so crucial to the origins of philosophy. The transition is, put briefly, from the sense of *what is said*, be it *an account, story, description* to *reason*. Is Heraclitus using the word in the former and traditional way, in which case the saying would seem to express the difficulty of giving a definitive account of soul? Just when he thinks he has grasped it, there always appears more to say.² Read thus the saying has a mystical flavour not dissimilar to expressions of the profound unaccountability of god. Or is the sense of λόγος not objective in this way, that is as an account about soul, but is λόγος rather possessed by soul as its own principle, its own *facultas legendi*, and of a special kind that can increase itself? With such transitional thinkers as Heraclitus we are left with the dilemma of assimilation to the past or future, of over- and under-interpretation.³

Let me first say that the mechanics of transition from sense one to sense two are often not fully appreciated. To my mind the primary shift is the slippage between what is said about a thing and why that thing admits of such an account. By this move the reason an account can be given of a thing is because that account is somehow internal to the thing as ordered structure. In other words, I can talk about something because that thing exhibits an order which allows me to understand and talk about it. It has λόγος. Λόγος thus becomes the mute precondition for any account.

Marcovich (1967) ad loc. argues against the attribution of this fragment to Heraclitus, and also against reading λόγος, as Diels does, in the sense of reason rather than physical proportion (but see n. 3 below). Attribution to Socrates might be supported by a passage from Plato, below n. 4. Since I am concerned with the *development* of reflexive ideas, the question for me is not so much the fragment's author as its antiquity. Being plausibly at least coeval with Socrates, I include it here for discussion.

² This reading is supported by the sense of λόγος in B₄₅, below pp. 121–122.

³ For the different meanings of λόγος see Guthrie (1967) 420–424. Miller (1981) 68 collapses them into the two broad groupings of *oratio* and *ratio* meanings. Burnet (1892) 133 rejected the imputation of the latter to Heraclitus, but following Jaeger (1947) 116, who interprets λόγος in certain instances as 'divine law', more recent scholarship has preferred *ratio* readings (see Miller (1981) 167–169 for references), or at least some transitional mediation of old and new senses (see e.g. Nussbaum (1972b) 14–15).

If I cannot talk about something, it's because that thing's behaviour does not satisfy the conditions of language; it is unruly, chaotic, and illogical.

Is the self-increasing language of soul an allusion to the intellectual development and ongoing self-exploration of a philosopher in training? We note again that we have a transitive reflexive and not a middle reflexive construction. This λόγος which increases itself is actively involved in the process of growth. Its growth is not spontaneous but deliberate and self-determining, just as Socratic care of the self. The soul is resourceful enough that it may develop itself without need of outside help. A reasoning soul is sufficient for working out the truth of a matter.

In any case, this fragment is the first extant attribution of a reflexive activity to soul. This is important as Plato and later philosophers, including those of our own era, would conceive of soul (or later self) as essentially engaged in reflexive acts, whether it be self-movement, self-consciousness, self-determination, etc. Many scholars see Heraclitus as one of the first to begin moving in this direction of reflexivity. For example Robb writes:

What is remarkable here, and emphasised, is the *logos* of *psyche* is *self*-expanding, that is, interior to the *psyche* and not imposed from the outside; the mental improvement proceeds from within as a concomitant of self-generated effort and is not cast into the *psyche* (or *noos* or *phren*) from without by some deity, the standard Homeric manner of conceptualizing all mental initiative. The activity which results in the self-augmenting of *logos* is, then, both the self-exploration of the inner cosmos, i.e., one's own mental and speech acts, and the exploration of the *logos* of the external cosmos.⁴

⁴ Robb (1986) 338–339. See also Nussbaum (1972b) 169. A passage which should perhaps be linked to the self-increasing λόγος is Pl. *Phdr.* 276e6–277a4, which features a similar metaphor. Socrates describes the dialectician's planting of self-helping λόγοι within an interlocutor's soul, which bloom into great happiness and in turn spawn λόγοι in others in an undying process of dissemination: φυτεύη τε καὶ στείρη μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους, οἱ ἑαυτοῖς τῷ τε φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἱκανοὶ καὶ οὐχὶ ἀκαρποὶ ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα, ὅθεν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἦθ' εἰσι φυτόμενοι τοῦτ' αἰὲ ἀθάνατον παρέχειν ἱκανοί, καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦντες εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατόν μάλιστα "the dialectician plants and sows with knowledge words which are capable of helping *themselves* and the one who planted them, and are not fruitless but contain seed from which other words grow in the soil of other characters—words capable of rendering this seed forever immortal and making its possessor happy to the extent possible for a human being." The self-growing λόγος is endlessly self-generating like nature, both intra- and inter-subjectively.

Robb thus seems to see the soul's self-increasing λόγος as representing reflection upon oneself using λόγος as a faculty—a notion which would also cover Heraclitus' search for himself.⁵ In addition, that this self-increasing λόγος belongs to soul also redefines the nature of its possessor.⁶ Soul has a special type of λόγος, one which is self-increasing, and in this may be said to unite the *oratio* and *ratio* senses of the word, for when it reflects upon itself it is the subject of λόγος as that which speaks or reasons while at the same time the object of this reasoning, all in a process that goes through developmental growth.⁷

In another fragment a reflexive is used to express one of his most famous ideas: the unity and connectedness of opposites.

οὐ ξυνιᾶσιν ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογέει· παλίντροπος ἄρμονίη
ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης. (B51 DK)

They don't understand how differing it agrees with *itself*; a back-turning harmony like the bow's or lyre's.

The exact intention of the analogy has perplexed commentators. Translation of ἄρμονίη in the inherited modern sense of attunement, whereby different pitches agree with each other as steps in the same scale, fits the lyre but not the bow. In its root sense ἄρμονίη simply means a fitting-together, broad enough to cover everything from a ship's joint and a betrothal to a musical scale.⁸ Thus some have suggested that it is the construction or *framework* of the bow and lyre meant by ἄρμονίη. As Snyder argues, the neck of the ancient lyre was not straight like a guitar, but curved, so that in profile it describes part of a circle just as the limbs of a bow.⁹ According to her ἄρμονίη is to be taken in a visual sense: '[T]he opposite ends of each object, while apparently tending away from each other, nevertheless partake of the unity of a circle.' However Vlastos, in keeping with the dynamism of Heraclitus' cosmos, understands the framework not to represent a static visual image but rather the bow

⁵ I have deferred discussion of this fragment to pp. 121–122, 244–246.

⁶ Snell (1953) 17 claims that Heraclitus is the first writer to feature the new concept of soul as the central faculty which unites all the others. In Ch. 2.3 I suggested the connection of this meaning of soul to new uses of the complex reflexive, and this is exactly what one finds in this fragment.

⁷ I see in this idea the lineaments of a definition of thought as a dialogue of soul with itself. Heraclitus may be trying to depict the peculiar nature of philosophical thought, which develops a λόγος or theory mostly through pure reflection.

⁸ Vlastos (1955) 350.

⁹ Snyder (1984) 92–93.

and lyre's *modus operandi*. Both do their work at the moment the plucking finger or drawing hand releases the string and it begins to move in the opposite direction.¹⁰

Heraclitus joins the other Presocratics in asserting the underlying unity of the world, but differs in claiming that that unity is not so much despite the apparent disagreement between its entities, but almost because of it. In fact it is likely that the participle διαφερόμενον in the fragment is causal and not simply attributive or concessive. Such a reading would certainly testify to his notorious obscurantism and sympathy for the paradoxical: agreement is achieved precisely through difference, albeit a special type of harmonic difference.

The exact interpretation of the fragment and the analogy within it does not concern us so much as his invocation of the concept of self-agreement. Reflexive use of the verb ὁμολογέω becomes especially important for philosophy. Whether one is talking about the cogency of an argument or whatever is ontologically highest in a particular philosophical system, self-agreement seems a necessary property of truth. It is telling too that we find this even in the case of Heraclitus, the philosopher who otherwise most emphasises difference. There is a literal sense in which ὁμολογέω means to have the same λόγος as another. If this self-agreement is a property of the world as a whole, then its λόγος must be a ξυνὸς λόγος, 'a common λόγος'. Now if the verb ὁμολογέω can be applied to things which do not speak in the concrete sense as a human speaks, then the λόγος inherent in this verb must be meant in what I have called the subjective sense. A (non-human) thing which agrees with itself has an internal consistency that may be understood by humans and reflected in their account of it. Thus the use of ὁμολογέω as in fragment B51 suggests that λόγος has taken on some of the connotations that would see it approach the meaning of 'reason', or more generally a condition of language. Without this extension, application of a notion such as 'speaking the same as' to non-speaking things is nonsensical. The two senses of λόγος in any metaphysics which holds self-agreement as a condition of truth combine. Working from language to the world, this metaphysics holds that an account of the world which does not agree with itself, i.e. is contradictory, cannot describe what is the case; working from the world to language, a world which cannot yield an account which agrees with itself, cannot be the case.

¹⁰ Vlastos (1955) 351.

3. *The Cosmology/Ontology of Parmenides and Anaxagoras*

With Parmenides and Anaxagoras we see a use of the reflexive emerge which will eventually give us the philosophical ‘in itself’ so important for fundamental ontology. In the beginning it characterises the behaviour of substances and entities imagined physically rather than as conceptual abstractions. In Parmenides at least this particular reflexivity is, it seems to me, a logical consequence of philosophy’s attempt to think existence as a whole. If one sums all of Being, then any relation exhibited by this totality will have to be reflexive, since there is nothing left over as an other with which to relate instead. Although the self-relation of Being in Parmenides is not logically derived, such an argument seems the natural logical exegesis of his intuitions. The relevant passage reads:

τῷ ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἔστιν· ἐὼν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει.
 Αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν
 ἔστιν ἀναρχον ἄπαστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος
 τῇλε μάλ’ ἐπλάχθησαν, ἀπώσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθής.
 ταῦτόν τ’ ἐν ταῦτῳ τε μένον καθ’ ἑαυτό τε κείται
 χοῦτως ἔμπεδον αὐθι μένει. (B8.25–30 DK)

Therefore it is all united, for Being draws near to Being. Further, it is changeless in the coils of huge bonds, without beginning or cessation, since becoming and perishing have strayed very far away, thrust back by authentic conviction; remaining the same and in the same state, it lies *by itself* and remains thus where it is perpetually.¹¹

Being is by itself, remaining the same and in the same place. This last sentence also connects αὐτός as an attributive adjective and the cognate reflexive pronoun. If we were to again flesh out Parmenides’ conclusions logically, then, since whatever is by itself does not interact with anything else, it cannot import difference from outside and so must remain the same.

Further on in this fragment Being is compared to the mass of the sphere. This is one of the first examples of philosophy’s affection for the sphere as the geometric paradigm of reflexivity, in that it is self-contained, equal to itself in all directions:

οὔτε γὰρ οὐκ ἐὼν ἔστι, τό κεν παύοι μιν ἰκνεῖσθαι
 εἰς ὁμόν, οὐτ’ ἐὼν ἔστιν ὅπως εἴη κεν ἐόντος
 τῇ μᾶλλον τῇ δ’ ἴσσον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἔστιν ἄσυλον·
 οἷ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἴσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει. (B8.46–49 DK)

¹¹ Trans. McKirahan (2009).

For neither has Not-being any being which could halt the coming together of Being, nor is Being capable of being more than Being in one regard and less in another, since it is all inviolate. For it is equal with *itself* from every view and encounters determination all alike.¹²

In the last line we see the old reflexive use of the simple pronoun without αὐτός. Later, in his *Timaeus*, Plato describes the motion of the philosophising, self-reflexive soul as appropriately circular—it revolves ‘in itself and around itself’. Common to both Parmenides and Plato then is geometrical modelling of important entities in dimensions of reflexive circularity and self-identity.¹³ The entities so modelled are high, if not highest, in their respective ontologies. But is there a connection between the two? Why is it that soul should take on the same characteristics as Being, or indeed of the cosmos as a whole? As the highest principle in the human, soul mirrors the highest principle in the world through a macro-/microcosmic analogy.¹⁴ In one of his notoriously enigmatic statements, Parmenides appears to intimate a philosophical basis for this isomorphism:

¹² Trans. McKirahan (2009).

¹³ When Parmenides turns to discuss mortal opinion, which divides the cosmos into ethereal fire and dark night, the former is likewise characterised by self-identity, ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ πάντοσε τοῦτόν “the same as itself in every direction” (B8.57). Note too Empedocles’ depiction of the divine sphere, in which Jaeger (1947) 141 sees the partial conservation of Parmenides’ notion of Being: οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ νότιοιο δύο κλάδοι αἰσσοῦνται, | οὐ πόδες, οὐ θοὰ γούνα, οὐ μήδεα γεννήεντα, | ἀλλὰ σφαῖρος ἔην καὶ [πάντοθεν] ἴσος ἑαυτῷ “for two arms don’t spring forth from its back, no feet, no nimble knees, no reproductive organs—but it was a sphere and equal to *itself* on [on all sides]” (B29). Minar (1963) 133 claims that ‘the idea of sphericity, as applied to gods, was for Empedocles related rather to an anti-anthropomorphic ideal, to the self-equality, consistency, and actual or potential omnipresence of divinity than to any homogeneous or motionless quality’. But the philosopher’s conception of the form of man as mind rather than body means that the apparent anti-anthropomorphic ideal is really a new kind of anthropomorphism underpinned by a new construction of man. The god becomes an idealised philosopher. If Darcus (1977), (1977b) is correct in identifying the sphere with the holy φρῆν of B134, then we have yet another case of the mind’s transfiguration as geometric reflexivity.

¹⁴ So in later, and especially Stoic philosophy, the self-identity of Being, Mind, etc., becomes an onto-ethical human ideal: one should strive to become identical and equal to oneself by practicing *constantia*. Thus Seneca: *Homines multi tales sunt qualem hunc describit Horatius Flaccus, numquam eundem, ne similem quidem sibi; adeo in diversum aberrat* “many men are such as Horace describes this man: never the same, not even similar to *himself*, so greatly does he deviate into difference” (*Epistle* 120.21). Cf. also *Epistle* 120.22, where being *inpar sibi* is considered the ultimate disgrace. Whether the Presocratics also discussed identity with oneself as a human ideal, or applied it only to preeminent cosmological entities, is shrouded in silence—but it is present in a fragment of Euripides (fr. 963 *TrGF*, quoted below p. 175).

τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι.

(B3 DK)

for the same thing is for conceiving as is for being.¹⁵

Leaving aside any attempt at a definitive analysis of this ridiculously vexed line, let us merely stake out the position that it claims some deep relation of being and thinking.¹⁶ This would entail that one could arrive at the structure of Being through an examination of the structure of thinking and its agent the soul, and vice versa. Another way of saying this is that thinking provides a reliable route to being—which would seem a necessary presupposition for philosophy of any kind.¹⁷ Parmenides furnishes an ontology to house Thales' intuition that 'there is continuity between the mind and the world out there that the mind thinks'.¹⁸

Parmenides' rough contemporary Anaxagoras characterises the cosmological element νοῦς in terms echoing his own characterisation of being.¹⁹ The difference is that νοῦς is one element among others and not Being as a whole. Νοῦς set the world in order, knows about everything, and has power over everything. Unlike the other elements, it does not partake in the various mixtures but remains by itself:

¹⁵ Trans. McKirahan (2009).

¹⁶ For an able history of this line's interpretation see Long (1996). It hinges on whether the infinitives should be read as old datives—in which case it states that the object of thinking and the subject of being are the same—or substantival subjects of the ἐστί—in which case it states that thinking and being are the same. Those favouring the former have often done so in order to avoid foisting on Parmenides an allegedly anachronistic idealism. But that Being has Mind, a necessary consequence of the latter reading, is, as Long argues, a completely natural position within Presocratic philosophy: reality is intelligent for all of these thinkers.

¹⁷ By the same token, as has often been remarked, it would also provide a metaphysical foundation for the reality of logical truth. If mind cannot think a λόγος that contains contradiction (e.g. that what is not is), then it cannot be the case, because what cannot be thought cannot be (stated more formally, where the first assumption listed is one possible logical representation of B3, then: $\forall x (\Diamond \text{Exists}(x) \Leftrightarrow \Diamond \text{Be thought}(x)), \neg \Diamond \text{Be thought}(a) \vdash \Box \neg \text{Exists}(a)$). Cf. Heidegger (1968) 242: '[This saying] becomes the basic theme of all Western-European thinking and the history of that thinking is at bottom a sequence of variations on this theme, even where Parmenides' saying is not specifically cited.'

¹⁸ Roachnick (1990) 138.

¹⁹ Coxon (1986) rightly derives Anaxagoras' depiction of νοῦς as μόνος αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑωυτοῦ and πᾶς ὁμοίος from Parmenides' description of Being as μουνογενές, καθ' ἑαυτό, and πᾶν ὁμοίον. Cf. Long (1986) 143. As argued in Ch. 7, Plato's characterisation of the forms as αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό continues this tradition.

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει, νοῦς δὲ ἔστιν ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ μέμεικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑωυτοῦ ἔστιν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ τειωὶ ἐμέμεικτο ἄλλωι, μετεῖχεν ἂν ἁπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμεικτό τειωὶ ἐν παντί γὰρ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστιν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μοι λέλεκται· καὶ ἂν ἐκώλυνεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμειγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως ὥς καὶ μόνον ἔοντα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. ἔστι γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον· καὶ ὅσα γε ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω, πάντων νοῦς κρατεῖ. (B12 DK)

The other entities have a share in everything, however mind is infinite and *self-ruled* and has been mixed with nothing, but is alone *itself by itself*. For if it wasn't *by itself* but had been mixed with something else, it would have a share in everything, if indeed it had been mixed with something. For in everything there is a share of everything, as I just said, and the things mixed with mind would in that case prevent it from having power over anything in the same way as it has now by being alone *by itself*. Since it is the most rarefied and purest of all things, has absolute intelligence about everything, and has the greatest power. Mind holds sway over all things which have soul, both greater and smaller.

Anaxagoras argues that it is precisely because νοῦς stays 'itself by itself' that it has power over other things; if it were to mix with them they would hinder it. It appears too that its purity is linked to this isolation and freedom from mixture.²⁰ We do not have space here for an investigation of the primitive association of purity and lack of mixture (cf. ἀ-κέραιος, ἀ-κήρατος in their evaluative sense of 'incorrupt, guileless, upright') except to say that religious ideas of purity may well have informed a conception of the in-itself and ensured its connection to the divine. Divinity is thought as a primeval self-sufficiency that does not deign to corrupt itself by coming into contact with others.

Besides the reflexive phrase ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ we have the compound reflexive αὐτοκρατὲς. As in other passages, what we are dealing with here is a whole network of reflexivity. The attribute 'self-controlling' is connected to the fact that νοῦς is αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑωυτοῦ. One may first observe that ἐπί with the genitive can be used in the sense of authority *over* something, or,

²⁰ Conversely, for everything other than νοῦς the following holds: οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἔστιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει. ὅτε τοῦλάχιστον μὴ ἔστιν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν δύνατο χωρισθῆναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὅπωςπερ ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ νῦν πάντα ὁμοῦ (B6). It would not be possible for anything to be separated and come to be by itself.

somewhat conversely, on condition of something.²¹ Since it does not partake in relations with another, it cannot be ruled by another, so must rule itself. However this line of thinking quickly deconstructs itself or leads to the conception of the reflexive entity as hermetically sealed, inviting the same criticisms Parmenides would make of the self-relating forms in Plato's dialogue.²² If relations with another are ruled out, then not only should a thing such as *voũς* not be ruled by another, but it should also not rule another itself. A purely reflexive entity that was by itself in the extreme would engage with nothing, and like Lucretius' gods or the Hindus' Brahman, have nothing to do with the world. It would go the way of everything abstracted into itself: into the ether and never to be seen again.

In order to rescue any such concept from a solipsistic singularity that is beyond communication, some types of other-relation must be permitted. This is typically done by claiming that the only relations it has with others are ones in which it determines them rather than they determining it. The only relations in which it is determined are ones in which it is determined by itself. Hence it determines others but is determined only by itself. This effectively means that such a being always remains a subject because even when it is determined it is also present as a subject in a reflexive construction. A being with these properties, one defined by pure activity and the lack of all forms of passivity that are not reflexive, is an important philosophical invention, and versions of it can be found far and wide in the history of philosophy.

Given Parmenides' deep relation of being (*εἶναι*) and thinking (*voεῖν*), Anaxagoras' characterisation of *voũς* (the verbal agent noun from *voεῖν*) in terms similar to Parmenides' characterisation of Being is quite likely more than accidental.²³ The qualities of Being, or what is, have been transferred to thinking or *voũς* as that which thinks, and Parmenides' theory of their relation would seem to provide just such a conduit for this transference.²⁴ For a modern theorisation of the interdependence

²¹ LSJ s.v. *ἐπί* A III 1, 3. What is powerful can alternatively be understood as either above others or as the very ground or condition of others.

²² See below pp. 202–203.

²³ For Anaxagoras' debt to Parmenides, and his adoption of the connection between what is and what is knowable, see especially Curd (2007) 192–205.

²⁴ I am not so concerned here with the debate regarding the extent of Parmenides' idealism (or whether he was an idealist at all) beyond the claim that his equation of being and thinking at the very least sets up an isomorphic relation between the two that allows for inferences about reality on the basis of pure thought.

of being and thinking we may compare Žižek's metaphorical use of the concept of parallax in physics, which captures the way in which a change in the observer's line of sight changes the apparent orientation of the observed object relative to other objects:

The philosophical twist to be added of course, is that the observed distance is not simply subjective, since the same object which exists 'out there' is seen from two different stances, or points of view. It is rather that, as Hegel would have put it, subject and object are inherently mediated so that an 'epistemological' shift in the subject's point of view always reflects an ontological shift in the object itself. Or—to put it in Lacanese—the subject's gaze is always-already inscribed into the perceived object itself, in the guise of its 'blind spot,' that which is 'in the object more than object itself,' the point from which the object itself returns the gaze. Sure the picture is in my eye, but I am also in the picture.²⁵

Correlating epistemology and ontology is exactly what Parmenides is doing by linking νοῦν and εἶναι. By a kind of intellectual anthropomorphism, the early philosophers propose objective substances that are nevertheless given form or 'inscribed' by their human subjects—an anthropomorphism not so much of man's body as man's mind, since for the philosopher man's form is a thinking being. To extend Xenophanes' famous comment, as the horse would draw an equine god, the thinking man imagines a thinking god.²⁶ Mind (νοῦς) attracts the qualities of Being (τὸ ὄν) and vice versa.

One of the major ways in which this correlation manifests itself is in the linkage of the reflexive subject with the thing-in-itself. To borrow Žižek's Lacanese, it is the inscription of the reflexivity of the subject in the object that produces the reflexive object as the thing-in-itself. This particular correlation shows itself clearly in the similar depictions of the thinking subject and what it thinks about that we see in a comparison of Parmenides and Anaxagoras. In Plato I hope to show that the concept of a form as a thing-in-itself depends on the concept of the soul as a reflexive entity and that one is the dialectical reflection of the other.

²⁵ Žižek (2006) 16.

²⁶ Ironically, this is exactly how Xenophanes himself envisages god: ἀλλ' ἀπάνευθε πόνου νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει (B25). Cf. below n. 76.

4. *Antiphon the Sophist*

Stobaeus (4.22b.66 Wachsmuth) quotes a lengthy fragment from the *Περὶ ὁμοιοίας* of Antiphon the sophist²⁷ that contains a striking use of the reflexive. The fragment questions the wisdom of marriage since it involves taking on the daily cares of another in addition to the surfeit of one's own. The relevant section reads:

ἐγὼ γάρ, εἴ μοι γένοιτο σῶμα ἕτερον τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐγὼ ἑμαυτῷ, οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ζῆν, οὕτως ἑμαυτῷ πολλὰ πράγματα παρέχων ὑπέρ τε τῆς ὑγείας τοῦ σώματος ὑπέρ τε τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίου ἐς τὴν συλλογὴν ὑπέρ τε δόξης καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ εὐκλείας καὶ τοῦ εὖ ἀκούειν. τί οὖν, εἴ μοι γένοιτο σῶμα ἕτερον τοιοῦτον, ὃ γέ μοι οὕτως ἐπιμελὲς εἴη; οὐκ οὐκ δὴ γινώσκω, ὅτι γυνὴ ἀνδρί, ἐὰν ᾗ καταθυμία, οὐδὲν ἐλάττους τὰς φιλότητας παρέχεται καὶ τὰς ὁδύνας ἢ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὑπέρ τε τῆς ὑγείας δισσοῶν σωμάτων ὑπέρ τε τοῦ βίου τῆς συλλογῆς [καὶ] ὑπέρ τε τῆς σωφροσύνης καὶ τῆς εὐκλείας; (F49 ll. 19–32 Pendrick)

If I were to have a second person like the one I am for *myself*, I would not be able to live, so many troubles do I cause *myself* for the sake of bodily health, for the sake of daily livelihood (for its collection), and for the sake of honor, prudence, glory, and reputation. What, then, if I were to have a second such person, who would be an object of such care? Is it not clear that if a wife is according to her husband's heart, she causes him no fewer pleasures and pains than he causes himself, for the sake of the health of two bodies, for the sake of the collection of their livelihood, and for the sake of prudence and glory?²⁸

In the interesting first sentence, Pendrick translates σῶμα as 'person' and ἑμαυτῷ as a dative of reference. This first use of the reflexive, if it is sound,²⁹ requires that it refer to a subject of consciousness or perspective, distinguished dualistically from a body. Such dative reflexives, where they encode a point of consciousness, present an individual's existence as a kind of self-relation in a way that approaches Sartre's concept of being-for-itself. One is not something simply—what one is is complicated by being brought into relation with a further subject of consciousness.

²⁷ For the major points of controversy over the identity or confusion of Antiphon the sophist with Antiphon of Rhamnus, the speech-writer and oligarch, see Pendrick's (2002) introduction. He was apparently a rough contemporary of Socrates, with whom, according to Xenophon, he had a series of conversations.

²⁸ Trans. Pendrick (2002).

²⁹ See *ibid.* ad loc. for the various proposals to delete or supplement the reflexive. But examples like *E. Alc.* 685, *Men. Mon.* 132 Edmonds, *Ov. Met.* 8.72–73 etc. should remove any difficulty.

This in effect destabilises the initial predication due to the usual requirement of disjunction in an act of perspective taking: what I am to myself I cannot really be, otherwise I would simply be what I am.³⁰

The type of reflexive relation set up in this first sentence is abstract and highly philosophical. It is the relation of one to oneself in the most general terms possible. In the following lines other reflexives appear and the relation is contextualised as daily self-maintenance, a job that provides the self with much trouble, pleasures and pains. 'Trouble' is the usual translation of *πράγματα* when construed with *παρέχω*, but more literally it means business, things that require attention and work. Self-maintenance thus provides much to work on and exhausts the conscientious man's energies. Antiphon is presenting here the worldly counterpart of the Platonic *ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ*. The body/person/'I' is *ἐπιμελής*, an object of care. In this environment there again appears a subject to whom this job of reflexive caring falls, and who is separated out from this object of care as transcendental. This subject conceives of existence as a prolonged occupation with self-relation or self-maintenance. Farenga's analysis of the subject splitting involved in this passage matches our own in many respects, especially in its theoretical aspects:

The first self hypothetically creates the second, and in order to place the second, as a simulacrum or image of itself, within the frames of *physis* and then *nomos*. It then observes this self-image as though it were a double, both familiar and alien ... This first, reflexive self is ephemeral too, existing only in the speech act and in the hypothetical moment of this thought experiment. Here Antiphon captures beautifully the operation of Mead's "I" as it evaluates, in a performative attitude that is also a burst of self-conscious, the conventional roles from which the "me" must choose if it wishes not merely to survive but to achieve recognition from the dominant social other.³¹

³⁰ Further uses of this existential reflexive are considered in Ch. 6, p. 153. Insofar as it is a being-for-itself, the human of Sartre's philosophy can never simply coincide with its essence, in the manner say of a stone, but is left incomplete. This is the modern's curse as well as his salvation: what one is is contingent and forever open to redefinition. One is, as Odysseus is, a Nobody, i.e. one whose essence is beyond the determination of names. For Odysseus in the guise of nobody as the prototype of the modern subject, see Horkheimer and Adorno (1947) 60. Cf. Peradotto (1990) 152: 'The true individual is nameless or withholds his name; he is Outis.' Odysseus represents a new type of subject, one which negates the heroic culture of *κλέος* as a function of appellation (*καλεῖσθαι*). Just as the transcendental subject of modernity is beyond objectification, so too is it beyond naming *qua* objectification.

³¹ (2006) 465.

Farenga's use of Mead's ontology is welcome because Mead himself explicitly equated his 'I' with Kant's transcendental subject.³² His point that this transcendental 'I' is temporarily created during the thought experiment is also fortunate, since it supports my argument that this type of self is a product of internalised reflexivity. Its construction as an ontological category is encouraged by the practice of evaluating oneself from a distance in the performance of different social roles.³³ With reflexivity such roles are no longer the dominant mode of existence, compulsory scripts dictated by society. The human being, in addition to being for another and open to determination by this other, becomes for itself and open to determination and evaluation by that self as a more radically autonomous subject.

A reflexive evaluation and conception of the task of human existence, this time with a more normative bent, appears again in another quotation from *Περὶ ὁμοιοῦς* by Stobaeus (3.20.66 Wachsmuth). The fragment doubts the rationality of harming others and expecting to be successful without suffering oneself. The portion relevant to us reads:

ἐλπίδες δ' οὐ πανταχοῦ ἀγαθόν· πολλοὺς γὰρ τοιαῦται ἐλπίδες κατέβαλον εἰς ἀνηκέστους συμφοράς, ἃ δ' ἐδόκουν τοὺς πέλας ποιήσιν, παθόντες ταῦτα ἀνεφάνησαν αὐτοί. σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνδρὸς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλου ὀρθότερόν τις κρίνειεν ἢ ὅστις τοῦ θυμοῦ ταῖς παραχρήμα ἡδοναῖς ἐμφράσσει αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν κρατεῖν τε καὶ νικᾶν ἡδυνήθη αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν.
(F58.8–14 Pendrick)

Hopes aren't a good thing in every case. For such hopes have cast many into incurable misfortune, and what they thought they would do to their fellows they are in the end shown to have suffered themselves. One couldn't ascribe self-control to another man with better judgement than to he who makes *himself* impregnable to the immediate desires of his appetite and is able to master and conquer *himself*.

It has been noted that harming others is not discouraged because it is inherently immoral but because doing so without in turn being harmed oneself is so hard to achieve. Theoretically, if this end could be guaranteed, then there is no reason why vicious prosecution of any grievance should be avoided. The speaker is thus grounding ethics in rational

³² Mead (1964) 141. His category of 'me' therefore becomes the self in its determined aspect as it engages with various social others.

³³ I argue further below in Ch. 6 that theatre going is an important component of this practice since it provides a space for individuals to evaluate different characters and their roles as though they were themselves.

self-interest, a philosophical program that contributes at least one current of thought to the intellectual milieu of fifth century Athens.³⁴

Though his theoretical foundation may be different from Plato's, even in a sense opposed to it, a similar imperative is reached—namely the need to conquer oneself, and block oneself to the pleasures of the moment.³⁵ Both these acts exhibit the typical transitive conceptual structure of an agent wilfully bringing about an effect on some patient, but a fine semantic distinction in the sense of the reflexive shows just how varied such constructions can be in the psychological model they implement. The notion of conquering and mastering oneself invokes the model of a transcendental subject controlling a lower self which is consumed by certain desires. The separation between the two is quite radical, which is entirely necessary for the conceptualisation of such an event as a struggle. However the separation between the subject and reflexive in the notion of fencing in and blockading oneself (ἐμφοράσσει αὐτός ἑαυτὸν), is not nearly so pronounced. It is the desires which are separated out and externalised, but the self which is protected by this act is kept close and identified with by the subject. But even here the identity cannot be complete. The act of blockading is still presented as a transitive task that requires the subject to direct its energies towards some goal. There could be no sense of task or work, let alone a sense of will, if any volition were automatically achieved. Will requires some impediment to its actualisation to be thought of as such, for otherwise it would simply be spontaneous action. Nevertheless, leaving this limitation on identity aside, we have in these two reflexive expressions a good example of how the reference of the reflexive adapts itself to the semantic requirements of a particular verbal event.

In yet another quotation from Stobaeus (3.5.57 Wachsmuth), Antiphon makes the point that the reflexive act of self-restraint presupposes the existence of a desire to be overcome. He seems to be judging the relative virtue of those who are good naturally without ever having to face temptation, and those who must wrestle with desire in order to self-improve. That one is σώφρων only through struggle shows the extra value accorded to the individual who expresses himself deliberately and his self-making powers:

³⁴ See Pendrick (2002) ad loc.

³⁵ For the widespread conception of σωφροσύνη as self-control in the later fifth and in the fourth century see Pendrick (2002) ad F59, F58 ll. 11–12.

ὅστις δὲ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν ἢ τῶν κακῶν μήτε ἐπεθύμησε μήτε ἤψατο, οὐκ ἔστι
 σὺφρων· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅτου κρατήσας αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν κόσμιον παρέχεται.
 (F59 Pendrick)

He who has neither desired nor engaged in shameful or immoral acts is
 not self-controlled, for there is nothing which he has overcome to make
himself orderly.

One shows himself orderly and well-behaved only through an act of will,
 here of overcoming desire.³⁶ One may therefore appreciate how depen-
 dent the reflexive virtue of σωφροσύνη is on the emphatic agency of
 the subject. In this reflexive usage παρέχω/παρέχομαι is often translated
 'show' or 'exhibit', but the verb also has the senses of 'render' and 'make'.³⁷
 Recognition of this is important as it restores the appropriate degree of
 transitivity: I show myself well-behaved because I have made a conscious
 effort to make myself such through overcoming certain desires.

I have already touched on the fact that ethical systems can be erected
 on the basis of the self without necessarily being systems of self-interest
 in the ordinary and narrow sense of the word. Though the prudential
 morality of early Greek thinkers seeks to show that it is in one's own
 interest to regard others, by reconceiving the notion of the type of self to
 whose interests one should look and the nature of the good that belongs
 to it—especially when construed as a higher or more spiritual soul,
 whose good is a certain harmonious state of being—the result is very
 different from a subservience to egoistic desires. Insofar too as reasoning
 or thinking is a dialogue of the soul with itself, then an ethical system that
 prioritises such reflection is also in the same act prioritising the soul.
 But one can also begin with a different understanding of the self and
 thus end in an ethical system of a different verve—one of self-interest in
 the more egoistic sense where there is little distinction between higher

³⁶ This and the previous quotations are the some of the first extant examples of
 reflexivised acts of ethical care, to which may be added Hdt. 2.173.2: ὁ Βασιλεῦ, οὐκ
 ὀρθῶς σεαυτοῦ προέστηκας, ἐς τὸ ἄγαν φαῦλον προάγων σεαυτόν. The first phrase
 suggests government of oneself, and anticipates Plato's reflexivisation of the political
 vocabulary more generally. As with other reflexive constructions of this type, the second
 phrase's notion of bringing oneself into a certain condition activates a specific kind of
 subject, namely one which is self-consciously involved in the project of maintaining a
 certain type of self, in this case a self with the proper measure of dignity.

³⁷ LSJ s.v. παρέχω A V, παρέχομαι B V. The reflexive use of παρέχω becomes a very
 popular term of self-cultivation (e.g. Isoc. 2.20; 3.34, 38, 45, 51, 60, 63), often uniting the
 senses of *make* and *show* to mean *making oneself such-and-such in a way that can be seen
 by others*. The Greeks are also envisaging the presentation of the social self as a reflexive
 technology of self-management.

and lower pleasures. What is shared, however, by those (often sophists) associated with an ethic of self-interest and Socratic care of the soul, is that they both proceed from a category of self.³⁸ This shared assumption, that morality must be grounded first in the self, I believe indicates the increased emphasis placed on the self in the changed socio-economic climate of this era: morality must be rethought and justified on *its* terms.

Let's take as an example the following lines from a surviving papyrus fragment of Antiphon's treatise *Περὶ ἀληθείας*:

χρῶντ' ἂν οὔν ἄνθρωπος μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ συμφερόντως δικαιοσύνη,
εἰ μετὰ μὲν μαρτύρων τοὺς νόμους μεγάλους ἄγοι, μονούμενος δὲ
μαρτύρων τὰ τῆς φύσεως. (F44(a) I.12–23 Pendrick)

A man, then, would use justice in a way that most advantages *himself* if he should consider the laws great when in the presence of witnesses, but when left alone without witnesses the facts of nature.

Here the speaker is considering the use of justice in the service of maximising self-interest or self-advantage. The expression of this idea requires first that this subject is a well-defined entity whose interests are similarly well-defined.³⁹ The socio-political background of urbanisation and the privatisation of certain aspects of life that accompanies it no doubt influence the formation of such a being. One might even take the Greek phrase *πράσσειν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ* as a motto for urban living. Though of course the Greek city demanded active participation in many aspects of public affairs, what is remarkable and different in the transition to the city (and which confronts to this day immigrants from more communal societies to the great cities of the West, divided as they are into a myriad of self-contained private lives) is not so much the existence of a public, which is familiar in one form or another in all societies, but the vastly expanded realm of the private sphere.

The point here is that concepts such as *πράσσειν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ* and *πράσσειν τὰ ἑαυτῷ συμφέροντα* are interconnected and borrow from one another. *Τὰ ἑαυτοῦ* may even be translated in many contexts as 'things in which only oneself has, or should have, an interest'. Thus the

³⁸ Nill (1985) gives a good account of the development of the idea of self-interest from Protagoras, to Antiphon, to Democritus and Socrates. The moral theory of Democritus and Socrates differs from Antiphon in that they internalise the good for persons as a spiritual or inner good (74). In our terms, this is because they understand the 'self' component of self-interest in a different way.

³⁹ For another use of the reflexive in the context of self-advantage, cf. F44(a) V.7 Pendrick.

emerging importance of this idea should be linked to the project of prudential morality. These thinkers wish to ground morality in the self because as social actors their proper domain of activity has been defined as τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, things/interests which belong to oneself.

5. *Democritus*

So far we have seen reflexivity entering into fundamental ontology and cosmology, while also making its way into ethics as thinkers seek to found morality in the self. This is a decisive movement, and leading the way seems to be the atomist Democritus. The project begins as an attempted solution to a dilemma stemming from a perceived loophole in the *conventional* enforcement, or sanctioning, of morality. If it is only convention that sanctions morality, then ‘someone who can escape conventional sanctions, e.g., by doing wrong in secret, has no reason to comply with moral demands.’⁴⁰ Democritus and others sought to close this loophole and find a criterion of morality that was absolute and not subject to the presence or not of a particular convention. This was bound to be attached to some kind of essence as that which is inalienable and given before all else. Since the human is the moral agent, it naturally became the essence of the individual. For the acting individual presupposes just that, an individual, so that if moral sanctions could be anchored there, they would be given, inescapably, along with the act itself no matter where that act was committed. There would not have to be a society, which could be sloughed by withdrawing into secret, to establish moral sanctions; one would only need an individual carrying such sanctions within herself.

Now the precise way in which this attempt was made was with a technique that by now, I hope, is becoming familiar. Democritus unexpectedly reflexivised a traditionally other-directed form of moral sanction,

⁴⁰ Taylor (1999) 228. The problem is charmingly expressed in the famous ‘Sisyphus’ fragment (traditionally attributed to Critias fr. 19 *TrGF*, but more recently by Dihle (1977) and Kahn (1997) to Euripides, though Winiarczyk’s (1987) confirmation of the traditional attribution is persuasive), where an irreverent speaker claims that the idea of an all-seeing and all-knowing divinity was invented to stop people from even acting, speaking, or scheming in secret. I take the fragment as a symptom of the current socio-political context, in which the regulation of private behaviour has become a pressing issue, especially since growing cynicism in some quarters has threatened traditional sanctions. Cf. Antiphon (F44(a) I.13–23 Pendrick), who asserts that one should abide the authority of φύσις rather than νόμος when no witnesses are present.

that of shame or respect, and even claimed that one should be more ashamed before oneself than before others:

μηδέν τι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους αἰδεῖσθαι ἑωυτοῦ μηδέ τι μᾶλλον
ἐξεργάζεσθαι κακόν, εἰ μέλλει μηδεὶς εἰδῆσιν ἢ οἱ πάντες ἀνθρώποι·
ἀλλ' ἑωυτὸν μάλιστα αἰδεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῦτον νόμον τῇ ψυχῇ καθεστάναι,
ὥστε μηδὲν ποιεῖν ἀνεπιτήδειον. (B264 DK)

In no way should one feel shame before other men more than before *oneself*, nor should one be any keener to work evil if nobody is likely to find out than if the whole of humanity were to; but one should feel shame before *oneself* most of all, and establish this as a law for the soul, so as to do nothing untoward.

This imperative, to feel shame before oneself, appears in two other fragments (B84, 244), prompting Gantar to claim it as the formula most characteristic of Democritus' ethical views.⁴¹ This reflexivisation of shame is treated by Gantar as an internalisation, and here he seems to join the ranks of moral historians who view the internalisation of shame as a development of conscience:

Das Schamgefühl, das in den altgriechischen ethischen Auffassungen eine so große Rolle spielte, daß man sogar von einer Scham-Kultur gesprochen hat, wird da ins menschliche Innere projiziert; im „Selbst“ wird ein Sittenrichter entdeckt, der wirklich autonom ist und erhaben über alle Vorurteile der äußeren Welt. Es mag wie eine Umwertung der sittlichen Grundsätze der damaligen Gesellschaft klingen, wenn statt des homerischen αἰδέομαι Τρῶας, wodurch etwa Hektor sein Handeln begründet, und bei Demokrit als die höchste Sitteninstanz das αἰδεῖσθαι ἑωυτόν aufgestellt wird.⁴²

Kahn's description of the development is equally ardent:

The force of this expression [αἰδεῖσθαι ἑωυτόν] can only be understood in the light of the traditional shame standard of Greek morality, which is here stood on its head. In place of the hero's code, which identifies his self-respect with his status in the eyes of others, Democritus proposes an inner

⁴¹ Cf. GV. 11–12 Thom: πρήξεις δ' αἰσχρόν ποτε μήτε μετ' ἄλλου, μήτ' ἰδίῃ. πάντων δὲ μάλιστα αἰσχύνεο σαυτόν. Of course, whether Pythagoras actually said this and anticipates Democritus is impossible to say (though the fact that it is quoted and discussed by Galen (*Aff. Dig.* 26.9–14 Kühn) gives at least some longitude to the tradition). The saying was apparently a favourite of later philosophers: Stobaeus ascribes it to Theophrastus (3.31.10), Musonius (3.31.6) and Cato (3.31.11 Wachsmuth).

⁴² Gantar (1980) 46. Cf. Annas (2002) 174: '[I]n these fragments we can, it seems, see the other in the process of becoming internalized.'

“law for the psyche” that is an almost literal anticipation of Kant’s notion of the moral law as autonomy or self-legislation.⁴³

These are grand claims, yet the boldness of the reflexive construction to some degree credits the notion of it as a micro-revolution. The simple fact is that this sort of a construction—or indeed any reflexivisation of a verb of moral treatment, e.g. ἀδικέω/δικέω, κακίζω—is conspicuously absent until the Greek of this period.⁴⁴ Now one will naturally wonder why such a notion should appear at this particular point in history. Let it be said that there are many factors and processes that would feed into such a result—we can only sketch a few. Outstanding among these would have to be the proliferation of private spheres caused by the disintegration of tight-knit communities and the increased social differentiation and labour specialisation consequent to the urban revolution. For it is precisely the growth of private spheres from which the conventional face-to-face gaze is excluded that undermines conventional morality.⁴⁵ It is

⁴³ Kahn (1985) 28. Yet cf. Procopé (1989) 322: ‘B264 has sometimes be read as a declaration of moral autonomy, of a Kantian *Autonomie des Sittlichen*—a misleading interpretation, if “autonomy” is to mean “laying down the law for yourself”. The fragment is certainly not telling you to “follow your conscience”, your capacity for judging the rightness of actions, and to disregard everything else.’ Note the difference in connotation in English between laying down the law for yourself and laying it down for your soul. The reflexive carries the notion of enlightenment autonomy that Procopé warns against attributing to Democritus, whereas it is not present in the word *soul* because of soul’s greater disjunction with the subject. One is not so much writing law for oneself as giving an already established law, ‘do nothing bad’, to the soul so that it may enact it. Kant’s position requires a further reflexivisation of the notion here in order to make the subject herself the source of this law.

⁴⁴ One may of course argue that this is an accident of what texts have survived. But surely we have enough Greek from before this time to claim with a high degree of probability that if such reflexive constructions were in any way important to the society that used them some trace thereof would have been left in the texts that have survived. Add to that my argument that the PRS was relatively undeveloped before this time and such reflexivisation seems even more unlikely.

⁴⁵ For the collapse of face-to-face society at Athens, see Farrar (2002) 178–179. The argument may be extended to other large πόλεις. One is of course speaking relatively: Greek still retained many aspects of face-to-face society, and many states incorporated the divisions of tribal hierarchy in some form or other. The position of Finley at (1973) 17 therefore provides a useful limit to the modernising treatment of this period of socio-economic development. For the reflection of the disintegration of tight-knit communities in changing attitudes to death and burial practices, see Sourvinou-Inwood 1981. For the urban revolution that began in the Archaic age, see esp. Snodgrass (1977), (1980) 15–84. One ideological necessity of urbanisation is the relative suppression of an actor’s primary identification with a local community and his reattachment to the more universal signification of the πόλις—while at the opposite end of the spectrum limiting local identification to one’s family. This move spotlights the individual, on whose rise see Snell

this space that allows an actor to slip on Gyges' ring and to conduct himself 'in secret.' A supplementary moral sanction is therefore needed which compensates for the shrinking of conventional morality's jurisdiction. This may be achieved by installing a sanctioning gaze within the individual herself. In one way, then, nothing has changed. Whether one is dealing with a small-scale face-to-face society where another's gaze is almost perennially present, or a post-industrial nation of highly individualised consumers, the sanctioning field manages to conserve itself more or less regardless of the type of society in question by finding new means of expression when others have been cut off.⁴⁶

This gaze or 'panopticon' is traditionally conserved in private by invoking the all-seeing gods. But if these cannot be sustained (whether because of a naturalism that does not countenance interventionist gods, or because inculcating such a conviction is relatively inefficient, requiring constant reinforcement and social investment for what is on balance a relatively weak sanction, etc.) one 'falls back on largely psychological sanctions, on the threat of emotional disquiet, to make good the inadequacies of law. In so doing [Democritus] touches on what became a standard line of argument: injustice should be avoided because it is bad for the soul.'⁴⁷ This 'bad for soul' manifests as a weight on the heart or the pangs of conscience. Doing wrong is to be avoided not because of the threat of the strong arm of the law or an accounting god but because it leaves one feeling bad within herself.⁴⁸ In one telling

(1953) 43–70 and Snodgrass (1980) 160–200. For an outstanding survey of the sociological changes conditioning individualism and the development of critical reflexivity, with a special focus on the processes of urbanisation, see Sandywell (1996) 102–135.

⁴⁶ Durkheim had already realised the regulatory problem created by the anomie of excessive individuation. As Dingley (2008) 100 puts it, '[w]hen the collective fails to exercise its moral and integrative function, individuals become disordered and directionless in their behaviour, wants and desires.' Our argument here is that one attempted solution of this problem is the introduction of an ideology of the self-regulating individual that can order its behaviour even when decontextualised from the integrative function of the collective.

⁴⁷ Procopé (1989) 320. Alternatively, divinity can be internalised as ὁ ἐνδον δαίμων. The god within is an omnipresent witness to one's actions and so sees what one does even when alone and shrouded in darkness (see e.g. Arr. *Epict.* 1.14.12–15 Schenkl). Cf. the personification of character (ὁ τρόπος, in this passage a clear precursor to the later Stoic δαίμων) at Men. *Epit.* 1092–1099 Sandbach: it is an internal, ever-present divine warden that should not be abused by acting unethically and which one can propitiate (ἱλάσκειν). These two approaches are not unrelated insofar as the inner god is identified with the higher self, as in Stoicism. Cf. Ch. 7 n. 86 for the connection of these ideas to self-care.

⁴⁸ According to Procopé (1989), Democritus is in part driven to psychology as a refuge by the particular need to resolve the judicial dilemma of ensuring jurists cast their vote

fragment Democritus characterises this unpleasant state of mind as *κακίζειν ἑωυτόν*, self-reproach:⁴⁹

ὁ μὲν εὖθυμος εἰς ἔργα ἐπιφερόμενος δίκαια καὶ νόμια καὶ ὕπαρ καὶ ὄναρ χαίρει τε καὶ ἔρρωται καὶ ἀνακηδὴς ἐστίν· ὃς δ' ἂν καὶ δίκης ἀλογῇ καὶ τὰ χρὴ ἐόντα μὴ ἔρδῃ, τούτῳ πάντα τοιαῦτα ἀτερπείη, ὅταν τευ ἀναμνησθῇ, καὶ δέδοικε καὶ *ἑωυτόν* κακίζει. (B174 DK)

The cheerful man is compelled to just and lawful action, and so rejoices both in waking life and in sleep, and is strong and without worry. But whoever takes no account of justice and doesn't do what's right, all such things cause him displeasure when he remembers them, and he fears and torments *himself*.

The unpleasant psychological state of one who takes no account of justice and duty is contrasted with the good cheer (*εὖθυμία*) of one who does. This cheerfulness holds for the just man in both waking and sleeping life, which implies that a stock of nasty, guilty dreams is in store for the delinquent. In fact the delinquent becomes averse to justice in such a way that the mere thought of it troubles him and fills him with self-reproach. Key here is Democritus' focus on psychological (*ἀναμνησθῇ*) and internalised phenomena (*ἑωυτόν κακίζει*). The potential for an upset and self-destructive soul that cannot even enjoy its usual function of memory without assailing itself is Democritus' ultimate sanction against immorality. This state stands in opposition to that of the self-controlled person who, as Plutarch⁵⁰ quotes Democritus, is one

ἐξ *ἑαυτοῦ* τὰς τέρψιας ἐθιζόμενον λαμβάνειν. (B146 DK)
accustomed to take pleasures from *himself*.

We therefore see two reflexive acts contrasting in Democritus' account of human psychology, the habit of deriving pleasures from oneself and that of rebuking oneself, and these both take part in his ethical foundation. Insofar as one can judge out of context, Democritus is probably

in accordance with the law when this is impossible to legislate for (those interpreting the law are necessarily to some extent outside the law).

⁴⁹ For self-reproach as an aspect of care of self, cf. Kierkegaard (1843) 79: 'A free-born soul who caught himself at this would despise himself and make a fresh start, and above all not allow himself to be deceived in his soul.'

⁵⁰ *De prof. in virt.* 81b Babbitt. Cf. a paraphrase of the same notion at Plu. *Non posse suav. vivi sec. Ep.* 1096d3 Pohlenz-Westman, where Plutarch characterises the Epicureans as making the soul only delight in the experience, recollection, and expectation of corporeal pleasures, μηδὲ τερπνὸν ἐξ *αὐτῆς* λαμβάνειν μηδὲ ζητεῖν ἑῶντες.

here calling upon the virtue of self-sufficiency: one who is satisfied with a modicum of external goods turns inward to derive pleasure from himself,⁵¹ which is conducive to peace of mind (εὐθυμία) and imperturbability (ἀθαμβία).⁵² This reading is confirmed by B235, in which Democritus criticises the short-sightedness of those who ἀπὸ γαστρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ποιέονται. Pleasures are not to be derived from any of the bodily organs but from the self proper which is differentiated from these and engages in higher forms of recreation.⁵³

Back-pedalling a little, 'Shame before oneself' is thus a necessary adaptation for a social system comprising so many private spheres, if it is to be sustainable and well-regulated in a climate of secularisation where the gods have lost some of their force as sanctions. Now the private sphere is constituted succinctly in Greek by a single activity, προᾷξις τῶν ἑαυτῶν.⁵⁴ And in the imperative as a maxim exhorting each and every person (προᾷσσε τὰ σαυτοῦ), it guarantees the construction of so many individuals and so many private spheres as their domain of praxis. This maxim gets to the heart of Greek individualism, and together with 'know yourself' forms a unity. One might see the first as the instantiation of a private sphere, the latter as this sphere's moral regulation insofar as it seeks to bring individual actors into a deeper relationship with themselves and thus attune them to self-regulation and limitation. For there is an ambivalence in προᾷσσε τὰ σαυτοῦ whose corrosive side must be defended against: is it counselling discreet minding of one's own business or selfishness?

⁵¹ That is, because true blessedness is a property of the soul (B170), it is from oneself as soul that one ought to derive enjoyment (for this internalisation of happiness, see most recently Annas (2002) 172–180, and below Ch. 7 n. 86). Note therefore that here the reflexive seems to refer to the soul in the relatively new sense of a psychological subject, or even the true self from which blessedness really arises. We again see the development of new meanings in the reflexive mirror new meanings in ψυχή.

⁵² For εὐθυμία as a state of the soul, see especially B191; for ἀθαμβία cf. B215. As Nill (1985) 91 argues, Democritus' internalisation of the good for persons as a psychological state anticipates Plato.

⁵³ There is some argument over whether these include intellectual pleasures, as they do in Plato. See Nill (1985) 79. In B189 there is an intimation that the higher pleasures of the soul are found in what is immortal: τοῦτο [τὸ τὸν βίον εὐθυμία διάγειν] δ' ἂν εἴη, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπὶ τοῖς θνητοῖσι τὰς ἡδονὰς ποιῶτο.

⁵⁴ The sociological matrix for the promotion of this category is again complex, but an important factor is the development of a form of mercantile capitalism in which one works for one's own benefit in order to exchange goods and services on an open market. For the impact of more liberal systems of exchange on individualisation in Greece, see Sandywell (1996) 112–117.

Sanctioning the practice of one's own interests so that the state does not disintegrate into an orgy of self-interest is a delicate balancing act of which the Athenians were well aware.⁵⁵ Thucydides' Pericles paints the picture of a finely-tuned dialectic between τὰ ἴδια/τὰ ἑαυτοῦ and τὰ κοινά/τὰ δημόσια in his famous funeral oration:

ἐλευθέρως δὲ τὰ τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δι' ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας, εἰ καθ' ἡδονὴν τι δοῖα, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ ἀζημίους μὲν, λυπηρὰς δὲ τῇ ὄψει ἀχθηδónας προστιθέμενοι. ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἴδια προσομιλοῦντες τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται καὶ ὅσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσιν. (Th. 2.37.2–3)

We have a political culture which is liberal in respect of public activity, but also concerning that mutual suspicion that often exists in day-to-day life: we do not nurse anger at our neighbour if he does something for pleasure, and do not assume disapproving looks on our faces that, though they do not break any bones, are hurtful. And despite socialising privately without taking offence, in public we are particular in not transgressing the law because of fear, with attentive obedience to those in office and the laws—especially the laws which have been established to assist the wronged, and those unwritten laws which bring agreed disgrace [to whoever breaks them].

The Athenians are said to be free from suspicion towards one other in day-to-day life. They are as liberal in public governance as they are in private matters. The Greek word for suspicion, of course, is the literal equivalent of our Latin root. Both refer to a looking-under, a surreptitious gaze. Crawley translates it well as 'jealous surveillance'.⁵⁶ The motif of the gaze is quickly picked up again with repetition of ὄψις in the phrase οὐδὲ ἀζημίους μὲν, λυπηρὰς δὲ τῇ ὄψει ἀχθηδónας προστιθέμενοι, 'and not assuming disapproving looks on our faces that, though they do not break any bones, are offensive'. In refraining from looking at one another thus, a private sphere is created in which another's gaze as moral sanction is absent, leaving each to do as he pleases. But Pericles is quick to forestall the impression that this freedom might come at the expense of public law and order: 'But all this ease in our private relations does not make us lawless as citizens.'⁵⁷ His move to qualify betrays that this harmony

⁵⁵ See especially Ober (1998).

⁵⁶ Crawley (1910) ad loc.

⁵⁷ Ibid., ad loc.

of the spheres is tricky to manage and requires a complex set of cultural norms delicately arranged. It is claimed that in public life they are obedient to the magistrates and the laws, especially those that are established to assist the wronged as well as those unwritten laws that enjoy accepted respect. Athenian politics walks a fine line familiar to any modern state as it trades a liberalised private sector and civil society with the common good and seeks the perfect amount of regulation.⁵⁸

Democritus is more realistic than Pericles in his articulation of the private/public relation (which may also be recoded as the problematic relation between the autonomous 'I' and the socialised 'me') and appears to throw his hands up at an easy solution:

τοῖς χρηστοῖσιν οὐ συμφέρον ἀμελέοντας τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἄλλα πράσσειν· τὰ γὰρ ἴδια κακῶς ἔσχεν. εἰ δὲ ἀμελεῖσι τις τῶν δημοσίων, κακῶς ἀκούειν γίγνεται, καὶ ἢν μηδὲν κλέπτῃ μήτε ἀδικῇ. ἐπεὶ καὶ (μὴ) ἀμελέοντι ἢ ἀδικέοντι κίνδυνος κακῶς ἀκούειν καὶ δὴ καὶ παθεῖν τι· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἀμαρτάνειν, συγγιγνώσκεισθαι δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐκ εὐπετέες.

(B253 DK)

It is not advantageous for the good to neglect their own interests and occupy themselves with other concerns, since in that case their private situation suffers. But if anyone should neglect public affairs, the result is he's badly spoken of, even if he hasn't embezzled anything or done wrong. Yet there is also a danger of being maligned, and even suffering some bodily harm, if one doesn't neglect public life and does no wrong. For it is inevitable that one makes a mistake, and people don't find it easy to forgive.

The passage is classically aporetic: you are damned alike by a bad reputation whether you enter public life or not. Athenian society is torn between the principle of ἀπραγμοσύνη, abstention from excessive curiosity concerning others affairs (πολυπραγμοσύνη) and doing one's own business—the sentiment of the first sentence in the above passage—and the need in a democracy for everyone to be active politically so that they can vote in a responsible way. Pericles' speech gives us the latter:

⁵⁸ Farena (2006), building on Ludwig (2003), offers a fine treatment of the threat posed to the Periclean and popular conception of democracy by excessive individual autonomy. In his words, the citizenship paradigm of Periclean Athens tries to 'inoculate each Athenian's performance of citizenship from susceptibility to the voluntarist dimensions of the inner life' (425), and views the moral sense that develops from an intense Socratic deliberation with one's ψυχή, requiring as it does withdrawal from the social body and its norms, as potentially subversive of established νόμοι. Yet the paradox and difficulty of democracy is that it must effectively limit the creative autonomy which is at the same time its founding principle and *raison d'être*. I consider this issue further in Ch. 6.2.

ἐνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια, καὶ ἑτέροις πρὸς ἔργα τετραμμένοις τὰ πολιτικά μὴ ἐνδεῶς γινῶναι· μόνοι γὰρ τὸν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλ' ἀχρεῖον νομίζομεν, καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἦτοι κρῖνομέν γε ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα ὁρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ᾧ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. (Th. 2.40.2)

Here a concern for private as well as political affairs exists in the same individuals, and even in those others devoted to business one finds a knowledge of political matters which is far from deficient. This is because we alone believe that a man who takes no part in such things is not unmeddlesome but useless, while we at the same time decide and formulate policy properly, not thinking words a detriment to deeds, but rather not being better informed in discussion prior to embarking in action upon whatever course necessary.

Important is his deployment of the adjective ἀπράγμονα, which would usually be interpreted as a positive term. But Pericles redefines the person who does not partake of the political not as admirably unobtrusive but useless. However he omits the cost of taking such a share diagnosed by Democritus. In entering public life you enter the public gaze, the domain of ὑποψία, and put your reputation on the line. Since you are bound to make mistakes, your reputation is bound to take a blow. Furthermore, because of the extremely problematic relation of the private and public sphere in a democracy, there is always boiling away a suspicion that you are entering politics not for the public good but to expand your private interests. Where the public good is at stake, by a total reversal *πρᾶξις* τῶν ἑαυτῶν becomes entirely pejorative where elsewhere it was glorified as ἀπραγμοσύνη. Similarly, reflexivity becomes self-aggrandisement:

τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν χρεὼν τῶν λοιπῶν μέγιστα ἡγεῖσθαι, ὅπως ἄξεται εὔ, μήτε φιλονικέοντα παρὰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς μήτε ἰσχὺν ἑαυτῷ περιτιθέμενον παρὰ τὸ χρηστὸν τὸ τοῦ ξυνοῦ. (B252 DK)

Of everything else one must consider affairs of the state the most important, that it is well run, neither being fond of political victory contrary to what's reasonable nor investing *oneself* with power contrary to the common good.

People are forever suspicious of politics becoming just another arm of the private sphere. Their suspicions are not groundless precisely because of the ambivalent reflexivity of self-interest, a chameleon that is now a vice, now a virtue.⁵⁹ The ethic of being ashamed before oneself endeavours

⁵⁹ Note especially Nicias' censure of Alcibiades as τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον σκοπῶν (Th.

to rework this reflexivity in a more positive light by including self-regulation alongside self-interest as its moderator, to 'keep an eye on it' as it were. Read in this way, Democritus' philosophy is a response to the problem of *πρᾶξις τῶν ἑαυτῶν* and the private sphere. On the one hand it introduces regulation of this sphere through self-shame, while on the other keeping its privacy intact by identifying the gaze's subject as oneself and not another.

The ancient connection between the reflexivity of doing one's business and *ἀπραγμοσύνη*, an accord lodged deep in Greek culture, will have a profound effect on later intellectual development.⁶⁰ The internalisation of this ancient form, by which concern shifts from *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ* to *ἑαυτόν*, from *πρᾶξις τῶν ἑαυτῶν* to *ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ* is a key transformation in the denouement of this history, and already present in Democritus since the gaze as shame takes the reflexive directly as its object. While Foucault is right to refer the practice of care of self to particular forms of life, to its incorporation in the various religious, philosophical, and friendship networks, and to a social structure which allowed elites the leisure to indulge this care,⁶¹ the platform of *πρᾶξις τῶν ἑαυτῶν* on which care of self stands as a refinement had a very broad socio-economic base.

The breadth of this base may be measured by a passage from Herodotus, which admirably depicts the rising spirit of Greek economic liberalism productive of *πρᾶξις τῶν ἑαυτῶν*:

δηλοῖ ὧν ταῦτα ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκάκεον ὡς δεσπότηι ἐργαζόμενοι, ἔλευθερωθέντων δὲ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωυτῷ προεθυμέετο κατεργάζεσθαι. (Hdt. 5.78.1)

These events clearly show that while oppressed they played the coward as though working for a master, but when freed each individual was eager to make the most of his labour *for himself*.

Herodotus is commenting on the flourishing success of Athens since she threw off her tyrants. They deliberately played the coward and were

6.12.2). Within a Socratic frame, on the other hand, the moral examination of *τὸ ἑαυτοῦ* and *ἑαυτόν* to the exclusion of other interests is one's first ethical duty.

⁶⁰ Foucault (1981–1982) 217–223 considers its central place in Plutarch and Marcus Aurelius, where turning one's gaze away from others means turning to it to oneself.

⁶¹ Ibid., 112–121. However he does state (115), correctly I think, that the practice was nevertheless widespread, but divided between two major poles: 'on one side a more popular, religious, cultic and theoretically unpolished pole; and, at the other end, care of the soul, care of the self, practices of the self, which are more individual, personal, and cultivated, which are more linked to and frequent within more privileged circles, and which depend in part on friendship networks.'

apathetic when oppressed and working for a master, but when freed to enjoy the fruits of their labour the entrepreneurial agency of each individual was unleashed: each man was eager to work αὐτὸς ἑωυτῷ. The development of the material conditions of society to a point where the individual may be posited as economically *for-itself* and therefore as constituting its own *telos*, puts in some groundwork for the abstraction of this orientation as the for-itself of consciousness prevalent in Hegel and Sartre. For consciousness as self-production, which includes both production of the self and for the self, is in one sense a subjectivisation of the individual's economic state as one who works for himself. We see this tangle of economics and ontology most clearly in the way the Greeks' invest their gods with self-sufficiency at the very time this idea establishes itself as a socio-economic ethic.⁶²

In fact the contribution of reflexivity to the idea of individuation is exhibited in at least two concrete ways that have sedimented into common language usage. Firstly, Greek ἑκαστος, which designates a being under its singular and differentiated aspect just as in the Herodotean passage above, is built from PIE *swe-*. It analyses as ἑκασ-στος (**ḥhe-kās-s-tos*), which Pokorny glosses as 'für sich stehend' (for **ḥhe-kās* as 'for itself' cf. ἀνδρα-κάς, 'man for man').⁶³ Representation of the individual as a subject standing for itself also surfaces in the popular Latin idiom combining the individuating pronoun *quisque* with some form of the reflexive, e.g. *sibi quisque* and *pro se*, 'each for himself'.⁶⁴ Individuality is thought as self-involved being.

6. The Roots of Reflexive ἀρχαί in the Presocratics and Their Legacy

I have already observed the ascription of self-identity and the property of being αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό to onto- and cosmological foundations. Within anthropology, Aristotle reports the popular Presocratic understanding of

⁶² Self-sufficiency is a very Greek obsession. For it as a human virtue, see Gigon (1966). The ideal of economic self-sufficiency is interleaved with the ideal of individual self-sufficiency. See Most (1989) 127–130 for an overview and bibliography. Divine self-sufficiency becomes especially prominent in Plato and his tradition and is discussed further below.

⁶³ Pokorny (1959) s.v. *se-* 5, p. 883. In this sense, though in time it had likely bleached, ἑκαστος is a primitive antecedent for the phrase αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτόν, which also serves to differentiate via reflexivity, albeit more emphatically.

⁶⁴ See L&S, s.v. *quisque*.

soul as a self-mover, the first concatenation of reflexivity and the human subject.⁶⁵ Aëtius claims that Pythagoras gave self-movement to number, taking it as a substitute for νοῦς:

Πυθαγόρας ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν κινοῦντα, τὸν δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ νοῦ παραλαμβάνει.⁶⁶ (Aët. 4.2.3 Diels)

Pythagoras says that soul is number moving *itself*. He takes number as a substitute for mind.

Since genesis is easily conceived of as a kind of motion, self-movement suggests self-generation and vice versa. When attributed to what is ontologically highest, a reflexive relation terminates an otherwise infinite causal chain of one thing determining another; conversely, if a thing is truly highest and there is nothing higher than it, then it cannot have been generated by anything else and so must have generated itself.⁶⁷ Thus the search for the fundamental origin of an activity such as motion or generation will always lead, if the process is to stop somewhere, to an entity which directs that activity onto itself. This metaphysical template of reflexivity is retained even where a quite different being is substituted for the foundational being of God, or God vanishes and leaves the world to found itself. So with the deconstruction of the transcendent God of metaphysics in our own era, his disappearance in and merging with the world leaves the world as all there is; nothing exists outside and beyond it by which it might be determined as an object, so that world becomes a reflexive subject—a subject of itself and immanent to itself—and assumes

⁶⁵ Arist. *An.* 404b30ff. In this work Aristotle (e.g. at 406a11–15) takes issue with his predecessors and seems to reject soul's self-movement in the holistic sense—preferring to analyse any apparent self-motion as one part of it moving another—but his overall attitude to the possibility of self-motion in a deep sense is complicated and appears conflicted. See e.g. Kosman (1994) for a discussion of the tricky issue of whether the Prime Mover as an unmoved mover is self-moving or not. Self-motion is also involved in Aristotle's account of νοῦς, on which see Wedin (1994). Contemporary thought extends the reflexive conception of the subject of consciousness, though its typical relations are even more abstract, eg. Sartre (1943) 85: 'The for-itself can not sustain nihilation without determining itself as a *lack of being*. This means that the nihilation does not coincide with a simple introduction of emptiness into consciousness. An external being has not expelled the in-itself from consciousness; rather the for-itself is perpetually determining itself *not to be* the in-itself. This means that it can establish itself only in terms of the in-itself and against the in-itself.'

⁶⁶ See also Arist. *An.* 404b27–30, 408b32 ff.

⁶⁷ Or it must have existed forever. So Epicharmus (fr. 275.1–4 PCG): ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τοι θεοὶ παρήσαν χυπέλιπον οὐ πάποκα, | τάδε δ' αἰεὶ πάρεσθ' ὁμοῖα διὰ τε τῶν αὐτῶν αἰεὶ. | (B.) ἀλλὰ λέγεται μὲν Χάος πρῶτον γενέσθαι τῶν θεῶν. | (A.) πῶς δέ κα, μὴ ἔχον γ' ἀπὸ τίνος μηδ' ἔς ὅτι πρῶτον μόλοι;

the familiar reflexive character of the self-creating God: 'If the world is the growth of/from nothing—an expression of a formidable ambiguity—it is because it only depends on itself, while this "self" is given from nowhere but from itself.'⁶⁸

The scope of this logic of reflexive foundations is comprehensive and seems to cover all the domains of philosophy. Like those of cosmology, the ἀρχαί of epistemology must also be reflexive, which in their case means self-justified or convincing in themselves:

ἔστι δὲ ἀληθὴ μὲν καὶ πρῶτα τὰ μὴ δι' ἐτέρων ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτῶν ἔχοντα τὴν πίστιν· οὐ δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, ἀλλ' ἐκάστην τῶν ἀρχῶν αὐτὴν καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι πιστήν.

(Arist. *Top.* 100b17–21)

The true and primary elements are those which have assurance not through others but *through themselves*. For an answer to the question of why it is the case need not be sought in the case of epistemological principles, but each of these principles must be credible *itself in itself*.

Aristotle also applies this logic in his statement of the Good as the ultimate end of action. The ultimate τέλος must be sought on account of itself, and not on account of something else, if it is to be truly fundamental;⁶⁹ otherwise an infinite regress of other-determinations results:

εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τᾶλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἰρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὁρεξιν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὰγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον.

(EN 1094a18–22)

If indeed there is some goal of actions which we desire *on account of itself*, and other things on account of this goal, and we do not choose everything on account of something else (for if this were the case the process would continue to infinity, so that desire would be empty and in vain), it is clear that this would be the good, the supreme good.

⁶⁸ Nancy (2007) 51. The transfer of reflexivity entailed by God's disappearance from ontology and world's promotion to what is highest is anticipated by Nietzsche (1901) §796, p. 419: 'The world as a work of art gives birth to itself.' Again, these reflexive relations often come down from cosmology to human consciousness, e.g. Sartre (1943) 101: 'The possible is an absence constitutive of consciousness in so far as consciousness itself makes itself.'

⁶⁹ Cf. Kierkegaard (1843) 83: 'The ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal it applies to everyone, which can be put from another point of view by saying that it applies at every moment. It rests immanently in itself, has nothing outside itself that is its *telos* but is itself the *telos* for everything outside, and when that taken up into it, it has no further to go.' Cf. the characterisation of Ἔρως in the Orphic *Argonautica* (v. 424 Dottin) as αὐτοτελής. LSJ translate 'self-sufficing', but perhaps 'self-fulfilled' or 'self-fulfilling' gives a more appropriate force to the head's verbal root.

The same holds true of other categories and concepts that serve as argument stopgaps.⁷⁰ There is none more prevalent, then as now, than the idea of *nature* as the final determination of why things are as they are. Φύσις names for the Greeks the very process of generation; as an originating power that is a prerequisite for anything coming to be in the first place,⁷¹ φύσις itself could have only come to be by applying this originating power to itself. Nature thus encompasses that which is generated by itself without external stimulus and shaping by others, especially humans.⁷² We find mythic representations of this logic in Hesiod's *Theogony*, where Aphrodite must be promoted to a position of primordial existence—for without her the gods could not have procreated!⁷³ And we see nature being characterised reflexively just as other foundational beings, as in Epicharmus' portrayal of instinctive intelligence:

Εὔμαιε, τὸ σοφὸν ἔστιν οὐ καθ' ἐν μόνον,
ἀλλ' ὅσα περ ζῆ, πάντα καὶ γνῶμαν ἔχει.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ θῆλυ τᾶν ἀλεκτροίδων γένος,
αἱ λῆς καταμαθεῖν ἀτενές, οὐ τίκτει τέκνα
ζῶντ(α), ἀλλ' ἐπώζει καὶ ποιεῖ ψυχὰν ἔχειν.
τὸ δὲ σοφὸν ἂ φύσις τόδ' οἶδεν ὡς ἔχει
μόνα· πεπαίδευται γὰρ αὐταύτας ὕπο.⁷⁴

(Epich. B4 DK)

Eumaius, cleverness does not have one form alone, but everything which lives possesses intelligence. Since even the female chicken, if you really want to learn, does not give birth to live young but broods upon eggs

⁷⁰ Epictetus (Arr. *Epict.* 1.17.1–3 Schenkl) employs the same regress argument to demonstrate that reason is self-articulating or self-analysing. Note that the ladder of determinations is again scaled for value. What determines is superior or at least equal to what is determined. Cf. 1.20 for reason as self-contemplating (αὐτοῦ θεωρητικός). In this case the argument is akin to Aristotle's interpretation of self-thinking mind as the identity of νοῦς and τὸ νοούμενον: reason, as a system of (re)presentations of a certain quality (σύστημα ἐκ ποιῶν φαντασιῶν), is of the same kind (ὁμοειδής) as its objects of contemplation, which are themselves (re)presentations.

⁷¹ Cf. Aristotle's definition at *Met.* 1014b16: φύσις λέγεται ... ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις πρώτη ἐν ἐκάστω τῶν φύσει ὄντων.

⁷² Hence nature's association with reflexive compounds. Αὐτοφυής, for example, may simply mean 'natural' and contrasts emphatically with χειροποίητος—'self-grown' as opposed to 'made by the hand'. Τὸ αὐτοφύες may mean one's own nature or natural state, in Aristotle opp. to τὸ ἐπίκτητον. See LSJ s.v. αὐτοφυής 3, 4.

⁷³ A similar logic may also be behind her asexual birth from Uranus' seething genitals. For how could sexual reproduction produce the principle of sexual reproduction when she does not exist yet?

⁷⁴ Note the emphatic reduplicated reflexive, αὐταυτου, a Doricism.

and makes them come alive. Nature alone knows how this clever device operates, for it has been educated by *itself*.

This fragment can be referred to Homer's characterisation of the bard Demodocos in the *Odyssey* as self-taught. In other words, Demodocus is a natural bard—the implication being that his song is not unduly influenced by counterfeiting human artifice but is inspired directly by the Muses. Being taught by nature is tantamount to being self-taught since the ability to sing arises αὐτογενής or αὐτοφυής. In the Epicharmus fragment, nature can only have been taught her wisdom by herself since there is nothing prior which may have taught her instead.⁷⁵

However we cannot pass over these metaphysical and cosmological ideas without considering what they reveal about their human thinkers, for the Greeks aspired to assume the attributes of whatever ontological foundation they looked up to. We see operating here the familiar ascription of ideal traits to gods.⁷⁶ One of the earliest expressions of the ideal of self-sufficiency is found in Democritus, who grounds it in nature:

τύχη μεγαλόδωρος, ἀλλ' ἀβέβαιος, φύσις δὲ αὐτάρκης· διόπερ νικᾷ τῷ ἥσσονι καὶ βεβαίῳ τὸ μείζον τῆς ἐλπίδος. (Democr. B176 DK)

Fortune bears great gifts, but is unreliable, whereas nature is *self-sufficient*. Nature therefore beats hope's greater share with its lesser but dependable share.

Though it gives less hope for extraordinary gain, the self-sufficient reliability of nature trumps the promises of fortune. There is an implicit suggestion that one should try to become self-sufficient like nature, which

⁷⁵ However when nature is subordinated to a demiurge and becomes his product rather than a product of itself, it can no longer logically retain the attribute of αὐτογενής. This attribute is instead reallocated to the creator god as the new highest rung on the ontic ladder. E.g. Orph. fr. 245.8 Kern: εἷς ἐστ', αὐτογενής, ἐνὸς ἔκγονα πάντα τέτυκται; *Oracul. Sibyll.* 3.11 Geffcken: εἷς θεός ἐστι μόναρχος ἀθέσθατος αἰθέρι ναίων | αὐτοφυής ἀόρατος ὁρώμενος αὐτὸς ἅπαντα.

⁷⁶ In Feuerbach's (1854) 29f. immortal phrase: 'Man—this is the mystery of religion—objectifies his being and then again makes himself an object to the objectified image of himself thus converted into a subject.' Isocrates (3.26) comes closest to a Greek articulation of this perspective when he argues for the superiority of monarchy: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτ' αὐτῇ [τῇ μοναρχίᾳ] χρῆσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς ἔφαμεν, εἰ μὴ πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὴν προσέχειν ἐνομίζομεν. If the theist prefers it the other way, one may claim that ideal traits are transferred from gods to their creation, as in Plato's description of the creator making the universe like to himself: πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ (*Ti.* 29e2). The structural outcome, an analogous relation between humans and foundational beings, is the same whether man is viewed as an image of the gods, or the gods an image of man.

is buttressed by, the advice to become used to deriving pleasures from oneself,⁷⁷ and especially the following fragment:

ὑγίειν εὐχῇσι παρὰ θεῶν αἰτέονται ἄνθρωποι, τὴν δὲ ταύτης δύναμιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχοντες οὐκ ἴσασιν ἀκρασίῃ δὲ τὰναντία πρήσσοτες αὐτοὶ προδότες τῆς ὑγίειν τῇσι ἐπιθυμίῃσιν γίνονται. (Democr. B234 DK)

Human beings beg for health from the gods with prayers, and don't understand that they have the power for this in *themselves*. Through a lack of self-control they do the opposite, and so they themselves become traitors of their health to their desires.

The reflexive relation of αὐτάρχεια is retained in this circumlocution as power within oneself.⁷⁸ Independence is even carried in this fragment to the extent of independence from the gods and interlocks with ideas which I will visit later, such as the ability of mortals to cause their own suffering autonomously. The notion of inherent, autonomous power is a two-edged sword. The power of self-sufficiency, the ability to supply one's needs from oneself, also entails the ability not to supply those needs, and even to supply one's own damages from oneself in their place.⁷⁹

7. The Gnostic Tradition

a. Pythagoras and the Seven Wise Men

With the apophthegmatic tradition we encounter the thorny problem of pseudepigraphy. We may skirt a substantive treatment of the issue and

⁷⁷ B146.

⁷⁸ Cf. Men. *Mon.* 404 Edmonds: ὁ σοφὸς ἐν αὐτῷ περιφέρει τὴν οὐσίαν. Sen. *Constant.* 5.4: *Sapiens autem nihil perdere potest; omnia in se reposuit, nihil fortunae credit, bona sua in solido habet contentus virtute, quae fortuitis non indiget ideoque nec augeri nec minui potest.*

⁷⁹ Misfortune self-chosen thus appears here as the negative incarnation of self-sufficiency, as I will later explore under the general heading of tragic reflexivity. The scapegoating of gods for human ills is hindered by a new conception of the divine as absolutely good, so that man reviews with increased concentration his own fault and seeks to ameliorate his condition through self-improvement and character-building rather than through ritual appeasement. Cf. Democr. B175: οἱ δὲ θεοὶ τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι διδοῦσι τὰγαθὰ πάντα καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν, πλὴν ὁκόσα κακὰ καὶ βλαβερά καὶ ἀνοφελέα. τάδε δ' οὔτε πάλαι οὔτε νῦν θεοὶ ἀνθρώποισι δωροῦνται, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ τοῖσδεσιν ἐμπελάζουσι διὰ νοῦ τυφλότητα καὶ ἀγνωμοσύνην. Men. fr. 500.3–10 PCG: κακὸν γὰρ δαίμον' οὐ νομοστέον | εἶναι βίον βλάπτοντα χρηστόν, οὐδ' ἔχειν | κακίαν, ἅπαντα δ' ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν θεόν. | ἀλλ' οἱ γινόμενοι τοῖς τρόποις αὐτοὶ κακοί, | πολλὴν δ' ἐπιπλοκὴν τοῦ βίου πεπονημένοι | † εἰ πάντα τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀβουλίαν | ἐκτρέψαντες † ἀποφαίνουσι δαίμον' αἴτιον καὶ κακὸν ἐκεῖνόν φασιν αὐτοὶ γεγονότες.

state simply that the instances of care of self offered here are meant merely as examples of the sort of transitive reflexive construction that a teacher like Pythagoras may plausibly have used. I say *plausible* since it seems that Pythagoras advocated self-examination in one form or another as part of his regimen.⁸⁰ Given this goal, it is quite possible that he or other wise men used reflexives in a way that suggested the structure of the Delphic maxim. Here are some examples from the Pythagorean *Golden Verses*:⁸¹

μήδ' ἀλογίστως σαυτὸν ἔχειν περὶ μηδὲν ἔθιζε.⁸² (GV 14 Thom)

Don't habituate *yourself* to behaving irrationally in anything.

πολλοὶ δ' ἀνθρώποισι λόγοι δειλοί τε καὶ ἐσθλοὶ
προσπίπτουσ', ὧν μήτ' ἐκπλήσσειο, μήτ' ἄρ' ἐάσῃς
εἰργεσθαι σαυτόν. (GV 21–23 Thom)

Many reports, good and bad, reach the ears of men: neither be amazed by them, nor let yourself abstain from them.

As I have previously argued, we must distinguish between the use of a reflexive construction and an intransitive paraphrase. For the first example, the command μήδ' ἀλογίστως ἔχειν περὶ μηδὲν ἔθιζε/ἐθίζου would have been a workable non-reflexive alternative. Yet it differs in that it does not present the imperative to be calculative and thoughtful as a project of explicit self-habitation and therefore does not create the impression of a transcendental subject authoring and generating

⁸⁰ Foucault (1984) 60 n. 58 cites Porph. *Vita Pythagorae* 40 and D.L. 8.22, which both mention a daily practice of asking oneself what one has achieved today, where one has erred, and what remains undone. Inwood (2005) 343, following Burkert (1972) 213 and n. 19, is sceptical, arguing that the sources 'in fact contain recommendations for memory training rather than spiritual exercises as a means to character improvement or transformation.' This is true, but I see no reason why the moral and mnemonic functions have to exclude one another—as Thom (1995) 165–166 and n. 2 argues, they are actually complementary. In Plato too ἀνάμνησις displays intellectual, moral, and eschatological aspects simultaneously and in an interrelated way (see *Men.* 81b–c; *Phd.* 74bff.; *Phdr.* 249cff.). One is at this point in danger of being swept into the ongoing debate over the degree of continuity between some of the so-called shamanistic practices of sects like the Pythagoreans and philosophy 'strictly' speaking, for a critical summary of which see Hadot (1995b) 179–188. But for our purposes, since Pythagoras (and the Seven Wise Men) are roughly contemporaneous with the appearance of the Delphic maxim, surely this latter is indicative of a concern for self-examination among the wise men of the day and did not arise in a vacuum.

⁸¹ See Thom (1995) 35–58 for the issue of dating. He himself favours a compositional date of 350–300 BC.

⁸² The construction σαυτόν ἔθιζε also appears in Isocrates (1.15; 2.29). Note that he too displays a predilection for reflexives when doling out γνῶμαι (e.g. 1.14, 21, 34,

this act. To accustom yourself to reasoning requires a subject making itself exist in such a state through the force of its agency. It does this in accordance with some principle it has taken on for itself. These effects, as I have argued in other cases, flow from the reflexivisation of a transitive conceptual structure. There arises a division in the subject, with the higher, transcendental component moulding its other aspect, albeit with some difficulty (that is why we speak, and the philosophers speak, of self-cultivation as an ongoing project that is not automatic but must be worked on).

The second example adopts an almost identical scheme, though here the form of control is put as permission. That is, instead of making yourself be in a certain way, it involves not letting yourself do such and such. Again we see a scheme of self-control in which certain behaviours are to be admitted or not admitted of the self. The disciplined man cultivates a transcendental self that is capable of such determinations and prides himself on it. Beyond their psychagogical value, these notes of advice to oneself are also useful aids for negotiating the complex world of human affairs as an individual, as someone who has, comparatively speaking, been left to find his own way and who therefore needs laws for himself to direct his conduct.⁸³ This practice would go on to enjoy a prosperous future, particularly through the Christian *Erbauungsliteratur* and works like Marcus Aurelius' *Tὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν*, whose title is indeed symbolic.

These Pythagorean sayings accord with others in the apophthegmatic tradition. Stobaeus records a bunch of these, attributing them to the different Seven Sages. Needless to say, the same problem of authorship, dating, and phraseology applies here as it does in Pythagoras' case. But it is again plausible, given the wise man's metier of self-examination and self-improvement, that these men were in the habit of using reflexives, if not exactly, at least in ways similar to those given below in their proverbial advice:⁸⁴

38; 2.13, 20, 29), suggesting that they were already a staple of the genre by this time, likely inspired, as proposed below pp. 188–189, by the Delphic maxim and other ancient reflexive templates.

⁸³ This involves viewing and dealing with others as individuals similarly defined by *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ*, eg. Isoc. 1.35: ὅταν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ μέλλῃς τινὶ συμβούλῳ χρῆσθαι, σκόπει πρῶτον πῶς *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ* διώκησεν· ὁ γὰρ κακῶς διανοηθεὶς περὶ τῶν οἰκείων οὐδέποτε καλῶς βουλευέσεται περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων.

⁸⁴ Cf. the *Maxims of Menander*, which exhibit the same tendency to cast advice in the mould of a highly transitive care of self: e.g. ὁ οὖν δὲ *ἑαυτὸν* παντός ἐκ φαύλου τρόπου.

τραχὺς ὢν ἥσυχον σεαυτὸν παρέχε, ὅπως σε αἰσχύνωνται μᾶλλον ἢ φοβῶνται. (Chilon 12 ap. Stobaeus 3.1.172 Wachsmuth)

If harsh, make *yourself* gentle, so that they respect rather than fear you.

σεαυτὸν ἄξιον παρασκεύαζε τῶν γονέων.

(Periander 10 ap. Stobaeus 3.1.172 Wachsmuth)

Make *yourself* worthy of your parents.

ἄρχων κόσμει σεαυτόν.

(Thales 20 ap. Stobaeus 3.1.172 Wachsmuth)

When ruling order *yourself*.

θεώρει ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ τὰς σαυτοῦ πράξεις, ἵνα τὰς μὲν καλὰς ἐπικοσμήῃς, τὰς δὲ αἰσχράς καλύπτῃς.

(Bias ap. Stob. 3.21.11 Wachsmuth)

Observe *your own* actions as in a mirror, so that you may add honour to those which are beautiful, but conceal those which are disgraceful.

Construction of verbs such as παρασκευάζω and παρέχω with reflexives becomes popular in Plato. We may also compare a fragment of Epicharmus (B52): μὴ (ἐ)πὶ μικροῖς αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ὀξύθυμον δείκνυε. They denote the practices of making, exhibiting and showing oneself as such and such, and thus involve a careful concern with creating and managing one's self and self-image. In both uses here the self being moulded is on display to society at large. In Chilon's case the notion of self-control is implicit as the addressee is told to make himself gentle despite the fact that he is harsh. One is accordingly urged to remake his character when that given him by nature proves a disadvantage. The third expression is a compact way of saying that a ruler should not be so intent on ruling others as on ordering himself.⁸⁵ It contributes to the program of knowing oneself in seeking to correct the familiar human proneness to direct certain critical and organising behaviours towards others instead of oneself—whether it be finding the mote in the other's eye and overlooking the beam in one's own, or wishing to direct and advise another's

σαυτὸν φύλαττε τοῖς τρόποις ἐλεύθερον. μηδέποτε σαυτὸν δυστυχῶν ἀπελπίσης (Men. Mon. 471, 485, 931 Edmonds). Here too intransitive paraphrases, e.g. 'keep away from every shady character', have a different connotation.

⁸⁵ This maxim gains special force from the cultural stereotype of the unruly tyrant. Rulers would be better if they learnt also to rule themselves, and before thinking of ruling others he should first rule himself. Cf Isoc. 2.29: ἄρχε σαυτοῦ μηδὲν ἥττον ἢ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τοῦθ' ἡγοῦ βασιλικώτατον, ἂν μηδεμιᾷ δουλεύῃς τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλὰ κρατῇς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν.

affairs instead of taking care of one's own.⁸⁶ On this view knowing oneself consists in scrutinising one's faults and taking steps to correct them, an ethic which develops the ancient virtue of ἀπραγμοσύνη and becomes the backbone of the gnostic tradition of self-improvement. Several other apophthegms attributed to the Seven Sages also seek to counter this bias. For example:

ὅσα νεμεσῶς τῷ πλησίον, αὐτὸς μὴ ποίει.

(Pittacus 4 ap. Stobaeus 3.1.172)

Do none of those things *yourself* which you deplore your neighbour for.

εὐθυναν ἑτέρους ἀξιῶν διδόναι καὶ αὐτὸς ὕπεχε.

(Solon 11 ap. Stobaeus 3.1.172)

When demanding that others answer for their conduct, submit to doing so *yourself* too.

When taken together, such expressions provide a popular context for Plato and Democritus' aspiration to make the self, rather than the other, the initial ethical (and also epistemological) priority.⁸⁷ We should also make special mention of Isocrates' anticipation of the 'golden rule', e.g. at 1.14 (τοιοῦτος γίγνου περὶ τοὺς γονεῖς, οἷους ἂν εὖξαιο περὶ σεαυτὸν γενέσθαι τοὺς σεαυτοῦ παῖδας⁸⁸), which is historic because basing altruism on the self only becomes a powerful argument when that self has become a thing of singular value. One should value others because one values oneself and those others are selves too. The valuing of oneself is culturally legitimised by the category of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ and other practices that accentuate and sanction the individual's interest in himself.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ For applications of the sentiment, cf. Isoc. 2.38, 3.61. Cf. also Men. fr. 744 PCG: οὐθεις ἐφ' αὐτοῦ τὰ κακὰ συνορᾷ, Πάμφιλε, σαφῶς, ἑτέρου δ' ἀσχημονοῦντος ὄψεται. Men. fr. 710 Edmonds: ὅταν τι μέλλης τῶν πέλας κατηγορεῖν | αὐτὸς τὰ σεαυτοῦ πρώτ' ἐπισκοποῦ κακά. Catullus 22.20–21.

⁸⁷ In both expressions αὐτός differentiates the self and is the natural transformation of an emphatic reflexive when it enters the nominative case, and vice versa. One can thus readily transform the second clause of each proverb into a reflexive construction: ὅσα νεμεσῶς τῷ πλησίον, σαυτῷ νεμέσα. εὐθυναν ἑτέρους ἀξιῶν διδόναι καὶ σαυτὸν ἀξιῶν.

⁸⁸ Cf. Isoc. 2.24, 38; 3.61; 4.81.

⁸⁹ One such practice, which I have mentioned in passing, is the growing concern for individual eschatological salvation evinced by the increasing popularity of the various mystery religions and cults, movements which assert the individual's ability to realise the soul's full potential as divine and immortal if one cares for it in the appropriate way. The means of purification may be ritualistic, moral, or both (see Parker (1983) Ch. 10). Besides the prominence of this idea in Plato (e.g. *Phd.* 64a ff.), the doctrine of the

b. *The Delphic Dictum*

Seldom has so terse an expression, seemingly innocuous in its brevity, ignited such hermeneutical wonder as the dictum γνῶθι σαυτόν. As a well of interpretative diversity it ranks with some of humanity's most powerful signifiers—god, truth, beauty. Its precise origins are mysterious, but its engraving into the temple at Delphi symbolically announces the arrival of a developing trend of reflexivity.⁹⁰ Linguistically, it gathers much of its semantic impetus from the sudden unexpected substitution of the reflexive for some other object of knowing. As such it is a paradigmatic example of the meaning that can be generated through creative application of the PRS. The indefinite reference of the reflexive pronoun also provides a wealth of potential readings. Know yourself *qua* what? What is 'yourself' anyway?

The first quotations of the dictum in literature are in fragments of Heraclitus and Ion, and in Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*.⁹¹ The apophthegmatic tradition attributes it to some of the Seven Sages, and Socrates in Plato's *Protagoras* claims that the Seven Sages came together and inscribed this, along with another famous Delphic dictum, μηδὲν ἄγαν, as a dedication to Apollo of the first-fruits of their wisdom. The apophthegmatic tradition is notoriously unreliable and Socrates' testimony is casually anecdotal. Who exactly inscribed the proverbs at Delphi and at what time is uncertain, but 'they must have been on the temple built toward the end of the 6th, or early in the 5th, century to replace the old stone structure destroyed by the fire in 548 BC, and it is possible, if not probable, that they were on the earlier temple of stone.'⁹² There are other historical issues. Was the proverb born at Delphi and spread from there through popular culture, or did it appear there after it had already become, or was becoming, a commonplace of Greek thought? Some sources even ascribe the original occasion of utterance to Phemonoe, the first priestess of Delphi—inspired, presumably, by the god.⁹³

soul's immortality was already established by ancient Pythagoreanism and the Presocratic philosophers. See Burkert (1985) 319–320; Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983) 238, 347–348.

⁹⁰ At the same time the idea was finding expression in India too, e.g. at BU 4.5.6: 'You see, Maitreyi—it is one's self (*ātman*) which one should see and hear, and on which one should reflect and concentrate. For when one has seen and heard one's self, when one has reflected and concentrated on one's self, one knows this whole world.'

⁹¹ Heraclitus B116; Ion fr. 55 *TrGF*; A. *PV* 309.

⁹² Wilkins (1917) 6.

⁹³ Cf. Clem. Al. *Strom.* 1.14.60.3–4 Stählin; D.L. 1.40.

From Wilkins' extensive survey of the dictum one gleans that it was originally interpreted as know your measure and place relative to the gods and other humans. Do not over- or underestimate your wealth, physical appearance, knowledge, social status etc., when dealing with others—when dealing with the gods the more so, being careful to think the mortal thoughts that are appropriate for a mortal creature.⁹⁴ What interests us is that Plato appears to radically reinterpret the dictum as know your soul.⁹⁵ He essentialises the reference of the reflexive as soul, and it is towards this essence of the human, her essential constitution, that the act of knowing should be directed. We can think of this shift as a move from a relative interpretation of the reflexive, whereby one knows oneself in relation to other men or the gods—e.g. 'I have little wealth, he has more,' 'I am mortal, they are immortal'—to an interpretation that reads it *in itself*. This follows from Plato's attempt to separate rigorously the self from the possessions of the self: a philosopher should not confuse himself with the latter but be careful to focus on the former. Plato's move seems to have been anticipated, to some degree, by Heraclitus. Two of his fragments read like a coordinated response to the Delphic command:⁹⁶

ἐδιζησάμην ἐμῶντόν.

(B101 DK)

I searched for *myself*.

ψυχῆς πείρατα ἰὼν οὐκ ἄν ἐξεύροιο, πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· οὕτω
βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει.⁹⁷

(B45 DK)

You couldn't journey to discover the limits of soul, despite travelling every road. So deep is its *logos*.

⁹⁴ So too Courcelle (1974) 12 and Tränkle (1985) 23.

⁹⁵ Wilkins (1917) 60–77, Tränkle (1985) 25–26. Cf. Courcelle (1974) 15. Since grasping the essence of the human being, the soul, as immortal is an integral component of this knowledge, the inception of this interpretation is no doubt fostered by the ideal of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ and the general belief in personal immortality spread by mystery religion.

⁹⁶ So Gigon (1935) 111. They were also associated by later writers. See Plu. *Adv. Col.* 1118c1–11 Pohlenz-Westman; Jul. *Or.* 6.5.30–43 Rochefort. Note also Julian's connection of the dictum to ὁμοίωσις θεῷ and his inference that God knows other things if and only if he knows himself, given his status as a reflexive totality: πάντα γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐστίν, εἴπερ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχει τῶν ὅπως οὖν ὄντων τὰς αἰτίας "for he is *himself* everything, if indeed he has within *himself* and right by *himself* the causes of all the things that exist in some way." One notices again the idealised reflexivity of divine beings. Cf. Ch. 7.4 below.

⁹⁷ Cf. CU 3.14.3: "This self (*ātman*) of mine that lies deep within my heart—it is smaller than a grain of rice or barley, smaller than a mustard seed ... but it is larger than the earth, larger than the intermediate region, larger than the sky, larger even than all these worlds put together."

The first seems to tell of his search for himself in response to being told to know himself, the second reports back what he found. This is, of course, pure reconstruction, but it must be admitted that it is at least contextually plausible. The verb ἐξευρίσκω is a natural answer to διζημαι, and if we read the two together it turns out that what Heraclitus was looking for in his search for himself was some account of soul, a λόγος ψυχῆς, which would later occupy Socrates and Plato. What he uncovered was something unfathomable, the expanse of which to thought seemed infinite. If B101, B45 and the Delphic dictum are connected, then Heraclitus' quest for self-knowledge initiates a new interpretation of the dictum in seeking an internalised metaphysical essence as the reflexive's referent. The semantics of searching seems to require some hidden object for uncovering, while knowing oneself in the traditional sense can simply comprise knowing that one is mortal and of low estate compared to the gods. That is, it can be knowledge about oneself rather than knowledge of the self *per se*.⁹⁸

It is clear then that shifting the interpretation of the Delphic dictum in this direction moves one towards nominalisation of αὐτός insofar as it takes the reflexive pronoun to refer to some essential form of the human being. It thus falls within the general diachronic scheme of our argument. We see also that this reflexive kernel becomes increasingly important to philosophy's program—eventually it will make its way up the hierarchy of philosophical studies to become the discipline's very culmination, and also its foundation,⁹⁹ a development which is further proof of an increasing inward turn.

8. Conclusions

At the birth of philosophy we find the formation of several foundational reflexive concepts, which are regularly attributed to the highest beings in a given domain; in ontology and cosmology they include self-identity and spherical reflexivity, self-rule, self-movement, self-generation, and

⁹⁸ Kahn (1979) ad loc. writes that '[w]e are surprisingly close here to the modern or Christian idea that a person may be alienated from his own (true) self.' See further below pp. 244–245. I disagree with Wilkins' conclusion, cautious though it is, that B101 and B45 are probably not connected with the Delphic dictum, and that when Heraclitus uses the dictum (B116) it is in the conventional and traditional sense. The two just seem to me too good a contextual fit not at least to be implicitly connected.

⁹⁹ As Wilkins (1917) 66 notes, the Stoics began to 'centre all their philosophy around

the idea of existence αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ/καθ' ἑαυτόν.¹⁰⁰ The significance of this ancient connection of reflexivity and philosophical ἀρχαί for the later tradition can scarcely be overstated, and may be gauged, for example, by the almost hysterical level of reflexivity reached in Hegel's depiction of Absolute Spirit:

It [Absolute Spirit] is the inner being of the world, that which essentially is, and is *per se*; it assumes objective, determinate form, and enters into relations with itself—it is externality (otherness), and exists for self; yet, in this determination, and in its otherness, it is still one with itself—it is self-contained and self-complete, in itself and for itself at once.¹⁰¹

This attribution has an implicit logic to it: if it is to foreclose an infinite regress, whatever is most fundamental in a given respect, since it cannot be determined by anything else, in that respect can only determine itself. This is generally true of all principles, whether they be cosmological, anthropological, or ethical.

Microcosmically, the soul attracts reflexive characterisation. It possesses a λόγος that increases itself, while its characterisation as self-moving might go as far back as Thales.

Thinkers begin shifting the centre of ethical gravity towards the self. Democritus claims one should feel shame before oneself more than before others, that in suffering certain emotions one becomes an enemy to oneself, and that the necessary resources for happiness lie within oneself and the soul. Accordingly, happiness is internalised as a state of the soul rather than consisting in the myriad relations one has with others, including material goods. Antiphon the sophist makes self-control, victory over oneself, and reflexive evaluation of the social self as it plays out

γνῶθι σαυτόν. The Neo-Platonists were also keen to promote self-knowledge to a foundational status. Proclus' commentary on 1 *Alcibiades* (5.13–14 Westerink) states: αὕτη τοίνυν ἔστω καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἀρχὴ καὶ τῆς Πλάτωνος διδασκαλίας, ἡ ἑαυτῶν γνῶσις.

¹⁰⁰ In the Upaniṣads too reflexive acts define primordial and ultimate beings, and the reflexive in its substantival sense as *self* becomes the highest being, e.g. TU 2.7.1: 'In the beginning this world was the nonexistent, | and from it arose the existent. | By itself it made a body for itself.' Cf. BU 1.4.1: 'In the beginning this world was just a single body (*ātman*) shaped like a man. He looked around and saw nothing but himself. The first thing he said was "Here I am!" and from that the name "I" came into being.' The subjective affirmation of one's existence as a self has been elevated to the position of the world's first act. Cf. BU 1.4.17: 'In the beginning this world was only the self (*ātman*), only one.'

¹⁰¹ Hegel (1807) § 25. Note however that Hegel takes this reflexivity further by developing the simple self-identity of classical logic into a dynamic relation that transpires as a mediation with self which includes moments of self-negation and self-transcendence typical of reflexivity in modern thought.

different roles essential to successful living. The importance to ethics of transitive action directed towards oneself is thus taking shape as a developing technology of self-care, which coalesces in the Delphic dictum and is further reflected in the reflexive use of *παρέχω*, and, though somewhat apocryphally, in the predilection for reflexives in the apophthegmatic tradition.¹⁰²

The enormity of the task of ethical self-engagement calls to mind Kierkegaard's words: 'to contend with the whole world is a comfort, but to contend with oneself dreadful.'¹⁰³ It is fascinating to find a similar ethic of self-care solemnised by Confucius, more or less in time with the Presocratic developments, e.g.: 'I suppose I should give up hope. I have yet to meet the man who, on seeing his own errors, is able to take himself to task inwardly.'¹⁰⁴ Confucius also identifies grappling with oneself as the ultimate source of moral conduct: 'If for a single day a man could return to the observance of the rites through overcoming himself, then the whole Empire would consider benevolence to be his. However, the practice of benevolence depends on oneself alone, and not on others.'¹⁰⁵

Reflexive concepts are spreading through the various philosophical domains, and there is a synergistic macro-/microcosmic analogy by which humans and the highest cosmic beings share reflexive attributes.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Cf. Ch. 7 n. 35 and pp. 235–236. That this concern for self, far from courting egoism, is taken to create a more rigorous ethical standard, cf. Kierkegaard (1843) 102–103: 'for someone who really respects himself and is concerned for his own soul is assured of the fact that a person living under his own supervision in the world at large lives in greater austerity and seclusion than a maiden in her lady's bower.' The transitive relation with self begun here has become highly fashionable in today's society, where one encounters slogans such as 'Challenge yourself' (Australian Defence Force) and 'Broadcast yourself' (Youtube); even colloquial greetings have been turned into a query of self-relation, as when one asks, 'What have you being doing with yourself?' With the first cf. also the trite tendency of moderns to welcome difficulty as an opportunity to learn something about oneself. The sentiment is rather Stoic: *Opus est enim ad notitiam sui experimento* (Sen. Prov. 4.3).

¹⁰³ Kierkegaard (1843) 138. Recall Diogenes to Alexander, Ch. 2 n. 38, and Nietzsche (1885) § 17, p. 78: 'But the worst enemy thou canst meet, wilt thou thyself always be; thou waylayest thyself in caverns and forests.'

¹⁰⁴ *Analects* V 27, tr. Lau (1979).

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, XII 1.

¹⁰⁶ This analogy will become especially labile as the goal of *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ* takes hold of Greek thought and becomes an explicit ethical ideal. Though the phrase first appears in Plato (*Tht.* 176b), Joly (1964) traces the notion to ancient Pythagoreanism, so that it may already have been at work in this period.

This spread indicates the value of reflexivity to these new forms of discourse, and the general productivity of the PRS. And, crucially, the propagation of reflexive ἀρχαί points to the inscription of the human being's own reflexivity into its objects of knowledge.

I have proposed that the technologies of self-care, especially ideas such as Democritus' αἰδῶς ἑαυτοῦ, are emerging partly in response to profound sociological changes in Greek society, which require the development of self-directed regulatory behaviours to compensate for the (comparative) weakening of other-directed strategies.¹⁰⁷ The individual is encouraged by the structure of urban society to take an interest in himself and τὰ ἑαυτοῦ; it is improper to meddle in the affairs of another, especially when this means negligence in one's own. The individual sees himself as having the power to shape his destiny—not merely by appeal to the gods, but by shaping his own character (τρόπος, ἦθος)—and in this way to attain a heightened level of autonomy.

¹⁰⁷ For Democritus' idea of making laws for the soul, cf. Isocrates' (1.45) reflexivisation of the verb ἐπιτάσσω to portray the earnest and disciplined man as one who 'enjoins himself to do what is best' (τὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τὰ βέλτιστα πράττειν ἐπιτάττοντα), and his passivisation of exhortative verbs with the reflexive, e.g. at 2.13: μάλιστα δ' ἂν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σαυτοῦ παρακληθῇ. Cf. also Hermippus fr. 3 West: ξύνεσι γὰρ διη δεσμ(ι)ῳ μὲν οὐδενί, | † τοῖσι δ' ὑπαγωγέῃσι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ τρόποις †, i.e. "For he is joined with no [external] bond, but rather with the mortar of his own [internal] character."

CHAPTER FIVE

CONSCIENCE AND THE REFLEXIVISATION OF ΣΥΝΟΙΔΑ

In Chapter 3 we considered en passant Sappho's reflexivisation of σύνοιδα and left further discussion of its import to this section since its significance demanded a more extensive treatment. My argument here is that the emergence of a specific category of conscience is the perfect example of reflexivisation of a traditionally other-directed relation, and a perfect case study for the semantic implications of such a move. Besides Democritus' notion of 'shame before oneself', conscience or 'knowing with oneself' is another key idea in the conceptual toolbox of self-regulation necessary for moral life as a self-interested being in the Greek πόλις. Because conscience is interpreted as an interior function of the soul, this particular reflexivisation also clarifies the relationship between psychological uses of the reflexive and the idea of ψυχή, and paves the way for similar associations in Plato.

The speeches of the Attic orator Antiphon provide a window into the developing discourse of legal rhetoric and the construction of the idea of conscience. In Greek this takes a specifically reflexive formulation, which already suggests that conscience is understood as an internalised equivalent, or metamorphosis, of an other-directed counterpart. In the common syntactical projection of σύνοιδα, the complement of the prepositional prefix—that is, with whom one knows—takes the dative case and is usually disjoint from the verb's subject. It is often left out and to be supplied by the context. The base meaning of this verb is thus given by LSJ as '*know something about a person, esp. as a potential witness for or against him.*'¹ As LSJ's definition implies, this verb is especially applicable for the knowledge of facts which are not neutral but of normative interest. For example, I *know with someone* that he is an upstanding citizen, or a shameless drinker.²

¹ S.v. σύνοιδα.

² The semantic history of reflexive conscience, especially when nominalised as συνείδησις, is largely a story of the development and then predomination of its normative use. See Marietta (1970) 178, Bosman (2003) 276.

The verb, in its other-directed sense, is not found in Homer. It appears first in Solon:

ἧ (sc. Δίκη) σιγῶσα σύνοιδε τὰ γιγνόμενα πρό τ' ἔοντα (Sol. 4.15)

who [justice] is silently conscious of present and past occurrences.

A word such as βροτοῖς is to be understood as the complement of the prepositional verbal prefix: justice takes silent note of present and past deeds as a witness for or against mortals. The act of normative witnessing is understood as a dialogical relation, in Gill's sense, between two beings, a god and mortal. What German scholars have called the objectification of conscience (*Objectivierung des Gewissens*³) is supposed as the original manner of its representation; it is exemplified by the idea of the vengeful *Erinyes* as a personification of the horror that afflicts the consciousness of a perpetrator. The substitution of this self-other relation with the internal, psychological self-self relation of conscience, in which one layer or level of the subject judges another, satisfies the compulsion of a burgeoning rationalism to analyse the experiences of consciousness as an effect of the psyche's operation on itself without reference to external, supernatural entities.⁴ As Seel writes, it is the *form*, not the *essence*, which changes in this transition, 'so tief auch „Form“ in die menschliche Grundbefindlichkeit einzugreifen vermag.'⁵ But, as I argue further below, this particular form's deep intervention in the basic human condition can, within limits, reconstitute the way we experience conscience itself.

With the reflexivisation of σύνοιδα one becomes a witness to the actions of oneself. She becomes her own judge, and as such a second voice or perspective is created that evaluates the actions or thoughts of the first. Certain aspects of this process are amenable to the common treatment of guilt as internalised shame. According to this view guilt arises when,

³ Snell (1930) 28. The idea is beautifully developed by Seel (1953) 313–314, who comments generally on the experience of the world as personified exchange, which works 'in die Fülle der Erscheinungen Ordnung und Zusammenhang zu bringen, gefühltes Erlebnis sagbar zu machen, Rangstufen, Ursachenreihen, Daseinsbedingungen, ahnungsvolles Erschauern und beglücktes Schauen zu repräsentieren.'

⁴ E. Or. 395–396 is often taken to illustrate this replacement: Με. τί χοῖμα πάσχεις; τίς σ' ἀπόλλυσιν νόσος; | Όρ. ἡ σύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δεῖν' εἰργασμένος. See Seel (1953) 298–299 for a summary. Rodgers' (1969) insistence that translation of σύνεσις as *conscience* is unjustified in Greek tragedy falls prey to the overwrought 'morphologische Spezifikation' cautioned against by Seel (298).

⁵ Seel (1953) 315.

independently of the presence or absence of others, the affected individual takes a view on her actions by assuming the perspective of another. Once internalised, she carries this viewpoint around inside herself so that its effects can be felt even when she is alone. This view of guilt is obviously incomplete or otherwise absurd, since if taken absolutely it would mean that all moral affect is reducible to a response to the gaze of others. The self could never author its own moral position more or less independently of others' views, but what at first glance appeared to be a position arising from itself would in fact merely be an appropriation or internalisation of the views of others. Just how certain people could come to judge themselves by unorthodox standards, even in the face of the hostility of their peers, would then become quite difficult to account for, if there did not exist another source of moral evaluation in addition to that of the other.⁶

Guilt derives its regulatory power from the transparency of consciousness. Accordingly, there is nothing that I can do without being aware of it. I may commit an evil act, and may conceal this from others, but may not conceal it from myself. In other words, I know better than any other whether I have done wrong. As Isocrates writes:

μηδέποτε μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιήσας ἔλπιζε λήσειν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους
λάθῃς, σεαυτῷ συνειδήσεις. (Isoc. 1.16)

Never expect that your commission of any shameful act will pass without notice. For even if you escape the notice of others, you will be conscious of it with *yourself*.

As suggested in the section on Democritus, this inability for the conscientious subject to hide from itself thus assures the conservation of moral regulation even when others are absent. Given the history of Greek moral thinking, what is unusual here is that the appeal to limit wrongdoing in secret is not directed to the omnipresent gaze of the gods, the traditional sanction, but rather to the subject of συνειδήσεις as a site of conscience. It is this subject which has become a forceful moral sanction, and thus a *self-regulator*, by effectively taking over the role performed by *Dike* in the above fragment of Solon. The reflexivisation of σύννοια thus foreshadows modernity's attempt to construct the individual as an autonomous

⁶ Cairns (1993) rightly acknowledges that from Homer onwards even αἰδώς, a word which has often been treated as an essentially externalised and other-directed emotion, can be felt when a person fails to live up to their own idealised self-image, which may be conditioned but not totally determined by what others may say.

self-regulating agent, and is at the same time dependent on other developments in human ontology. For it is only when the subject of *σύννοια* has assumed a form that emphasises its privileged intellectual access to its own thoughts and acts, rather than finding expression as a society of mind in which certain agents are opaque to others (as, for example, *ἄτη* is to Agamemnon in his famous apology), that consciousness of immoral acts will become especially burdensome.⁷

One passage in Antiphon is particularly illustrative of the reflexive use of *σύννοια* in the rhetoric of moral responsibility, with some philosophising about the involvement of the soul in these reflexive acts thrown in to boot:

εὔ δ' ὅτε οἱ οὐκ ἂν ποτ' ἦλθον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, εἴ τι ξυνήδη ἑμαυτῷ τοιοῦτον· νῦν δὲ πιστεύων τῷ δικαίῳ, οὐ πλέονος οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἄξιον ἀνδρὶ συναγωνίζεσθαι, μηδὲν αὐτῷ συνειδῶτι ἀνόσιον εἰργασμένῳ μηδ' εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς ἡσεβηκότι· ἐν γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ ἤδη καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀπειρηγὸς ἡ ψυχὴ συνεξέσωσεν, ἐθέλουσα ταλαιπωρεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ξυνειδέναι ἑαυτῇ. τῷ δὲ ξυνειδῶτι τοῦτο αὐτὸ πρῶτον πολέμιόν ἐστιν· ἔτι γὰρ καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἰσχύοντος ἡ ψυχὴ προαπολείπει, ἡγουμένη τὴν τιμωρίαν οἱ ἥκειν ταύτην τῶν ἀσεβημάτων· ἐγὼ δ' ἑμαυτῷ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν ξυνειδῶς ἴκω εἰς ὑμᾶς. (Antiph. 5.93)

Know well that I would never have come to the city had I been *conscious with myself* of anything of this sort. Rather it was out of trust in justice, the most valuable ally that a man who is *conscious with himself* of having committed no unholy act and no impiety against the gods can have. For in such a man the soul rescues the body even when it has already given up, ready to endure because its conscience is free. But it is exactly this which is the number one enemy of the man who is conscious. For the soul forfeits in advance even while the body is still strong, believing that this vengeance for sacrilegious acts is coming upon it. However I come before you *conscious with myself* of no such a thing.

This passage reveals the inner workings of conscience as a sanction. For one who is guilty (τῷ ξυνειδῶτι), the very fact of being conscious of an immoral act is one's own worst enemy (πρῶτον πολέμιον), whereas the soul with a free conscience is often one's salvation. The use of *πολέμιον* recalls Democritus' and Plato's reflexive use of these words: in being conscious of an immoral act one is an enemy to oneself. The enmity presumably refers to the self-torture of the guilt-ridden conscience.

⁷ Since Isocrates' observation that one is conscious of one's own acts is in a sense self-evident, the foundation of an ethical sanction on this fact is another manifestation of philosophy's general endeavour to found systems on infallible principles. For the search for perfect premises in ancient philosophy, see Hermann (2004) 251–256.

The guilty conscience is therefore a kind of punishment, which Socrates in Xenophon's *Apology* warns lies in store for those who abetted his lying accusers (τούτοις ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ πολλὴν ἐαυτοῖς συνειδέναι ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν), while he, guilt-free, may enjoy the spiritedness that comes with a private sense of righteousness no less than before his condemnation (ἐμοὶ δὲ τί προσήκει νῦν μείον φρονεῖν ἢ πρὶν κατακριθῆναι, μηδὲν ἐλεγχθέντι ὡς πεποίηκά τι ὧν ἐγρόψαντό με).⁸ Both Antiphon and Xenophon emphasise the deleterious effect that the mere intellectual act of conscience can have. As a secret form of interiorised knowledge it is quite naturally attributed by Antiphon to the soul, especially if we look to soul's characterisation in Plato as a reflexive being. But most importantly, conscience is understood to affect the health of the soul, in a manner that also anticipates Plato.⁹ A free conscience empowers the soul and enables it to strengthen a failing body, whereas a burdened conscience makes the soul give up in advance, even when the body is strong.¹⁰ This focus on the state of the soul is consistent with a self-directed ethics, in which the negative result of the guilty conscience is not, as in the case of shame, damage in the way one appears to others—for instance *ἀδοξία*—but an inner disease of the soul that compromises the agency of the subject.¹¹ In cases of bad conscience it is the mere intellectual act of reflexive *συνείδησις* that is destructive, whose internality stands in stark contrast to *ἀδοξία*. Significantly, the speaker chooses to emphasise not that he simply *did not* commit the alleged act, but rather that he *is not conscious of* having committed it. This choice implies that the question of conscience is becoming a focal-point for legal appeal, and therefore heavily involved in the establishment of guilt as a prerequisite

⁸ X. *Ap.* 24.

⁹ So too Isoc. 3.59: ζηλοῦτε μὴ τοὺς πλεῖστα κεκτημένους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μηδὲν κακὸν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς συνειδότας· μετὰ γὰρ τοιαύτης ψυχῆς ἥδιστ' ἂν τις δύναιτο τὸν βίον διαγαγεῖν. The view that it is one's own rather than another's sense of whether one has acted justly that ultimately determines psychological wellbeing also occurs in Confucius (*Analects* XII 4, tr. Lau (1979)): 'If, on examining himself, a man finds nothing to reproach himself for, what worries and fears can he have?'

¹⁰ Cf. Men. fr. 745 PCG: ὁ συνιστορῶν αὐτῷ τι καὶ ἢ θρασύτατος | ἢ σύνεσις αὐτὸν δειλότατον εἶναι ποιεῖ.

¹¹ One notes however that the cause of the soul's failing is rationalised as fear of coming punishment, and thus is still understood within a scheme of public reward and retribution—quite a different thing from the guilt that persists even when there is little or no chance of discovery, as if the immoral act was sufficient *in itself* to negatively affect the soul. Cf. Men. fr. 1137 Edmonds: ὁ μὴ κολασθεὶς τῷ νόμῳ πράξας κακὰ | αὐτὸς ὕφ' ἐαυτοῦ τῷ φόβῳ κολάζεται.

for punishment.¹² And because an appeal to conscience is an appeal to the state of the soul, in this way law joins the philosophy of the day in conducting a portion of attention away from the aspect under which human beings appear to one another (for philosophy, away from δόξα as mere opinion, for law, away from δόξα as reputation), and towards ψυχή as the human being's real form.

One story that is often told concerning the development of moral ideology in Ancient Greece is that the primarily shame-oriented culture of Homeric Greece is in time superseded by the guilt-oriented culture of Classical Greece.¹³ This relates to the question of conscience, or reflexive σύννοια, since guilt is interpreted as the price for failure to act according to conscience. One must emphasise that for those who employ the distinction between shame and guilt, or shame and conscience, as an instrument of cultural classification, it is not to be read absolutely in terms of the absence of one and the presence of the other. As Heller says:

Conscience regulation can play the primary role, yet shame regulation never entirely loses its force. I would rather speak of changing proportions between the two and even of a kind of pendulum movement from conscience regulation to shame regulation and vice versa.¹⁴

¹² On the other hand, the question of conscience is largely irrelevant to shame. One feels shame when exposed in a disgraceful act whether it has been committed in bad conscience or not, just as the raped female is ashamed even though she has been violated completely against her will. So in extreme cases of shame regulation, and especially in the case of women—to whom society often does not grant the privilege of appeals to conscience, attempting instead to regulate their behaviour solely through shame—violated women are punished severely. What matters from the point of view of society is that they have been involved in a shameful act that needs to be appeased, regardless of any private intellectual or volitional relation to this event.

¹³ Dodds (1951) provides the canonical statement of the theory in the classical context, though the distinction between shame- and guilt-oriented cultures has also been applied in other anthropological contexts. See e.g. Benedict's (1947) analysis of Japanese culture as shame-oriented in contrast to the guilt-consciousness of American culture. Dodds follows Freud in interpreting guilt as internalised shame. For a general statement of the issue from the psychoanalytic perspective, see Piers and Singer (1953). Recent scholars, especially Williams (1993), have, predictably enough, taken issue with Dodds' progressive scheme, in which guilt is a more 'advanced' moral sense than shame, but I hope the terms of my discussion have suggested that there is, from the sociological perspective, no better and worse forms of moral sense, just more or less effective forms of social regulation adapted to different forms of social organisation. Guilt is far from inherently better; indeed the anonymity of many contemporary societies is so extreme that guilt, a comparatively weak sanction, is having trouble regulating behaviour effectively.

¹⁴ Heller (2003) 1029. My argument, therefore, is not that guilt is altogether absent in early Greek society, but rather, as Konstan (2003) points out, that modernity has sought a

She goes on to illustrate this pendulum effect:

The age of Enlightenment struck perhaps the hardest blow to shame culture by devaluing traditional norms and rules, declaring them null and void. Yet, at the same time, especially in the Victorian age, the so-called civilizing process, as discussed by Norbert Elias, gathered momentum as tradition was replaced by class conventions that were, perhaps, even more binding. The increasing indifference to the opinion of others, the reliance on one's judgement, has been accompanied by the renewal of shame regulations.¹⁵

Heller also makes the point that the distinctness of conscience from shame is already present in the word's etymology. Conscience is not, as shame is, an innate feeling, affect, or instinct that is a species trait, but an intellectual construction on top of the primogeniture of shame. She writes that '[t]he word "conscience," "*conscientia*," "*Gewissen*," indicates that the role played by knowledge in the constitution of this feeling is intimately connected to the activity of a reflective self-consciousness.' If this etymology is important, then it would seem the point can also be reversed: conscience plays an important role in the construction of (self)-consciousness. In the third volume of his *History of Sexuality*, Foucault gives an historical dimension to the interlocking construction of conscience and consciousness. The technologies recruited for 'care of self', especially the practices of self-examination in late Roman times and the confessional during the Christian Middle Ages, unfurled a deepened internal landscape of the soul and amplified the internal voice of conscience. Foucault finds the beginnings of this development in Plato's *1 Alcibiades*, where Socrates defines care of the self as the original philosophical project. We can trace the development even further if the development of conscience is linked to the reflexive use of σύνοιδα, and in turn to the linguistic development of pronominal reflexivity as a whole that cultivates the self as an object of reflexive activity.

Reflexive use of σύνοιδα is first attested in a fragment of Sappho, where a lacuna has been supplemented by a quotation from the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus:

... ἔγω δ' ἔμ' [αὐτὰι τοῦτο σύ]νοιδα (Sapph. fr. 26 LP)

... I am conscious of this with myself

rigorous separation between shame and guilt in the interests of downplaying the former as a kind of infringement on the self's autonomy, and elevating the latter as the moral sense appropriate to an authentic self. I take the development in Greece of a specific vocabulary of guilt through reflexivisation as one of the first signs of this shift in focus.

¹⁵ Heller (2003) 1029.

Without the context it is impossible to know whether the object of consciousness was of moral interest, or simply a subjectively felt experience without any particular moral connotation. Sappho certainly has a reputation for her intimate portrayal of human emotional experience, so that the latter would certainly not be alien to her usual subject matter. The tone of her poems is personal, and seems to give voice to a unique self. The relative subjectivity of Lyric compared with Epic, mediated historically by didactic epic forms, has exercised many scholars. The fact that lyricists speak in the first person is perhaps most indicative of a shift in perspective.¹⁶ Reflexivity, insofar as it characterises the subject, would thus not be out of place in this literary form, and scholars have fastened onto lyric as the literary vehicle for the newly discovered sense of individuality fostered by the major socio-political changes of the Archaic epoch. In Bowra's words, a new 'means of expression' is needed for the individual to define himself.¹⁷

An old problem is about to resurface here, namely the question of whether it is simply a case of finding a new means of expression for old troubles, problems, and experiences, or whether a particular means of expression can actually create certain experiences or magnify certain aspects of them. I refer the reader back to Taylor's destruction of the realist fallacy when it comes to 'objects' of consciousness.¹⁸ We may further observe that there are culturally socialised patterns of emotional and experiential response just as there are individually unique ones. I am not schooled in machismo, so do not feel, for example, a challenge to my honour in being looked at in the wrong way, nor do I feel the accompanying upsurge of indignation, whereas for some this is a perfectly natural response. For those involved in this system of behaviour, there exists a language of honour and respect that efficiently maps onto these socialised patterns of experience and is available to actors for expedient self-expression. Differences in the language we use to interpret our experience in many cases point to different habits of emotive response.¹⁹

¹⁶ Cf. Tsagarakis (1977) 81–82, who argues that these personal expressions are for the most part to be taken in the representative sense. The lyric 'I' in many instances does not stand for a particular identifiable subjectivity which excludes all others but is rather the bearer of conventionalised experiences common to human subjects.

¹⁷ Bowra (1961) 9. See also Jebb (1893) 107, Snell (1953) 43–70.

¹⁸ Ch. 1 n. 4.

¹⁹ As an important general note, Wierzbicka (1986), (1999) has diligently demonstrated the linguistic construction of human emotion, arguing that cultures generate specific emotive complexes by combining certain universal semantic primitives in unique ways. Different cultures lexicalise different complexes according to which emotions are

If the reflexive use of σύνοιδα is a new expression, framed by the narratives of lyric and legal rhetoric, an appreciation of this development can perhaps be gained by briefly considering the extremes to which this notion is taken following the Classical era and applying this as a limiting case. Such a consideration has the fortunate offshoot of demonstrating the importance of nominalisation in creating psychic categories. In the Classical era, reflexive knowing-with is almost exclusively a verbal phenomenon. There are only two extant instances of the deverbal feminine noun συνείδησις from the fifth century, in a fragment of Democritus:

Some men, not knowing about the dissolution of mortal nature, but acting on knowledge (συνείδησις) of the suffering in life (κακοπραγμοσύνη), afflict the period of life with anxieties and fears, inventing false tales about the period after the end of life. (Democr. B297 DK)

Whether συνείδησις carries ethical overtones here and is best translated as ‘conscience’, or whether it simply denotes neutral knowledge or awareness is uncertain, and also hinges upon the precise interpretation of κακοπραγμοσύνη. For this word could either mean ‘faring ill’, i.e. ‘lack of success’ (stronger, ‘suffering’), or ‘doing ill’, i.e. ‘evil doing’. Translation of συνείδησις as ‘conscience’ obviously fits the latter better and also the eschatological context, which seems to presage punishment in an afterlife for the evils committed when alive.

This scarcity may be compared with the popularity συνείδησις assumes in the Hellenistic Age and the *New Testament*, where it more clearly becomes the notion of conscience moderns are familiar with.²⁰ In fact it takes its place within the psyche as a fully-fledged agent, alongside the heart, reason, etc. This is dependent on the nominalisation of what in classical times was emphatically a verbal notion, in an important way. Only when it has become a noun may συνείδησις take predicates of its

key players in the performance of a particular socio-cultural life. Apropos our current theme, at (1986) 591–592 she has some very interesting things to say about equivalents of English ‘shame’ in Australian Aboriginal cultures, especially concerning their embedding in specific cultural practices and behaviours. Given quite vast cross-cultural differences, diachronic differences in the conception of (moral) emotions within a specific culture are also completely plausible. The development of reflexive συνείδησις is one semantic thread that will eventually be weaved into the modern conception of consciousness.

²⁰ For the sudden popularity of συνείδησις in the Hellenistic Age, in particular its importance for Stoicism, see Marrieta (1970). According to Bosman (2003) 276, the use of substantive forms really takes off with Philo and Paul.

own.²¹ It may, in Barthes' language, start to attract its own senses, and this assembly of predicates around a noun begins to characterise and give it life as an active entity:

They show that what the law requires is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness and their conflicting thoughts accuse or perhaps excuse them on that day when, according to my gospel, God judges the secrets of men by Christ Jesus. (Rom 2:15 RSV)

Conscience has become a *bona fide* part of oneself that one can possess, and is now an entity in itself that may confirm and bear witness as if it were an agent. In Classical Greece, συνείδησις simply is not an entity of this type and is not a member of the Greek society of mind. When nominalised, it still retains its verbal aspect, and never takes its own animate predicates as though it were an agent. However, it can be said that the reflexive use of σύννοιδα is a conditional step and is necessary for the later nominalisation which, when carried to a particular extreme, yields the personification of Christian conscience.²² Personification may be viewed as an extension of nominalisation if nounhood is correlated to animacy and agency hierarchies. Concepts which animate and structure a culture rank highly on these scales and thus have a power of animacy and agency normally only afforded to human agents.

We meet then a remark made in the Introduction regarding the development of the psychological vocabulary from Homer to Plato, and which applies to lexical evolution generally. For an idea to get a name is not for it to come into existence from nothing. But in either being differentiated from a wide-ranging term that previously engulfed it, or in rising from an implicit semantic background to its own position of prominence, what receives an easily accessible signifier may assume a leading part in the economy of signs that makes up discourse, and living there as a unique entity impress the human mind with its significance. Speakers will make use of it to interpret their experience; in the case of conscience, philosophers and preachers will refer to it, and surely its use will magnify those aspects of experience it draws attention to. The person socialised in the Christian way, who has learnt the discourse of conscience, will learn to

²¹ Of course, one may technically form a noun by articulating the infinitive, but this is a rather indirect method. If the use of the concept is frequent enough, in time a regular nominal form will be derived.

²² I reiterate the point that nowhere when I make such historical claims are they to be taken in anything other than a counterfactual non-teleological sense.

interrogate its condition with more solicitude than the Homeric hero. Words are like lenses that may focus our consciousness on this or that colour of experience—in conscience's case, on the condition of the soul.

CHAPTER SIX

TRAGEDY AND COMEDY

1. *Preliminaries*

The following words of Lucian, though written centuries after the period under consideration, are a fitting introduction to this chapter. They describe the reflexivity of *θέα* or *θεωρία*, the mode of theatrical speculation. The theatre-goer sees himself in the proficient actor just as in a mirror:

“Ὅλως δὲ τὸν ὀρχηστρὴν δεῖ πανταχόθεν ἀπηκριβῶσθαι, ὥς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν εὐρυθμον, εὐμορφον, σύμμετρον, αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἑοικὸς, ἀσυκοφάντητον, ἀνεπίληπτον, μηδαμῶς ἐλλιπές, ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων κεκραμένον, τὰς ἐνθυμήσεις ὀξύν, τὴν παιδείαν βαθύν, τὰς ἐννοίας ἀνθρώπινον μάλιστα. ὁ γοῦν ἔπαινος αὐτῷ τότ’ ἂν γίγνοιτο ἐντελής παρὰ τῶν θεατῶν ὅταν ἕκαστος τῶν ὁρῶντων γνωρίζῃ τὰ αὐτοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ τῷ ὀρχηστῇ ἑαυτὸν βλέπῃ καὶ ἃ πάσχειν αὐτὸς καὶ ἃ ποιεῖν εἴωθεν· τότε γὰρ οὐδὲ κατέχειν ἑαυτοὺς οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὕψ’ ἡδονῆς δύνανται, ἀλλ’ ἀθρόοι πρὸς τὸν ἔπαινον ἐκχέονται, τὰς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῆς ἕκαστος εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες καὶ αὐτοὺς γνωρίζοντες. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ τὸ Δελφικὸν ἐκεῖνο τὸ Γνώθι σεαυτὸν ἐκ τῆς θέας αὐτοῖς περιγίγνεται, καὶ ἀπέρχονται ἀπὸ τοῦ θεάτρου ἃ τε χρὴ αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ ἃ φεύγειν μεμαθηκότες καὶ ἃ πρότερον ἠγνόουν διδαχθέντες.

(Luc. *Salt*.81)

It is altogether necessary that the pantomime be perfect in every way, so that his entire piece is well-proportioned, graceful, harmonious, self-consistent, beyond quibble and reproach, in no way deficient, blended of the most excellent elements, razor-sharp in its conception, deep in its culture, and above all human in its ideas. Indeed the praise he gets from the spectators would be complete when each of those watching recognises *his own* situation, or rather sees *himself*, and all he’s accustomed to doing and experiencing, in the pantomime just as in a mirror. For it’s precisely then that people are incapable of restraining themselves for pleasure, and instead gush with praise in droves, each individual seeing images of *his own* soul and recognising *himself*. For they actually inherit as a consequence of the spectacle the fulfilment of that Delphic command to “Know *yourself*”, and they depart the theatre with an understanding of what they must choose and avoid and are taught what they were previously ignorant of.

Lucian identifies the vicarious experience of the viewer as a lesson in knowing oneself. In this sense Greek theatre is a cultural manifestation of the Delphic dictum, whose aesthetic, defined as the way in which it is experienced, is the intellectual act of knowing oneself. The characters are images of the spectator's very own soul (τὰς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῆς εἰκόνας), an idea indebted to the new meaning of ψυχή as the essential and self-contained person. Indeed Platonic anthropology and its antecedents may have come to influence the way spectators relate to stage characters by directing their attention beyond the mask of a mythical and numinous persona to the soul behind it, a soul in essence like their own. In other words, rather than being an encounter with the other, theatre becomes a demystified encounter with a version of one's self.

Just as in the conceptual scheme of pronominal reflexivity, the act of spectation occurs across a gulf. The audience see themselves objectified on the stage but from a distance safe enough to allow dissociation with the events and selves portrayed thereon. Thus one may suffer vicariously without really suffering, make mistakes without really making them, and so learn through simulation ἅ τε χρὴ αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ ἅ φεύγειν.¹ As we will discuss, the tragic characters themselves often display a self-awareness whose topography reflects this theoric structure. That is, at times they step out of, or long to step out of, their presence on stage in order to see themselves as the audience sees them.

Lucian's is an optimistic, even positivist view of what one stands to gain from tragedy. But one can also hear within certain tragedies themselves a conservative strain in conflict with this former, according to which self-knowledge is the ultimate peril. It asks the question of whether knowledge of self should be sought if in peeling back the layers of self-deception an abomination is revealed. In such a case, Nietzsche's observation hits the target: 'Not to know oneself: prudence of the idealist. The idealist: a creature that has good reasons to be in the dark about itself and is prudent enough to be in the dark about these reasons too.'²

Like any cultural trend, the ethic of self-knowledge may be interpreted as either a good or a bad thing, and tragedy is true to its name in responding rather pessimistically to the emerging category of a reflexive self,

¹ This knowledge of self, especially when it takes form as consolation, may be comparative, as at Timokles fr. 6.18–20 PCG: ἅπαντα γὰρ τὰ μείζον' ἢ πέπονθέ τις | ἀτυχίματ' ἄλλοις γεγονότα ἐννοούμενος | τὰς αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ συμφορὰς ἦττον στένει.

² Nietzsche (1901) § 344, p. 189.

whose darker implications it exposes in an attempt to ritually appease them. The human ideal of self-knowledge may in the end be hubristic and better left as the privilege of gods who may deservedly delight in their immortal and shining selves; the mortal need only know of himself that he is mortal—any more may on the one hand horrify him, on the other spark self-conceit. If he seeks to know himself in the Platonic sense as an immortal soul, then truly he has stolen more than fire from the gods.

This chapter explores the specifically tragic fascination with reflexivity, especially in its more problematic guises. We also see tragedy adopting some of the concepts of the Presocratics and continuing the expansion of the PRS, struggling in a rapidly evolving social context to come to grips with a new sense of self—celebrating it one moment, wishing like Oedipus to blind itself to it the next. I then go on to discuss reflexivity in comedy, which also inherits and modifies reflexive themes in its idiosyncratic way. Together they paint a picture of self-concern propagating through the various spheres of cultural discourse.

2. *Tragedy*

a. *Tragic Reflexivity*

The combination of the intensifier and reflexive becomes especially common in the fifth century. Since αὐτός is present in both, the locution is an example of polyptoton. The self interacts with another case of the self. Here are some examples from Aeschylean tragedy:

ἄχθος διπλοῖζει τῷ πεπαμένῳ νόσον·
τοῖς τ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ πήμασι βαρύνεται
καὶ τὸν θυραῖον ὄλβον εἰσορῶν στένει. (A. Ag. 835–837)

The burden is double for one who has acquired a disease: he is weighed down *himself* by *his own* woes and groans on seeing the prosperity of others.

παῖδα τὸν αὐτὰς πόσιν αὐ-
τῇ θεμένα τοῦσδ' ἔτεχ' (A. Sept. 928–929)

She gave birth to these men after making *her own* child a husband for *herself*.

The first passage makes use of an emphatic contrast between self and other (αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ vs. θυραῖον). The burden of the sick man is double since both his own private pain and the sight of the happiness of others

afflict him. In the second Jocasta gives birth to Eteocles and Polyneices having made her very own son into a husband for herself.³

The growing fondness for polyptoton of αὐτός in the fifth century is one of the clearest indications of an emphatic differentiation of self as an emerging social trend. Each case of αὐτός categorically excludes from the relevant thematic roles everyone but a single highly individuated actor. This actor's appropriation of more than one role in the event structure of a given act equates to a reduction of dialogical relation to subjective relation and reflects the self-involved individual. But tragedy's exploitation of this device aims at something quite removed from the abstraction of transcendently reflexive ἀρχαί and forms. In fact reflexivity in tragedy appears most often as its problematisation. As the passage from *Agamemnon* illustrates, the human suffers as a self, and the fact that it has its suffering for itself alone while happiness belongs to another only degrades its situation further.

This problematisation may be categorised as a species of tragic irony. What I will call *tragic reflexivity* transpires when actions initially intended for another instead end up rebounding on oneself with disastrous consequences.⁴ In the tragic universe an individual is incapable, due to the contingencies of nature, the gods, and their own self-conceit, to fully secure the goal of their actions.⁵ One certainly has a certain degree of control over her actions insofar as she acts, but once the action is initiated—once the ball is set into motion—its unravelling, including who it lands upon as an object, lies beyond the human ken. In its most general form a typically other-directed action becomes, unintentionally and tragically, a self-directed action. The most famous example of this device is obviously Oedipus' curse against his father's murderer which ends up being a curse against himself.⁶

³ Note that Shakespeare in particular likes to combine the intensifier and reflexive, possibly wishing to mimic classical idiom, e.g. 'So in thyself thyself art made away' (*Venus and Adonis*, v. 763). So too vv. 161, 1129 of the same poem.

⁴ As Zeitlin (1990) 148 argues, this dangerous reflexivity has settled into the landscape of Thebes as a mythic locus. Bound in a web of autochthony, incest, and interfamilial murder, it is unable to distinguish self from other, lost like Narcissus in self-absorption. It might easily make Narcissus' wish to escape and be separated from himself its own at *Ov. Met.* 3.467–468: *o utinam a nostro secedere corpore possem!* | *votum in amante novum: vellem, quod amamus, abessem!* See further Gildenhard and Zissos (2000).

⁵ For use of the idea of tragic reflexivity in philosophical debate, see below p. 235.

⁶ See too *OT* 379, as well as the hidden significance of 137–138: ὕπερ γὰρ οὐχὶ τῶν

οἴμοι τάλας· ἔοικ' ἑμαυτὸν εἰς ἄρας
δεινὰς προβάλλον ἀρτίως οὐκ εἰδέναι. (S. OT 744–745)

Oh wretched me! I seem to have been unaware that just now I was
embroiling *myself* in dreadful curses.

καὶ τὰδ' οὐτις ἄλλος ἦν
ἢ γὼ π' ἑμαυτῷ τάσδ' ἄρας ὁ προστιθείς. (S. OT 819–820)

And on top of this it was no else but I who laid these curses on *myself*.

κάλλιστ' ἀνὴρ εἷς ἐν γε ταῖς Θήβαις τραφεῖς
ἀπεστέρησ' ἑμαυτόν, αὐτὸς ἐννέπων
ὠθεῖν ἅπαντας τὸν ἀσεβῆ ... (S. OT 1380–1383)

I, the one of noblest rearing at Thebes, deprived *myself* by *myself* com-
manding everyone to expel the polluted one ...

οἴμοι· φρόνησον, ὦ κασιγνήτη, πατήρ
ὥς νῶν ἀπεχθῆς δυσκλεῆς τ' ἀπώλετο,
πρὸς αὐτοφώρων ἀμπλακημάτων διπλᾶς
ὄψεις ἀράξας αὐτὸς αὐτουργῷ χερί. (S. Ant. 49–52)

Mark, sister, how our father has come undone, abhorred and in foul repute,
having on behalf of *self-detected* sins *himself* destroyed with *self-working*
hand his two sources of vision.

The last passage is especially outstanding for its triplication of αὐτός (αὐ-
τοφώρων, αὐτός, αὐτουργῷ) within a single clause, which defines and
shapes its phrasal contour. The polyptoton is cleverly divided between
three cases—nominative, genitive, and dative—and stitches together two
main strands of reflexivity: the first is the sins that Oedipus himself
inadvertently committed and publicly condemned,⁷ the second his self-
inflicted blinding when he became aware of the truth of his actions.
Hence his response to an unintentionally reflexive act, the cursing and
condemnation of himself, is to intentionally harm himself. He must

ἀποτέρω φίλων, | ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τοῦτ' ἀποσκηδῶ μύσος. He will not only get rid of
the pollution on behalf of himself, he himself will be that very pollution.

⁷ There is some obscurity to the meaning of the phrase αὐτοφώρων ἀμπλακημάτων.
LSJ and Jebb translate it as self-detected, Jebb commenting that they were detected by
himself when he insisted on investigating the murder of Laius. But we could also interpret
αὐτοφώρων differently by taking a different sense of the head, that of theft (LSJ s.v.
φωρά), and by extension commission of a crime, rather than detection—in which case
the phrase could mean 'sins committed by himself'. We may add that the ambivalence is
in this instance serendipitous, since they are sins which have been both committed and
detected by himself.

follow this path of reflexivity, stumbled across accidentally but scored into nature herself, to its end. Becoming actively involved in his self-destruction is a way of reclaiming his destiny and making it authentic. A fatalism which, paradoxically, becomes voluntary and all the grander for the fact that he senses the pull of fate and willingly goes along with it. Oedipus says, 'Gods, if you wish that I curse myself, I will *truly* curse myself and destroy my own eyes!' By enacting his own curse, Oedipus salvages honour as a man of his word.

But in the Oedipal story there are multiple tragic reflexivities reticulating the myth. The second passage above alludes to another of these. Jocasta intends an other-directed marriage, but instead she contracts an execrable union between herself (αὐτῇ) and what belongs to herself intimately, her own son (παῖδα τὸν αὐτῆς). In a third tragic reflexivity, Laius intends an other-directed act of procreation, but instead gives birth to his own doom:⁸

κρατηθεῖς δ' ἐκ φιλᾶν ἀβουλιᾶν
ἐγένετο μὲν μόρον αὐτῷ
πατροκτόνον Οἰδιπόδαν ...

(A. *Sept.* 750–752)

Overcome by his own foolish counsel, he begat doom *for himself*, patricidal Oedipus.

Each of the familial members, then, issues a tragically reflexive action: Laius gives birth to his own doom, Jocasta marries her own son, Oedipus curses himself. This tragic reflexivity is a literary exploration of unexpected coreference as a theme. It is thus one of the discourses whose birth is linked to the creation of the complex reflexive. It both supplies the perfect context for its application and further cements its grammaticalisation through the unexpected coreference of tragic reflexivity. In this way it exemplifies the way the needs of discourse can shape a language's functional grammar (and how this grammar can then feed back into discourses that further quarry and develop the grammar's resources).

Tragic reflexivity is not limited to the Oedipal myth, though this is perhaps its greatest realisation.⁹ In Aeschylus' *Choephoroi*, for example, Orestes claims his mother's murder will be hers rather than his:

⁸ Cf. Orestes to his mother at *E. Or.* 1229: φονέας ἔτιπτες ἄρά σοι. Note in this case the use of the enclitic σοι in place of the heavy reflexive. It remains a viable form, especially when it satisfies metrical constraints.

⁹ See also A. *PV* 920–921: τοῖον παλαιστήν νῦν παρασκευάζεται ἐπ' αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, δυσμαχώτατον τέρας. A. *Sept.* 405–406: γένοιτ' ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐνδικῶς τ' ἐπώννυμον, καὶ αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτοῦ τήνδ' ὕβριν μαντεύσεται. Both are threats. Cf. also E. *Hipp.* 395–397: γλώσση γὰρ οὐδὲν πιστόν, ἢ θυραῖα μὲν φρονήματ' ἀνδρῶν νουθετεῖν ἐπίσταται, αὐτῇ δ' ὑφ'

Κλ. κτενεῖν ἔοικας, ὦ τέκνον, τὴν μητέρα.

Ορ. σὺ τοι σεαυτὴν, οὐκ ἐγώ, κατακτενεῖς.

Κλ. ὄρα, φύλαξαι μητρὸς ἐγκότους κύνας. (A. Cho. 922–924)

Kl: You seem intent, child, on killing your mother.

Or: You will kill *yourself*, not I.

Kl: Take care: beware a mother's vengeful hounds.

The suggestion is that she initiated the chain of events that led to her death at his hands and that ultimately she killed herself. The reversal is exceptionally dramatic, for killing is the ultimate other-directed action and contains an extreme gulf between the state of killer and killed. Blood for blood is not a new phenomenon, but the depiction of it here is not of one life taken to satisfy the life of another (a relation between two others), but of an individual who murders herself via the murder of another. The whole sequence of events is chained to the perspective of a single individual as the origin and end of that sequence, and drives home the Hesiodic principle that in harming another one is harming oneself. Such representations are examples of a more general view that in a world of self-involved individuals action begins and ends with the self: other-relations are proxies for indirect reflexive relation, and the former can be substituted by the latter. The example given above from the *Choephoroi* is structurally paralleled in Euripides' *Orestes*. Orestes, on the verge of punishing Menelaus for his earlier betrayal by killing his daughter Helen, corrects Menelaus' admission that he (Orestes) has out-manoeuvred and caught him via reflexive substitution:

Με. ἔχεις με. Ὅρ. σαντὸν σὺ γ' ἔλαβες κακὸς γεγώς. (E. Or. 1617)

MENELAUS: You've got me. ORESTES: That is you got *yourself* by becoming a coward.

Oedipus' original reflexive curse reiterates itself in the next generation when the two brothers Eteocles and Polyneices slay each other over the kingdom of Thebes. Murder among kin is a prevalent tragic motif. There is evidence too that it is conceived of as a reflexive act. Since a close relation is tantamount to another self, their murder counts almost as a form of suicide. Thus Aeschylus uses the reflexive compound αὐτοκτόνος of the brothers' reciprocal murder.

αὐτῆς πλεῖστα κέκτῃται κακά. References to the same or similar idea, which also employ the reflexive, are found scattered among the tragic fragments: A. fr. 139; E. fr. 874; S. fr. 350; ad. 573 *TrGF*.

Moreover, we see that the semantic field of murder has an interesting affinity for compounds of αὐτός, especially αὐθέντης and αὐτόχειρ.¹⁰ Both these words restrict agency, and therefore responsibility, to the self, marking out an individual as a self-doer. Though the two different senses of αὐθέντης as murderer and master have troubled some, there need not be any difficulty. Murdering and mastering are at the extreme end of the scale of transitivity and as such are two natural tokens of a generic term designating highly transitive action.¹¹ Murder, as control over the life of the patient, is the acme of domination.

One has to ask why suicide and murder of kin are so central to tragedy. I think the reflexive language itself used to describe such episodes leads us in the right direction. These obsessions are a natural, mythic symptom of a developing category of the reflexive self. The killing of oneself, and the killing of one's kin as intimates of oneself, are perhaps the two most problematic reflexive events. As the most extreme other-directed transitive act, killing, becomes self-directed, the subject's agency becomes problematic and self-destructs. Suicide is the price that must at times be paid for the existence of a self.¹² It is at once a last protest of agency

¹⁰ The word αὐθέντης etymologically means self-accomplishing (αὐτός, ἄνύω). See LSJ and Chantraine (1968–1980) s.v. αὐθέντης. Αὐτόχειρ is an exocentric compound meaning self-handed.

¹¹ To relate this back to earlier point, αὐτός in agreement with a subject also contributes to the formation of category of will, or the wilful subject, just as the development of the pronominal reflexive system does. This co-contribution finds its expression in the intensive plus reflexive locution: the subject and itself alone directs action onto itself alone.

¹² Excessive individuation, or insufficient integration into the social body and its norms, has been theorised as a main cause of suicide since Durkheim, whose scheme has been applied to the Greek situation by Kaplan and Schwartz (2000), and especially Garrison (1995) in the first book-length consideration of Greek suicide. However I agree with one reviewer, L. McClure (1995), in finding Garrison's view that tragic suicide reinforces social values unconvincing. McClure suggests an historical dimension to the development of the fifth-century obsession with suicide by highlighting the differences between the worlds of epic and tragedy, suicide in the former being given scant attention since it violates the aristocratic code. If, in her words, 'tragic suicide does not so much affirm social values, but rather seems to stand outside the normative social and ethical system', the tension between the individual and normative social system exacerbated by the rise of the individual in the fifth-century may well explain this newfound fascination with suicide. Theatre-goers see reflected in suicide, albeit in a greatly magnified way, their own sense of being selves somewhat outside the normative social system (for example, in being free to vote how they choose), and the struggle to reconcile the concerns of this self (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ) with the social. Cf. Garrison (1991) 22: 'Suicide happens at such a critical moment, when one finds oneself in the marginal area in which one set of values is being replaced by another, but neither set of values is completely established in society.' Such

in the face of complete disempowerment—if I control nothing else, I at least may control myself, even to the point of power over my life and death—and an abominable perversion of the Platonic care of the self, a kind of disowned sibling.¹³ Both of these, as instances of reflexive agency, rely upon the same category of self to employ a model of highly transitive reflexivity. In a way, suicide takes the self-directed action espoused by phrases such as *γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν* and *νικάν ἑαυτόν* to its logical conclusion, all the way up to killing as the highest point on the transitivity scale. One could even associate the two practices of philosophy in Plato, philosophy as *μελέτη θανάτου* and philosophy as *ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ*, and find an uneasy implication of suicide in the connection between care of oneself and the practice of one's own death.

The *αὐθέντης* is problematic for a Greek in a way that moderns have sought to overcome. This word has been sublimated as 'authentic'; it has somehow metamorphosed from designating socially dangerous agency to authenticity as the ambition of modernity and the individual. But in Greece, or at least in tragic Greece, it is regarded with horror. For a human to act out *αὐτός*, to try and impose her will on the world as an agent, is bound to end in disaster.¹⁴ With every new category there is a perversion of that category, its distorted reflection, and tragedy explores this darker side as its cost. Indeed in many ways tragedy seems to mourn the birth of the self and its reflexive acts. It treats this category, and the technology of self-care, with the conflicted and sceptical attitude the

remarks capture well the transformative milieu of the fifth-century. The femininity of suicide is likely a simple case of projection: women are used by male citizens to scapegoat their own sense of dangerous autonomy.

¹³ Note that Oedipus' chain of unwitting reflexive acts (his self-cursing, marrying his own mother, etc.) culminates in the deliberate reflexive act of self-blinding. If the gods must grudgingly be given credit for human happiness, there is at least some wry satisfaction in humans taking credit for their suffering by getting in first and causing their own grief: in suffering they are free.

¹⁴ Especially in the case of Antigone, who as *αὐτόγνωτος* and *αὐτόβουλος* stands against the norms of the state. The paradox is that democracy and urbanisation help construct the person as just that, self-determined, so that they are, in a sense, complicit in individuals' subversion of social norms. But here the threat of self-determination is somewhat mitigated by its transference to a marginalised female character. Outside of tragedy the outlook is more promising, where human freedom is asserted positively at the expense of the agency of the gods, who have been demoted from their position as outright self-doers. For instance, Isocrates (5.150–151) writes: οὐ γὰρ [οἱ θεοὶ] *αὐτόχειρες* οὔτε τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε τῶν κακῶν γίνονται τῶν συμβαινόντων αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐκάστοις τοιαύτην ἔννοιαν ἐμποιοῦσιν, ὥστε δι' ἀλλήλων ἡμῖν ἑκάτερα παραγίγνεσθαι τούτων. See below pp. 163–172 for further discussion. There is a sense in which human beings become selves at the expense of the gods.

luddite shows material technology. This is nowhere clearer than in the case of Oedipus, whose single-minded pursuit of the Delphic exhortation to know himself reaps not self-enlightenment but self-destruction. In tragedy, the Delphic dictum is paradoxically the surest path to doom; it were better had Jocasta's warning to Oedipus been written in its place above the threshold:

ὦ δύσποτμ', εἴθε μήποτε γνοίης ὅς εἼ. (S. OT 1069)

Oh ill-fated one, may you never come to know who you are.

Kaplan and Schwartz compare the story of Narcissus. There too the seer tries to forestall his quest for self-knowledge, but he endures anyway and garners self-destruction instead. However I do not agree with their analysis of the relation between the Delphic dictum and both these myths: 'This constant discouragement of Oedipus' and Narcissus' search for self-knowledge seems to contradict the dictum of the Delphic oracle—"Know Thyself." The Delphic dictum actually enjoins that man be aware of his loneliness and powerlessness before the gods and does not in fact command a search for self-knowledge.¹⁵ This reading forces a traditional interpretation of the dictum which ignores the developing sense of the reflexive and diminishes the two myths' tragic feeling. Self-knowledge in both cases *does* contradict the dictum and that is precisely what is so ironical: that which is meant to liberate and enlighten actually wreaks the exact opposite. In the tragic cosmos, the enlightening reflexive act distorts into the destructive reflexive act. Oedipus may well have kept his eyes and Narcissus his life had they not known themselves.¹⁶ Perhaps his unconditional thirst for self-knowledge is his tragic flaw (ἁμαρτία).¹⁷

It is to be expected that the portents accompanying a momentous birth are not clear. At the inception of an idea like self-knowledge, tragedy cannot help but feel the stirrings of the ominous. As a social discourse it is a way of approaching and appeasing problematic categories that threaten to unweave society's tapestry. It is the intuition of life as a zero-sum game: along with every idea is generated its nemesis, and this must

¹⁵ (2000) 97 n. 4.

¹⁶ For the latter see Ov. *Met.* 3.344–346: *de quo consultus, an esset | tempora maturae visurus longa senectae, | fatidicus vates "si se non noverit" inquit.*

¹⁷ Note especially the uncompromising nature of OT 1058–1059: "With such signs as these in my grasp, there is no way that I won't reveal my lineage (γένος)." Here I diverge from Lefèvre (1987), Rocco (1997) 177–178, and Gandesha (2001) 117, who all maintain that it is Oedipus' *inability* to know himself that is his problem. Though their readings are excellent in other respects, on this point I think they miss the deeper irony of the play.

be ritualistically satisfied. Tragedy's portent is appropriately the thing eaten away and destroyed by itself. So in Sophocles' *Trachiniae* Deianeira observes too late the effect of a love-charm given her by Nessus the Centaur on a piece of wool:

τοῦτ' ἠφάνισται διάβορον πρὸς οὐδενὸς
τῶν ἔνδον, ἀλλ' ἐδεσπὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ φθίνει,
καὶ ψῆ κατ' ἄκρας σπιλάδος ... (S. *Trach.* 676–678)

This piece of wool has disappeared, consumed by none of the creatures inside—it perishes self-eaten and crumbles over the surface of a stone ...

The love charm is a poison that precipitates self-destruction. We must be careful not to exaggerate the role of divinity in tragedy. The sad fact is that the human, when left to its own devices, is more than capable of self-destructing without the interference of a divine power. There would be at least small comfort in knowing that one suffers because one is weak and ruled by greater forces. But in the greatest tragedy, and in Oedipus' case in particular, the point is rather that tragedy is so built into the human condition that it is capable of generating itself spontaneously by hijacking those very channels—most significantly, self-knowledge—that appear to offer individual salvation.

b. *Self-Address*

We may perhaps see the tragic reflexivity of self-cursing as an ironic form of self-address. Drama is naturally given to the *performance* of reflexivity, and through the technique of self-address presents the act of language, the ultimate other-directed gesture, alighting not on another but on the speaker herself. I will treat this category broadly and include the reflexivisation of both articulate and inarticulate expression. In direct speech these occur as monologues in which the character, before a foreign audience and foreign gods, alienated by her destiny, has no one left to address but herself. When these are reported or narrated, they are introduced as conversations with or to oneself just as internal dialogue. Euripides' *Medea* provides good examples and is an appropriate point of departure:¹⁸

ἐγὼ δ' ἐμαυτῇ διὰ λόγων ἀφικόμην
κάλαιδ' ὁρῶσα· Σχετλία, τί μαίνομαι
καὶ δυσμεναίνω τοῖσι βουλεύουσιν εὔ,
ἐχθρὰ δὲ γαίας κοιράνοις καθίσταμαι

¹⁸ For the classic treatment of self-address in tragedy see Schadewaldt (1926).

πόσει θ', ὅς ἡμῖν δοῖα τὰ συμφερότατα,
 γήμας τύραννον καὶ κασιγνήτους τέκνοις
 ἑμοῖς φυτεύων; οὐκ ἀπαλλαχθήσομαι
 θυμοῦ; τί πάσχω, θεῶν ποριζόντων καλῶς; (E. Med. 872–879)

I have talked with *myself* and reproached [myself] thus: 'Foolish creature, why am I raving and fighting those who plan things for the best? Why am I making myself an enemy to the rulers of this land and to my husband, who is acting in my interests by marrying a princess and begetting brothers for my children? Shall I not cease from my wrath (what has come over me?) when the gods are being so kind?'¹⁹

Internal dialogue has a venerable history in Greek literature, but tragedy's treatment of it both continues and breaks with tradition. In its Homeric form the character addresses not himself but one his psychic organs. Here the reflexive ἑμναυτῇ has replaced θυμῷ or a similar word.²⁰ However subtle, this is an important difference, and the latter should not be simply assimilated to the self.²¹ This instance of self-address is particularly edifying because Medea is reporting to Jason a conversation with herself she never actually had. It is a piece of deception concocted to regain his trust by portraying her change of heart as the result of a process of deeply involved thought. Her ploy, and also Jason's falling for it, thus presupposes the belief that a decision arrived at through self-dialogue carries a certain conviction, and that there therefore exists an essential

¹⁹ Trans. Kovacs (1994).

²⁰ Though the old usage continues alongside the new, especially where literary *ethnopoia* has characters speak in registers appropriate to their society. Thus many have interpreted the worried guard's quoting of his soul's advice in Sophocles' *Antigone* as a sign of rustic simplicity. However I cannot agree with Pelliccia's thesis (1995) that *ipsa verba* speeches of the organs are absent in Homer because of a certain dignity in the genre that would be scotched by such colloquialism. According to him, Homeric epic's official line is that the various psychic organ's cannot speak *propria persona*, but may be used according to a principle he calls 'belated discovery of error', whereby problematic thoughts, originally thought in the first person, are disowned and attributed to a psychological organ as a scapegoat. I think this absence is rather due to the more general absence of extended internal dialogue seeking out the appropriate course of action. Where such deliberative episodes do occur in Homer, the dialogue with one's θυμός is begun only to be rejected in favour of a socialised response or an already reached conclusion. There is not a single episode of dramatised internal dialogue in which thinking concludes in a productive new course of action.

²¹ One obvious structural difference between a reflexive pronoun and θυμός is the possibility of the latter to be a subject in its own right. One cannot say *'myself impelled me ...' θυμός does not need to be bound by an anteceding subject and to this fact it owes its semantic independence as an entity more thoroughly differentiated from the subject. Note also the related possibility of the attribution of an epithet like μεγαλήτωρ to θυμός. It is capable of independent characterisation in a way that the reflexive is not.

bond between dialogue with oneself and self-determination. The narration of internal dialogue has become an important technique for the justification and explanation of what one intends to do.

This same play begins with a monologue from Medea's nurse lamenting the current situation. She describes Medea's descent into jilted despondency upon hearing of Jason's engagement to Creon's daughter:

κεῖται δ' ἄσιτος, σῶμ' ὑφεῖσ' ἀλγηδόσι,
τὸν πάντα συντήκουσα δακρύοις χρόνον,
ἐπεὶ πρὸς ἄνδρὸς ἦσθητ' ἡδικημένη,
οὔτ' ὅμμι' ἐπαίρουσ' οὔτ' ἀπαλλάσσουσα γῆς
πρόσωπον· ὥς δὲ πέτρος ἢ θαλάσσιος
κλύδων ἀκούει νουθετουμένη φίλων·
ἦν μὴ ποτε στρέψασα πάλλευκον δέρην
αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν πατέρ' ἀπομώξῃ φίλον
καὶ γαῖαν οἴκους θ', οὓς προδοῦς' ἀφίκετο
μετ' ἄνδρὸς ὅς σφε νῦν ἀτιμάσας ἔχει.

(E. *Med.* 24–33)

She lies fasting, giving her body up to pain, wasting away in tears all the time ever since she learned that she was wronged by her husband, neither lifting her face nor taking her eyes from the ground. She is as deaf to the advice of her friends as a stone or a wave of the sea: she is silent unless perchance to turn her snow-white neck and weep to *herself* for her dear father and her country and her ancestral house.²²

It is unclear whether Medea's act of lament is articulate or simply primal wailing, but the reflexive phrase uses the emphatic combination of reflexive plus αὐτός. Medea is stubbornly inconsolable, and her grief turns inward as she turns away from the comfort of others. Yet the nurse too is indulging in a private lament of her own. When the teacher arrives on the scene and interrupts her monologue, he questions her thus:

παλαιὸν οἴκων κτῆμα δεσποίνης ἐμῆς,
τί πρὸς πύλαισι τήνδ' ἄγουσ' ἐρημίαν
ἔστηκας, αὐτὴ θροεομένη σαντὴ κακά;

(E. *Med.* 49–52)

Ancient possession of my mistress's house, why do you stand near the gates passing the hours in such solitude, crying over your troubles *to yourself*?

The reflexive is again combined with αὐτός and particularly emphatic. The hint of surprise in the teacher's voice may even suggest that such monologues are culturally unusual. Glen Most has stressed the importance of the monologue in the construction of an autobiographical discourse which carves out the self.²³ Such a discourse is almost entirely

²² Trans. Kovacs (1994).

²³ Most (1989).

absent even in Classical times and does not emerge in anything like its modern form until much later. The lyric 'I' and its narration of personal experience comes close, but according to Most, autobiography is not autobiography unless it is articulated before strangers and formally acknowledges the divide between the individual αὐτός and the otherness of the audience. The monologues of tragedy are therefore historic since the audience consists of strangers and the self-other divide is keenly felt; autobiographical words fly from an actor in monologue as strange creatures from the distant world of another subjectivity.

As we saw with the other forms of reflexivity, tragedy's approach to monologue is similarly one of problematisation. That is, the very isolation of the speaker, turning to herself in the face of strangers, exacerbates her problem and is often an omen of impending violence. In Electra's case:

... κάπικωκῶ πατρός
τὴν δυστάλαιναν δαῖτ' ἐπωνομασμένην
αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτήν· οὐδὲ γὰρ κλαῦσαι πάρα
τοσόνδ' ὅσον μοι θυμὸς ἤδονήν φέρει. (S. El. 282–285)

... and I lament to *myself* the miserable feast named after my father, for it is impossible for me cry to the extent that my heart desires.

Generally speaking, the self in dialogue with itself emerges when the integrative function of the social has failed to bring an alienated individual within its fold. The paths of resolution given it by society have been followed to no profitable end. It cannot exist stably in this state and so either self-destructs or becomes an agent of anomic violence. The difficulty of alienation in general is compounded by the absence of alternative methods of self-expression other than self-destruction. Indeed resolving that her brother is dead, Electra determines to kill Clytemnestra and Aegisthus herself. Without the modern cult of subjectivity, the alienated self of the ancient world is unable to find satisfaction in the idea of authenticity; it finds little fulfilment in the mere fact that *it* has chosen such and such a mould for itself and its life. In other words, a sense of meaning is not conferred by simple individual autonomy, which in our view is a good in itself: αὐτὴ δ' ἑαυτὴν ἄθλα τῶν πόνων ἔχει.

Here one finds the seeds of an explanation for tragedy's obsession with self-destruction. At the birth of the self the techniques of self-cultivation are insufficiently developed to compensate for its sense of alienation. The concern for self-destruction effectively points to the transition from an old to a new world. This latter, through the institutions of political

autonomy, representations of the person in law etc., makes increased demands of the human being *qua* individual self, but then leaves it somewhat exposed and mourning for the integration of old. Because it is an emerging form, this new self-consciousness is, in the beginning and before compensatory values have evolved to contextualise it existentially, necessarily experienced as a painful isolation.

The principle of individuation to the point of isolation is concisely put by Alcestis' father Pheres in Euripides' *Alcestis*. He has refused to die on his son's behalf, and the backbone of his reasoning runs thus:

σαυτῷ γὰρ εἴτε δυστυχῆς εἴτ' εὐτυχῆς
ἔφυσ' ἃ δ' ἡμῶν χορὴν σε τυγχάνειν, ἔχεις. (E. *Alc.* 685–686)

You are unfortunate or fortunate *for yourself*—what you ought to have obtained from us you have.

This is a very interesting claim and the use of the reflexive recalls an instance in Antiphon. You are what you are for or in relation to yourself (and no other).²⁴ What you are is yours alone to deal with, and the obligations of others towards you have their limit. Statements such as this are the closest one gets to existentialism in Greek thought. One finds the being-for-itself of Sartre by abstracting from the particular states of fortunate and unfortunate to all states, and then to the act of existence itself. A generalised interpretation is in fact favoured by the word order, which encourages reading σαυτῷ with ἔφυσ and taking εἴτε δυστυχῆς εἴτ' εὐτυχῆς epexegetically: 'You are for yourself, whether unfortunate or fortunate.' The reflexive's dative case could encode either relational point-of-view or advantage, but it is perhaps best to synthesise these senses. One is in relation to oneself as one is for oneself, such that the being of the subject and its comportment towards and for itself and for the future have now become deeply connected. The individual is expected to be *for himself* not just in an economic sense—though this is an important development, and perhaps the initial ground for this type of being—but also in how he fares; he works (πᾶς ἀνὴρ αὐτῷ πονεῖ), suffers, and succeeds for himself. What befalls him is his own business, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ. These isolated characters are reflections of the audience members' experience as increasingly individuated beings who must face the particular problems thrown up by this form of existence. Where the ideology of self-sufficiency extends to suffering, one must

²⁴ Note the emphatic position of the reflexive.

learn new techniques of self-address, for example those taught by the Stoics, in order to mitigate the angst one might otherwise resolve through incorporation with others.²⁵

c. Beginnings of an Inward Turn

Let us recall a couplet from Theognis:

γνώμης δ' οὐδὲν ἄμεινον ἀνὴρ ἔχει αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ
οὐδ' ἀγνωμοσύνης, Κύρν', ὀδυνηρότερον. (Thgn. 895–896 West)

A man has nothing better in himself than intelligence, Cyrenus, nor more painful than lack of intelligence.

We claimed that this was both the first extant use of the reflexive plus intensive locution and also the first use of the reflexive to denote the internal essence of the person where abstracts are stored. Charles Taylor has underscored the 'inward turn' of modernity, but insofar as it is here that we first find reflexive pronouns being used to denote that into and towards which one turns inwardly, this move has its antecedents in the cultural and intellectual revolution of Classical Greece.²⁶ This usage is developed further in the fifth century and finds particular favour in the more philosophical discourses. It also occurs in tragedy:

μή νυν ἔν ἧθός μοῦνον ἐν σαυτῷ φόρει,
ὥς φῆς σύ, κοῦδὲν ἄλλο, τοῦτ' ὀρθῶς ἔχειν. (S. *Ant.* 705–706)

Do not, then, bear one mood only in yourself: do not think that your word and no other, must be right.²⁷

²⁵ On the other hand, isolation in a traditional society constituted by a tight-knit community is nearly always interpreted negatively and the social body moves quickly to reintegrate the alienated individual. This is an experience familiar to many westernised anthropologists habituated to the self-involvement of urban life, whose need to be *by themselves*, even if only to read, is interpreted by their adopted community as a signal that they are suffering and wish to be consoled. The account of Musharbash (2008) 2 is typical: 'Living in the *camp*s of Yuendumu, I had taken quite some time to get used to being constantly surrounded by and involved with other people all day and every day. Whenever I sat down with a book in the shade of a tree, people immediately joined me and started conversations, assuming I was sad or lonely.'

²⁶ One must of course be careful in elucidating the relative continuity and discontinuity of Ancient Greece and modernity. Its 'inward turn' is not identical to modernity's, yet they share various structural similarities—among which I count extensive psychological use of reflexives and the conceptualisation of inherently reflexive beings and processes—and not least a chain of developmental conditionality.

²⁷ Trans. Jebb (1891).

This usage is very close to the instance in Theognis. A psychological entity, ἦθος, is located in the self. You should carry in yourself a plural, flexible disposition—a set of temperaments, each appropriate to a different situation. In Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound* the wilful Prometheus is also counselled with the virtue of an adaptable personality:

γίγνωσκε σαυτὸν καὶ μεθάρμοσαι τρόπους
νέους· νέος γὰρ καὶ τύραννος ἐν θεοῖς. (A. PV 309–310)

Know *yourself* and adopt new ways, for there is also a new ruler among the gods.

The Delphic dictum is juxtaposed with a dictum advising that Prometheus fit to himself a new character for a new situation; change oneself for a change in empire. There is an implicit logical relation between the two imperative clauses such that the second follows from the first. Knowing oneself in this instance entails knowledge of the self's constitutional character and the ability to adapt it. In this context the dictum's reflexive becomes the social self, and as elsewhere the transitive conceptual structure generates a transcendental subject observing, knowing, and altering itself.

In Euripides' *Orestes* there is another instance of ἐν plus reflexive. After his murder of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, and with the Argive political body about to pass a sentence of death for his crime, Orestes supplicates Menelaus to intervene on his behalf and secure asylum. But Menelaus must reckon with the competing claim of Tyndareus, his father-in-law and father of Clytemnestra, that justice be done. He is perplexed as he thinks what to do:

ἔασον· ἐν ἑμαυτῷ τι συννοούμενος
ὅποι τράπωμαι τῆς τύχης ἀμειχανῶ. (E. Or. 634–635)

Leave me alone. Reflecting *in myself* I am at a loss where in fortune to turn.

Menelaus places the act of reflecting 'in myself'. If we remove this phrase the sense is still serviceable. On the other hand, surely there is something named here that is beyond mere pleonasm. The subject is linked to the location of thinking, and the action arises and completes within that space. The subject, when thinking, is in itself, enclosed in a self-contained capsule.

Reflexive prepositional phrases have another interesting use, related yet different. They are employed in the Greek idiom for being oneself as opposed to suffering an ecstasy of emotion, be it anger or joy, in which the

self is lost.²⁸ However Sophocles' *Philoctetes* provides an example which appears crucially different:

ἄλλ' ἀπόδος· ἀλλὰ νῦν ἔτ' ἐν σαυτῷ γενοῦ. (S. *Phil.* 950)

Give it back! Now, at least, be *in yourself*.

The reflexive here refers to the essence of the person. In other cases the forces which alienate a person from himself are typically extreme emotions.²⁹ We do not have enough surviving Greek to determine with certainty whether I can be alienated from myself, say, when suffering a bout of absent-mindedness and the depersonalisation caused by ennui and a vaguely unfulfilling life, as the contemporary human being who declares 'I haven't been myself this week'. My intuition is that these forms of not being oneself are distinctly modern and would seem bizarre to the Greek—as bizarre as needing, in order to be oneself truly, a therapist to work through outstanding psychic hang-ups. Yet the context of this example gives an added significance to the reflexive which makes some implementation of a true-self model relatively certain. A naive but innately virtuous Neoptolemus, prompted by the guile of Odysseus, has faked sympathy for Philoctetes' plight in order to gain his trust and then deceive him into coming back to Troy. But this affectation has in time developed into real feelings of commiseration, and Neoptolemus faces a battle in his conscience between repentance for his duplicity and the honourable urge to personally assist Philoctetes in good faith, and his broader duty to Odysseus and the welfare of the Greek host. Philoctetes perceptively senses that something is amiss and asks him whether offence at his disease has persuaded him not to take him aboard his ship and back home to Greece. Neoptolemus responds cryptically with

ἅπαντα δυσχέρεια, τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν
ὅταν λιών τις δρᾷ τὰ μὴ προσεικότα. (S. *Ph.* 902–903)

Everything is offence when one abandons *his own* nature and does what isn't like him.

When Philoctetes finally catches Neoptolemus' meaning and the impending betrayal he launches into a lengthy invective deploring Neoptolemus. He also makes some last ditched pleas for him to change his

²⁸ E.g. Hdt. 1.119.6: οὐτε ἐξεπλάγη ἐντός τε ἑωυτοῦ γίνεται.

²⁹ Cf. Shakespeare (*King Lear* II. iv. 114–116) concerning the alienation of sickness: 'we are not ourselves | When nature, being oppress'd, commands the mind | To suffer with the body'.

mind, which is when he tells him to 'be in yourself'. The earlier interchange has thus primed a true-self interpretation of the reflexive. What Philoctetes must mean is for him not to abandon his inner nature but to be true to his virtuous inclinations and live up to the example of his noble father.

This is another example of the reflexive taking over the roles of Homer's psychic organs. The appearance of the phrase ἐν ἑαυτῷ to delimit a *chora* of the subject is an important redefinition of the essence of the person because it encompasses an internalised totality.³⁰ Contrary to being out of one's wits, to be outside oneself denotes an ecstasis from oneself *qua* whole. Though Greek thought is conservative in exploring the myriad semantic potentialities that become available when what is alienated is the reflexive, and therefore capable of standing for a double of the subject in any of its aspects, its innovative use here in a true-self sense is a prerequisite for later discoveries. It is apparent that the thought which follows invents all manner of ways in which the subject forgets itself, is distracted or flees from itself—for example, from the duties that exasperate it, from its personality, the pain of its existence, or, on the other hand, from its genuine realisation. Zarathustra's envisioning of the creator of the world may serve as an example:

The creator wished to look away from himself—thereupon he created the world. Intoxicating joy is it for the sufferer to look away from his suffering and forget himself. Intoxicating joy and self-forgetting, did the world once seem to me.³¹

Putting aside Socrates' claim that the eloquence of his accusers almost made him forget himself,³² many of these ideas do not acquire explicit expression in the Greek world. However one may venture that self-forgetting which applies a complex true-self model is contextually present in the *Philoctetes* and also relatively overtly lexicalised. Historically speaking, such expressions are encumbered by soul's status as the seat of consciousness; where it goes consciousness goes.³³ Hence soul cannot stand for any type of alienated self, the self left behind, since it is precisely that which is divorced from this self and leaves it behind. Unlike self,

³⁰ Cf. the reflexivisation of παρά below p. 165. Both these prepositional phrases introduce subtly new ways of talking about the constitution and perspective of the subject.

³¹ Nietzsche (1885) §4, p. 41.

³² Pl. *Ap.* 17a3: ἐγὼ δ' οὐν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἑμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην, οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον.

³³ Thus ψυχή leaves the body during syncope.

ψυχή cannot refer to different alienable editions of the subject.³⁴ But as the reflexive develops semantically, as we see happening here, it can be exploited to express these types of self-relation.

d. *The Theoric Gaze: Seeing Oneself from a Distance*

Despite these limitations, as the passage of Lucian's with which we began this chapter indicates, certain models of self-distancing are implied by the theoric modality of tragedy and developed therein. In this way tragedy reveals the division in the human being familiar to the later philosophers of self-knowledge, who recognise 'the fundamental asymmetry between the being of man and his selfhood'.³⁵ Theatre is capable of representing this division by dividing the character as a self from the spectator as another self. In this vein, towards the end of Euripides' *Hippolytus*, the distraught protagonist wishes the following:

εἴθ' ἦν ἐμαυτὸν προσβλέπειν ἐναντίον
στάνθ', ὥς ἐδράκωσ' οἷα πάσχομεν κακά. (E. *Hipp.* 1078–1079)

Would that I could stand apart and look at *myself* so that I might weep at the misfortune I am suffering.³⁶

He wishes, that is, that he could view himself from an outside perspective as if he were another person—only from this perspective could he compass the extent of his suffering and fully express it with weeping. Hippolytus wishes for this concretely and in actuality, and the wish is naturally a pipedream. Yet within the imagination seeing oneself from another perspective is entirely possible, as when we imagine ourselves acting in a hypothetical scenario and project this image like film onto a screen. Needless to say, the verb 'see' takes on a metaphorical sense when used in this way:

I regretted what I had done and saw myself suffering for it in the future.

I do not of course see myself in the flesh, but what this seeing preserves when it is carried across from physical seeing is the strong distinction between subject and object required by the verb. And this is precisely why the verb 'see' is appropriated for this use, because the event being depicted has just such a distinction in it. The semantic effect of an increased subject/object distinction can be seen from the following pair:

³⁴ Moving philosophical concentration from soul to self will therefore facilitate production of the sort of self-models employed in the Nietzschean example. Cf. Ch. 1 n. 18.

³⁵ Jopling (1986) 77.

³⁶ Trans. Kovacs (1995).

I felt happy.
I saw myself being happy.

In the former I am simply happy and I am a unity with my state of being happy. In the latter however there is disjunction between the 'I' which sees and the 'myself' which is happy. In fact this tension is significant enough that in its default interpretation the predication of 'myself' would take on a future tense: 'I saw myself being happy *in the future, if certain conditions should be satisfied or continue to be satisfied*.' The normal situation is that I cannot see myself being happy in the present, as it is and without condition, because the feeling of being happy does not involve any split in the subject—if anything, such emotions produce the exact opposite effect, a complete absorption in the feeling—and thus the event must be temporally displaced to avoid a contradiction. Otherwise, the first predication, 'I saw myself', would be asserting a subject/object distinction, while the second, 'I was happy', would not.

At least in its metaphorical sense, Hippolytus' wish can be fulfilled, for we do in Greek find a verb of seeing, *ὁράω*,³⁷ being used to denote viewing in the theatre of the mind. Thus we find Prometheus digesting his maltreatment:

συννοία δὲ δάπτομαι κέαο,
ὁρῶν ἐμαυτὸν ὧδε προσελούμενον. (A. PV 437–438)

I am consumed in my heart by painful thought seeing *myself* mistreated in this way.

How would the meaning differ if we eradicated the subject/object distinction? Consider the following:

συννοία δε δάπτομαι κέαο ὧδε προσελούμενος.

I am consumed in my heart by painful thought being mistreated in this way.

There is little to no construction of a transcendental subject, a remote viewer, when the transitive seeing relation is replaced by an intransitive predication which belongs to the subject copulatively and directly. The sentence 'I see myself being maltreated' involves an intellectualisation—a representation—of the simple expression 'I am being maltreated'. This

³⁷ But note that Hippolytus uses *προσβλέπειν* instead of *ὁράω* for his verb of seeing precisely because the former connotes a more concrete, spatial, and physical type of sight—'look at' instead of merely 'see'—and so underlines his desire to be spatially divorced from himself like any other member of the audience.

expression is quite literally presented again to a second generation of the subject, just as it was presented first to the immediate subject, the one which is being maltreated directly. The representation is linguistically encoded through recursive subordination. This repackages one predication of the subject as an object in another predication of that same subject: I see [myself being maltreated]. It makes use of the transcendental subject's ability to reform its own experiences as an object of consciousness. Typically the act of consciousness is one of reflection or intellection, and here the verb ὁράω approaches the sense of mental sight.

Beside its creation of a second generation or transcendental subject, Prometheus' expression has certain connotational effects that derive from its adoption of this model of 3rd person or objective viewing. In being seen his maltreatment becomes a problematic social event present to the public. This converts a private act of suffering into an object of public outrage, upon which he or any other fellow onlooker may gaze. Hippolytus too makes exactly this wish, that the full public manifestation of his suffering be made known to him. In this way, above and beyond the torment he feels as the being who suffers it, he wishes to feel also the pity another may have for him in seeing his misfortune. He wishes to compound his suffering with sympathy—to have his pathos reverberate through the soul of onlookers, and himself as one of them. Prometheus too increases his sense of injustice by making his maltreatment an object of sight and shame for himself just as it is for another. As he sees himself being mistreated so, he feels the shame and outrage another might feel at such a sight. This technique will be seen in the context of tragedy to enable a portrayal of the individual as feeling such emotions towards himself as he might feel towards another in the same predicament. When cast as an object of sight it attracts the various affectual complexes—shame, pity, sympathy—that accompany one when viewing the suffering of another. These augment the emotions already felt by the self, so that one ends with a tragic total of suffering that sums the affect of self and other.

We can see too that seeing oneself from a distance is assisted by tragedy's apparatus of representation. For the purpose of the stage is to present objects of sight, more technically θέα or θεωρία as the sight of the spectator.³⁸ Its *modus operandi* is remote viewing, and the characters

³⁸ It is notable that tragedy enters into a liaison with philosophy by loaning to it its mode of spectating, θεάομαι/θεωρέω. The metamorphosis of myth from a thing heard to a thing seen, from an object of ἀκούω to θεάομαι (even though the actors speak, the

of Prometheus and Hippolytus mimic (or in Hippolytus' case, wish to mimic) this relation by viewing themselves as though they were a member of the audience. There is a profound tragic irony then in Hippolytus' wish, for of all those in the theatre he is the only one who cannot see the evils he suffers and weep over them. The audience may gorge themselves on it, but he to whom the suffering by all accounts belongs properly is cruelly denied this grace. His wish also beautifully presents one of tragedy's deepest desires: that the character should, through an act of reflexivity, become one of his own audience and thereby annihilate the alienation that prevents the consummation, and thus the end, of his suffering. He wishes to mourn with the audience his own fate, and in the solidarity of sympathy discover consolation. But he and his suffering are ultimately trapped within the cage of his own subjectivity and neither can be truly shared with the other. Hippolytus is thus another character who learns the price of deepened subjectivity; in the last analysis, he is *ἑαυτῷ δυστυχής*.

The separation inherent in the structure of representation becomes quite acute in a form of self-address that appears to have been invented by Euripides. He mixes second-person illeism and reflexivity to begin one of Hecuba's monologues:

δύστην, *ἑμαυτὴν* γὰρ λέγω λέγουσα σέ,
Ἐκάβη, τί δράσω; (E. *Hec.* 736–737)

Luckless one—in saying “you,” Hecuba, I mean *myself* — what am I to do?³⁹

The distance has become so great that Hecuba can even inflect herself in the vocative. He uses this technique again in *Medea* (873), quoted above, where she addresses herself as *Σχετλία*.⁴⁰ Traditional self-address inflects one of the psychic organs, e.g. *ὦ θυμέ*, but in these two instances it is the person as a whole who is addressed, not one of their parts. The characters of tragedy again seem to be reiterating the relation between themselves and the audience who watches them by addressing themselves as if they

dominant perceptual mode is sight in that we go to *see*, not to *hear* a play) radically alters the way in which it appears to us. In Rorty's (1980) view, the perceptual model of *θεωρία* has prejudiced the epistemology and metaphysics of the Western tradition: the ocular master-metaphor of truth renders the philosopher's object as something seen, a visual image or *εἶδος* over against his autonomous and self-sufficient spiritual eye as *ψυχή* or *νοῦς*. The same ocular model of ‘representationalism’ is here structuring self-relation.

³⁹ Trans. Kovacs (1995).

⁴⁰ Cf. Umberto Eco's rather humorous portrayal of scholarly debates over the existence of a vocative case for the first person pronoun in his *In the Name of the Rose*.

were another. One could speak of an internalisation or a reflexivisation of *θεωγία* in which characters are aware of the fact that they are being staged and represented as an object of theatre. This device presupposes a self-conscious split between the character and the actor *qua* human being. Hecuba is characterising herself as *δύστην* Ἑκάβη, and in making herself a character her consciousness shifts towards the perspective of the audience who also sees her as a character.⁴¹ She is for a moment laying aside the tragic mask, the *persona* which Mauss saw in early ancient society as concealing and suppressing, by superimposing the image of the socio-mythic role-player, the true individual as an instance of the category of self.⁴²

e. *Reflexivisation of the Sailing Metaphor*

In Euripides' *Orestes* Menelaus cautions him against seeking to overcome Argos' demand that he pay for the murder of his mother and Aegisthus through inflammatory force, counselling instead conciliatory speeches and a spirit that yields when it is opportune.

ὅταν γὰρ ἡβᾷ δῆμος εἰς ὀργὴν πεσὼν,
ὅμοιον ὥστε πῦρ κατασβέσαι λάβρον·
εἰ δ' ἡσύχως τις αὐτὸν ἐντείνοντι μὲν
χαλῶν ὑπέικοι καιρὸν εὐλαβούμενος,
ἴσως ἂν ἐκπνεύσειεν ἦν δ' ἀνῆ πνοάς,
τύχοις ἂν αὐτοῦ ῥαδίως ὅσον θέλεις.

(E. Or. 696–701)

For when the people have fallen into anger and are in full force, it is like quenching a raging fire. But if one gently slackens *himself* and yields to the people as they increase the tension, carefully watching for the right opportunity, they might blow themselves out. If they relax their gale, you may easily obtain from them whatever you want.

⁴¹ This technique, along with the portrayal of Hippolytus' wish to see himself from a distance, would thus be a form of Euripidean metatheatricity or metatragedy—though I am unaware of them being discussed in this connection—in which a work self-consciously draws attention to its own production. For one of the first treatments of metatragedy in Euripides, see Segal (1982), especially p. 370 for a seminal definition.

⁴² Drawing on the meaning of *persona* and πρόσωπον as 'mask', Mauss (1938) outlines the development of the Western concept of an individual self from the ancient notion of the person as a role-player, identifying (13–19) several key transitional moments in the classical world, especially in the evolution of the juridical and moral meanings of these words (and thus compliant with the argument of Vernant apropos the development of a language of the will, above p. 30). One may include the development of the metatheatrical technique being discussed here as another moment in Mauss' history, in that it draws attention to and destabilises the function of the mask as a disguise by getting characters to step outside themselves.

The metaphor here is of sailing, as the verbs χαλάω and ἐντείνω (to slacken and tighten the sail), and reference to winds (πνοή, ἐκπνεύω) make clear. But the object of the verbs is not a sail but oneself, αὐτόν. In circumstances such as these, Menelaus says, you should slacken yourself just like a sail in a storm and wait for the winds to blow themselves out. Sailing metaphors are a Greek favourite, but this passage here is unique for its reflexivisation of the trope. The act of controlling the tension in the sail is a highly transitive event, and when the reflexive is substituted for the usual πόδα this conceptual structure of careful, conscientious management is preserved. Since sailing is a highly technical activity, there is an implication that this self-adjustment is a τέχνη. This brings us to Foucault, according to whom technologies of the self

permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.⁴³

Here we are seeing the emergence of one such technology, and even the beginning of the conceptualisation of these practices as a technology in the first place. We should emphasise again that controlling oneself is different in an important way from controlling one's anger or emotions. The reflexive pronoun becomes, when an object of control, a far-reaching project, for the technology of the self has now increased in scope to apply to the whole person rather than specific aspects of it as a complex. Again it follows that the subject must be distinguished from itself as the whole person indexed by the reflexive pronoun—and in so doing it becomes above and beyond the limited whole of the person, just as the subject of theoretical knowledge gazes upon the limited whole of the world from a transcendent vantage point.

f. Problematisation of Self-Determination

The idea of self-determination is integral to the conception of democracy, not least because each individual citizen votes autonomously.⁴⁴ Against this backdrop, tragedy is drawn to problematic instances of self-determination just as we have seen it drawn to problematic instances of

⁴³ Foucault (1988) 18.

⁴⁴ See Farrar (1988) for an excellent and in-depth investigation of democracy's relation to a self-conscious sense of personal agency, which also considers tragedy's participation in this evolving discourse.

reflexivity in general. Negatively, excessive self-determination appears as *αὐθάδεια*, pleasing oneself without taking others' claims into account.

At the beginning of *Prometheus Bound* Prometheus, suffering vicious treatment from Zeus, foretells that he will eagerly seek his friendship when misfortune turns on him:

οἶδ' ὅτι τραχὺς καὶ παρ' ἑαυτῷ
τὸ δίκαιον ἔχων Ζεὺς. ἀλλ' ἔμπας οἶω
μαλακογνῶμων
ἔσται ποθ', ὅταν ταύτῃ ῥαισθῇ·
τὴν δ' ἀτέραμνον στορέσας ὀργήν
εἰς ἄρθμὸν ἔμοι καὶ φιλότητα
σπεύδων σπεύδοντί ποθ' ἥξει. (A. PV 189–195)

I know Zeus is savage and keeps justice *to himself*. Even so, I believe he'll be compliant when he is crushed in this way. Having levelled his harsh temper, he will then enter into coalition and friendship with me, both of us mutually eager for this result.

In Prometheus' opinion Zeus is harsh and keeps justice to himself; as absolute king, he has monopolised τὸ δίκαιον. Here what may be called the self-righteousness of Zeus is pejorative, though we will see that the exact same concept is ambivalent and can in a different context be entirely positive. Zeus' tyranny, when carried to an extreme of self-indulgent wilfulness (*αὐθάδεια*), offends the flowering Greek notion of a justice common to all and not kept in the hands of one individual. So Euripides adapts the phrase in condemnation of human tyrants:

οὐδὲν τυράννου δυσμενέστερον πόλει,
ὅπου τὸ μὲν πρῶτιστον οὐκ εἰσὶν νόμοι
κοινοί, κρατεῖ δ' εἷς τὸν νόμον κεκτημένος
αὐτὸς παρ' αὐτῷ· καὶ τόδ' οὐκέτ' ἔστ' ἴσον. (E. Supp. 429–432)

Nothing is more hostile to a polis than a tyrant, in which case firstly there are no laws shared in by all, and secondly one man rules who possesses the law *for himself* alone. Here equality no longer exists.

Nothing is more hostile to a city, claims Theseus, than a tyrant. He possesses the law αὐτὸς παρ' αὐτῷ, beside himself alone; he rules as one man. What is objectionable is not that a person possesses αὐτὸς παρ' αὐτῷ *per se*, but that only the king in a tyranny gets to possess in this way. Liberalisation of this form of possession is possible within a democracy and might be put in Greek as follows:

τῶν δὲ πολιτῶν ἕκαστος τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον αὐτὸς παρ' αὐτῷ ἔχει·
κατὰ γὰρ γνώμην τὴν ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου, ὥς ἂν
δοκῇ, ἕκαστος ψηφίζεται.

In a democracy each citizen votes according to their own conception of justice, and thus has the law in his own hands, and with himself. Democracy is a form of government in which each individual becomes a tyrant over the realm of what they consider just. The individual possesses παρ' αὐτῷ the law and justice as an *idea* of law and justice.⁴⁵ This subjectivisation of the sense of παρ' αὐτῷ grants the individual his own perspective and a greater sense of self-determination.

In the Aeschylean passage above Prometheus concedes that Zeus, as king of gods, can do what he wants—since justice is firmly in his power alone—but he ought to exercise some restraint, if only for the sake of justice herself. Neither Zeus nor Prometheus will give an inch, and what eventuates is a stand-off. At the end of the play Zeus sends Hermes to Prometheus to demand that he relent under threat of dire consequences. Hermes has this to say:

αὐθαδία γὰρ τῷ φρονοῦντι μὴ καλῶς
αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς μείζον σθένει. (A. PV 1012–1013)

Wilfulness *by itself*, for someone not thinking properly, has no more power than anything.⁴⁶

There is doubtless a play on αὐτός here, which appears three times: twice as a reflexive morpheme (in the compound αὐθαδία and the reflexive pronoun) and once as the intensifier. Etymologically αὐθαδία is a compound of αὐτός and ἥδομαι, 'to please oneself'. It is a stubbornness that takes little account of the needs of others, a brute 'my self versus your self'. The beauty of these lines is in the ironic play of the phrase αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν on the selfhood inherent in αὐθαδία. Αὐθαδία is almost by definition αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν, restricted to itself, by virtue of the fact that it is already reflexive. It is thus deficient in precisely the way that anything, considered alone and in itself, is deficient, and only becomes powerful through combination with the right other, in this case proper thinking.

Problematic self-determination is also a theme in Sophocles' *Antigone*. Two semantically related reflexive compounds, αὐτόνομος and αὐτόγνωτος, frame her characterisation. Both terms are used pejoratively to refer to her wilfulness in acting outside the sanctions of the state and

⁴⁵ This use of παρ' αὐτῷ is common in Plato; it delimits what falls within the self's own sphere of influence and control or opens a psychological space in the subject, especially one which encodes subjective point of view. See *Phd.* 100d4, 107b2; *Tht.* 145e9, 170d4; *Sph.* 250c10; *Sym.* 200a2; *R.* 440d3, 456d5, 477c9, 523a6, 529a10, 554a6.

⁴⁶ Trans. Griffith (1983).

determining for herself what the law is.⁴⁷ The first surviving use of *αὐτόνομος* occurs at line 821 of *Antigone*, which was produced in 441.⁴⁸ Creon has condemned her to the symbolic death of solitary entombment for her transgression of his stately power. In a lengthy exchange with the Chorus, the latter weighs her case and taunts her with ironic praise. Smitten by neither sickness nor sword, 'guided by your own laws and still alive, unlike any mortal before, you will descend to Hades'⁴⁹ (*ἀλλ' αὐτόνομος ζῶσα μόνη δὴ | θνητῶν Ἀΐδαν καταβήσει*). The adjective *αὐτόνομος* speaks twice in Antigone's case since she goes to her death of her own free will, having committed an act for which she knew the consequence would be destruction.⁵⁰ A little further on the chorus repeats the point in less uncertain terms:

σὲ δ' αὐτόγνωτος ὥλεσ' ὀργά. (S. Ant. 875)

Your *self-determined* disposition has destroyed you.

Antigone's fate is thus graded as yet another form of tragic self-destruction and her downfall a further example of tragedy's problematisation of self. This contextually ambiguous use of *αὐτόνομος*, disturbingly combining the senses of both self-legislation and self-destruction, exposes again a tension in the notion of autonomy which unsettles the very possibility of positive reflexive agency.

Farenga finds a similar unholy union of self-determination and self-destruction in Aeschylus' *Suppliants*.⁵¹ The Danaids have fled Egypt and marriage to the sons of Aegyptus on account of *αὐτογενεῖ φυξανορία*, 'self-born aversion to marriage'.⁵² Like Antigone, their self-determination is excessively voluntaristic; it is both extra-social in challenging the

⁴⁷ The matter is complicated by the fact that her laws are *θεῶν νόμματα*. But the secularisation necessary for the institution of democratic *νόμοι* must exclude the gods as law-makers, so that Antigone's excommunication repeats the mythic moment of democracy's self-institution, refigured in human terms. Tragedy is occupied with the question of whether man can liberate himself without offending the gods.

⁴⁸ If, as Ostwald (1982) argues, *αὐτονομία* first applied to independent states, it is certainly surprising that it is first found applied to an individual. If he is correct, then it must have quickly crossed from collectives to individuals. The subjectivisation of the term is comparable to the adaptation of other socio-political relations for an internalised reflexive signification, considered in Ch. 7.3.

⁴⁹ Tr. Jebb (1891).

⁵⁰ At A. *Sept.* 1053 the herald warns Antigone against her intention to bury her brother and also uses a reflexive compound denoting self-determination: *ἀλλ' αὐτόβουλος ἴσθ', ἀπεννέπω δ' ἐγώ*.

⁵¹ (2006) 373–393.

⁵² A. *Supp.* 8.

tradition of marriage and extra-political in putting at risk by supplication a state, Argos, of which they are not citizens. At the same time the motif of self-destruction also presents itself during the Danaids' opening lament in polyvalent form: they equate themselves with the archetypal lament performer, αὐτοφόνος Μῆτις, and threaten to hang themselves, while their eventual murder of their spouses—which in Greek renders them αὐτοφόνουι—looms in the dramatic irony of intertextual allusion. Farenga identifies this passage as 'the moment when an isomorphic link emerges between *autophonia* and *autonomia*'.⁵³ Though Farrar reads the incorporation of the Danaids into Argos as a reconciliation of individual autonomy and democratic order,⁵⁴ their subsequent egregious act of kin-slaying severely undermines this claim. I would instead understand this episode as teaching the self-destructive nature of radical autonomy, and the trouble had by democracy in coming to grips with and containing the seminal act of autonomy that founded it. The only act of radical autonomy that democracy in the Greek conception may countenance is the act that instituted it in the first place, alongside the repetitions that re-enact this moment in a controlled manner, as for example in the resolutions of the assembly.⁵⁵ We therefore find the manifestation of autonomy outside these limits displaced onto women who are only included in the state at its own peril.

Antigone's characterisation may be compared with αὐθάδεια as a Promethean trait. As the champion of humanity, Prometheus' αὐθάδεια is symbolically theirs; what galls Zeus is human self-determination, their pleasing themselves beyond the sanction of the cosmic powers. Antigone is to the sovereign state as Prometheus is to the sovereign cosmos, and each opposition, as I will argue further below, both reflects and problematises the Greeks' current desire to differentiate an area of human self-determination that is politically and cosmically independent.

The institution of democracy has meant the male citizens have become by definition αὐτόβουλοι, and political decisions, insofar as they result from the decision of each voting individual, αὐτόγνωτα. Tragedy's

⁵³ (2006) 386.

⁵⁴ (1988).

⁵⁵ Cf. Derrida (2002) 268 in his exegesis of Walter Benjamin's 'Zur Kritik der Gewalt': 'The state is afraid of *founding* violence—that is, violence able to justify, to legitimate, or transform the relations of law, and so to present itself as having a right to right and to law.' Radical autonomy is a form of foundational violence. Cf. also Farenga (2006) 377, who calls attention to the Danaids' extra-political claim to the right of democratic law, which endangers the state.

treatment of self-determination must therefore be referred to this wider political discourse. This move is especially justified when we look at the importance of related reflexive compounds in a passage from Thucydides that defines the constitution of sovereignty. The sovereignty concerned is that of the sacred precinct at Delphi, but the vocabulary is applicable to any autonomous state. It is an article in the peace agreement between Athens and Sparta, the so-called ‘Peace of Nicias’:

τὸ δ' ἱερόν καὶ τὸν νεῶν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Δελφοὺς
 αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ αὐτοδίκους καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς
 τῆς ἑαυτῶν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια. (Th. 5.18.2)

The precinct and temple of Apollo at Delphi, and the Delphians themselves, are to be *autonomous*, *self-taxed*, *self-judged* (i.e. with their own courts of justice), and in control of *themselves* and *their own* land according to their inherited customs.

The anaphora of the αὐτός morpheme in this passage is quite unprecedented, totalling five instances within the one sentence, three reflexive compounds plus two reflexive pronouns. As Graves notes, ‘[t]he genitive αὐτῶν depends on the idea of ‘control over’, which is implied in the preceding adjectives, especially αὐτονόμους.’⁵⁶ We may thus analyse the genitives as equivalent to a phrase such as κρατοῦντας ἑαυτῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἑαυτῶν. Sovereignty thus appears as a macrocosmic version of the philosophical idea of self-control. Ideally the fully autonomous state ought to have control over itself, just as an individual ought to have control over himself. It is not an accident that notions such as political autonomy are surfacing as culturally important at the same time as self-control is being philosophised as a key virtue. The two are structurally connected and the same idea is being translated to different scales, from individuals to collections of individuals and vice versa. The philosophical idea of self-control finds support in the political institution that guarantees political self-control. One recalls Democritus’ application of the language of legislation to the individual, who makes the law of self-respect for his soul as though he were a state. This transference is greatly facilitated by democracy because democracy transforms the state into a sum of the decisions of autonomous individuals; it becomes an easy metonymical slip since each individual claims a more substantial part in the whole.

⁵⁶ (1891) ad loc.

This socio-political context also helps explain the Greek intellectual's (and by extension his audience's) newfound concern for considering a thing in abstraction, αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό. I would argue the Greeks are considering things *in themselves*, individually, because they too have been constructed (or have constructed themselves)⁵⁷—socially, politically, and philosophically—as individuals with a reflexive relation to themselves.⁵⁸ They view things *sub specie sui*. Now the philosophical dimension of this connection will be explored when we consider Plato's concept of the essence of the person, the soul, as paradigmatically αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν. But here we may take some initial steps in uncovering the socio-political dimension of this construction. It must first be said that it takes root within the creation of the city-state. For this city-state guarantees the autonomy and civil liberty which constitutes a person as a reflexive individual. Surviving political documents from the fifth century are rare, but Aristotle's *Constitution of the Athenians*, discovered only at the end of the 19th century independently of the Corpus Aristotelicum, gives a history of Athenian politics and insight into the conception of persons *qua* citizens of a state. In his account of the oligarchic revolution of the Thirty that followed the end of the Peloponnesian War, he quotes one of the terms of agreement in the first settlement to resolve the dispute. Previously the Thirty had withdrawn to Eleusis after the death of its leader Critias in a battle over the Piraeus, which the Democrats now held. With the death of Critias rule in the city passed to a more moderate board of Ten. The Spartan general Pausanias then brokered a peace deal between the Democrats and those in the city. Key to the deal was the option for any of those who had remained in the city to relocate to Eleusis if they wished:

τοὺς βουλομένους Ἀθηναίων τῶν ἐν ἄστει μεινάντων ἐξοικεῖν ἔχειν Ἐλευσίνα ἐπιτίμους ὄντας καὶ κυρίους καὶ αὐτοκράτορας ἑαυτῶν καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν καρπουμένους. (Arist. *Ath.* 39.1)

Of the Athenians who remained in the city, those who wish to emigrate may settle in Eleusis as fully enfranchised and sovereign citizens, in charge of the *themselves* and reaping the proceeds of *their own* property and interests.

⁵⁷ I make no claims as to whether this concept of the person is one that has mostly evolved naturally from the self (as in Hegel) or whether it is mostly the creation of external social forces. Whatever the agent of the construction, the important thing for us is that it takes such and such a form.

⁵⁸ Note Sandywell (1996) 122: "The 'natural universe' is a mythic projection of sociomorphic operations."

According to Carawan, the provision means that the émigrés will be fully enfranchised and have full rights in their adopted community (ἐπιτίμους ὄντας καὶ κυρίους).⁵⁹ The phrase τὰ αὐτῶν καρπυμένους means that they will be in control of the proceeds from their property. What then does αὐτοκράτορας ἑαυτῶν mean? It is surely an expression of individual civil autonomy: they will be masters of themselves. The émigré is thus guaranteed control of himself and his property.⁶⁰ These two notions are very close, a fact baldly demonstrated by their frequent juxtaposition.⁶¹ There is also the important question of the relation between the self and private property: is the construction of a reflexive self dependent on the institution of private property? Does power over what is one's own lead, through ineluctable metonymy, to power over oneself? This would amount to an internalisation of the relation between subject and private property so that I have power over and 'own' certain abstract properties: my image, my political opinions, my choice of friends, my actions, etc., all of which constitute me as myself. The concept αὐτοκράτορας ἑαυτῶν is the socio-political transcription of Anaxagoras' conception of νοῦς as αὐτοκρατῆς and μόνος αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑωυτοῦ. The same reflexive construct is translating itself from one domain to another; the independence of the mind or soul and the political independence of the individual share the same provenance.

We conclude this section in a way that incorporates the ideas of tragic reflexivity and the reflexivity of ontological foundations. The flowering of autonomy as an ideal led the Greeks to consciousness of themselves as the source of their own norms.⁶² There is a diminished *heteronomous* externalisation of νόμος to a divine other for it now has its foundation in man himself. But this consciousness necessarily includes as a corollary an increased awareness of themselves also as the source of their own *suffering*. Tragically, freedom entails the freedom to err. *Qua* free, the human being is often her own worst enemy.⁶³

⁵⁹ (2006).

⁶⁰ It is technically possible that the phrase αὐτοκράτορας ἑαυτῶν is meant collectively: they as a group will rule themselves as a group. However, since each of the other terms applies to them as individuals, it is most likely that this phrase does also. Carawan seems to take it as a guarantee of property rights, and thus seems to treat αὐτοκράτορας ἑαυτῶν as a virtual synonym for αὐτοκράτορας τῶν αὐτῶν. By coincidence he is therefore illustrating my point concerning the metonymical slippage between self and private property.

⁶¹ We will later see some examples from Plato.

⁶² Castoriadis (1997) 'The Greek polis and the creation of democracy'.

⁶³ In Menander's view (fr. 844.5–8 PCG) this ability to suffer on account of himself

A sense of this tragedy first appears in the beginning of the *Odyssey*, where Zeus claims that mortals suffer beyond their divinely-appointed measure through their own recklessness.⁶⁴ The anguish of such suffering is all the more brutal for having been self-chosen, *αὐθαίρετος*, and this is of course Oedipus' predicament:

τῶν δὲ πημονῶν
μάλιστα λυποῦσ' αἶ φανῶσ' *αὐθαίρετοι*. (S. OT 1230–1231)

Those ills are especially painful which are shown to be self-chosen.

The same idea is also phrased with reflexives:

ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἄλγιστ', ἣν παρὸν θέσθαι καλῶς
αὐτός τις *αὐτῷ* τὴν βλάβην προσθῇ φέρων (S. fr. 350 TrGF)

Most painful of all is when one inflicts damage *on himself* even though it was possible for him to have brought things to a successful issue.

Euripides goes so far as to claim that the majority of human suffering is self-chosen:

τὰ πλεῖστα θνητοῖς τῶν κακῶν *αὐθαίρετα*. (E. fr. 1026 TrGF)

The majority of mortals' ills are *self-chosen*.

The human naturally finds comfort in hiding itself from this fact and attributing its suffering to a greater power, since there is some small solace in the belief that we are at least not responsible for our torment. The idea of *fortune* is a convenient scapegoat when we paradoxically wrong ourselves:

ἄνοια θνητοῖς δυστύχημ' *αὐθαίρετον*.
τί *σαυτὸν* ἀδικῶν τὴν τύχην καταιτιᾷ; (Men. fr. 709 PCG)

Stupidity is for mortals a *self-chosen* misfortune. Why do you blame fortune when you wrong *yourself*?

The stupidity (Menander ἄνοια, Homer ἀτασθαλία) that is for mortals a self-chosen misfortune is interpreted as a reflexive wrong committed against the self (σαυτὸν ἀδικῶν). Menander has synthesised Homer's

renders man the least blessed of all creatures, even more wretched than the ass ὃ τοι κακὸν δι' *αὐτόν* οὐδὲν γίνεται, | ἃ δ' ἡ φύσις δέδωκεν, (αὐτὰ) ταῦτ' ἔχει. | ἡμεῖς δὲ χωρὶς τῶν ἀναγκαίων κακῶν | *αὐτοὶ* παρ' *αὐτῶν* ἕτερα προσπορίζομεν.

⁶⁴ *Od.* 1.33–34: οἱ δὲ καὶ *αὐτοὶ* | σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε' ἔχουσιν Cf. *GV* 54: γνώσῃ δ' ἀνθρώπους *αὐθαίρετα* πῆματ' ἔχοντας. The moralised theology of the *Odyssey's* proem in which humans take an increased share of responsibility for their suffering has been interpreted by some, though not without controversy, as an historical development (see Segal (1992) n. 2). Cf. Ch. 4 n. 79 and the theodical passage at Pl. *Ti.*

notion with the new moral psychology developed by Democritus and Plato in which ethics is founded in reflexive acts and care of self—that is, in a transitive relation to self. Stupidity is a sin against oneself since we have a duty to know ourselves. In Homer on the other hand, people suffer by their own agency (καὶ αὐτοὶ σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον), but this is not conceived reflexively as wronging oneself. Folly is stupid and to be avoided, but its commission is not conceived as a failure to treat oneself ethically. It is simply going astray, especially against others and the gods, not going astray against oneself.

Democritus is particularly scathing of this proclivity, saying that men have fashioned an idol of fortune as a cover for their own stupidity.⁶⁵ This form of consciousness is typical of the fifth century, an age during which humans increasingly rationalised their institutions as their own achievement rather than accepting them as the gift of the gods.⁶⁶ Because the Greeks now know themselves and their social significations, to an extent, as their own creation, they assume the reflexivity that we have seen characterises ontological foundations. In the language of Castoriadis, the Greek becomes conscious of the fact that the human being *qua* being-for-itself creates for itself its own world within which it also posits itself.⁶⁷ The tragic notion of τὸ αὐθαίρετον is thus properly a reflex of αὐτονομία, and one way in which tragedy in general is cognate with democracy: suffering, like law, is self-determined and grounded in the reflexive subject.

g. Dialogue with Contemporary Philosophical Issues

Tragedy often displays a healthy intertextual concern with issues treated by philosophy and on such occasions seems to borrow certain reflexive concepts that populate philosophical discourse. This is especially the

42d–e, which talks of a mortal race which is governed excellently by the gods except where it is ‘itself a cause to itself of evils’ (ὅτι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ γίγνεται αἴτιον).

⁶⁵ B119. Cf. Men. fr. 687 PCG: ἀδύνατον ὥς ἔστιν τι σῶμα τῆς Τύχης· | ὁ μὴ φέρον δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τὰ πράγματα | τύχην προσηγόρευσε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τρόπον.

⁶⁶ Guthrie (1962–1981) 3.60–63. Cf. Podlecki (2005) 16–27. This development has many aspects, including the closing of the mythical ‘floating gap’ through historiography, which withdrew Greek society from its mythic origins and hence made its foundation in a divine past more difficult, just as Herodotus’ connection of the Greek *historicum spatium* to ancient Egyptian history problematises aristocratic arrogation of divine lineage. Cf. Sandywell (1996) 104. Note Isocrates’ (11.13) use of the phrase αὐτὸς αὐτῷ κύριος to denote independence of the gods: τῶν γὰρ ὀμβρῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνχμῶν τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ὁ Ζεὺς ταμίης ἐστίν, ἐκείνων δ’ ἕκαστος ἀμφοτέρων τοῦτων αὐτὸς αὐτῷ κύριος καθέστηκεν.

⁶⁷ Castoriadis (1997) ‘Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary’, 326.

case in the tragedies of Euripides, who is reported to have associated extensively with the philosophers and ideas of his day.⁶⁸ Here I divide the crossover into three categories: metaphysics, care of self, and ethics. Two outstanding examples of metaphysical speculation come from fragments of the play *Pirithous*, whose author may be Euripides or Critias.⁶⁹ According to Collard and Cropp, both fragments ‘are from the entry chant of the Chorus, comprised apparently of dead initiates of the Eleusinian Mysteries; they come to pour offerings to the under-world powers, but celebrate also physical and metaphysical aspects of the world above.’⁷⁰ The first fragment conceptualises time as a being which gives birth to itself:

ἀκάμας τε χρόνος περί τ' ἀενάῳ
 ῥεύματι πλήρης φοιτᾷ τίκτων
 αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν, δίδυμοί τ' ἄρκτοι
 ταῖς ὠκυπλάνοις περὺγων ῥίπαῖς
 τὸν Ἀτλάντειον τήρουσι πόλον.

(Critias fr. 3 *TrGF*)

Time, unflagging and full in its ever-flowing stream, meanders giving birth to *itself*; and the twin bears, with swift-beating wings, watch over the pole of Atlas.

The author follows the trend of Presocratic thought in conceptualising ontological fundamentals as reflexive. Beings such as time are thought as original principles of the cosmos; since there is nothing higher than them on the ontic ladder, they cannot have been created by something else but must generate themselves. This conception is particularly apt in the case of time since it appears phenomenologically that each present moment, as if with the inertia of a heavy object with great momentum, through some inexhaustible and effortless internal principle generates the next present moment. Furthermore, the circularity of time's calendar means it repeats itself periodically. It also appears transcendently as a great container required before one conceives of any physical event at all. The Greeks even found this temporal reflexivity embedded etymologically in the word for year, ἐνιαυτός, analysed as ἐν ἑαυτῷ. The phrase's general interpretation is that time has the phenomenological world transpire within itself.⁷¹ A Euripidean fragment plays with this etymology:

⁶⁸ See Nestle (1901), Egli (2003).

⁶⁹ See Collard and Cropp (2008) 630–635 for a summary of the controversy.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 637.

⁷¹ Egli (2003) 51–53 traces the idea back to Heraclitus. It appears in Hermipp. fr. 73 and Epich. fr. *295 *PCG*, and West's restoration into tetrameter, following Wilamowitz, of Stobaeus' quotation of Scythinus (fr. 2), a contemporary of Plato and interpreter of Heraclitus.

(‘ἐνιαυτός’ ... εἴρηται) ὁθούνεκα
 ἐν (αὐτὸς) αὐτῷ πάντα συλλαβὸν ἔχει. (E. fr. 862 TrGF)

(It has been called “in-itself”) since it has gathered together and holds everything *in itself*.

In Plato’s *Cratylus* Time takes on an intellectual attitude towards what transpires within itself. Etymologising another word for year, ἔτος, as connected to ἐτάζω, he combines both etymologies to define time as τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐτάζον, ‘that which examines within itself’.⁷² As an entity that gives birth to itself, time is the inexhaustible spring that, like the earth giving forth another yield of crops, continually gives rise to and harbours yet another round of mortal affairs. It possesses the eternal fecundity of a self-sufficient nature. As a totality that appears to contain everything, it is very difficult to think of something which contains it, so that thought, capitulating at its limit, gives up and views time as the source of time. We should also add that the apparent popularity of this etymology among intellectuals suggests a concurrent fascination with the theme of reflexivity, insofar as folk etymologies represent culturally important signifiers.

The second relevant fragment from *Pirithous* also refers to a self-generating entity:

σὲ τὸν αὐτοφυῆ, τὸν ἐν αἰθερίῳ
 ῥυμβῷ πάντων φύσιν ἐμπλέξανθ’,
 ὃν πέρι μὲν φῶς, πέρι δ’ ὀρφναία
 νύξ αἰολόχρως ἀκριτός τ’ ἄστρον
 ὄχλος ἐνδελεχῶς ἀμφιχορεύει. (Critias fr. 4 TrGF)

You, the *self-generated* one, who weaves together the nature of everything in an ethereal whirl, about whom the light, the dark and dappled night, and the infinite multitude of stars perpetually dance.

Clement, who quotes the fragment, identifies the addressee as Mind. If Euripides is the author, this identification would be especially appropriate given his association with Anaxagoras. Others have argued that the fragment addresses Time or Zeus. Though I favour the ancient testimony, what is most relevant for us is that we again see an ontological fundamental being conceptualised reflexively. Collard and Cropp’s translation of the compound αὐτοφυής is particularly evocative: ‘You, who generate your own self ...’⁷³

⁷² Pl. *Cra.* 410d1–e1. Socrates’ characterisation of Time as an examiner doubtless draws on the commonplace of the test of time, as in the English idiom ‘Time will tell.’

⁷³ Collard and Cropp (2008) 645 ad loc.

Several Euripidean fragments also make use of the idea of self-care. The spread of this notion into different discourses indicates its success as a general cultural category and the importance of the discipline of care of self for the fifth century Greek. Consider the following fragments:

ὅστις νέμει κάλλιστα τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν,
οὗτος σοφὸς πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. (E. fr. 634 TrGF)

That wise man who administers *his own* nature best is naturally disposed to profit.

μηδ' εὐτύχημα μηδὲν ὧδ' ἔστω μέγα,
ὅ σ' ἐξεπαρεῖ μείζον ἢ χρεῶν φρονεῖν,
μηδ' ἦν τι συμβῇ δυσχερές, δουλοῦ πάλιν
ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αἰεὶ μίμνε τὴν σαυτοῦ φύσιν
σώζων βεβαίως ὥστε χρυσὸς ἐν πυρί. (E. fr. 963 TrGF)

Let no stroke of good fortune be so great that it carries you away and makes you think more arrogant thoughts than you should. Conversely, if some difficulty befalls you, do not be its slave. Instead, always remain the same, securely preserving *your own* nature like gold in fire.

Both these passages employ a combination of φύσις and a reflexive possessor. This phrase functions as an essentialised substitute for a reflexive pronoun, e.g. τὴν σαυτοῦ φύσιν for σαυτόν, and provides a useful gloss for the latter. Ψυχή is also possible in place of φύσις:

ὃς τάδε λεύσσων οὐ προδι[δ]άσκει
ψυχὴν [αὐ]τοῦ θεὸν ἢ[γε]ῖσθαι (E. fr. 913.2–3 TrGF)

who in gazing upon these things [the heavenly sights] doesn't teach in advance *his own* soul to consider god

The use of φύσις in the sense required by such passages, viz. one's inner nature or character, is a classical development and is likely influenced by the Presocratic physicists.⁷⁴ Where φύσις in early literature refers to the result of growth, rather than the principle or process of growth, it means the outward form or appearance of a thing rather than its internal or psychological nature. Thus in the only occurrence of φύσις in Homeric Epic, the statement 'he showed me the nature of the medicinal plant moly' means 'he showed me what its natural form looked like'.⁷⁵ In similar fashion, Pindar contrasts νόος and φύσις, mind or character and

⁷⁴ Cf. S. Ph. 874, 902, 1310. Note Burkert (1962) 186 n. 155: 'The general idea of φύσις is scarcely likely to have existed before the second half of the 5th century.'

⁷⁵ Od. 10.303.

outward form.⁷⁶ It seems that at some stage the meaning of φύσις was internalised so that it could also refer to the inner as well as the outward form of a human being.⁷⁷ The practice of care of self, which teaches the training and maintenance of one's character, is the perfect social context for this semantic development. This practice is a type of τέχνη and as such suggests the management and modification of nature. Bias, one of the Seven Sages of Greece, is reported to have said:

εἰς κάτοπτρον, ἔφη, ἐμβλέψαντα δεῖ, εἰ μὲν καλὸς φαίνη, καλὰ ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ αἰσχρὸς, τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἑλλειπὲς διορθοῦσθαι τῇ καλογαγαθίᾳ.

(Bias ap. Stobaeus 3.1.172 Wachsmuth)

You must gaze in the mirror, he said, and if you look good, do good, but if you look ugly, correct nature's deficiency with good conduct.

Directives like this one encourage the essentialisation of the object of this concern, i.e. one's internal character.⁷⁸ One such essentialisation is φύσις, another ψυχή. These differ from the Homeric psychic organs in that they are open to practices of character-building and result from an intellectual search for the essence of the human being. Homer is more interested in how different agents play a role in psychic life—in other words, in its plurality—whereas post-Homeric psychology is more interested in finding which agent or internal form 'is' the real person, just as Presocratic physics searches for which of the various elements is the most fundamental and thus really 'is'. As just proposed, this person becomes a focus of concentrated developmental attention. Indeed for Democritus, nature and teaching become very close. What is taught can in time become what is natural, so that teaching has the power to reshape the nature of the individual:

ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ διδασχὴ παραπλήσιόν ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ ἡ διδασχὴ μεταρρυθμίζει τὸν ἄνθρωπον, μεταρρυθμοῦσα δὲ φυσιοποιεῖ.⁷⁹ (Democr. B33 DK)

⁷⁶ N. 6.5.

⁷⁷ Cf. English 'nature' which in the case of humans may only refer to inner and not outward form: 'She has a beautiful nature.'

⁷⁸ Cf. Democr. B61: οἷσιν ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶν εὐτακτος, τούτοις καὶ ὁ βίος συντέτακται. Note however that the myth of Narcissus problematises Bias' mirror metaphor: one must be careful to avoid the danger of excessive fascination with one's image. Nonetheless, the mirror is an important trope for moral self-examination. Cf. Seneca *Clem.* 1.1: *Scribere de clementia, Nero Caesar, institui, ut quodam modo speculi vice fungerer et te tibi ostenderem perventurum ad voluptatem maximam omnium.*

⁷⁹ Vlastos (1946) with whom Taylor (1999) 233 now agrees, refers the action of μεταρρυθμίζει to Democritus physics, within whose context it becomes a technical term denoting the production of a new configuration in the atomic aggregate that constitutes

Nature and teaching are similar. For teaching changes the human being's constitutional arrangement, and in so doing creates [a new] nature.

Such a view is obviously sympathetic with Platonic care of soul or self, a practice which seeks to produce a stable and harmonious state in the essence of the individual. The psychological constancy advocated above in E. fr. 963 is another example of the theme of action reflexively directed towards one's nature. One should not be a slave to, and derive excessive pleasure from, the vicissitudes of fortune.⁸⁰ The fragment also stands out for its praise of self-identity (αὐτὸς αἰεὶ μῖμνε), an evocation of what will become Stoic *constantia*; as a relation of the self to itself, this idea partakes in the discourse of *responsibility*, for responsibility may only latch onto what reproduces itself consistently across time, and is compromised by the disruptions in identity caused by extreme emotional states such as ἄτη and the ecstasy of madness, and to lesser extent, by the playing of different social roles.⁸¹ The care for self-identity is thus at the same time care for the responsible self, for its creation and preservation, and also for its institution as the identical person that must make answer before the law. At this point the onto-ethical push for identity moves together with the history of responsibility by providing the ontological groundwork for that which is responsible.⁸²

We dealt in Chapter 4 with Democritus' exhortation in B264 to establish self-shame as a law for the soul and noted Procopé's reservations towards reading this fragment as a declaration of moral autonomy in the Kantian sense. A comparable example is found in Euripides' *Hippolytus*, but here perhaps comparisons to Kantian self-legislation are more justified. The reflexive is used instead of ψυχή, and there is a clearer focus

the soul. For teaching as constituting an individual's nature cf. the use of the verb ἐμφυσιῶ: e.g. τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι ἐμφυσιῶσαί τινι (X. *Lac.* 3.4).

⁸⁰ The speaker seems to agree with Democritus' advice to derive pleasure instead from oneself. δουλοῦσθαι ὑπὸ τυχῇ seems an inverse of κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ. Cf. Pl. *R.* 589e: τὸ ἑαυτοῦ θεϊότατον ὑπὸ τῷ ἀθεωτάτῳ ... δουλοῦται.

⁸¹ The elaboration in the sense of πρόσωπον and *persona* from role-playing mask to the subjective identity *behind* the mask, above n. 42, is also involved here. Cf. Martin and Barresi (2006) 29–33.

⁸² This history is treated briefly but concisely by Mauss (1938) 18, who notes the influence of the Stoics, 'whose voluntarist and personal ethics were able to enrich the Roman notion of the "person", and was even enriched itself whilst enriching the law', and at length by Patočka (1975), who marks the importance of Platonism's repression and subjugation of myth and orgiastic mystery for the foundation of a responsible self. Derrida's (1992) 1–52 excellent reading of Patočka's essay underscores the shadow cast on this self by soul's reflexivity in the *Phaedo*. The care of identity and semantic interchange of self and same is considered further in Ch. 7.

on the subjectivity of the legislator. In addition, the act of self-legislation arises from a perspective shift in the subject that calls to mind a similar move underpinning the golden rule. The context is the confrontation between Theseus and Hippolytus over the corpse of Phaedra, Theseus having falsely concluded that Hippolytus made attempts upon his wife and Hippolytus being unable to defend himself directly on account of his earlier oath to secrecy. Theseus has proclaimed the banishment of his son, but Hippolytus, though he only stands to worsen his situation by this admission, finds this proposed punishment unequal to the alleged crime and suggests that if their roles were reversed he would have punished himself with death. Theseus rejects his son's self-assessment in the following words:

ὥς ἄξιον τόδ' εἶπας. οὐχ οὕτω θανῆι,
ὥσπερ σὺ σαυτῶι τόνδε προύθηκας νόμον·
ταχὺς γάρ ᾿Αἰδης ῥᾷστος ἀνδρὶ δυστυχεῖ·
ἀλλ' ἐκ πατρώας φυγὰς ἀλητεῦων χθονός.⁸³ (E. *Hipp.* 1045–1048)

How true to form this statement of yours! You will not die in agreement with the law you have proposed for *yourself*, since a swift death is the easiest way out for an unfortunate man, but wandering as an exile from your ancestral land.

Theseus reads Hippolytus' rhetorical claim to being a most exacting self-legislator and self-punisher as just another symptom of his conceited self-righteousness, virulently rebuked by Theseus earlier in lines 948–957. This is the meaning behind his deployment of ἄξιον in the first line: his hypothetical self-punishment is worthy of his holier-than-thou attitude. In a similar mood he later accuses Hippolytus of being better practiced at sanctimoniously honouring himself (σαυτὸν ἡσκησας σέβειν, 1080)—an insinuation of excessive self-care—than treating his parents piously. Theseus avoids giving Hippolytus the satisfaction of pleasing his sense of moral superiority through setting himself his own laws, while at the same time implying that the penalty he has proposed for himself is no punishment at all but a convenient escape from the torment he deserves. There is tragic irony here too, for at the start of the play the servant

⁸³ I have followed Kovacs (1995) rather than Murray (OCT) in the reading of the Greek text. Murray accepts Weil's (1868) transposition of v. 1046 to v. 1048, who connects the sense of this line not to Hippolytus' words immediately prior but back to v. 1029 where he wishes exile upon himself if he is guilty. I do not have the space here to consider Weil's arguments and can only say that I prefer the traditional reading followed by Kovacs and others. But if Weil is right, it can be said that the expression then becomes thematically similar to Oedipus' self-cursing.

reminds Hippolytus of the law (νόμος) among mortals to hate what's haughty—Hippolytus, to his detriment, has ignored this law for laws of his own making.

One Euripidean fragment paints a rather vivid and detailed picture of a technique of care of self. It presents the act which Posidonius will later give the technical term *προενδημεῖν*,⁸⁴ whereby one imagines to oneself all manner of potential misfortunes in advance and is thus inured to them as if they had already happened:

ἐγὼ δὲ () παρὰ σοφοῦ τινος μαθὼν
εἰς φροντίδας νοῦν συμφορὰς τ' ἐβαλλόμεν,
φυγὰς τ' ἐμαυτῷ προστιθείς πάτρως ἐμῆς
θανάτους τ' ἁώρους καὶ κακῶν ἄλλας ὁδούς,
ἴν' εἴ τι πάσχομι ὧν ἐδόξαζον φρενί,
μή μοι νεῶρες προσπεσὼν μᾶλλον δάκοι.⁸⁵ (E. fr. 964 *TrGF*)

Having learnt this from a certain wise man I used to bring worrying and disastrous situations to mind, imposing *on myself* various sorts of exile from my homeland, untimely death and other means of misery, so that if I should suffer any of the things I imagined in my head, it would not strike me as a new experience and so bite me more sharply.

The reference to a 'wise man' from whom Theseus learnt this technique perhaps points to the various schools of self-cultivation and professional self-help instructors in Euripides' own age.⁸⁶ It will be seen that this technique of scenarioising, in addition to being another internalisation

⁸⁴ Galen (*Plac. Hipp. et Pl.* 4.7.8–9 de Lacy) glosses it thus: βούλεται δὲ τὸ 'προενδημεῖν' ὅημα τῷ Ποσειδωνίῳ τὸ οἶον προαναπλάττειν τε καὶ προτυποῦν τὸ πρᾶγμα παρὰ ἑαυτῷ τὸ μέλλον γενήσεσθαι καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἤδη γινόμενον ἐθισμὸν τινα ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ βραχύ.

⁸⁵ Cf. E. fr. 818c *TrGF*. Cf. also the use of *προβάλλειν ἑαυτῷ* (Men. fr. 717.2 *PCG*, Epict. *Ench.* 33.12) and esp. *ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἑαυτῷ* (Pl. *Phdr.* 271e4) to denote presentation to oneself in the mind/imagination. The development of this technique is significant in that it employs a representationalist model of mind, and thus takes part in the beginning of a history of metaphysical thought in which mind objectifies reality through representation, making it into, in the words of Derrida (1973) 102, 'the being-before-oneself of knowledge in consciousness'. Cf. above n. 30 and esp. Heidegger (1977) 'The age of the world picture', 149–150: 'To represent means here: of oneself to set something before oneself and to make secure what has been set in place, as something set in place ... Representing is no longer the apprehending of that which presences ... That which is, is no longer that which presences; it is rather that which, in representing is first set over against, that which stands fixedly over against, which has the character of object ... Representing is making-stand-over-against, an objectifying that goes forward and masters. In this way representing drives everything together into the unity of that which is given the character of object.'

⁸⁶ Galen (*Plac. Hipp. et Pl.* 4.7.9 de Lacy) claims that the idea ultimately derives from Anaxagoras and that Euripides inherited it from him.

of θεωρία and akin to the practice of viewing oneself from a distance, is also a method for mediating suffering self-sufficiently. It attempts to resolve the problem presented by the ideology of self-sufficiency as it relates to suffering. If the individual cannot resolve his suffering by mediating with another, then he must find a way of doing so through mediation with himself.

Euripides also weighs in on certain ethical debates current at the time. Important among these is the sanction for virtue: why do good? Philosophies of self-interest were keen to formulate a rational response to this question. Virtues such as kindness to others become a means to the end of one's own happiness, and vices such as the craving to harm one's fellows are to be avoided because one may be harmed in turn. An impressive Euripidean fragment appears to offer a basis for virtue that contrasts with rational self-interest:

ἴτω τὸ δεινὸν () ὑπερφρονῶ
 ὁθιούνεκα' ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις μόνη
 οὐκ ἐκ θυραίων τὰπίχερα λαμβάνει,
 αὐτὴ δ' ἑαυτὴν ἄλλα τῶν πόνων ἔχει. (E. fr. 908c TrGF)

Let the dreadful come; I scorn it completely since of things among men virtue alone takes its reward not from what is outside it, but possesses *itself* as the prize of its labours.

Virtue should be valued in itself. In the view of rational self-interest, on the other hand, reward, or conversely punishment, comes precisely from something else. One wins good treatment from others, say, by treating them well oneself, or harm from others by harming them oneself. The last line of this fragment is a fine poetic expression of a justice which is to be sought for its own sake. It represents justice as self-sanctioning. Related ideas can be found in Democritus, for whom justice should not be sanctioned through the external forces of νόμος, ἀνάγκη, and φόβος, but rather through πειθώ, which leads one to an understanding of τὸ δέον and the internally sanctioned conviction that justice is to be practised in itself, independently of the compulsion exercised on one by other powers. The idea of self-justifying justice is also involved in the attempt to resolve the problem of sinning in private. Since it has itself as its own reward, one should pursue it even when public motivations—the avoidance of punishment, maintaining a good reputation, etc.—are removed.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ See especially Democr. B181, but also B41. Cf. Adeimantus' request for Socrates to avoid the trap of others—those οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς εὐδοκίμῃσεις (R.363a)—and give an account of the effects justice and injustice

Finally, as the ἀρχή of ethics, like other ontological foundations it must be reflexive to prevent an infinite regress.⁸⁸

The analysis of essential goods as to be pursued for their own sake is expanded in Aristotle, for whom the highest goods are distinguished by this property.⁸⁹ At the beginning of his *Metaphysics* he defines the knowledge sought by the present inquiry as having the least practical and utilitarian value—rather, it is sought purely on account of itself, and this fact is the very reason for its esteem and divinity. He compares the free and independent science with the free and independent man, both of which exist for the sake of themselves:

δηλον οὖν ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν χρεῖαν ἑτέραν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, φαμέν, ἐλευθερος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὄν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴν ὡς μόνην οὔσαν ἐλευθέραν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνῃ γὰρ αὕτη αὐτῆς ἕνεκέν ἐστιν. (Met. 982b24–28)

It is clear then that we do not seek it on account of another use, but just as we say a free man is one who exists for the sake of *himself* and not another, so too we call it the only free science, since this science alone exists for the sake of *itself*.

Aristotle's choice of comparison is another example of how a reflexive ideal, here that of individual freedom, and the individual himself who is so formed as αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, has infused the understanding of philosophical ἀρχαί so that they mirror his own reflexive nature. The loftiest entities are causally reflexive in a normative sense and constitute their own value. We see again that the political construction of the human being affects the nature of its philosophical categories.

Let us consider now one last fragment, quoted anonymously by Philo:

ἐγὼ δ' ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ κλύειν ἐπίσταμαι
ἄρχειν θ' ὁμοίως, τάρετ' ἰσταθμώμενος
τὰ πάντα (ad. 327 TrGF)

I know how to govern and listen to *myself* alike, measuring everything with the ruler of virtue.

produce αὐτὴ δι' αὐτὴν on their possessors, rather than an account of their reputations, since he claims that justice belongs to those things that should be possessed αὐτὰ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα (R. 367a–e). This request ultimately leads into Socrates' exposition of justice as the harmonisation of the tripartite soul.

⁸⁸ See further Ch. 4.6.

⁸⁹ In Plutarch's *Lives* (e.g. *Dem.* 13.5.3 Ziegler), the pursuit of the good for its own sake is a credit to its subject.

Striking here is the coordination of two verbs of opposing meaning, obeying and ruling, to govern the reflexive, which asks that we interpret it differently in each case. The speaker rules a lesser self, one presumably constituted by problematic desires, but listens to the soul as a higher self in pursuit of virtue. While reflexive constructions with ἀρχεῖν are common, the construction with κλύειν is unusual in that it invokes a true-self model.⁹⁰ Though it is impossible to locate this fragment with surety, I would argue that the reflexive could only easily take on this sense when ψυχή has been reinterpreted as the real person, so that the fragment belongs to the milieu of late 5th century Athens or after. The self which is being listened to is a source of prudent judgment, and therefore an intellectual principle; it is towards just such a principle that the philosophers are pushing the human essence.

3. Comedy

a. *Parody of Philosophical Reflexivity*

Now with comedy we get a handle on just how pervasive the category of pronominal reflexivity has become. It has percolated through the different registers, genres, and discourses, present alike in the upper echelons of philosophy and the vulgar colloquialism of comedy. There are signs too of mediation and contact between these realms. Comedy may borrow the reflexivity of philosophy for parody, as for example in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. Havelock has argued that the use of reflexives is a hallmark of Socrates' philosophical style, and was probably rather extraordinary at the time—perfect for a comic send up.⁹¹ Aristophanes

⁹⁰ 'To be true to oneself' would be a good rendering of κλύειν ἑαυτοῦ in idiomatic English.

⁹¹ Havelock (1972). It is worth noting in this regard that the subjective reflexivity of Plato's demiurge also seems to have attracted comedic treatment by later thinkers. Aëtius' doxography contains the following provocative lemma at 1.7.4 Diels: καὶ γὰρ Πλάτων ὁ μεγαλόφωνος εἰπὼν 'ὁ θεὸς ἔπλασε τὸν κόσμον πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὑπόδειγμα' ὅξει λήρου βεβηροῦ κατὰ γε τοὺς τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμωδίας ποιητὰς· πῶς γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀτενίζων ἔπλασεν; 'For when the grandiloquent Plato claims that 'god moulded the universe looking to *himself* as a model', he reeks, to use the language of the poets of old comedy, of senile nonsense. Since how did he mould while gazing intently at *himself*?' The competent craftsmen must naturally focus on the stuff to be moulded that is before him, and can scarcely afford to navel-gaze.

alludes to reflexive ideas such as shaping one's own character and being responsible to oneself for the direction of its development,⁹² as well as self-examination.⁹³

There are other signs of parody too. On first entering Socrates' thinking-shop, Strepsiades, like a prospective student encountering the menagerie of open day, is confronted by the strange scene of pupils with their heads fixed intently upon the ground. The disciple guiding him answers his question of what on earth they are doing thus:

Μα. οὔτοι δ' ἐρεβοδιφῶσιν ὑπὸ τὸν Τάρταρον.
 Στ. τί δῆθ' ὁ πρωκτὸς ἐς τὸν οὐρανὸν βλέπει;
 Μα. αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτόν ἀστρονομεῖν διδάσκεται. (Ar. Nu. 192–194)

STUDENT: These are plumbing the depths under Tartarus.

STREPSIADES: Why then does the arse look to heaven?

STUDENT: It is learning to study the stars *itself by itself*.

The arse learns αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτόν, which superficially means that it has gone its separate way from the rest of the body and become an independent intelligent being. But given the obvious philosophical context, the phrase αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτόν takes on a further connotation. For we have seen that such reflexive prepositional phrases characterise transcendent beings like Anaxagoras' Νοῦς, and are later used by Plato to mark the self-relation of the soul and the forms. Since Aristophanes antedates Plato, it is probable that Socrates himself used this vocabulary in a way that anticipated and influenced Plato's own usage. Furthermore, I would cautiously suggest that the similar characterisation of the star-gazing arse and the soul as it contemplates the forms αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν in Plato is possible evidence for the Socratic heritage of the latter. It would certainly deepen and improve the joke if such a theory is lurking in the subtext of these lines. If this is so it counts against the common view that the theory of the soul contemplating the forms is a Platonic idea fathered upon Socrates. At the very least, given the philosophical tradition of such terminology prior to Plato, the joke consists in the arse being treated like a reflexive philosophical ἀρχή.⁹⁴

⁹² Nu. 88: ἔκστρεψον ὡς τάχιστα τοὺς σαντοῦ τρόπους. Nu. 1454–1455: αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν σαντῶ σὺ τούτων αἴτιος | στρέψας σεαυτὸν εἰς πονηρὰ πράγματα.

⁹³ Nu. 695: ἐκφρόντισόν τι τῶν σεαυτοῦ πραγμάτων. Nu. 842: γνῶσει δὲ σαντὸν ὡς ἀμαθὴς εἶ καὶ παχὺς.

⁹⁴ For the pre-Platonic tradition of the reflexive terminology of forms, see below Ch. 7.1, and Thgn. 895–896 West, above pp. 78–80. Havelock (1972) 16 n. 48 suggests the possible parody of pronominal expressions for 'per se' in a note.

Further on in the *Clouds* we see Socrates attempt to disabuse Strepsiades of his rustic anthropomorphic conception of divinity by offering naturalistic explanations for ostensibly divine phenomena. He demystifies Zeus' thunderbolt:

ὅταν ἐς ταύτας ἄνεμος ξηρὸς μετεωρισθεὶς κατακλησθῇ,
 ἔνδοθεν αὐτὰς ὥσπερ κύστιν φυσῶ, κἄπειθ' ὑπ' ἀνάγκης
 ῥήξας αὐτὰς ἔξω φέρεται σοβαρὸς διὰ τὴν πυκνότητα,
 ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥοίβδου καὶ τῆς ῥύμης αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν κατακάων.

(Ar. Nu. 404–407)

Whenever a dry wind rises and is shut inside these clouds it inflates them from within like a bladder; it then by necessity bursts them open and escapes with violence on account of its density, igniting *itself* due to the rush and force of its movement.

The emphatic locution αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν is, as we have seen, the language of philosophy, and its placement here is most likely a transparent borrowing from the jargon of naturalism. Without gods as external causes, physical processes must take on a level of autopoiesis and cause themselves, and nature becomes φύσις αὐτοφυής. But the naturalistic physics of philosophers is a marginal discourse, and the attribution of reflexivity to the wind is likely to elicit a laugh for its absurdity. The words αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν almost seem to force an animacy on the wind that is misplaced; that a wind can act in this way, itself directing action towards itself like a conscious being, is risible.

b. Parody of the Reflexivity of Conscience

We also find in Aristophanes a wonderful adaptation of the reflexivity of conscience. The inveterate and litigious jurist Philocleon, who prides himself on always voting against the defendant, is mortified when he learns that he has been deceived by his son into placing his vote into the urn of acquittal. He is dismayed:

πῶς οὖν ἑμαυτῷ τοῦτ' ἐγὼ ξυνείσομαι,
 φεύγοντ' ἀπολύσας ἄνδρα;

(Vesp. 999–1000)

How then will I live with *myself* when I have acquitted a man who stands accused?

I have translated the Greek into an idiomatic English which preserves the reflexivity of the original, but more literally the question expresses Philocleon's dismay at the prospect of having such an acquittal on his conscience, his knowing-with-himself. Philocleon's ironical use of σύννοια plus the reflexive is intended to be humorous. Unlike conventional, or at

least officially sanctioned moral sentiment, his conscience is plagued not by the commission of an immoral act but by the failure to commit it. He has failed to live up to his own lofty standards of unbridled litigiousness and this gives him great scruple.

As suggested, comedy is a good measure of just how deeply a category has lodged itself into the public consciousness. For it is only through a familiarity with the detailed nuances of a category that these nuances can be manipulated to produce a comic effect, and this same familiarity is assumed by the comedian of his audience. Every joke is on some social scale an in-joke. The Athenian gets Philocleon's ironical use of σύννοια with the reflexive because he experiences in his day-to-day society the prevailing use of this term, whether it is spouted as part of an ingenuous profession of innocence, a self-righteous claim to moral purity, or the guilty expression of one sorely afflicted by the knowledge he has with himself of having committed an inglorious act. Thus the profanation of the orthodox use of the word reveals at the same time the central place the category it denotes has come to occupy. An idea, just as any public figure, knows that it has not truly made it until it has been satirised by society's comedians.

There are other suggestive signs of comedy's satire of reflexivity. Apollonius' treatise on pronouns, in a section discussing the impossibility of a nominative case of the reflexive, cites an exception from the Μέτοικοι of Plato Comicus, a contemporary of Aristophanes.⁹⁵ His use of the form ἐμαντός is attributed to comic licence (ὑπὸ κωμικῆς ἀδείας). Later on he mentions this exception again as likely fishing for a laugh (καὶ ἴσως ἔνεκα τοῦ γελοίου).⁹⁶ Unfortunately the relevant passage is not quoted, but the play's title, which means 'immigrants', hints that the form parodies the solecism of those for whom Greek is not the native tongue.⁹⁷ But one wonders still whether this one instance in Greek is not the tip of some greater iceberg.⁹⁸ If we take English as a guide and widen

⁹⁵ A.D. *Pron.* 69 Schn.

⁹⁶ A.D. *Pron.* 113 Schn. Schneider rejected the authenticity of the second mention since it disagrees with the first in attributing the play to Pherecrates and not Plato. Is it possible that there was a similar instance in the plays of Pherecrates and the two have been mixed up?

⁹⁷ So Meineke (1839) 1.70.175: *inquilinos induxit soloece loquentes*.

⁹⁸ Besides the reflexive pronoun, comedy also seems to have played with αὐτός, deriving both comparative and superlative forms: αὐτότερος αὐτῶν (Epich. fr. 5 PCG); αὐτότατος (Ar. *Pl.* 83). They appear to make fun of the ontological sense of the intensifier, and thus betray its fashionable use in contemporary society—particularly, one suspects, in philosophical circles.

our purview to the idiosyncratic and dialectal, it will be seen that jokey, playful use of the reflexive in the nominative is not limited to Greek.⁹⁹ Finally, as another sign of the reflexive subject's eventual materialisation as a popular category, we observe that two of Menander's plays even use reflexive constructions in their titles: ὁ ἑαυτὸν τιμωρούμενος ('The Self-Punisher') and ὁ αὐτὸν πενθῶν ('The Self-Mourner').¹⁰⁰

c. *Substitution of an Unexpected Reflexive in Playful Abuse*

I have argued that the pronoun turns into the reflexive pronoun by being emphatically marked with αὐτός for its unexpected coreference in prototypically other-directed scenarios. Now this makes reflexivisation a technique perfectly meet for comedy, since humour thrives on the unexpected. Reflexivisation can, in the right context, effectively turn an otherwise prosaic sentence into a sort of punchline. This is especially the case in idioms telling someone to get lost:

οὐκ ἀποδιώξει σαντὸν ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκίας;
φέρε μοι τὸ κέντρον. (Ar. Nu. 1296–1297)

Won't you chase *yourself* from my house? Bring me the goad!

As an OD verb ἀποδιώκω sets up an expectation that it will be someone else other than the subject that is being chased. But the sentence quickly counters this expectation and substitutes the reflexive instead. Contrasting objects, one coreferential and the other not, brings the playfulness even further to the fore:

ῶθει τὸν ὄνον καὶ σαντὸν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν. (Ar. Vesp. 196)

Shove the ass and *yourself* inside!

Such reflexive use of verbs of translational movement depicts a point of conscious volition moving its body about through space. Here the effect is doubtless meant to be humorous: one's self is treated as being shoved about like an ass, or chased away as one might chase away a flea-bitten dog. But such expressions also have another side. One individual has encountered another with the expectation of doing business with him or

⁹⁹ E.g. in *The Real Mother Goose* by Blanche Wright, a self-conscious parody of contemporary preoccupation with reflexivity in all its incarnations: 'As I walked by myself, | And talked to myself, | Myself said unto me: | "Look to thyself, | Take care of thyself, | For nobody cares for thee." | I answered myself, | And said to myself | In the selfsame repartee: | "Look to thyself, | Or not look to thyself, | The selfsame thing will be."'

¹⁰⁰ See Edmonds (1961) 3b.572, 602–606.

affecting him in some way—which may be represented schematically as events in which he as agent carries out some more or less transitive action that affects the other as patient—but that other has essentially told him, via telling him to get lost using a reflexive construction, that the only person he will be affecting as far as he is concerned is himself. In other words, these exchanges are motivated by the ethic *πρᾶσσε σαντόν/τὰ σαντοῦ*. Telling someone to haul himself away is a lively way of telling him to mind his own business and not impose on another person's agency and self. In addition, the model also applies the dualistic concept of person inherent in transitive reflexive structures of movement. In the hands of comedy the mind-body dualism of philosophy has become a person hauling herself about like a sack of potatoes.

Such a command can stop short of breaking off a relationship altogether and end instead in a cautionary defence of the boundary between one person and another. This may manifest itself as someone affecting coolness and asserting their independence and indifference to the claims of others on their person. This may again take the form of reflexivising an OD verb, as in this example from a fragment of Aristophanes:

τῶν ἔνδοθεν καὶ βύσμα καὶ γευστήριον
κᾶπειτα μισθοῦ σαντόν ἀμφορεαφορεῖν. (Ar. fr. 299.3)

(bring) a stopper and tasting-cup from the pantry and then hire *yourself* to carry water-pitchers.

The first clause is incomplete but obviously contains a command to bring out a stopper and tasting-cup from the storeroom; next the addressee is commanded to hire himself to carry the amphora. The verb *μισθοῦμαι* is naturally other-directed and its reflexivisation is unexpected and comical. 'Don't even think of getting someone else to carry the amphora for you,' says the speaker. The subtext is that he is an independent person and will not suffer being imposed upon. Through devices such as these comedy depicts the friction that arises when self-interested individuals rub up against one another and one tries to affect the other in some way. The primacy of *πρᾶσσε τὰ σαντοῦ* is asserted and he who tries to affect another is told to affect himself.¹⁰¹ As I argue further below, this dictum is an invisible cultural hand which guides the construction of the individual in the fifth century, but is seen operating here in a peculiarly comic way.

¹⁰¹ Cf. a similar comical substitution of a reflexive in the following unassigned fragment (ad. 664 Kock): *περίθες σεαυτῷ τὸν πνιγέα*. *Πνιγέα* is another word for muzzle (*ψιμός*), but instead of muzzling some kind of animal as expected the reflexive is thrown in.

d. *The Reflexive Snowclone*

The following Aristophanic expressions all involve a reflexive as object followed by a substantival clause, put in **bold**, that expands upon and explains the precise respect in which this reflexive is an object:

αὐτός τ' ἑμαυτὸν ὑπὸ Κλέωνος ἄπαθον
ἐπίσταμαι διὰ τὴν πέρυσσι κωμωδίαν. (Ach. 377–378)

I know *myself*, what I suffered at Cleon's hands as a result of last year's comedy.

γνώσει δὲ σαυτὸν ὥς ἀμαθὴς εἶ καὶ παχύς. (Nu. 842)

You will know *yourself*, how stupid and thick you are.

ἄγε δὴ, σὺ πότερον σαυτὸν ὅστις εἶ φράσεις,
ἢ τὰπὶ τούτοις δρῶ; (Pl. 56–57)

Come now, will you declare yourself, who you are, or am I to do “what comes next”?

Each of these phrases could do without the reflexive and reform as simple indirect questions without suffering excessive semantic haemorrhage. For example the first could be rephrased (disregarding metre) as αὐτός θ' ὑπὸ Κλέωνος ἄπαθον ἐπίσταμαι διὰ τὴν πέρυσσι κωμωδίαν and the second as γνώσει δὲ ὥς ἀμαθὴς εἶ καὶ παχύς. But they all insert a reflexive as the most immediate object to the main verb while the substantival clause becomes an exegetical clarification of what it is about oneself that is known or declared.

What is the semantic effect of turning otherwise prosaic indirect questions into explicit reflexive constructions? The first two examples reproduce the form of the Delphic dictum by promoting the self to a position of epistemic primacy, while the substantival clause is reduced to describing certain aspects or properties of this self.¹⁰² The intrusion of the reflexive is decidedly emphatic, which is particularly clear from the first example since it adds αὐτός in the familiar collocation.

Such expressions appear to be tailored versions of a common snowclone—that is, they are context-specific applications of a clausal shell outlining a fashionable expression (the Delphic dictum, or more generally a reflexivised verb of knowing/inquiring) that the author may customise by substituting the required substantival clause or circumstantial

¹⁰² Cf. Gantar (1966) 152: ‘Γνωθὶ σαυτὸν ist wohl ein uralter Archetypus, nach dessen Vorbild andere Reflexivformeln geprägt worden sind.’

participial phrase. Another way of putting this would be to say that the author applies an emphatic object-raising, whereby the subject of the secondary verb in the substantival clause is pulled out to become an object of the main clause's verb in order to evoke the Delphic dictum and make the action a case of explicit transitive reflexivity.¹⁰³ The popularity of this pattern is further evidence for this structure's seduction, and the reflexivity it supports, of the Greek mind.

e. The Comic Version of Tragic Reflexivity

The comic version of tragic reflexivity is when self-interest backfires, when what you think is in your best interest turns out through an ironical twist to in fact damage those interests. Here are two pithy expressions of the notion from anonymous comic fragments:

ἐν τοῖς ἐμαυτοῦ δίκτυοις ἀλώσομαι. (ad. 560 Kock)

I will be caught in *my very own* net.

τὴν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ γὰρ θύραν κρούει λίθῳ. (ad. 564 Kock)

For it's *his very own* door he strikes with a stone.

The comic differs from the tragic version in that tragedy reverses a search for truth, comedy a search for self-interest, each portraying the individual's quest according to its conventions.¹⁰⁴ But the general template is the same: an action intended to land on another unexpectedly lands on oneself. You are yourself caught in the very net you cast to catch another, and in breaking and entering another's house you have in fact broken into your own.¹⁰⁵ Such expressions emerge from a melting-pot of influences, one of which is the need for a rationalist ethics à la Antiphon demonstrating that harming others is wrong because it does not in the end advance one's interests, even if it might at first appear to do so. The first extant analysis of evil directed towards another as evil directed towards oneself is found in Hesiod's *Works and Days*:

¹⁰³ The snowclone becomes particularly common in the gnomic tradition, eg. Men. *Mon.* 571 Edmonds: ἔλεγε σαντὸν ὅστις εἰ πρῶτων κακῶς.

¹⁰⁴ Macarius glosses the first fragment ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων πανουργιῶν ἀλισκομένων, the second ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα πλημμελούντων. Note that τὰ οἰκεῖα is a synonym for τὰ ἑαυτοῦ. Kock compares Aeschylus (fr. 139 *TrGF*) for the first: τάδ' οὐχ' ὑπ' ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ τοῖς αὐτῶν πτεροῖς ἀλισκόμεσθα.

¹⁰⁵ Without context the second fragment is admittedly enigmatic, yet it does seem to use the image of a robbery.

οἷ γ' αὐτῷ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλω κακὰ τεύχων,
ἧ δὲ κακῇ βουλῇ τῷ βουλευσάντι κακίστη. (Hes. *Op.* 265–266)

A man makes trouble for *himself* by making it for another, and an evil plot is worst to he who planned it.

It is worthwhile remembering that Hesiod is writing at the time of the formation of the city-states due to land shortages and must therefore formulate his ethic in the prevailing terms of the day. These are times when self-interest is hotly competed and Hesiod must attempt to deconstruct this paradigm from the inside—that is, he must show that by the selfish person's very own guiding principle, that one should not seek τὰ κακὰ οἷ αὐτῷ, the apparent self-interest in plotting against others fails. The need is acute since on balance the mode of city life is, as we have discussed, *πρᾶξις τῶν ἑαυτοῦ*, and any system of ethics within this context must be adapted to this foundation. One can build this foundation into a non-rationalist construction (or at least a construction that purports to be non-rationalist), but it involves a reinterpretation of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ in the manner of Plato. Comedy too is caught within this category of reflexivity, and thus expresses the folly of roguish self-interest by having it rebound on that very same self.

f. Comic Reflexivisation of the Sailing Metaphor

We saw in the previous section how tragedy had reflexivised the popular sailing metaphor. This trope is not lost on comedy either, but we find it twice in Aristophanes' *Knights*:¹⁰⁶

νῦν δὴ σε πάντα δεῖ κάλων ἐξιέναι σεαυτοῦ (Ar. *Eq.* 756)

Right now you must let out every sail rope *of yourself*.

ἐγὼ δὲ συστείλας γε τοὺς ἀλλᾶντας εἴτ' ἀφήσω
κατὰ κῦμ' ἐμαυτὸν οὖρον, κλάειν σε μακρὰ κελεύσας.

(Ar. *Eq.* 432–433)

But I'll pack up my sausages and then let *myself* run with a fair swell after telling you to go cry about it.

As in the instance from tragedy, the reflexive has in both these cases replaced a word for 'ship' or some part of the ship, for example the sail(s). The first instance is particularly evocative. The reflexive is a

¹⁰⁶ Cf. also an especially vivid use of the image in Menander (fr. 64.5–7 PCG): νῦν ἀληθινὸν | εἰς πέλαγος ἐμβαλεῖς σεαυτὸν γὰρ πραγμάτων.

partitive genitive and replaces ship (νεώς) or sails (ἱστίων, or more technically, since the κάλως are attached thereto, ποδῶν). The partitive genitive is unusual due to its heavy substantival nature. It tends towards nominalisation of the self, and especially so in this context where the reflexive stands in for a fully referential noun.¹⁰⁷ The image requires that you imagine yourself as a ship complete with sail-ropes and that you are sailing this ship of self.

Certain nouns, when possessed, bring forth a more categorical sense of the reflexive than others. One's house is possessed in a different way to one's nature or character; the former through an external alienable relation and the latter through an internal inalienable one. In the latter case the genitive is close to the sense of the partitive, since a whole-part relation is also typically an internal one. The *Clouds* has numerous examples of this use of the possessive reflexive, which seem to play with the popular philosophical idea of a mouldable character. Here's one:

ἄγε δὴ κάτειπέ μοι σὺ τὸν σαντοῦ τρόπον,
 ἵν' αὐτὸν εἰδὼς ὅστις ἐστὶ μηχανάς
 ἦδη 'πὶ τούτοις πρὸς σὲ καινὰς προσφέρω.¹⁰⁸ (Nu. 478–480)

Come now and tell me fully *your own* character, so that knowing what sort it is I may then bring novel siege-engines to bear on you in light of these facts.

Here the addressee is urged to consider what constitutes himself. The *possessum* is a constitution that is possessed essentially. The reflexive possessive (σαντοῦ) seems quite attracted to this sort of possession. In the chapter on Lyric we found νοῦς and φρήν possessed by the complex reflexive even though extant instances of its possessive use in this period are very rare. At this early stage of the reflexive's grammaticalisation the αὐτός element without a doubt retained its emphatic force; one can imagine a lexical choice between the weaker possessive adjective and the genitive of the emphatic reflexive pronoun according to semantic needs. The latter effectively replaces the emphatic combination of possessive adjective plus genitive of αὐτός common in Homer. The choice of the reflexive pronoun in these situations means that it involves itself in internal possessive relations, and that things essential to the human such as νοῦς, φρήν, φύσις become members of it as a reflexive possessor and the internal space it denotes.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. other partitive genitives at Ar. *Lys.* 115–116, 131–132.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. reflexive possession of φύσις at v. 960.

4. *Conclusions*

Tragedy delves into the negative implications of an emerging self, whether it be an individual who suffers for herself alone, the tension of individual self-determination with the sovereignty of the state, or the dangerous siren song of self-knowledge. It shows the self's reflexivity metamorphosing into various degenerate forms: self-destruction, incest, and the murder of kin. One sees that tragedy reverses the logic of self-affirmation that Horkheimer and Adorno find represented in Odysseus as the prototype of the bourgeois or 'enlightened' individual. While Odysseus, equipped with the technology of *ratio*, 'loses himself in order to find himself',¹⁰⁹ Oedipus finds himself in order to lose himself, his moment of enlightened self-knowledge degenerating into self-destruction. More generally, the tragic performance of self-destruction illustrates with concision Horkheimer and Adorno's dialectic of enlightenment, insofar as it presents a newly differentiated self collapsing, almost inexorably, back into the myths from which it struggled to disentangle itself and a nature whose riddles it had apparently solved. Society has a hard time coming to grips with the new sense of autonomy (personified in characters like Antigone) it itself has made possible. As a form of ritualised self-sacrifice, tragedy tries to incorporate the legacy of myth into civilisation: 'But the level of mythology at which the self appears as a sacrifice to itself is an expression not so much of the original conception of popular religion, but of the inclusion of myth in civilisation.'¹¹⁰ Tragedy is civilisation sacrificing itself to myth, a sacrifice of man as the αὐτόχειρ and αὐθέντης who claims for himself his own agency. The newly born self that girds Greece's democratic institutions quickly moves to undo itself and find existential comfort in reabsorption into a mythic age.

A number of theatrical techniques reinforce the thematic concern with reflexivity. The aesthetic mode of theatre itself, θεωρία, retools the transitive reflexive scheme by presenting the actors as objectified forms of the audience's selves or souls, and this relation is reiterated in certain characters who address or see themselves from a distance. Theatre therefore promotes a reflexive attitude to social roles that we also saw in Antiphon's thought, in that their performance is reconstituted as 'for the self' and submitted to this theoretic self for evaluation. The technique of self-address signifies a being left by society (often dangerously so) to

¹⁰⁹ Horkheimer and Adorno (1947) 47–49.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 54.

involve with itself and narrate its experiences and thoughts privately. It is often a further expression of the shadow of autonomy: as one is left to one's own interests (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ), so is one left to one's own suffering.

Polyptoton of αὐτός is particularly popular in tragedy. The development of this rhetorical device indicates a new interest in emphatic forms of reflexivity generally and the unexpected reflexivisation of OD structures. It is one linguistic sign of a human subject coming to be defined by self-relation.

Comedy too cashes in on unexpected reflexivity, which demonstrates inventive use of the PRS across a wide range of discourses. In particular, Aristophanes' *Clouds* shows the reflexivity of philosophy pollinating comic discourse. Since it is usually the case that comedy parodies popular concepts, its parody of reflexivity is a test of reflexivity's emerging cultural currency.

CHAPTER SEVEN

PLATO

1. *Preliminaries*

Of all the writers considered in the period of this study, Plato's use of reflexivity is the most substantial. This is not just a by-product of the fact that more of his work than others' has survived. Many of his reflexive ideas, if not outright innovations, elaborate, intensify and further internalise notions adumbrated by earlier thinkers.¹ He reinterprets the reflexive's sense in traditional expressions as soul: τὰ ἑαυτοῦ now refers to the interior constituents and functions of ψυχή, and the Delphic dictum's γνῶθι σαυτὸν commands one to know his own soul rather than his social position in a relational hierarchy.

Plato also appears to have invented one of the most intellectually important categories of fundamental ontology, the idea of the 'thing-in-itself', which he typically denotes with the intensified reflexive phrase αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό or the intensifier alone. His intimate reflexive characterisation of ψυχή is another landmark in the history of ideas and sets into motion the long tradition of thought which holds that the activity of the human being's essence is properly reflexive and that a person's first ethical duty is care of self as soul, ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ.

In this chapter I continue the argument that the diachronic development of reflexivity provides an interpretative spine to Greek intellectual history and, as with other thinkers, is particularly useful for understanding Plato's place within this tradition. Above all, his extension of the semantic range of the reflexive system and his broadening of its application confirm the further development and ever deepening role of reflexivity in Greek thought and practice. The erasure of external participants in other-directed dialogical relations, and their substitution by instances of the self through reflexivisation, lay bare a process of subjectivation that transposes the orientation of Greek ideas of personhood towards the subjective.

¹ See especially Gantar (1980).

2. *The Being of the In-Itself*

a. *The Genealogy of the In-Itself*

Inquiry into the intellectual pedigree of Plato's forms can amount to little more than conjecture. But it is at least a conservative surmise to identify its historical matrix as the one-many problem. Broadly put, this concerns the question of whether reality is fundamentally a plurality or unity, and how it is that a diverse set of objects, whether real or imagined, can be classed together as variations or instantiations of a single substance or idea, and thus counted as one. There is no doubt that early philosophy, especially the so-called Ionian succession, developed a material response to this question, but this does not assist us in isolating the provenance of a cognitive or ideal approach. I have tentatively suggested that Parmenides' relation of being and thinking, and his emphasis on the logical unity of being, points to the possibility of a conceptual solution. The jump from material to conceptual unity may have been made under these auspices.

Later philosophy, heavily influenced by Platonism, fathered a conceptual solution upon Pythagoras whose value will vary with one's historiographical commitments. The doxographer Aëtius, for instance, outlines the Pythagorean equation of the monad with the intellect:

νοῦς μὲν οὖν ἡ μονάς ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κατὰ μονάδα θεωρεῖται, οἷον πολλῶν ὄντων ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ μέρους εἰσὶν ἀναίσθητοι ἀπερίληπτοι καὶ ἄπειροι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀνθρώπον ἕνα μόνον νοοῦμεν, ὃ οὐδεὶς ἔτυχεν ὁμοιος· καὶ ἵππον ἕνα μόνον νοοῦμεν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ μέρους εἰσὶν ἄπειροι.² (Aëtius 1.3.8 Diels)

The intellect is the monad, since the concept is conceived in the singular. For example, when the many human beings are taken individually, they escape perception, indefinite and infinite in number. But we have a concept of this very thing, one human being alone, who no one is like. And we have a concept of one horse alone, but these taken individually are infinite.

In other words, the Pythagorean monad is here doing the work of the unifying concept, which is also numerically one. It is impossible to peel back the layers of Platonizing and revisionism to discover the true Pythagorean doctrine current in the fifth century. More reliable evidence is perhaps to be found in certain philological traces. In our survey of the

² For the translation of νοῦς as 'concept' in the second clause, which makes Usener's emendation of θεωρεῖται to θεωρεῖ redundant, see Diels (1879) 852 ad loc. I have followed his German for this clause closely.

Presocratics we noted pre-Platonic sources for this reflexive vocabulary, especially in Parmenides' notion of Being and Anaxagoras' conception of Mind.³ Such influences cast their shadow, for instance, over the self-relating soul—an idea which seems to transfer the properties of the cosmic ἀρχή to the human ἀρχή⁴—and presentation of the beautiful as it is given in the *Symposium*:

αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μεθ' αὐτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν
(211b1)
itself by itself, with itself, uniform, forever existing.

Though the forms certainly retain many of the features of Presocratic ἀρχαί, they greatly expand reflexivity's field of operation. The Platonic development is to make the property of being αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό applicable to a wide range of entities (while at the same time seeking to avoid, it would seem, the embarrassing possibility that there might be forms for things as mundane as hair and mud⁵) so that the very question of what a thing is essentially invokes the category of the thing-in-itself. This is because what a thing is essentially is what it is when one strips away the peripheral properties that appear when it is instantiated in the phenomenal world or interacts with other entities. If it is to satisfy the law of identity, real justice and the real soul can only be what justice and the soul are when identical with themselves. On this view the essence of a thing is what is given to it by virtue of being itself, and which cannot be subtracted without it ceasing to be what it is. The notions of essence and the thing-in-itself thus take form as a conceptual couple, each implying the other. They promote the intellectual abstraction which singles something out as an object of thought and reflective attention, setting this object apart by itself, and spring from a conviction, which is supported by the regime of an identitarian logic, that self-identical entities lie behind the phenomenal flux of everyday existence.

³ For the influence of Anaxagoras, see Kutash (1993).

⁴ The philosophising soul is αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν, which ideally should not mix with the body and its affect, and picks up Anaxagoras' conception of the cosmological Νοῦς as αὐτὸς ἑφ' ἑωυτοῦ, which alone does not mix with the other elements. An interesting question, which unfortunately can advance no further than speculation, is whether thinkers like Anaxagoras and Parmenides ever theorised the ψυχή or νοῦς of humans in the same way as they did their fundamental cosmological or ontological categories. Was Plato the first to transfer these properties to the ideal human and her essence, as a result of lengthy meditation on the constitution of the soul, while the others were preoccupied rather with the physics and constitution of the macrocosm?

⁵ *Prm.* 130d.

It is just possible that the analytic usage of the vocabulary of forms, to distinguish between an abstract universal and things which exemplify it, also has pre-Platonic origins, if a fragment ascribed by Diogenes Laertius⁶ via Alcimus to Epicharmus is authentic:

οὐκ οὖν δοκεῖς | οὕτως ἔχειν (κα) καὶ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ; τὸ μὲν | ἀγαθὸν
τι προῖμι εἶμεν καθ' αὐτὸ, ὅστις δέ κα | εἰδῇ μαθὼν τῇν, ἀγαθὸς ἤδη
γίνεται (fr. 277 PCG)

Don't you then think that this could be true of the good too? That the good is a certain thing *in itself*, while whoever has learnt and knows it becomes now good.

The editors are understandably suspicious of the Platonic language, noting that 'one couldn't easily believe either τὸ ἀγαθὸν or καθ' αὐτό belong to Epicharmus.' Perhaps, however, the question should not be closed entirely. We have seen the philosophical use of reflexive prepositional phrases prior to Plato, and his apparent originality may simply be the false impression of the patchy historical record of pre-Platonic philosophy.

For the use of the simple intensifier to mark essential existence, a possible antecedent is found in Empedocles:

αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι' ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα
γίνεται ἀλλοιωπά· τόσον διὰ κρήσις ἀμείβει. (B21.13–14 DK)

For these exist *themselves*, and coursing through each other take on different shapes; so great is the change which compounding causes.

Empedocles is referring to the cosmic 'roots' or elements which retain their identity despite diverse compounding.⁷ Compounds exist only in a shallow sense and perish as contingently as they arise, but the existence of the roots is self-identical and cannot be subtracted. Translators follow LSJ in giving αὐτά the sense of 'alone'—'these and no others exist'⁸—yet the exact meaning is murky, though surely predicative given the word order. It seems here to pass into notions of self-subsistence, or to outline that mode of existence in which the elements, in being 'by themselves', are, like Anaxagoras' Mind, ontologically distinct from other entities. The former possibility is supported by an almost identical construction in another fragment, where Empedocles is speaking of

⁶ D.L. 3.12.

⁷ The first line also appears in fragment B17.34–35, but with ἀλλά for γὰρ and transposed accordingly.

⁸ LSJ s.v. αὐτός I 3.

certain desirable objects of philosophical contemplation which have a deep effect on the thinker's self:

αὐτὰ γὰρ αὖξει | ταῦτ' εἰς ἑθὺς ἕκαστον, ὅπῃ φύσις ἐστὶν ἐκάστωι.
(B110.4–5 DK)

For these grow *by themselves* [i.e. of their own accord] into each inner character, where each man's nature is.

The only difference in the relevant phrase is the verb, and in this instance αὐτὰ clearly modifies the action to denote a growth which happens by itself. Since the syntactic model for both instances is identical, we would guess that αὐτὰ too is functionally equivalent in both cases. The activity in B21 is existing, so modification by αὐτὰ on this model naturally produces the idea of self-existence, an existence which is dependent on no other. The elements, Empedocles may well be saying, are not simply the only things which exist. Rather, their existence is of a different kind. They are self-subsisting.

Fundamentally, the function of the determination αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό cleaves the whole of being in two—underlying, objective reality splitting to one side and phenomenal appearance to the other, and the original moment of this disjunction framed philosophical thought in a way so basic that without it philosophy is scarcely possible. In ancient as well as modern philosophy, thinkers stake out their position by either maintaining or collapsing this distinction in a variety of ways.⁹ In Plato the scheme's general blueprint is more or less clear: the underlying reality is intelligible to reason inspired by philosophical *eros*, and is inhabited by the forms as things-in-themselves; phenomenal reality is sensible, appearing to both the bodily senses and *doxa*, and inhabited by phenomena and perceptions which exist solely *πρὸς ἄλλα* ('in relation to others' rather than to themselves) and whose true natures are withdrawn and remain veiled. The question of the existence of this intelligible realm is succinctly put in the *Timaeus*:

λόγῳ δὲ δὴ μᾶλλον τὸ τοιόνδε διοριζομένους περὶ αὐτῶν διασκεπτέον:
ἄρα ἐστὶν τι πῦρ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ πάντα περὶ ὧν αἰεὶ λέγομεν οὕτως
αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά ὄντα ἕκαστα, ἢ ταῦτα ἅπερ καὶ βλέπομεν, ὅσα τε ἄλλα
διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα, μόνα ἐστὶν τοιαύτην ἔχοντα ἀλήθειαν,
ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ μάτην ἐκάστοτε
εἶναι τί φαμεν εἶδος ἐκάστου νοητόν, τὸ δ' οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἦν πλὴν λόγος;
(Pl. *Ti.* 51b6–c5)

⁹ Confer, for example, Nietzsche's attack on the Kantian thing-in-itself, for which see Houlgate (1993).

But in pressing our inquiry about them, there is a question that must rather be determined by argument. Is there such a thing as ‘Fire just *in itself*’ or any of the other things which we are always describing in such terms, as things that ‘are just *in themselves*’? Or are the things we see or otherwise perceive by the bodily senses the only things that have such reality, and has nothing else, over and above these, any sort of being at all? Are we talking idly whenever we say that there is such a thing as an intelligible Form of anything? Is this nothing more than a word?¹⁰

It is decided that there are two orders of reality, and that the things-in-themselves do exist, on the grounds of a primary distinction between the intellectual mind and true opinion (νοῦς and δόξα ἀληθής¹¹). It is remarkable that the ontological differentiation is made to rest on this epistemological distinction between two different agents or kinds of knowledge. This asserts again the special relationship between the thing-in-itself and νοῦς, but more broadly between philosophy and the thing-in-itself. For it is difficult to imagine that philosophy would have anything left to say if it were concluded that things are absolutely just as they appear to us, and that one could only be superficially but not deeply mistaken about what is. And what would be left of the philosophical λόγος if talk of forms is, as Timaeus ironically fears, nothing except λόγος (τὸ δ’ οὐδὲν ἄρ’ ἦν πλὴν λόγος)—in other words, if the grand sense of the former λόγος inevitably depletes itself so as to become the empty talk of the latter? Philosophy is sustained by this tension between taking language seriously on the hand and demeaning it on the other. The hypothesis of forms is one way of resisting λόγος as mere talk swamping λόγος as reason.

b. *The Dialectical Interdependence of Protagorean Relativism and Platonic Absolutism*

In Chapter 3 I suggested that Pindar’s χορὴ δὲ κατ’ αὐτὸν αἰεὶ παντὸς ὄρεᾶν μέτρον (*P.* 2.34) would, in a different context, be close to an expression of Protagorean relativism.¹² One might couch the idea in Greek as follows:

¹⁰ Trans. Cornford (1935).

¹¹ *Ti.* 51d–e.

¹² As almost no *ipsa verba* of Protagoras survive, we see him through the prism of others, and especially Plato in the *Theaetetus* and *Protagoras*. Plato’s fidelity to Protagoras’ ideas is a matter of debate, see Maguire (1973), (1977). Whether or not Protagoras held to the subjectivist relativism proposed here is not really relevant to us. For an overview of the different historical and contemporary interpretations of ‘man is the measure of all

ἕκαστος δὲ καθ' αὐτὸν αἰεὶ παντὸς ὁρᾷ μέτρον.

“Each individual always sees the measure of everything according to himself.”

Platonic absolutism makes similar use of a reflexive with the preposition, but here it is the object rather than the subject that is in relation to itself. Indeed the objective and subjective extremes of an epistemological continuum—the extreme at which the object maximally determines a subject’s measurement or perception and we say the subject perceives objectively, and the other extreme at which a subject maximally determines its own measurements and we say it perceives subjectively—are well suited to conceptualisation in terms of reflexivity. The former may be expressed as knowledge of the object αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, i.e. as it relates to and is in itself independent of all else; the latter, if I am the subject, as knowledge of it κατ' ἐμαυτόν, i.e. as it is only in relation to and in terms of me as the measuring subject. Here’s the contrast in Greek:

νοῶ τι αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτό. (Platonism)

“I conceive something itself in relation to itself.”

νοῶ τι αὐτὸς κατ' ἐμαυτόν. (Protagorean relativism)

“I conceive something myself in relation to myself.”

In each case the reflexive prepositional phrase effectively gives the power to determine how a thing appears to the reflexive’s antecedent. For example, if I am a dog and contemplate the divine κατ' ἐμαυτόν, then it will likely appear like a dog. But if I am a dog and contemplate the divine καθ' ἑαυτό, then it will show itself to me on its own terms and as it is, regardless of whether I am a dog or anything else. Both these positions thus rely on a category of reflexivity, and this is why Platonic absolutism, perceiving objectively, and Protagorean relativism, perceiving subjectively, come into being as a natural antithesis: they are two different applications of the same category of reflexivity. Thus reflexives are also a valuable tool for setting out a relativistic position:¹³

things, see Glidden (1975). If Protagoras himself did not espouse the views presented by Plato, then it is likely that someone in his intellectual milieu did. What is relevant is that both sides of the subjectivist-objectivist antithesis, which we see taking shape here and which is seminal in the history of philosophy, are well-suited to expression in reflexive terms.

¹³ There is the same bilateral reliance on reflexivity in Sartre’s (1943) ontology, since both poles of being—i.e. both being-in-itself and being-for-itself—include the reflexive pronoun in their definition.

εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐκάστω ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὃ ἂν δι' αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἕτερος τὴν ἑτέρου ὁρθὴν ἢ ψευδῆς, ἀλλ' ὁ πολλάκις εἴρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὁρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δὴ ποτε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος ἀξιοῦσθαι δικαίως μετὰ μεγάλων μισθῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἢν παρ' ἐκείνων, μέτρῳ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἐκάστω τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας;

(Tht. 161d3–e3)

For if it will be true to each whatever each opines through perception, and if neither someone else will discriminate the experience of someone else better nor will another be more competent to examine the opinion of an other whether it's correct or false, but as it has been said many times, each one alone *by himself* will opine *his own* things, and all these (are) correct and true, however can it be, comrade, that Protagoras (is) wise, so as actually to claim for himself that he justly deserves to be the teacher—with great wages—of everyone else, and we (are) more foolish and have to frequent his school, since each of us is the measure *for himself* of *his own* wisdom?¹⁴

The apposite points here are that each man alone forms his own opinions himself and is himself the measure of his own wisdom. The standard of truth, it is clear to see, has become the αὐτός of an isolated subject: a person has the criterion of things ἐν αὐτῷ, 'in himself'.¹⁵ This αὐτός claims special ownership over its judgements which it has emphatically appropriated (τὰ αὐτοῦ). It is of interest how extreme statements of subjectivism often treat the subject in ways otherwise associated with a divine creator of the universe. The solitary subject (αὐτὸς ἕκαστος μόνος) stands in the same privileged relation of originary selfhood to his subjective world as the creator stands in relation to the cosmos. The divine craftsmen is the measure of the cosmos, which is in effect *his* world and modelled after himself. Free of envy, 'he wanted everything as much as possible to be like himself'.¹⁶ One should understand this homology of the divine subject and the relativised human subject as the outcome of a generalised operation which roots the process of world-creation in the αὐτός. The metaphysical structure of each world is erected on a similar basis.

Now we should not forget that Socrates is never completely sold on the existence of abstract ideas as things-in-themselves, especially following the devastating criticisms raised by Parmenides in Plato's dialogue.

¹⁴ Trans. Benardete (1984).

¹⁵ Tht. 178b5–6.

¹⁶ Ti. 29e2.

As the protagonist demonstrates, if these ideas exist only in relation to themselves and not in relation to their likenesses among the world of mortals, then it would be impossible for us to know anything about them, since knowledge presupposes a self-other relation.¹⁷ The formal world would have nothing to do with us, nor us with it, each constituting a mutually exclusive dimension. On the other hand, if one does not allow the existence of ideas that remain the same for each of the things that are—irrespective of whether we view them as artefacts of the mind or, like Plato, as transcendently existent entities—one destroys the possibility of discussion, and even endangers philosophy itself.¹⁸ If the word ‘just’ meant something completely different from one moment to the next, without anything to fix its reference from subject to subject, context to context, and any other *πρός τι* one cared to add; if the coherence between one instance of the just and another were no greater than that between an instance of the just and anything else one may happen to choose—in that case it would be useless as a sign, and dialectic little more than a charade of communication between participants who in fact were not communicating at all but instead merely throwing words at each other that happened to have the same sound. The ideas make reality stand still long enough for us to meaningfully discuss it.

A solution to the problem of relating to entities which only relate to themselves may be reconstructed from a passage in the *Phaedo*, where Socrates describes a kind of mystical reflection in which the thinker himself mirrors this property of self-relation and withdraws into the abstract:

*αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν [τὴν ψυχὴν] συλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι [ἢ φιλοσοφία] παρακλεουσμένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἄλλ' ἢ αὐτὴν αὐτῇ, ὅτι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων.*¹⁹
(*Phd.* 83a7–b2)

¹⁷ *Prm.* 134d–135c. See Scolnicov (2003) 68 ff. for an excellent analysis of the dilemmas of the split-world ontology. Cf. Socrates' argument at *Tht.* 201e–202c that things-in-themselves, when conceived as elements, can only be named and cannot be rationally analysed. If something is alone by itself, *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*, then one can add no additional qualification to it beyond the mere act of naming it. Therefore, since a rational analysis consists in giving an account of how parts relate to one another to create a whole, things-in-themselves cannot be rationally known. This reminds us of Kant's claim that the naming of 'I' is a purely transcendental designation that does not note in it any quality whatsoever, and is not an object of knowledge. Both share the notion that what is purely reflexive is somehow beyond determination.

¹⁸ *Prm.* 135c.

¹⁹ Cf. *Phd.* 80e5.

... philosophy encouraging the soul to collect and gather *itself to itself*, and trust nothing other than *itself* and whatever entity, *itself in relation to itself*, it thinks *itself in relation to itself*.

The soul becomes like a form among other forms, and as such may interact with beings of its own nature.²⁰ There is an intriguing structural correlation here between the thinking soul as that which should relate only with itself and shun any association with the body and the senses, and the objects of its thought as things which similarly relate only to themselves as things-in-themselves.²¹ A self-relating subject thinks self-relating entities. As I proposed earlier, ‘subject and object are inherently mediated so that an “epistemological” shift in the subject’s point of view always reflects an ontological shift in the object itself.’ The inscription of the reflexivity of the subject in the object produces the reflexive object as the thing-in-itself.²² Self-relation is therefore a considerable factor influencing the communicative synergy of Platonic intellection, together with its epistemology and ontology. What Plato says of entities in themselves, “relating in themselves to their own being precisely as they are by nature”,²³ may also, to an extent, be said of the Platonic subject, and of the person more sharply individuated by the socio-economic developments in Greek society and abstracted from some of his other-directed relations: he is as he is by himself and in relation to his own essence.

The link is also clear in the antithesis of Platonic absolutism:

²⁰ It is unclear whether the soul *is* a form or merely *like* a form. The claim that it is a form is controversial and the problem is not fully solved if it is just a likeness. Nevertheless, the application of the phrase *αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό* to both the subject and objects of intellection makes it clear that this particular mode of being is understood by Plato to mediate their interaction—especially on the side of soul, which grasps the forms only by gathering to itself and becoming *αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό* just like a form.

²¹ For the nexus of reflexive thought and being *καθ’ αὐτό*, cf. Men. fr. 333 PCG: ἐρῶν τι βούλευσαι κατὰ *σαυτὸν* γενόμενος | τὸ συμφέρον γὰρ οὐχ ὁράται τῷ βῶν, | ἐν τῷ πρὸς *αὐτόν* δ’ ἀναλογισμῷ φαίνεται “If you want to say something deliberate when you’re *by yourself*; for what’s advantageous isn’t grasped by shouting but appears in *self-reflection*”. The solitary thinker is of course a common motif.

²² Conversely, one infers that an other-related soul, a soul that relates intimately with the body and the senses, would think other-related objects, objects that are what they are only by linking up with other objects in fluctuating, perennially transforming relationships. This is precisely what we find in contemporary thought’s turn to the body, which implicates a similar turn towards ontological systems that favour relativistic, other-related beings.

²³ Pl. *Cra.* 386e3–4: *καθ’ αὐτὰ* πρὸς τὴν *αὐτῶν* οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ἥπερ πέφυκεν.

ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἅρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὅτι οὖν; ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς,
ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι οὐδὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτόν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτόν
σεαυτῷ ἔχειν; (Tht. 154a6–8)

Does anything at all appear similar to a different human being and you?
Do you have (know) this strongly, or is it much more the case that not even
for you *yourself* (is there) the same thing, on account of the fact that you
yourself are never in a condition similar to *yourself*?²⁴

The relativism that Socrates tables here and develops magnificently in the rest of the dialogue goes further than simply admitting the possibility of the same thing appearing different to different people; it suggests that nothing even appears the same to oneself, since one is never in an identical state to oneself. Indeed a person is not one but many, and this multiplicity becomes infinite if the process of differential becoming never ceases because stable being is impossible.²⁵

The variability of the subject is especially significant if a change in the state of the perceiver effects a change in what is perceived. This is one reason why self-identity in the subject is so important for Platonic thought: without it, one can never be guaranteed of thinking objectively, of 'having the same thoughts about the same objects' and coming into contact with the forms behind the likenesses. Platonic epistemology, ontology, and ethics, form a complete organism. For given the above relation between perceiver and perceived, the search for objectivity requires the subject to strive to attain self-identity within himself if he is to find it in what he comprehends. Socrates' practice of death is one method, which works towards self-identity by withdrawing soul from its relation with others and having it gather entirely to itself. Another is the very process of dialectical argument; one seeks a λόγος that is not self-contradictory and enables one to agree with oneself.

The αὐτός is split between the self-identification which produces the thing-in-itself and the self-differentiation which produces the endlessly fracturing subject of relativism. The split may be seen to spring from the structural ambiguity of the intensive pronoun's identity function. As we have discussed, the intensifier attempts to map or bind a referent to another instance of itself. But as Hegel and others since have pointed out, any assertion of identity is trivial and empty if it does not equate beings which are in some sense distinct. So, paradoxically, an identity relation

²⁴ Trans. Benardete (1984).

²⁵ Tht. 166b7–9.

presupposes a differential relation if it is to be meaningful. The αὐτός is then, from the very beginning, problematically torn, and this gives rise to the competing philosophical approaches. For our purposes, what I would emphasise is that the αὐτός is, in Kantian terms, the condition of possibility for both these approaches. Theories of self-differentiation and self-identification are beyond transparent formulation without the αὐτός as a well-established operator.

3. *Building a Reflexive Subject*

a. *The Reflexivity of ψυχή*

The *Phaedo*'s exposition of a reflexive soul has been taken to influence the idea of conscience. In an essay on Jan Patočka, Derrida finds in soul's turn to itself a gesture to the privacy of conscience and consciousness as secret self-knowledge. The passage

describes a sort of subjectivizing interiorization, the movement of soul's gathering of itself, a fleeing of the body towards its interior where it withdraws into itself in order to recall itself to itself, in order to be next to itself, in order to keep itself in this gesture of *remembering*. This conversion turns the soul around and amasses it upon itself. It is such a movement of gathering, as in the prefix *syn*, that announces the coming-to-conscience ...²⁶

Reflexivity creates a secret space for the singularity of individual conscience and responsibility. The use of reflexives to explore this inner world propelled the internalisation of their reference and was heavily involved in the psychologisation of the human subject. These uses appear to have been especially enriched by Plato as he peered within the workings of psyche and rationalised its relations in reflexive terms. Such reflexive representations replaced, to considerable degree, the objective figurations of mind which interpret and transform the internal world by refracting it through the kaleidoscope of varying mythological procedures and narratives.

Let us now further investigate the self-relation of the thinking subject as it comprises this space. The activities of soul are often characterised as playing out wholly within its own scope, meaning that the objects of these activities are not independent entities but are enveloped by

²⁶ Derrida (1992) 13.

soul as a part or extension of it. The action does not propagate from the domain or field of one entity to that of another, but stays within the bounds of the subject. This effect is commonly achieved through a reflexive prepositional phrase. For example, when it is said of the soul, *κινουῖσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἔννοιαν*,²⁷ ‘thought’ is characterised as internal to soul, and thinking is defined as a dialogue of the soul with itself in which it asks questions of itself and responds to itself.²⁸ Other psychological objects, such as memories, are also portrayed in this way. Indeed memory is defined as the repetition of experiences that originally arose through an interaction of psychic and corporeal fields within the bounds of the soul alone:

ὅταν ᾧ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχεν ποθ’ ἡ ψυχὴ, ταῦτ’ ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀναλαμβάνη, τότε ἀναμνησθεσθαὶ που λέγομεν. ἢ γάρ;²⁹ (Phlb. 34b6–8)

Whenever the soul, *itself in itself* without the body, does its best to recollect what it once experienced with the body, we say that it remembers, don’t we?

Interestingly, not all transitive relations between a whole and its parts are capable of reduction to the domain of the subjective whole. For instance, in ordinary language my body and its parts are not capable of internalisation, and if we are to squeeze any sense out of such an attempt, a virtual simulation of the body has to be meant:

I scratched my arm *inside myself.

If this expression means anything, it could only be that I *imagined* scratching my arm. These facts indicate a mental bias inherent in the reference of the reflexive pronoun when used with prepositions denoting internality; reflexive internalisation tends to exclude the body. Soul is thus unusual in that it is capable of *enfolding* the objects of its intellectual actions whereas ordinary transitive action takes place between two thoroughly distinct entities, neither of which is *in* or *within* the other. The use of the reflexive pronoun with ἐν to denote internal psychological space is absent in Homeric Greek, where internal spaces are instead located in organs such as θυμός, φρένες and κῆρ. By the time of Plato, a significant portion of the territory of this internal space has been

²⁷ R. 524e5.

²⁸ Tht. 189e6–190a6, Sph. 263e3–5.

²⁹ Cf. Tht. 186a10.

appropriated by the subject and unified under it.³⁰ This move in turn affects its constitution, since the activities which take place in this internal space now define it. At its extreme, the subject is exclusively identified with this internal space and the actions it contains.

While most of us would view the conceptualisation of the internal world of soul using spatial analogies as purely metaphorical, the materialism of Greek thought often concerns itself with explicating the physical and geometric dimensions of soul, whose harmonies and movements are viewed as no less physical than those of the astral bodies. Indeed the rational movement of these bodies in the heavens *are* the proportioned motions of soul. So in the *Timaeus* the soul is constituted by the respective orbits of the same and other. But here too soul retains its association with reflexivity, which is simply translated into geometric terms. Accordingly, gathering to itself becomes circling back on itself. Here Plato continues a venerable tradition in Greek philosophy discussed in Chapter 4, the representation of reflexivity by circular motion, and its ascription to foundational beings. The internalised motion of soul as self-moving³¹ is connected to the movement of the speech without sound, which can in turn be identified with the silent self-dialogue of intellectual thought. In terms of the macrocosm, this is the true discourse (λόγος ὁ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀληθής) permeating the world-soul of the self-moving heaven. These themes come together in the passage below:

ἄτε οὖν ἐκ τῆς ταύτου καὶ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως ἐκ τε οὐσίας τριῶν τούτων συγκαταθεῖσα μοιρῶν, καὶ ἀνὰ λόγον μερισθεῖσα καὶ συνδεθεῖσα, αὕτη τε ἀνακυκλουμένη πρὸς αὐτήν, ὅταν οὐσίαν σκεδαστὴν ἔχοντός τινος ἐφάπτεται καὶ ὅταν ἀμέριστον, λέγει κινουμένη διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς ὅτῳ τ' ἂν τι ταῦτόν ᾗ καὶ ὅτῳ ἂν ἕτερον, πρὸς ὅτι τε μάλιστα καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως καὶ ὁπότε συμβαίνει κατὰ τὰ γινόμενά τε πρὸς ἕκαστον ἕκαστα εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν καὶ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχοντα αἰεὶ. λόγος δὲ ὁ κατὰ ταῦτόν ἀληθής γινόμενος περὶ τε θάτερον ὃν καὶ περὶ τὸ ταῦτόν, ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ φερόμενος ἄνευ φθόγγου καὶ ἡχῆς, ὅταν μὲν περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν γίγνηται καὶ ὁ τοῦ θατέρου κύκλος ὁρθὸς ἰὼν εἰς πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν διαγγεῖλη, δόξαι καὶ πίστεις γίνονται βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς ...
(*Ti.* 37a2–b8)

³⁰ For early examples see above pp. 154–158. The use is legion in Plato: *Grg.* 491e1; *Smp.* 222a4; *Men.* 85d6; *Phdr.* 241a3, 278a7; *Cra.* 384a2; *Phd.* 93c6, 8; *Phlb.* 38e7, 39c1; *Leg.* 645b5; *R.* 409c7, 435c6, 440b2, 442c7, 443d2, 558d4, 575c8, 590c4. Construction with παρὰ is also common, for which see Ch. 6 n. 45.

³¹ The idea of soul as self-moving is given more extensive treatment in the *Phaedrus*, and seems to have been a rather popular philosophical notion, as discussed in Ch. 4.6.

Seeing, then, that soul had been blended of Sameness, Difference, and Existence, these three portions, and had been in due proportion divided and bound together, and moreover revolves upon *herself*, whenever she is in contact with anything that has dispersed existence or with anything whose existence is indivisible, she is set in motion all through *herself* and tells in what respect precisely, and how, and in what sense, and when, it comes about that something is qualified as either the same or different with respect to any given thing, whatever it may be, with which it is the same or from which it differs, either in the sphere of things that become or with regard to things that are always changeless. Now whenever discourse that is alike true, whether it takes place concerning that which is different or that which is the same, being carried on without speech or sound within the thing that is *self-moved*, is about that which is sensible, and the circle of the Different, moving aright, carries its message throughout all its soul—then there arise judgments and beliefs that are sure and true.³²

Further on in the *Timaeus* the node of self-movement, reflexive circular motion, and reflexive thought becomes even more explicit. The passage describes the third kind of soul that exists in plants:

πάσχον γὰρ διατελεῖ πάντα, στραφέντι δ' αὐτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ περὶ ἑαυτό, τὴν μὲν ἔξωθεν ἀπωσαμένῳ κίνησιν, τῇ δ' οἰκείᾳ χρησαμένῳ, τῶν αὐτοῦ τι λογίσασθαι κατιδόντι φύσει οὐ παραδέδωκεν ἡ γένεσις. διὸ δὴ ζῆ μὲν ἔστιν τε οὐχ ἕτερον ζώου, μόνιμον δὲ καὶ κατερριζωμένον πέπηγεν διὰ τὸ τῆς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινήσεως ἑστερηθῆναι. (Ti. 77b6–c5)

For it is always suffering all affections, but its formation has not endowed it with any power to observe the nature of its own affections and to reflect thereon by revolving *within and about itself*, rejecting motion from without and exercising motion of its own. Therefore it lives, indeed, and is no other than a living creature, but it stands still, fixed and rooted, because it is denied *self-motion*.³³

This type of living being is completely passive and lacks reflexive circular motion and self-movement, and so is not endowed with the capacity to reflect on its own experiences. Particularly striking is the triplication of the αὐτός morpheme in the phrase στραφέντι δ' αὐτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ περὶ ἑαυτό. The circular motion of the loftier soul capable of reflexive thought is reflexive in two related ways: firstly, it rotates about itself relative to the centre (περὶ ἑαυτό), and secondly, this activity is contained within itself (ἐν ἑαυτῷ), as the movement does not project beyond the circumference. This motion is attributed participially, and is best read as a cause of the

³² Trans. Cornford (1935).

³³ Trans. Cornford (1935).

phrase τῶν αὐτοῦ τι λογίσασθαι κατιδόντι. It is by turning about itself within itself that a soul is naturally endowed with the capability of seeing completely (κατιδόντι) and reflecting on (λογίσασθαι) any of the things which belong to itself as experiences (τῶν αὐτοῦ τι). The reflexivity of thought is thus derived from a reflexivity of motion, and the objects of the thinking process belong to the thinker, in this case soul.

Besides its connection with reflexivity, soul is also deeply implicated with the idea of sameness. The two connections are best considered as a nexus, especially since αὐτός may mean both self and same.³⁴ But the interconnection is not limited to etymology. It seems intuitively correct that it only makes sense to speak of me as having a self insofar as I am the *same* being from one moment to the next. The doctrine of multiple selves does not diminish or refute the correctness of this intuition. If I exhibit more than one self, it still seems that it must be the case that each of these different selves is the same as itself across a certain period of time, namely that for which I am acting out that particular self. If not, I could not be any particular self whatsoever for more than an infinitesimally small period of time, which is clearly absurd. Each of the multiple selves will be opened to reveal another set of multiple selves inside, and each of these in turn will contain another set, and so on ad infinitum in an endless Droste effect.

If the self is an entity which is in some way the same across (a period of) time, it is different from other self-identical entities in that it maintains this identity through inclination or conatus—or in the terms of systems theory and biology, through the self-production of autopoiesis. It is not just the same from one moment to the next indifferently, but is engaged in reproducing itself and the conditions of its existence. Platonic philosophy, and especially Stoic philosophy following it, harnesses autopoiesis as an ethical imperative. Because of the contingency opened by human freedom, a soul or person can be more or less in accordance with its essence depending on how we act: we should maximise our identity across time and reproduce ourselves consistently.³⁵

³⁴ Cf. German *selbst* ('self') and *derselbe* ('the same'). The connection is very common cross-linguistically.

³⁵ This normativity is emphasised by Gerson (2003) 4, who recognises its reflexive intention: the embodied person can 'strive to transform themselves into their own ideal.' The emergence of this idea helps explain the reflexivisation of the vocabulary of pejorative evaluation conspicuous in Plato, for one cannot find fault with oneself without presupposing an idealised self-image that one has failed to live up to. See below pp. 235–236.

An important passage uncovering the conceptual network of soul, same, and self occurs in the *Phaedo*.³⁶ Socrates is developing one of his proofs for the immortality of the soul. The overall argument is that the soul is like that which it contemplates. Since it contemplates the forms, and these are unchanging and immortal (the former is derived as a condition of the latter), it too is unchanging and immortal.³⁷ Now a soul acting in the capacity it ought to is characterised by a certain reflexivity. It acts αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν, and likewise becomes αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν. In relating only to itself, and the forms with which it shares kinship, it makes sure that it always keeps the same condition in the same respects (ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ὡσαύτως ἔχει). The conclusion that soul is more similar to what always stays in the same condition than what does not (ὅλω καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι ψυχὴ τῷ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μὴ), shows that already at the inception of philosophy the concept of self (insofar as it is equivalent to soul) had been connected to that of sameness and identity. Yet this connection is stated somewhat differently in the case of Plato, where the question is not what makes me the same person from one moment to the next—which then becomes the question of the unity of consciousness and conscious experience—but how over and against the ephemerality of the body and the phenomenal world the soul achieves unchanging identity with itself and the forms. Ancient thought does not investigate the identity of pronouns, and above all the subject, but of a substance, soul, for the most part objectively rather than subjectively understood, but with a special ability—through relating only to itself and to the forms, which are to it like another self—to maintain itself in the same condition across time.

The normative contour to soul's identity is apparent in other places. Divine beings show an elevated identity by thinking thoughts the same as themselves, and humans ought to aspire to the same state by developing a soul with a self-consistent λόγος, one that always thinks the same thoughts about the respective forms.³⁸ While self-identity as an ideal later becomes a keynote of the Stoic tradition,³⁹ we see already in Plato the various refractions of self-identity, such as ὁμόνοια ἑαυτῷ and ὁμολογία

³⁶ *Phd.* 79d ff.

³⁷ With the important condition that this identity with itself is not given but must be cultivated. Cf. Gerson (2003) 50–98.

³⁸ For this project of self, note especially *R.* 500c. It is the philosopher's duty to mimic the stable divine order and liken himself to it (ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαι τε καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι).

³⁹ See Ch. 4 n. 14.

ἑαυτῷ, as goods. It also appears that self-identity is a result of being αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό: to consider something αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό is to consider it insofar as it is identical with itself; it is to consider the concealed *identity* behind the multifarious phenomena of things which are given the same name. A thing is altered by interacting with something different and being brought into relation with something other—that is, by becoming καθ' ἕτερον. What is in itself does not relate to anything other and so cannot suffer alteration. Just as Anaxagoras' Νοῦς, when soul relates to itself, and thus becomes like a form, it attains self-identity in the manner of any abstract concept.

Now understanding soul as an *abstract concept*, by virtue of which it displays self-identity, breaks with the general current of ancient thought, which for the most part interprets the human being, along with the rest of the world, *complexively*.⁴⁰ According to MacDonald,

[w]hile a cognitive concept groups objects according to their possession of at least one common attribute, “the bonds relating the elements of a complex to the whole and to one another may be as diverse as the contacts and relations are in reality.”⁴¹

This distinction happens to be very useful for elucidating the difference between the Homeric and Socratic conceptions of the self, and also enables us to rescue the importance of Snell's point regarding the ambivalence of the psychic organs in Homer between general faculties and the particular products of such faculties.⁴² Since concepts rise above the concrete objects that compose them, while complexes frequently merge with their elements, a Homeric soul word like θυμός behaves like a complex in that in some instances it stands for the emotive faculty, or the emotive self, while in others it may refer to a particular instance of

⁴⁰ In Greece's case, Havelock (1963) 256–257 in particular has underlined the historic importance of Plato's vocabulary of forms: “The phrasing of the “itself *per se*”, stressing as it does the simple purity of the “object”, gathered together so to speak in isolation from any contamination with anything else, indicates a mental act which quite literally corresponds to the Latin term “abstraction”; that is, this “object” which the newly self-conscious “subject” has to think about has been literally ‘torn out’ of the epic context ad created by an act of isolation and integration. For example, the many (concealed) instances of proper conduct are gathered up into “propriety *per se*, quite by itself.”

⁴¹ MacDonald (2005) 224–225, quoting Vygotsky (1962) 41–42.

⁴² As Russo and Simon (1968) 495 state, drawing on Snell's (1953) treatise, there is ‘no clear distinction among the organs of mental activity, the activity itself, and the products of the activity.’ The metonymical facility also runs in reverse, so that Gaskin (1990) 3 stresses the ability of the different psychic organs to go proxy for a word denoting self.

emotion, will or thought—as in the phrase ‘another θυμός held me back’.⁴³ By contrast, a word like soul can never stand for a particular which characterises it. It *has* or *experiences* particular affective states, but cannot itself stand for such a state. In the language of subjects and predicates, the soul aggressively defends its position as subject and resists merging with its predicates, whereas θυμός may be both a personified subject *and* the emotion experienced by such a subject. The post-Homeric semantic development of ψυχή introduces the concept of a psychological subject distinguished from its psychic experiences with a new degree of rigour, one that is transcendental insofar as it rises above these particulars.

As a concept, the nature of soul concerns the idea of self-identity in a way that is irrelevant for complexes. The problem of psychic identity that has so engrossed the Western mind thus stems from a new conceptual understanding of the individual. It has been argued that thinking in concepts was and is promoted by literacy (and so, in the Greek context, by the revolution in literacy), because, among other reasons, readers are confronted by signs removed from their actual communicative context, and as a result, since there is no such particular referent ready to hand, are more sensitive to the question of what the sign ‘really’ refers to—why is the same sign used for different particulars?⁴⁴ Asked in relation to the individual, the concept of ψυχή answers the question of what is the self-identical unity that stands above and behind the manifold experience of consciousness.⁴⁵

The human subject’s reflexivity is refined further by Aristotle, who locates a special form of it in νοῦς as the best part of the person and what he ideally is, and reworks it into a direct, transitive form. Thought is capable of thinking itself when its potential to exercise its power through itself has been actualised.⁴⁶ He also proposes complete identity between

⁴³ *Od.* 9.302.

⁴⁴ This is, of course, the prototypical Platonic question. As suggested above, Plato’s philosophy, and especially his notion of forms, is in a sense a philosophy of literate language—somewhat paradoxically given Socrates’ disparagement of the written word. For literacy’s sponsorship of conceptual thinking, see Eastman (1975) 83–85, and especially Ong (1982).

⁴⁵ As noted above, n. 20, whether Plato unequivocally equated the soul with a form in his sense of the word is debatable. But insofar as he assigned existence αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό to both and held the soul to constitute what the human being essentially is, and since only forms exist essentially, the soul often approaches identity to a form.

⁴⁶ *An.* 429b5–9. Aristotle is close here to the idea of an essentially reflexive entity. The first such formulation appears in Plotinus, especially in the third chapter of the fifth *Ennead*, where mind is analysed as activity directed towards itself: ὁ μὲν νοῦς ἐν

the thinker and the thought (ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον⁴⁷), a claim undermined by the conceptual disjunction of the transitive scheme. But he seems to think his way around this problem by viewing the identity as a communion between thinking and its object:⁴⁸

ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ' αὐτήν τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ: νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταῦτόν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν.

(Met. 1072b18–21)

Thinking *in itself* is directed at the good *in itself*, and thinking in the highest sense at the good in the highest sense. The intellect thinks *itself* by participation in the object of thought: for by touching and thinking [this object] it becomes an object of thought, so that intellect and object of thought are the same.

Not only does thought think itself by touching and partaking of its object, but both it and its object are καθ' αὐτό, a continuation of Plato's idea of the soul *per se* thinking its objects *per se*. Aristotle has thus packed this relation inside a further reflexive relation in which the two in-themselves become identical. Under this new umbrella, the intellect's engagement with the forms is thus reinterpreted reflexively as thought thinking itself.

Aristotle's remarks address the luminous transparency of consciousness that draws the attention of later thinkers. The mind appears to be, in a crucial sense, self-constituting—which is say that the thinking intellect is constituted in such a way by its thought that the two become indistinct. The thinking agent (νοῦς) is realised in its objects of thought.⁴⁹ According to the doxographer Aëtius, Chrysippus etymologically connects the transparent reflexivity of representational consciousness (φαντασία) to light:

εἴρηται δ' ἡ φαντασία ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτός· καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ φῶς αὐτὸ δείκνυσι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχόμενα, καὶ ἡ φαντασία δείκνυσιν ἑαυτήν καὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς αὐτήν.

(Aëtius 4.12.1 Diels)

αὐτῷ ἐνέργεια (Enn. V 3.7.26 Henry-Schwyzler). Since ἐνέργεια may also denote active force in grammatical jargon, this idea is implicitly dependent on an underlying structure of transitive reflexivity projected by the PRS. Reflexivity has advanced to become the definitive property of the most divine part of the human person.

⁴⁷ An. 430a3–4.

⁴⁸ The thinking treated here is specifically God's thinking, but it is ideally also man's.

⁴⁹ Cf. Plotinus at Enn. VI 8.16.17 Henry-Schwyzler, where νοῦς is said to be ἑαυτοῦ ἐνέργημα, "the realised product of its own operation."

[Re]presentation is so-called from the word light [*phōs*]; for just as light shows *itself* and the other things which are contained in it, so too [re]presentation shows *itself* and that which has caused it.

In other words, to show the contents and objects of consciousness is at the same time to show consciousness itself; and in revealing its contents and objects consciousness reveals itself. We cannot wade too far into these interesting issues, but must confine ourselves to the observation that the psychological reflexivity of the self-dialoguing soul initiated by Plato opens the way for later writers to consider the self-constituting nature of intellectual thought and the self-embedding mechanism of representational consciousness. These moves further reduce the dialogical aspect of soul's reflexivity.

b. *ψυχή/νοῦς as the Real Person*

As has been proposed, the conception of soul as the real person relates to new semantic possibilities for the reflexive; the reflexive may reference the person as a soul, an internal and essentialised encapsulation of personality, normative agency, and the experience of consciousness.⁵⁰ The conception of the person in this way, in which the outward body is removed from all *essential* determinations of personhood—these are instead gathered within the single entity of soul—is a major turn in the history of thought.⁵¹ The idea of soul as the real person is a cornerstone of Platonic philosophy, and some have seen it as primarily a Platonic invention.⁵² Yet its roots go back to the soul's acquisition of body-soul meanings following Homer and to the development of mystery eschatology, which must assume the continuance of a person, enfranchised with the full palette of consciousness and identity despite its lack of body, into the afterlife *qua* soul.⁵³

⁵⁰ For a recent overview of the Platonic soul as person, see Long (2005). The personalised aspect seems to be a comparatively recent development. It is especially corroborated by the myth of individual destiny after death recounted at the end of the *Gorgias* (ibid., p. 185).

⁵¹ The idea of the essential person as an internalised being is carried over by Paul into Christianity as ὁ ἕσω ἄνθρωπος. See Rom 7:22; Eph 3:16; 2Cor 4:16. Cf. Philo *Agr.* 9 CW.

⁵² E.g. Burnett (1916). Claus (1981) 182–183 sees the Platonic innovation as a 'moralisation of the psychosomatic ψυχή of fifth-century medical and sophistic soul therapy'. With the *Gorgias* there appears a 'fully realized psychological version of the Pythagorean soul'.

⁵³ See above p. 60 ff.

The *Laws* (959a ff.) clearly states the identification of the real person with ψυχή. The soul is that which makes/represents each of us (ἐν αὐτῷ τε τῷ βίῳ τὸ παρεχόμενον ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοῦτ' εἶναι μηδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν) and is what each of us really is. This identification becomes a central step in the argument of 1 *Alcibiades*, where the notion of caring for oneself is interpreted as caring for one's soul. Here one sees that a new interpretation of what constitutes the person enables a new interpretation of the reflexive as an index of that person. Plato makes the same move with another famous reflexive construction, the Delphic dictum, glossing the reflexive as an internalised representation of the person, that is, as a soul. In both cases the reflexive borrows new semantic ideas from the concept of soul. These meanings may semanticise in time so that the default interpretation of the reflexive in these contexts is as an internalised person more or less distinct from the body and other external relations, eventually leading to the nominalisation of the reflexive morpheme itself as just such a being, namely a self.

This identification is somewhat flexible, since later in the *Republic* Plato equates the real person not with soul as a whole, but with its most rational part, an idea which endures in Aristotle's view of the true self as especially intellect.⁵⁴ As I noted in the introduction,⁵⁵ in Greek ideas of the true self, beyond the self which one casually is by virtue of being an embodied person, are hardly individual and personalised, which is particularly conspicuous in this case because the true self as reason excludes the emotions, character, personality, etc.⁵⁶ One may improve oneself by having reason rule the rest of the many-headed ψυχή, but this is an ordering among parts—one does not in the Greek view find one's true self as a specific and holistic type of individual soul. The not infrequent tendency for idealised psychic entities in Plato to be stripped of personal characteristics is perhaps influenced by soul's function as the non-personal principle of biological life, including non-human life,⁵⁷ and the cast of ancient thought in general, which

⁵⁴ See Sorabji (2006) 115–118.

⁵⁵ Ch. 1 n. 18.

⁵⁶ Cf. Sorabji (2006) 115–118.

⁵⁷ For ψυχή as a life-force, and a discussion of how this primary sense has shaped its psychological sense, see especially Claus (1981). Plato often mixes soul's aspects in a way that impacts his arguments, for which see Robinson (1995) 20, 34–37. Cf. Long (2005) 182–185, who foregrounds Plato's normative conception of soul.

strives to bring the individual into some concordance with an objective metaphysical order that is universal.⁵⁸

The outright equation of the human subject and soul is not without its difficulties, as Aristotle intimates.⁵⁹ Psychic acts like pitying, learning and thinking are more correctly predicated of man than they are of soul: to say that the soul feels anger is as absurd as to say that the soul weaves or builds. Man (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) thinks using soul as an instrument. Aristotle is thus directing our attention to the *subject* which transcends the soul. We may arrive at this subject through the logic of conceptual separation inherent in the relation of possession. This is ironical, given that Socrates uses the same method to differentiate the man as soul from his possessions in 1 *Alicibiades*; if the subject possesses soul, then is not *it* rather than soul the true person, being to it as soul itself is to τὰ ἑαυτοῦ? To escape this difficulty the discourse of human ontology must in the end turn its attention from soul as an objectified substance to the subject that is always already presupposed by any objectification.⁶⁰

These issues bear directly on the overall scheme of Plato's anthropology. Robinson, for example, connects *R.* 572a and *Phd.* 64e–65a—passages which both speak of a subject who does something to his soul—and posits as one possible interpretation the idea that Plato includes the philosophising subject alongside the body and the soul as a constituent of personhood.⁶¹ On this view, which ultimately goes back to Krohn's discussion of *R.* 572a,⁶² Plato's account has three elements. In *Ph.* 64e–65a

⁵⁸ Gerson (2003) 3, 9, 277 makes the elegant argument that in Plato the embodied person stands in relation to the disembodied person (i.e. soul) as the sensible images of the forms stand in relation to the intellectual forms themselves, with the important exception that the person is capable of self-transformation and through philosophy may learn to identify with her ideal self. Because this ideal is universal like a form it lacks personality.

⁵⁹ *An.* 408b11–15.

⁶⁰ Ironically, Aristotle's own argument would be as problematic for his identification of the real person with νοῦς as Plato's identification of it with ψυχή. The Stoic Hierocles, scaling the aspects of the self according to the degree of intimacy of possession (οἰκειώσεις), realised that even νοῦς is said to be ἑαυτοῦ and thus presupposes a possessor. According to Sorabji (1999) 16, it is possible that Hierocles sees the individual self as 'something very abstract, a sizeless point round which the mind forms the first circle and the body the next.' But as soon as this sizeless point is objectified in thought, another possessive subject will be presupposed, and so on *ad infinitum*.

⁶¹ Robinson (1995) 48.

⁶² Krohn (1876) 217, cited approvingly by Adam (1902) ad *R.* 572a s.v. ἡσυχάσας, who favours his view more than Schleiermacher's. The latter thinks there is a fourth part of the soul which calms the others.

these would work out as 1) a body which is to be avoided, 2) a soul which is to be tended to and separated from the body, and 3) a philosopher (called by Krohn *ein Ich*, and likened by Robinson to 'a super-Ego transcending the body-soul complex'⁶³) who exercises his agency on the soul to this end. Robinson thinks that if this view is correct, Plato is here identifying the philosopher, not the soul, as the genuine self. But this interpretation requires that Plato is distinguishing here between the objectified self (the soul), and the subjective self (the philosopher or philosophising subject)—a distinction which he never treats theoretically. More likely to my mind is that any appearance of such a distinction in this section is simply the result of certain atheoretical habits of language use on the one hand, and the sensitivity of the modern interpreter to the category of the subject on the other. If the self is objectified as soul, then the position of subject is filled by a pronoun or equivalent nominal placeholder which then relates to this objectified entity in various ways, affecting it and doing things to it or with it. Aristotle noticed this fact and this is why the soul is not for him a subject but an instrument.

However there is no textual evidence that Plato noticed this, or in any way connected the category of the grammatical subject to the category of the self, even though, as a user of language, he was bound to make use of the former. Natural language will of course lead Plato from time to time to relate an invisible subject, never formally included in the ontology of personhood, to an objective substance, soul, which is. It is left to the development of modern philosophy to make such a subject visible and formally treat it. It is my claim that the reflexive is vital in the transition to an ontology that takes the missing subject seriously. Reflexivity provides a way for the transcendental subject (the *Ich* of Krohn and the super-Ego of Robinson) to relate to itself in a comparatively de-objectified manner because the reflexive claims to stand for the subject. It refers back to the subject and thus marks it, turning the covert category of a grammatical subject into the overt category of a philosophical subject.

c. Psychic Concord and the Internalisation of Socio-Political Relations

We have seen that Plato's epistemological and ontological position requires the philosopher to seek self-identity. His theory of psychic con-

⁶³ Krohn (1878) 217, Robinson (1995) 47.

cord lays down the method and means for this project. Plato's treatment of the soul as a state constituted by different political classes is one of the most famous analogies in the history of philosophy, and is significant for our study of reflexivity since it provides many opportunities for the reflexivisation of various socio-political relations. In this way traditionally other-directed relations such as *φιλία*, *ἔχθρα*, and *ὁμόνοια*—staples of socio-political thought—are inventively reinterpreted as self-relations. The following passage from the *Republic*, discussing injustice's disruption of harmonious human association, illustrates the transition from the traditional use of such terms to depict socio-political relations between, or within groups of, different individuals, to their application within a single individual.

οὐκοῦν τοιάνδε τινὰ φαίνεται [ἀδικία] ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν, οἷαν, ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένηται, εἴτε πόλει τινὶ εἴτε γένει εἴτε στρατοπέδῳ εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὄψουσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν πράττειν μεθ' αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν καὶ διαφέρεσθαι, ἔτι δ' ἐχθρὸν εἶναι ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ; οὐχ οὕτως;

πάνυ γε.

καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ δὴ οἷμαι ἐνοῦσα ταῦτά ταῦτα ποιήσει ἅπερ πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι· πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμονοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἔπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις· ἢ γάρ;

(R. 351e9–352a8)

So injustice seems to have a certain power whose specific quality is to make whatever it arises in—whether some city, tribe, military camp, or anything else—in the first instance incapable of acting with *itself* because it's in a state of factional discord and at variance, and in the next an enemy to *itself* and everything opposite to it and just? Is this not the case?

Definitely.

And I think that when it exists in an individual it will create these very same effects which it is its nature to bring about. First it will make him incapable of acting, being in a state of factional discord and not like-minded *himself with himself*, and next an enemy to *himself* and to the just, won't it?

This passage shows two levels of reflexivisation. The first is the community that cooperates and is like-minded with itself, the second the individual. As reflexive processes applying to a group, the former can be classed with other important socio-political reflexive terms such as *αὐτονομία*, *αὐτοτέλεια*, and *αὐτάρκεια*. These, as we have seen, characterise ideal states, to which the attributes *πρᾶξις μεθ' αὐτῆς*, *ὁμόνοια*

πρὸς αὐτήν etc., may be added.⁶⁴ That the ideal characteristics of states and individuals align is one of the commonplaces of ancient, and indeed any thought. Whether one accounts for it by the human desire for a well-ordered, symmetrical, and fractal world, in which the same order of logical relations reproduces itself across different scales and thereby confirms the universe's grand design and purpose,⁶⁵ or through various psycho-analytic theories by which the human psyche internalises the symbolic order of social relations,⁶⁶ the macro-/micro-cosmic analogy is one of the most pervasive tendencies and heuristics of human thought. Thus the autonomous city has as its counterpart the autonomous individual, the city that is like-minded with itself the individual that is like-minded with himself. To reiterate a point already made, one should not, therefore, underestimate the degree to which sociological conditions determine individual actors' view of themselves. This is demonstrated nowhere better than in reflexivity's pervasion of politics as well as anthropology.

Stobaeus (2.33.14 Wachsmuth) quotes a passage from the Neoplatonist Iamblichus' *Περὶ ὁμονοίας*, in which he first sketches the traditional socio-political use of the term before defining its reflexive signification:

ἐτι δὲ περιέχει [ἡ ὁμόνοια] καὶ τὴν ἑνὸς ἐκάστου πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμογνωμοσύνην· ὅφ' ἑνὸς μὲν γὰρ τις νοήματος καὶ μιᾶς γνώμης κυβερνώμενος ὁμονοεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτόν, διχογνωμονῶν δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτόν καὶ ἀνόμοια λογίζόμενος διαστασιάζει· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς αἰεὶ αὐτῆς ἐπιμένων διανοήσεως ὁμοφροσύνης ἐστὶ πλήρης· ὁ δὲ ἀστατος τοῖς λογισμοῖς καὶ ἄλλοτε ὑπ' ἄλλης δόξης φερόμενος ἀστάθμητός ἐστι καὶ πολέμιος πρὸς ἑαυτόν.

(Iambl. Ep. *Περὶ ὁμονοίας* = Antiphon B44a DK)

Moreover like-mindedness also encompasses the unity of purpose each individual has with *himself*. For when someone is guided by one thought and one purpose he is like-minded with himself, whereas when he differs

⁶⁴ One must remember that analogies proceed by taking a standard, well-accepted descriptive model and applying it to a phenomenon where it does not originally, by convention, belong. We can therefore infer that such terms were probably, and with some regularity, applied to social groups and states. Cf. *Leg.* 693b3–4: διανοιθéntας τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι πόλιν ἐλευθέραν τε εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἔμφορα καὶ ἑαυτῇ φίλην.

⁶⁵ As in the homological worldview of German idealism: 'Such an image of a world infused with inner purpose had a particular significance for the ways of thinking about the self that developed in Germany. It depicted the world and the individuals who make it up as homologous or isomorphic, that is, as having corresponding or parallel structures, pointing to a kind of original harmony between them' (Seigel (2005) 297).

⁶⁶ Take e.g. Elliot (2008) 146: 'Many analysts agree that fragmentation, dislocation and contradiction are key characteristics of postmodernity that are mirrored internally at the level of the self.' The *ἐτερόνοια* πρὸς ἑαυτήν of postmodern society conditions the *ἐτερόνοια* πρὸς ἑαυτόν of the corresponding self.

in purpose with *himself* and his deliberations are dissimilar, he is at odds. The one, abiding by the same thinking, is full of unity of feeling—but the other, unstable in his calculations and moved by a different opinion on different occasions, is unsettled and an enemy to *himself*.

Iamblichus presents the reflexivisation of *ὁμόνοια* as a development of the original application of the word to various sorts of society, which is surely correct. There is argument over whether the sophist Antiphon's treatise *Περὶ ὁμονοίας*, of which only fragments survive, dealt with psychic concord in anticipation of Plato instead of the more traditional notion of civic concord, or perhaps even in both senses as Iamblichus does. Though Pendrick strongly rejects this possibility, I do not think his conclusion is as decisive as he makes out.⁶⁷ His commentary on F58–59, which discusses mastery of one's passions and thus provides a context for the potential use of *ὁμόνοια* in this sense, claims that Stenzel's imputation to these fragments of a concept of psychic concord arising from the conflict of opposing wills 'misrepresents the point at issue, which is not the reconciliation of conflicting desires but the mastery of potentially harmful ones.' But if we take such a distinction too seriously, it should have been impossible for Plato to use *ὁμόνοια* in this sense too, who leads into his own discussion of psychic concord by examining just that, the notion of self-mastery.⁶⁸ If he freely uses phrases such as ruling oneself when characterising such concord,⁶⁹ then he clearly does not see the two as distinct psychic states. Pendrick seems to put too fine a construction on the notion of reconciliation as a reciprocal relation rather than a peace brokered and enforced by one dominant entity. But the latter idea is surely present in Plato's account, where reconciliation takes place not between equal entities but under the authority of reason as ultimate master. If Plato does not finely distinguish between *ὁμόνοια* and self-mastery, then its use in a psychic sense in Antiphon is quite possible.

In the case of Plato's reflexivisation of friendship, and its opposite enmity, the thematic history is clearer.⁷⁰ The idea of self-love is, like

⁶⁷ Farena (2006) 469 n. 52 also finds Pendrick's argument at (2002) 41–42 unconvincing, especially regarding its philological point that the predominant sense *ὁμόνοια* in Antiphon's time was 'civic concord' (though use in the context of friendship was also possible) and that there is no early use of this term in a psychic sense. He approvingly cites Farrar (1988) 119, who suggests that *ὁμόνοια* is psychic in Antiphon just as *αὐτονομία* refers to a personal characteristic in *Antigone*.

⁶⁸ R. 430eff.

⁶⁹ E.g. R. 443d4–5: ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ καὶ συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, discussed further below.

⁷⁰ See the excellent study by Gantar (1966), who correctly (150–154) interprets the

πρᾶξις τῶν ἑαυτοῦ, a torn notion, and divided between self-interest and self-respect. The Greeks' sense of it as a universal human trait in the former sense will have been magnified by the aforementioned forces of socio-economic individualisation which sanction an individual's interest in himself. There is, in turn, an ideological tinge to its claim as a universal, because it justifies as natural an economy in which each works for himself. Self-love and working for oneself are of course very close:

ἌΓ. ἢ πάνθ' ὅμοια πᾶς ἀνὴρ αὐτῷ πονεῖ.
 ὍΔ. τῷ γάρ με μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ἢ ἑμαυτῷ πονεῖν; (S. Aj. 1366–1367)

AG: How in all things alike every man works for *himself*.

OD: Since who should I work for more than *myself*?

ἄρτι γινώσκεις τόδε,
 ὥς πᾶς τις αὐτὸν τοῦ πέλας μᾶλλον φιλεῖ,
 οἱ μὲν δικαίως, οἱ δὲ καὶ κέρδους χάριν;⁷¹ (E. Med. 85–87)

Are you just now realising this, that every person loves *himself* more than his neighbour, some with good reason, some also for profit's sake?

But a second sense of self-love arises which directs itself towards an idealised form of the self:

ἐγὼ πέφυκά τ' εὖσεβεῖν καὶ βούλομαι,
 φίλῳ τ' ἑμαυτήν, καὶ κλέος τοῦμοῦ πατρὸς
 οὐκ ἂν μίαναιμι, οὐδὲ συγγόνῳ χάριν
 δοίην ἂν ἐξ ἧς δυσκλεῆς φανήσομαι.
 ἔνεστι δ' ἱερὸν τῆς δίκης ἔμοι μέγα
 ἐν τῇ φύσει. (E. Hel. 998–1003)

I was born to be reverent and want to be. I love *myself*, and wouldn't stain my father's fame, nor do a favour for my brother which will make me infamous. There is in my nature a great temple of justice.

Far from being selfish, Theonoe's love of self is a pious act which honours the 'great temple of justice' that inheres in her nature. This form of self-love has become available due to major developments in psychology, including the moralisation of the soul as the human essence and its investment with a divine nature, but it also depends upon a more general categorisation of the individual as the privileged *source* of action. If I myself am seen as the source of piety in the statement ἐγὼ εὖσεβῶ, if this act is viewed as issuing from my nature and soul, then the value

positive sense of self-love as originating through the internalisation of the reflexive's reference and cites as antecedents many of the reflexive phrases we have considered.

⁷¹ For the same sentiment see S. OC 309; Eur. fr. 452 TrGF.

attached to εὐσέβεια as piety will ultimately accrue to me as its origin. In this context to love myself will be to love something invaluable since I am the cause of piety. This is a markedly different situation than one in which the source of piety is externalised and the individual's role as subjective agent downplayed. In this situation, though I may in a weak sense author the act, its ultimate origin lies with another, say with a god or an ancestor—it is under obligation to them that I act, and piety's value remains firmly with them insofar as I am ceding to them what is their due. The former model arises from the latter through an internalisation—in this passage, the subject has explicitly engulfed the temple of justice—and the internalisation is enabled by a much broader movement, the individual's identification of himself as αὐτουργός and αὐτόχειρ, the source of his action.⁷²

Loving oneself or being a friend to oneself in this way is not to act for one's own advantage but to respect the internal condition that is a prerequisite for just and thoughtful action in the first place. When conceived within the scheme of Platonic psychology, becoming a friend to yourself is to become a friend to the self as a (potentially) integrated psychic unity ruled by reason that better comprehends the forms of justice, the good etc.⁷³ Plato is thus applying a model of self-relation akin to Lakoff's True-Self model.⁷⁴ This well-ordered self is a thing to be cultivated and attained, and is thus differentiated from the subject's usual mode of being, which must strive to be brought into a relation of friendship and love with this self.⁷⁵ The model is continued by Aristotle in his positive use of φίλαυτος.⁷⁶

⁷² This view is to be parcelled with the position discussed pp. 163–172, that individuals, rather than gods, are responsible for their condition in life.

⁷³ Conversely, hostility to oneself represents the way a person often sabotages the realisation of a higher unity or happiness within themselves. This idea is also dependent on the notion of the individual as the source of events. Suffering becomes tragically 'self-chosen', and hostile forces are internalised rather externalised. Cf. Democr. B88: ὁ φθονέων ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἐχθρὸν λυπέει. Men. fr. 634 Edmonds: ὁ φθονερός αὐτῷ πολέμιος καθίσταται | αὐθαιρέτοις γὰρ συνέχεται λύπαις αἰεί.

⁷⁴ Cf. Isocrates' (1.49) reflexivisation of ἁμαρτάνω: δικαίως δ' ἂν τοὺς τοιούτους ὑπολάβοιμεν μὴ μόνον εἰς αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τύχης εἶναι προδότας. Such men sin against themselves by failing to fulfil their potential to become serious men and wasting the good hand fortune has dealt them.

⁷⁵ The production of this higher self can also be put in terms of recursive reflexivity, which I elaborate on below. Logically, if the primary self is bad, then the self which conquers this self must be good, and therefore love of this self is a good thing.

⁷⁶ E.g. at EN 1169a12: τὸν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι. Note that the idea has by this point been efficiently coded as a compound, suggesting frequent use and therefore

Perhaps the most signal use of the reflexive in this way occurs in the *Phaedrus*, where it denotes the spiritual selves of lovers whose rapport is triangulated by the idealised image of Zeus as god of the philosophers. Neophyte followers of Zeus first track down and discover *παρὰ ἑαυτῶν* ('from/in themselves'⁷⁷) the nature of their own personal god, from whom they receive inspiration and character. This image is reflected through the beloved, and the beloved too in time and turn falls under its spell. The flow of beauty washes back upon him and feathers and wings his soul. At this point he is still confused as to the cause and nature of his madness:

καὶ οὐθ' ὅτι πέπονθεν οἶδεν οὐδ' ἔχει φράσαι, ἀλλ' οἷον ἀπ' ἄλλου
ὀφθαλμίας ἀπολελυκώς πρόφασιν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔχει, ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν κατό-
πτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθεν. (Phdr. 255d2–6)

And he neither knows nor can say what has brought it on, but like one who has caught an eye infection from another and is unable to name the cause, he sees *himself* in his lover as in a mirror without being aware of it.

The reflexive is here partaking in a true-self model. As in Heraclitus' search for himself, this self can pass beneath notice and elude the subject's identification by hiding elsewhere, in this case in another. One guesses that expressions like this fed into Aristotle's analysis of the friend as another self and friendship as an extended form of self-relation. The analogy of the mirror, that modern totem of self-consciousness, effectively conveys the way in which the reflexive subject reproduces, multiplies, and reiterates itself in order to appropriate other-directed relations. Yet there is also an inkling of tragic danger, since the myth of Narcissus is present by its conspicuous absence. If the self truly replaces the other, then there is little to stand in the way of a spiralling descent into destructive self-absorption. This is likely the reason for Plato's extension of the relational chain involved in love: the inclusion of god (or the object of philosophical contemplation) keeps some measure of distance between the lover and himself, so that desire, by a circuitous diathesis, is brought back to the lover via multiple others.

significance as a socio-cultural category. The pejorative use also continues, e.g. at *MM* 1212a29.

⁷⁷ This phrase usually means 'of themselves' or 'without outside help', but Jowett (1892) and Fowler (in Lamb 1927) following, translate "in themselves" and "within themselves" respectively. This certainly bolsters the sense of the reflexive but perhaps over-interprets it.

d. *Internalisation of* *πρᾶξις τῶν ἑαυτοῦ*

Plato's debt to political and legal reflexivity is clearest in his appropriation of the popular notion of justice as *πρᾶξις τῶν ἑαυτοῦ*. He draws from its fount in several places:

καὶ ταύτῃ ἄρα πῃ ἢ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἔξις τε καὶ πρᾶξις
δικαιοσύνη ἂν ὁμολογοῖτο. (R. 433e12–434a1)

So then it would be agreed that having and doing what is one's own and belongs to *oneself* is justice.

ἀλλ' εὖ καὶ πάλαι λέγεται τὸ πράττειν καὶ γινῶναι τὰ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτόν
σώφρονι μόνῳ προσήκειν. (Ti. 72a4–6)

But it has long been said, and to good effect, that doing and knowing *oneself* and what belongs to *oneself* concerns the prudent man alone.

σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. (Chrm. 161b6)

Prudence would be doing what belongs to *oneself*.

As Adam comments, 'Plato is looking for a point of contact between his own view of Justice and the popular judicial meaning of the word, and finds it in *ἔξις τοῦ οἰκείου*'.⁷⁸ *ἔξις τοῦ οἰκείου*, interchangeable with *ἔξις τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ*, means possession of what is one's property by legal right. Similarly, *πρᾶξις τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ* in a judicio-social sense means managing, including the corollaries of controlling and possessing, what belongs to one by legal and social right. As I have already suggested, these notions are constructions of a certain type of political state, judicial and social system working in concert, which forges the individual as defined by a set of private interests to which he alone is entitled. This claim is enforced judicially but also regulated socially, through the various forms of conventional wisdom and *habitus* that enculture citizens.

An argument was introduced in the section on Democritus that the development of an ethic of *πρᾶξις τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ* has its wider cause in the breakdown of face-to-face society in Greece and the formation of the city-states. In a face-to-face society, one's business is the other's business, and one's praxis is exposed to the regulation of that other's face. The responsibility and imperative to know and manage oneself and one's interests⁷⁹ signposts a new direction in the history of Greek civilisation;

⁷⁸ Adam (1902) ad loc.

⁷⁹ Observe the juxtaposition of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ and ἑαυτόν at Ti. 72a5, one of many

a new code of practice for the human actor is needed to suit the changing socio-political conditions. In refraining from πολυπραγμοσύνη, the citizen is to refrain from imposing his face on the business of others. The novelty of this idea peers through the expression's form, for as apophthegm it states what is not obvious and taken for granted.⁸⁰

Plato's appropriation of this notion, and the theoretical use to which he puts it, is dependent therefore on a far larger matrix of socio-cultural development which constructs actors whose praxis is reflexive. This interdependence reveals itself openly in the mobile transference of reflexive attributes from the state or political body to the individuals that constitute that body and vice versa, and draws in its train a multitude of related reflexive concepts, αὐτάρκεια, αὐτοκρατεία, αὐτοπραγία, τὸ αὐτοκέλευστον, τὸ αὐτόγνωτον, τὸ αὐτόβουλον—all of which relate to the ideal of self-determination.⁸¹ The self-determined, autonomous individual is the subject of Philo's treatise *Quod omnis probus liber sit*, where the truly free man and freedom itself are defined by these reflexive qualities:

τὸν ἀψευδῶς ἐλεύθερον ἀναζητῶμεν, ὃ μόνῳ τὸ αὐτοκρατέες πρόσσεστι, καὶ μυριοὶ γράφωσι δεσπότης ἑαυτοῦς. (Prob. 19 CW)

We seek the truly free man, who alone possesses *self-rule*, even if countless others claim themselves in writing as his masters.

γνώσεται σαφῶς, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συγγενές οὕτως, ὥς αὐτοπραγία ἐλευθερία (Prob. 21 CW)

He will clearly know that nothing is so naturally connected to anything else as *self-action* is to freedom.

ἐλευθερίας, ἥς τὸ αὐτοκέλευστον καὶ ἐθελουργὸν κληρὸς ἴδιος. (Prob. 22 CW)

Freedom, whose special province is *self-command* and voluntary action.

Like Plato, Philo is concerned with liberating these terms from their usual socio-political context. Freedom is an internal state of the soul and

indications that the two are a conceptual blend. Cf. Men. fr. 307 Edmonds: τὸ γνῶθι σαυτὸν ἐστι ἂν τὰ πράγματα | εἰδῆς τὰ σαυτοῦ καὶ τί σοι ποιητέον.

⁸⁰ We may contrast the situation of modernity, in which the ethic of πράξις τῶν ἑαυτοῦ is so internalised that it scarcely needs apophthegmatic reinforcement. Pursuit of one's own interests, friends, partner etc., have become the default setting of an individual's praxis.

⁸¹ Cf. Xenophon's (*Mem.* 1.2.6) report of Socrates' condemnation of the sophists as ἀνδραποδιστάς ἑαυτῶν.

not a socio-political condition that exists between two people; it is about the development of the resources for happiness that lie within, and the attainment of a soul not enslaved by the various passions but free to act justly and determine itself in accordance with the contemplation of god's justice that is its proper nature.⁸² Both Plato and Philo internalise the vocabulary of political autonomy, but Plato's internalisation of *πρᾶξις τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ* in particular is an ingenious example of reinterpretation. The argument climaxes in the following famous passage from the *Republic*, which defines justice in terms of the tripartite soul:

τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτόν τι ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντός, ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἐάσαντα τὰλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεῖα εὖ θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ καὶ συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ ὄρους τρεῖς ἁρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα, πάντα ταῦτα συνδήσαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμოსμένον, οὕτω δὲ πράττειν ἤδη, ἐάν τι πράττῃ ἢ περὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν ἢ περὶ σώματος θεραπείαν ἢ καὶ πολιτικόν τι ἢ περὶ τὰ ἴδια συμβόλαια, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἡγούμενον καὶ ὀνομάζοντα δικαίαν μὲν καὶ καλὴν πρᾶξιν ἢ ἂν ταύτην τὴν ἔξιν σφῶν τε καὶ συναπεργάζεται, σοφίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν ταύτῃ τῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμην, ἀδικον δὲ πρᾶξιν ἢ ἂν αἰεὶ ταύτην λύῃ, ἀμαθίαν δὲ τὴν ταύτῃ αὖ ἐπιστατοῦσαν δόξαν. (R. 443c9–444a2)

The truth, it seems, is that justice is something of this sort, however it does not involve the external doing of what belongs to *oneself*, but the internal doing, which really concerns *oneself* and what belongs to *oneself*, and consists in a man not having allowed each thing in *himself* to do what is alien to it, and the principles in the soul to meddle in each other's affairs. Rather, he should manage well what is truly his own, rule and order *himself*, become a friend to *himself* and harmonize three elements just like three notes of a scale—lowest, highest and middle—and if there happen to be other elements in between these, bind together all of them too. And having become one out of many, self-controlled and harmonized, only in such a state should he then engage in action, whether he act concerning the acquisition of money, the care of the body, politically or concerning private business, in all such matters considering and calling just and beautiful the action which preserves this condition and helps produce it, and wisdom the knowledge which presides over such conduct, while considering and calling unjust the action which always undoes this state, and ignorance the opinion which in turn presides over it.

⁸² Cf. Inwood (2005) 303: 'Freedom in Greek philosophical thought, especially in Stoicism, is an internalization of a social and political reality.'

The internalisation is clearly signed by the contrast between the ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ forms of *πραξις τῶν ἑαυτοῦ*.⁸³ Only the inside form truly concerns the self and what belongs to the self (ὥς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ).⁸⁴ As if the divisions of the soul were citizens in a city, the just person should allow each to do its own business but not to interfere with others, and in doing so rule and order himself, as well as become a friend to himself. Earlier the suggestion that justice is the greatest of goods that the soul contains within itself, while injustice the greatest of evils, was stretched to a utopian possibility; if it were inculcated in humans from a young age, we would become perfect self-regulating machines:

οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος ἄριστος φύλαξ, δεδιὼς μὴ ἀδικῶν τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ σύνοικος ἦ.
(R. 367a2–4)

We wouldn’t be guarding each other from doing wrong, but each person would be the best guard of *himself*, afraid of having to live with the greatest evil by committing wrong.

In this situation a person would be most concerned with the injustice he does to himself, his soul. These words are spoken by Glaucon’s brother Adeimantus, who seeks from Socrates not some account of justice’s indirect benefits, whether they be a good reputation, honours, gifts etc., but a more fundamental account of justice’s effects *in and of itself* on the soul, excepting the gaze of gods and men. Socrates sets out his tripartite theory of the soul, the harmonic union of which constitutes justice, to answer this challenge. Just like Democritus, he is looking for a moral sanction outside the other-directed gaze of gods and men that, sunk deep into the self, requires less social context in order to operate. As I proposed in that section, such a sanction is required because the gaze of the other has retreated as the individual’s praxis has been privatised into *πραξις*

⁸³ The internalisation of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ figured here is followed up and adapted by Stoicism, which stores one’s true *propria*, especially virtue, in the self, where they are inalienable and cannot be plundered like merely adventitious *propria*. E.g. Sen. *Constant.* 5.7: *at ille victoriam illi [regi] excussit et se urbe capta non invictum tantum sed indemnem esse testatus est. habebat enim vera secum bona, in quae non est manus iniectio, at quae dissipata et direpta ferebantur, non iudicabat sua sed adventicia et nutum fortunae sequentia. ideo ut non propria dilexerat; omnium enim extrinsecus adfluentium lubrica et incerta possessio est.*

⁸⁴ For an internalised sense of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.61: Σωκράτης δὲ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου τὰ ἑαυτοῦ [according to Gantar (1966) 159 his *Seelenvermögen*] δαπανῶν τὰ μέγιστα πάντα τοὺς βουλομένους ὠφέλει.

τῶν ἑαυτοῦ. For moral regulation to persist in this new milieu, it must shift its basis to the self, and prioritise its care before care of the body, political duties, etc.

Platonic epistemology and ethics thus continue the inversion of traditional hierarchies by founding themselves in acts of self-relation. One must first know oneself or care for oneself before one can know or care for others, and success in the latter rests on success in the former. In his apology, Socrates depicts the foundation of ethics in care of self as his life's teaching, describing himself as

ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μῆτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθεῖν ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μῆτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.⁸⁵ (Ap. 36c5–d1)

trying to persuade each of you not to care for any of your property until you took care of *yourself*—with the goal of being as excellent and wise as possible—and not to care for the property of the city before the city itself, and to care for other things in the same way.

The reflexivisation of other-directed structures is part of what may be termed a wider turn to soul, the broad context which also gives us, for example, Democritus' transference of traditionally other-determined states that come from without, such as happiness and misfortune, to the soul.⁸⁶ It makes heavy use of the PRS insofar as the complex reflexive

⁸⁵ Cf. *Phdr.* 229e5–230a1 for the same attitude regarding epistemology: οὐ δύναμαι ποῦ κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνῶναι ἑμᾶυτόν· γελοῖον δὴ μοι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἄλλότρια σκοπεῖν. Note also Confucius (*Analec*s XIII 13, trans. Lau (1979)), who also prioritises spiritual care of self before political care of others: 'If a man manages to make himself correct, what difficulty will there be for him to take part in government? If he cannot make himself correct, what business has he with making others correct?'

⁸⁶ See especially Democr. B170: εὐδαιμονίη ψυχῆς καὶ κακοδαιμονίη. Both blessedness and misfortune are here expressed as compounds of δαίμων, the divine power controlling the destiny of individuals. Hence εὐδαιμονίη is the state of having a favourable guardian spirit, κακοδαιμονίη a hostile one. But Democritus, in quite radical fashion, internalises this power by locating it in the soul. As a property of the soul, it is determined by human agency (see Democr. B175). The idea first emerges in Heraclitus (B119), ἧθος ἀνθρώπων δαίμων, where it contrasts with the Homeric view of man's action as largely determined by the external forces of gods, *daimones*, etc. Cf. Menander's (*Mon.* 132 Edmonds) comic application of it: δαίμων ἑμᾶυτῷ γέγονα γήμης πλουσίαν—in turn a positive take on the notion of being-for-oneself offered at E. *Alc.* 685–686; and Ov. *Met.* 8.72–73: *sibi quisque profecto | est deus: ignavis precibus Fortuna repugnat*. According to Kahn (1979) 261, 'The cause [of our destiny] is not in the stars but in ourselves.' Note also Isocrates' (2.20) claim that the gods are more impressed by self-improvement than other offerings: ἡγοῦ δὲ θύμα τοῦτο κάλλιστον εἶναι καὶ θεραπείαν μεγίστην, ἂν ὡς

flags unexpected coreference. A symbiosis exists between the complex reflexive's semantics and the unexpected replacement of another with the self as an inversion of traditional relational practices.

It is clear from the argument in the above passage that *ἑαυτοῦ* and *αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως* are parallel, which suggests a reading of the reflexive as *ἑοῦ αὐτοῦ* and use of *αὐτός* as the ontological intensive⁸⁷ marking ideal forms, a reading that appears again in 1 *Alcibiades*. What one should care for first is the form of the person that is oneself, just as one should care first for the form of the city. Thus Plato's use of *αὐτός* to identify forms influences his interpretation of that same morpheme in the complex reflexive: the complex reflexive is to the person, or myself is to me, as the city in-itself is to the city. The semantics of the complex reflexive draws on the theory of forms, or the philosophical use of the intensive more generally—it refers to the person essentialised.

e. Self-Directed Speech, Intellectual, and Ethical Acts

I have already touched on the definition of thought as soul's conversation with itself. Self-directed intellectual activity is characteristic of the reflective mode of philosophy more generally, and reflexive pronouns are often found with verbs denoting these kinds of acts.⁸⁸ What I claimed above in the case of the use of the reflexive pronoun with the preposition 'in', that these phrases are different in flavour from constructions with other psychological agents, I believe also applies here: speaking to oneself, asking oneself, and examining oneself must be distinguished from speaking to one's heart, asking one's heart, or examining one's heart. The difference again lies in the special identity relation between the reflexive and its antecedent, which declares a subjective unity and renders any potential division in the subject a problem which requires resolution. Moreover, as

βέλτιστον καὶ δικαιοτάτον σαντὸν παρέχῃς· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐλπὶς τοὺς τοιούτους ἢ τοὺς ἱερεῖα πολλὰ καταβάλλοντας πράξιν τι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀγαθόν. Finally, cf. Aurelius, who commonly speaks of the divine power residing within a person, ὁ ἔνδον δαίμων (e.g. *Med.* 2.13.1, 2.17.2, 3.16.2 Farquharson; note also the addition of a possessive reflexive at 2.13.1, 3.12.1, 12.3.2). At 7.17 he defines happiness (εὐδαιμονία) as a δαίμων ἀγαθός, possibly alluding to Chrysipp. *fr. mor.* 4 von Arnim, where the virtue of the happy man (εὐδαιμόνος) is constituted as a function of one's internal δαίμων, viz. its harmony with the will of the universe's ruler.

⁸⁷ I.e. where the intensive makes its contrast within an internal domain as outlined in Ch. 2.2.

⁸⁸ Isocrates (3.8) characterises the sage as those best at conversing with themselves: εὐβούλους δὲ νομίζομεν οἵτινες ἂν αὐτοὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἄριστα περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διαλεχθῶσιν.

argued above, in intellectual contexts the complex reflexive may be interpreted as a transparent combination of pronoun plus intensifier, which returns a sense of the reflexive as an essentialised version of the subject.

As an example, consider the following from *Theaetetus*, which is replete with self-directed speech and intellectual acts. The topic is intellectual judgement (and the paradox of false opinion), which is again defined as silent talking to oneself. The soul and the person interchange as the reflexive subject:

ΣΩ. λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. ὥς γε μὴ εἰδὼς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοουμένη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπάξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστ' ἔγωγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὐτόν: σὺ δὲ τί;

ΘΕ. καγώ.

ΣΩ. ὅταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζῃ, καὶ φησὶν, ὥς ἔοικε, τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν.

ΘΕ. τί μήν;

ΣΩ. ἀναμνησκου δὴ εἰ πώποτ' εἶπες πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τό τοι καλὸν αἰσχροὺν ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἄδικον δίκαιον. ἢ καί, τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον, σκόπει εἴ ποτ' ἐπεχείρησας σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὥς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἢ πᾶν τοῦναντίον οὐδ' ἐν ὕπνῳ πώποτε ἐτόλμῃσας εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὥς παντάπασιν ἄρα τὰ περιττὰ ἄρτιά ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

ΘΕ. ἀληθὴ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. ἄλλον δὲ τίνα οἶε ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον τολμῆσαι σπουδῇ πρὸς ἑαυτόν εἰπεῖν ἀναπείθοντα αὐτόν ὥς ἀνάγκη τὸν βούν ἵππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἓν;⁸⁹

(*Tht.* 189e6–190c2)

SOCRATES: A speech which the soul by *itself* goes through before *itself* about whatever it is examining. As one who does not know, of course, I'm declaring it to you. Soul thinking looks to me as nothing else than conversing, *itself* asking and answering *itself*, and affirming and denying. But whenever it has come to a determination, regardless of whether its sally was on the slow or keen side, and then asserts the same thing and does not stand apart in doubt, we set this down as its opinion. Consequently, I for one call opining speaking, and opinion a stated speech; it's not,

⁸⁹ For further examples of speaking to oneself, see *Phlb.* 38d2.

however, before someone else any more than it's with sound, but in silence before oneself. But what of you?

THEAETETUS: I too.

SOCRATES: So whenever someone opines the other as an other, he then asserts before *himself*, it seems, the other is an other.

THEAETETUS: Why certainly.

SOCRATES: Then go ahead and recall whether you ever said before *yourself*, "It's as certain as can be, you see, the beautiful is ugly," or, "The unjust is just." Or even, and this is the chief point, consider whether you ever did try to persuade *yourself*, "It's as certain as can be, the other is an other." Or it's wholly the contrary, that not even asleep did you ever yet get the nerve to say before *yourself*, "It's altogether so after all, the odd is even," or anything else of the sort.

THEAETETUS: What you say is true.

SOCRATES: But do you believe that anyone else, whether healthy or crazy, had the nerve to speak before *himself* in all seriousness in persuading *himself* that it's a necessity for the ox to be a horse or the two one?⁹⁰

One sees in this exchange the pervasive reflexivisation of speech acts and the portrayal of judgment as the outcome of internalised dialogue, and these reflexive acts are appropriately assigned to the soul as a reflexive being. But the speech act whose reflexivisation is of particular moment for philosophy is *ὁμολογέω*. A *λόγος* is developed and probed by the dialectical method in such a way that it finally shows itself either self-consistent or self-contradictory. This enterprising step is sibling to Parmenides' reduction of the conditions of being to the conditions of thinking: in both methods truth has become in the first instance a property of a certain reflexive relation in thought and language, from which truth in the world is then inferred. If the *λόγος* is consistent with itself then such and such has to be the case in reality. This is an idea crucial to intellectual history, as self-contradiction is commonly held to be fatal for truth in the various forms of discursive thought that have developed since.⁹¹ Even in areas which are avowedly *a posteriori*, or empirical, self-consistency constrains the set of tenable hypotheses for an observed phenomenon.

Though this position may seem to us, embedded as we are in its legacy, self-evidently unassailable, it is nevertheless a metaphysical position.

⁹⁰ Trans. Benardete (1984).

⁹¹ For the importance of the emergence of self-refutation and self-agreement as criteria for falsehood and truth, see Hermann (2004) 7–8, who finds them first being applied by Parmenides.

Nothing (or at least nothing *logical*) guarantees that the self-consistency of the λόγος should map onto the world. The idealist will naturally claim that the world is logical because it is categorically organised by the λόγος internal to human beings which sets the limits of the representable. On the other hand, could it be that the world is at least in part, or indeed even as a whole, self-contradictory in such a way that a self-consistent λόγος does not apprehend it at all and is little more than an elegant picture of the human mind? One may naturally appeal to the technological success of this method for such a guarantee, but if a deeper justification is sought which passes beyond the pragmatic while also avoiding the pitfalls of idealism, a well-trodden path is to propose that the world is structured according to an inherent λόγος that human argument mirrors, or is an extension of, when practised according to certain rules. Platonic thought, and Christianity following it, is famous for depositing this λόγος in the guarantee of God, but a cosmic λόγος is often tacitly assumed even in the most secular of sciences.⁹² While making no claims as to the ultimate origin of this λόγος, every new scientific success in rendering account of a physical phenomenon, by precisely demonstrating that such a phenomenon admits of an account—or in the Greek idiom, that it has λόγος—proves the intelligibility and logic of the world in some new degree, and reaffirms the uncanny affinity between the structure of the world and human thought.

As a metaphysical condition of truth, self-agreement entwines with other reflexive properties, especially self-identity when understood as an intellectual function, a function of λόγος. The highest beings are marked by their having the same thoughts about the same things; insofar as such beings are constituted by these thoughts, such self-agreement translates into their own self-identity from one moment to the next.⁹³ The

⁹² For example in the conviction that the world is explicable in rational terms (Leibniz's *nihil fit sine ratione*), which seems a necessary assumption before even bothering with scientific endeavour in the first place. One can induce this from the success of the method in providing explanation so far, but this induction will provide only a weak ground.

⁹³ A member of the divine class of beings is depicted as *περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ* διανοοῦμένῳ (*Ti.* 40a8–b1), where the reflexive refers to the identity of such a being and strictly complements the phrase *τὰ αὐτά*. The idea that it thinks thoughts which are the same as itself appears to identify what it thinks and what it is. For a more contemporary formulation of the idea of self-agreement in thought leading to self-identity, we can compare the way a more or less consistent set of opinions and tastes forms a human persona. It is in large part the very act of giving the same λόγος to oneself and others concerning the same subject—for instance, a political opinion concerning

reflexivisation of intellectual and speech acts, especially those of questioning, interrogating, and examining, is therefore concerned with forming a stable identity that mirrors the immutability of the gods by ironing out contradictions in λόγος. A person cannot believe *p* and not *p* simultaneously without being split into two fragments or levels, each of which contradicts the other.⁹⁴ Hence self-agreement, and the dialectic technique which fosters it, is an important therapeutic art for producing a unified intellectual subject. As Socrates states in the *Gorgias*, to be disharmonious with himself is anathema, much worse than other forms of discordance:

καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀνάρμοστόν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοῖν, καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἓνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἑμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν. (Grg. 482b7–c3)

And yet I believe, good fellow, that it would be better for me to have my lyre, or some chorus I had defrayed for the public, out of tune and making a cacophony; better to have the majority of men disagree with and contradict me, than for me, being one, to be discordant with and contradict *myself*.

Furthermore, in the fray of philosophical debate, the logical and normative decrees for self-consistency find partnership with the motif of tragic reflexivity explored in Chapter 6 to provide a poetic way of expressing hypocritical and self-contradictory argument. Unsheathed by a philosopher to demolish another's position, this same weapon ends up demolishing his own. The demolition involves an implicit violation of the self-consistency constraint on a philosophical *logos*, because an argument that cannot withstand the attacks that arise from itself and are aimed at others is internally unstable. The best examples come from Plutarch's *Adversus Colotem*, but one imagines that similar argumentative tactics would have been current in the polemical philosophising of Plato's own day. The following passage will suffice to exemplify this usage:

the utility of war—that constructs a person as a stable entity. Even where we change our opinions, we do not simply state outright that before time *t* I thought *x*, but ever since I have thought *y*, the two positions being separated by a chasm that is never bridged by some kind of narrative—we are prone rather to give an account (if not overtly to others, at least to ourselves) of our transformation, and to tell a story that connects our self before that time to the our self after that time: 'I used to think that until I experienced such and such', etc. Cf. MacIntyre (1984) 216–217, quoted in Martin and Barresi (2006) 278: '[The self's identity] is just that identity presupposed by the unity of the character which the unity of narrative requires.'

⁹⁴ See McCabe (1994) 276–277.

ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ καθάπερ ὁ Λυδὸς ἐφ' αὐτὸν ἀνοίγειν οὐ θύραν μίαν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν ἀποριῶν καὶ μεγίσταις περιβάλλειν τὸν Ἐπίκουρον.
(Plu. *Adv. Col.* 1108d11–e1 Pohlenz-Westman)

He seems to me to be opening, just as the Lydian, more than one door against *himself*, nay, to be implicating Epicurus in the greatest and gravest difficulties.

The phrase is proverbial and Einarson and De Lacy identify the Lydian as Gyges' king Candaules, whose story is told by Herodotus (1.9.2, 12.1).⁹⁵ Gyges hides behind the same door to murder Candaules which Candaules had him hide behind to watch his wife disrobe. Further on at *Adv. Col.* 1110e, Plutarch talks of Colotes dumping on himself and his master the slime he claimed others are mired in. Here too he goes on to season his argument with a literary flourish, quoting a Euripidean fragment.⁹⁶ The alliance of tragic reflexivity and self-contradiction could hardly be more self-conscious.

Plato also reflexivises ethical acts which are prototypically other-directed to generate a linguistic toolkit sharpened to express the normative task of self-improvement. He is motivated, in the words of Gerson, by the view that the embodied person can 'strive to transform themselves into their own ideal'.⁹⁷ The emergence of this idea helps explain the reflexivisation of the vocabulary of pejorative evaluation conspicuous in the dialogues, for one cannot find fault with oneself without presupposing an idealised self-image that one has failed to live up to.⁹⁸ Take for example the following passage from the *Laws*:

εἰ δέ τι καὶ βραχὺ προὔργου πεποιήκαμεν εἰς τὸ πείθειν πῃ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἑαυτοὺς μὲν μισῆσαι, τὰ δ' ἐναντία πως ἦθη στέρξαι, καλῶς ἡμῖν εἰρημένον ἂν εἴη τὸ προοίμιον ἀσεβείας περὶ νόμων. (Lg. 907c5–d1)

If we have made even a small contribution to persuading the men to hate *themselves* and love in some way the opposite sort of character, then the prelude to the laws concerning impiety would have been spoken by us to good effect.

⁹⁵ Einarson and De Lacy (1967) ad loc.

⁹⁶ E. fr. 1086 Nauck: ἄλλων ἱατρὸς αὐτὸς ἔλκεσιν βρῶων.

⁹⁷ (2003) 4.

⁹⁸ Cf. the reflexivisation of αἰτιάομαι: *Phd.* 85d5, 90d3; *R.* 619c4; *Tht.* 150e2, 168a2; μέφομαι: *Prt.* 339d8; καταμέφομαι: *Men.* 71b2; ὀργίζομαι: *Ap.* 23c8; *Hp. Ma.* 286d4; μισέω: *R.* 486c11; *Tht.* 168a5. For an example of how such language is taken over by the subsequent tradition, cf. Epictetus' (*Arr. Epict.* 2.22.35–6 Schenkl) reflexivisation of verbs of maltreatment to depict dereliction of self-care and the cultivated person's freedom from these various forms of self-torment: καὶ οὕτως ἔσται πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ μὴ λαιδορούμενος, μὴ μαχόμενος, μὴ μετανοῶν, μὴ βασανίζων ἑαυτόν.

Impious men are to be persuaded to despise their own inner character and reform themselves. When certain ethical relations are reflexivised, various sorts of ideal self-model are implemented in which the reflexive references a part or image of the subject that ought to be transformed or conserved. This notion of a perfectible self is certainly not a cultural universal. For example the great anthropologist Bill Stanner writes of Aboriginal Australia: '[Traditional aboriginal life] knew nothing, and could not, I think, have known anything of the Christian's straining for inner perfection; of "moral man and immoral society"; of the dilemma of liberty and authority; of intellectual uncertainty, class warfare, and discontent with one's lot in life—all of which, in some sense, are problems of the gap between Ideal and Real.'⁹⁹ In its development of a language of normative relationship with self, Plato's philosophy presents an early example of the construction of the idealised self.

One final example will suffice to further consolidate our point. We have already in Ch. 5 considered the lexicalisation of conscience as 'knowing with oneself', especially regarding developing notions of guilt in the context of an evolving legal discourse. Linked with this category is the idea of self-forgiveness. When the discussion in the *Republic* turns to the value of myths teaching that Peleus 'possessed in himself two contradictory moral diseases (ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ νοσήματα δύο), a money-grubbing lack of generosity and excessive arrogance towards gods and men,'¹⁰⁰ and that 'the gods beget evils and heroes are no better than normal people,'¹⁰¹ it is concluded that these are harmful to those who hear them:

πᾶς γὰρ ἑαυτῷ συγγνώμην ἔξει κακῷ ὄντι, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα
 πράττουσιν τε καὶ ἔπραττον καὶ—“... οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι ...”
 (R. 391e4–7)

For every person will forgive *himself* for being bad once persuaded that even the close kin of the gods do and used to do such things.

4. *The Reflexivity of Macrocosmic Beings*

Alongside the soul, another important reflexive entity in the cosmology of the *Timaeus* is the global living creature which contains all the other

⁹⁹ (1979) 'The dreaming', p. 36.

¹⁰⁰ R. 391c4.

¹⁰¹ R. 391d6–7.

living creatures. We see again the familiar reflexivity of beings high in the ontic hierarchy, and especially self-sufficiency as a divine ideal.¹⁰² The following passage depicts the nature of its creation by the demiurge.

τῷ δὲ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ ζῶα περιέχειν μέλλοντι ζῶφ πρέπον ἄν εἴη σχῆμα τὸ περιειληφὸς ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα ὁπόσα σχήματα· διὸ καὶ σφαιροειδές, ἐκ μέσου πάντη πρὸς τὰς τελευτὰς ἴσον ἀπέχον, κυκλοτερές αὐτὸ ἐτορνεύσατο, πάντων τελεώτατον ὁμοιότατόν τε αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ σχημάτων, νομίσας μυρίῳ κάλλιον ὅμοιον ἀνομοίου. λείον δὲ δὴ κύκλῳ πᾶν ἔξωθεν αὐτὸ ἀπηκριβοῦτο πολλῶν χάριν. ὁμμάτων τε γὰρ ἐπεδείκτο οὐδέν, ὁρατὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ὑπελείπετο ἔξωθεν, οὐδ' ἀκοῆς, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκουστόν· πνεῦμα τε οὐκ ἦν περιεσπὸς δεόμενον ἀναπνοῆς, οὐδ' αὖ τινος ἐπιδεδῆς ἦν ὀργάνου σχεῖν ᾧ τὴν μὲν εἰς ἑαυτὸ τροφήν δέξοιτο, τὴν δὲ πρότερον ἐξικμασμένην ἀποπέμψοι πάλιν. ἀπήει τε γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ προσήειν αὐτῷ ποθεν—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν—αὐτὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τροφήν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φθίσιον παρέχον καὶ πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ πάσχον καὶ θρῶν ἐκ τέχνης γέγονεν· ἡγήσατο γὰρ αὐτὸ ὁ συνθεὶς αὐταρκεῖς ὃν ἄμεινον ἔσεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ προσδεῖς ἄλλων. (Ti. 33b2–d3)

For the living creature that was to embrace all living creatures within *itself*, the fitting shape would be the figure that comprehends in *itself* all the figures there are; accordingly, he turned its shape rounded and spherical, equidistant every way from centre to extremity—a figure the most perfect and like *itself* of all; for he judged uniformity to be immeasurably better than its opposite. And all round on the outside he made it perfectly smooth, for several reasons. It had no need of eyes, for nothing visible was left outside; nor of hearing, for there was nothing outside to be heard. There was no surrounding air to require breathing, nor yet was it in need of any organ by which to receive food into itself or to discharge it again when drained of its juices. For nothing went out or came into it from anywhere, since there was nothing: it was designed to feed *itself* on its own waste and to act and be acted upon entirely by *itself* and within *itself*; because its framer thought that it would be better *self-sufficient*, rather than dependent upon anything else.¹⁰³

The living world is imagined as the ultimate self-sufficient organism.¹⁰⁴ Because it contains the whole of living creation within itself, nothing exists outside of it for which it would need external sense organs to

¹⁰² Cf. especially the reflexive characterisation of οὐρανός at Ti. 34b4–8: καὶ κύκλῳ δὴ κύκλον στρεφόμενον οὐρανὸν ἓνα μόνον ἔρημον [ὁ δημιουργός] κατέστησεν, δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον συγγίγνεσθαι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἐτέρου προσδεόμενον, γνώριμον δὲ καὶ φίλον ἱκανῶς αὐτὸν αὐτῷ.

¹⁰³ Trans. Cornford (1935), adapted.

¹⁰⁴ For the radical metabolic self-sufficiency of the universe, which functions as a perfectly closed ecosystem, cf. M. Aur. *Med.* 8.50 Farquharson.

detect. The shape of the sphere, just as in the case of the circular revolutions that constitute soul, is deployed as the stereometric image of reflexivity. Just like the philosopher's soul, the tension of its surface seems to be focussed inwards.¹⁰⁵ Since nothing enters or leaves it, it is self-sustaining, feeding on its own waste. But what's more, this reflexivity is generalised to everything it experiences: everything it does and suffers plays out within and by itself, and the heavy anaphora of the reflexive within the one clause (four reflexives plus the intensifier) indicates the depth and degree of its reflexivity. Again, the conception of totalities naturally leads to them being thought of as essentially reflexive: with nothing left over, there is nothing with which a totality could have a disjoint, non-reflexive relation, so that all that remains is for it to have a relation with itself.

The idea of divine self-sufficiency taps into the current of thought, discussed in Chapter 4, that is fond of establishing reflexive ἀρχαί. It applies, just as the attribute of being αὐτογενής, to whatever is highest in a particular system. This is especially obvious in the philosophy of Philo, who, gesturing to his Neoplatonic leanings, characterises god as radically self-sufficient. Similarly to Plato's living world, god is not even in need of external organs for perception:

ὁφθαλμῶν γε μὴν οὐκ ἔδεῖτο, οἷς ἄνευ φωτὸς αἰσθητοῦ κατάληψις οὐ γίνεται· τὸ δὲ αἰσθητὸν φῶς γενητόν, ἑώρα δὲ ὁ θεὸς καὶ πρὸ γενέσεως φωτὶ χρώμενος ἑαυτῷ. (Philo *Deus* 58–59 CW)

He didn't need eyes, which cannot perceive without sensible light. Sensible light is created, and god saw before creation by using *himself* as light.

ἔστι γὰρ ὁ μὲν θεὸς ἀνεπιδείης, οὐδενὸς χρεῖος ὢν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὐταρκέστατος ἑαυτῷ.¹⁰⁶ (Philo *Virt.* 9 CW)

For god is without lack, being in need of nothing, but *himself* most *self-sufficient* to *himself*.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. the depiction of the living cosmos at *Plt.* 273a7–b2: ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ κράτος ἔχων αὐτὸς τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, τὴν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἀπομνημονεύων διδασχὴν εἰς δύναμιν. It has been weened from the creator as helmsman and now left to direct itself, which it does admirably at first since its memory of his teachings is fresh. Its care for and control over itself and the things in itself is a macrocosmic image of the philosopher who exercises care of self and control over what resides and transpires in his soul.

¹⁰⁶ Note the triple anaphora of αὐτός in the phrase αὐτὸς αὐταρκέστατος ἑαυτῷ, where αὐτός and ἑαυτῷ might seem pleonastic, as though the writer cannot emphasise greatly enough the reflexive self-sufficiency of god.

As the only self-sufficient being, and the only principle of generation, god is the only being that can produce ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ.¹⁰⁷ Even thoughts and impressions, which would otherwise be viewed as spontaneously generated by the thinker, are not strictly self-generated:

μάταιος δὲ ὁ νομίζων πρὸς τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ τι συνόλως γεννᾶσθαι ἢ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ. (Philo *Leg.* 2.46 CW)

But foolish is he who thinks as the true account that anything is entirely generated from the mind or from *himself*.

This is of course an extreme position and serves to highlight the radical dependency of the human on the other of god, and god's dependency on no one except himself. But like Plato, Philo also transfers the reflexive attributes of his highest being, god, to the highest of faculties in humans. Thus he writes of the rule of νοῦς over the lesser faculties:

ἡ ἐβδόμη δύναμις ἡ περὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν, ὃς ὅταν ἐπικυδέστερος γένηται τῶν ἕξι καὶ δυνατωτερᾷ ῥώμῃ κατακρατήσας ἀναχωρήσῃ, μόνωσιν ἀσπασάμενος καὶ ταῖς ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν (χαίρων) ὁμιλίαις ὡς ἀπροσδεῖς ὧν ἐτέρου καὶ ἀνταρχέστατος ἑαυτῷ, τηνικαῦτα φροντῖδων καὶ πραγματειῶν ἀπαλλαγείς τῶν ἐν τῷ θνητῷ γένει βίον εὐδιον καὶ γαλήνῳ ἀσπάζεται. (Philo *Abr.* 30 CW)

The seventh faculty concerns the ruling mind, which, when it becomes more triumphant than the six and withdraws after gaining mastery through its superior strength, having embraced solitude and rejoicing in spending time with *itself*, being in no need of another and most *self-sufficient* to *itself*, at that time is released from the cares and troubles that exist in the mortal race and welcomes a calm and serene life.

Νοῦς rejoices in the association of itself with itself, and needing no other is self-sufficient. Its characterisation is almost identical with that of god in the passage quoted above. Socrates' description of the philosophising soul in Plato's *Phaedo* is an obvious antecedent, and one may also detect a hint of Anaxagoras' Νοῦς as μόνος αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑωυτοῦ.¹⁰⁸ The important conclusion for us is that these philosophical foundations or ἀρχαί are acquiring reflexivity just as the human subject which thinks them is

¹⁰⁷ Though he also characterises the cosmos as self-sufficient (*Aet.* 74 CW). Philo is not strictly monotheistic in our sense, but admits the divinity of the planets and stars, as well as, like Plato, the cosmos as a whole. He would presumably rationalise the cosmos' self-sufficiency as ultimately inherited from its maker. All such observations contribute to our more general point, that whatever is considered divine is also considered highly self-sufficient.

¹⁰⁸ *Phd.* 80e4–5: φεύγουσα αὐτὸ [τὸ σῶμα] καὶ συνηθροισμένη αὐτὴ εἰς ἑαυτήν. Cf. Philo's poetic periphrasis μόνωσιν ἀσπασάμενος with Anaxagoras' μόνος.

acquiring it also. By Feuerbach's principle, this is good indirect evidence that the human being's conception of itself has become more reflexive and that this change is reflected in a new conception of ideal entities.

5. *The Science of Science and Care
of Self in Charmides and 1 Alcibiades*

The two dialogues whose argument involves a more technical analysis of reflexive structure, and therefore demand a more thorough treatment, are *Charmides* and *1 Alcibiades*. Let us begin with *Charmides*, whose topic is the definition of temperance.

Charmides adopts the popular definition of temperance as doing what belongs to one: σωφροσύνη ἄν εἴη τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν (161b6). Critias takes over from him when he runs into difficulty and goes on to tweak the definition as in fact equivalent to knowing oneself, to prevent the absurdity of being temperate and not knowing that one is being temperate. This self-knowledge is of a rather special kind: it is knowledge of what one knows and does not know (167a). Thus the science of oneself (ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ) becomes a science of science, which includes both itself and the other sciences: μόνη τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αὐτὴ τε αὐτῆς ἐστὶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη (166e5–6). We are now faced with a fully blown meta-science, the possibility of which Socrates seriously questions by analogy with other faculties (δυνάμεις). For example, if one takes the faculty of sight, its objects must possess colour, which would seem to require that sight or vision itself have some colour if it is to see itself, just as it would seem that hearing must possess sound if it is to hear itself. This seems intuitively absurd. Sound is possessed by the objects of hearing, not by hearing itself, which is empty of sound without the appropriate object. However the argument here rests on the transitive conceptual structure that underpins the grammar of faculties. As we have seen, this structure prototypically demands disjoint reference between a thing and its object. The overwhelming predominance of this pattern allows Socrates to treat the ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς as a surface variation of an underlying transitive relation without raising too many objections. The ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς is thus pressed to give the same account of itself as any other type of science:

To this I replied: What you say is true; but I can point out to you what is the peculiar subject of each of these sciences, distinct in each case from the science itself. Thus reckoning, I suppose, is concerned with the even

and the odd in their numerical relations to themselves and to one another, is it not?

Certainly, he said.

And you grant that the odd and the even are different from the actual art of reckoning?

Of course.

And once more, weighing is concerned with the heavier and the lighter weight; but the heavy and the light are different from the actual art of weighing: you agree?

I do.

Then tell me, what is that of which temperance is the science, differing from temperance itself?¹⁰⁹ (Ch. 166a3–b6)

Critias is finding it hard to defend his formulation since the very grammatical nature of it begs an analysis in terms of transitivity, which prototypically requires that subjects and objects be distinct, and therefore that the object of the temperance differ from temperance itself. If one could at this point rally to Critias' cause, it may be argued that what holds for the concrete does not necessarily hold for the abstract, and that Socrates' attempt to assimilate the ἐπιστήμη ἐαυτῆς to other forms of practical knowledge, let alone concrete faculties—and to hold it to the same criteria—ignores a qualitative difference between the two types of structure. In Socrates' view the faculty of vision is itself invisible and contentless, taking colour as its object. But what about vision in its metaphorical sense, for example in the phrase 'I see what you are saying'? Its content here surely is not colour. Indeed when used in this sense its content could be virtually anything.¹¹⁰ If the faculty itself is not nothing, which would of course be absurd, then vision in the metaphorical sense could take itself as its object.

Because Socrates misses this abstraction, namely that there are types of content other the sensual that may become the object of an abstracted perceptual faculty, and therefore misses the possibility of recursive perceptual relations, the promise of dialectic eventually gives way to aporia:

So what we want, my friend, is some great man who will determine to our satisfaction in every respect whether there is nothing in nature so constituted as to have its own faculty applicable to itself, and not only some

¹⁰⁹ Trans. Lamb (1927).

¹¹⁰ So Sorabji (2006) 202, who notes that knowledge may take *any* fact as its object, whereas vision requires colour—the analogy therefore breaks down.

other object, or whether there are some such, and others not such; and whether, again, if there are things that have such relation to themselves, they include a science which we assert to be temperance.¹¹¹

(Ch. 169a1–7)

McKim's interpretation makes the point that Socrates comes to realise that the utility of the knowledge of knowledge is severely limited. It can determine only whether somebody knows something, but not 'whether that person knows *what* he claims to know, for example, medicine.'¹¹² To evaluate this claim, the investigator must himself know the science of medicine. In Socrates' own case, he may know that he lacks knowledge of virtue without knowing the difference between good and evil.¹¹³ But McKim does not consider the power of this knowledge of knowledge when combined with specific types of knowledge like virtue. For then, and only then, does a radical rethink of a specific type of knowledge, in which the whole frame of reference is altered, become possible. For example, to argue, like Nietzsche, that approaching virtue in terms of good and evil is fundamentally mistaken, requires a meta-critical perspective that delegitimises the very status of virtue as knowledge.

While Socrates leaves the science of science to a great man, modernity has taken up its challenge with such gusto that it has become one of the definitive questions of our age. In Foucault's analysis, the science of man heralds the modern intellectual age, an idea comparable to the science of science. To continue Socrates' analogy of vision, by applying the science of science one dissects the preconditions that support and enable the operation of knowledge in the same way an anatomist might dissect the eye in order to discover the secrets of its mechanism. The science of man turns around the torch of reason, science's instrument, to illuminate its wielder, hitherto invisible, so long as the object of science had been directed at beings other than man, and man remained in darkness just behind the point of origin of light as its plume expanded outwards.

Figure 3 below gives the recursive procedure which generates a science of man from the science of other-than-man. That which lies outside the scope of science is constituted by what philosophy typically calls the preconditions of science. It is commensurable to the notion of the problematic in critical theory, defined as the structural preconditions determining what a text can and cannot perceive. In this context, the

¹¹¹ Trans. Lamb (1927).

¹¹² McKim (1985) 69.

¹¹³ Ibid., 73.

structural preconditions determine the scope of science, namely what objects it can illuminate and what objects it cannot.




Figure 3. The production of reflexive meta-concepts.

This schema adapts Wittgenstein's diagram of the eye situated just beyond the field of vision's point of origin—an analogous representation of the subject's relation to the world—to include multiple iterations. The propositions accompanying his diagram are edifying:

- 5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.
 5.623 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do *not* see the eye. And nothing *in the visual field* allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.¹¹⁴

Expanding upon Wittgenstein's terms and analogy, the subject limits what can be seen in the 'visual field' of the world. If one wishes to bring the subject into this world, to make it an object of the gaze of the science, one can never introduce it *in toto*. Rather, some subjective limit is always left over. The idea of the evasiveness of the subject to objectification is first intimated by Aristotle, where he attempts to solve the infinite regress of self-awareness spawned when one makes the self an object of the perceptual field,¹¹⁵ and will be dealt with in the next section. For

¹¹⁴ Wittgenstein (1921).

¹¹⁵ *An.* 425b12–28. *Pace* Sorabji (2006) 206, I think he misses an important point when he thinks 'there is nothing objectionable about admitting that one act will be overlooked'

now I wish to consider the general recursive procedure which produces meta-concepts of the form x of x and its relation to reflexivity and transcendental subjects.

Aristotle writes of the self-thinking mind that its thinking is a thinking of thinking (ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις¹¹⁶), with which we may compare Spinoza's definition of consciousness as *idea ideae* and Kant's understanding of the transcendental subject as the form of the form of forms. These meta-concepts are formed when an idea of sufficiently transitive verbal force takes itself as its own object, and my contention is that important aspects of the structure of these meta-concepts stem from the grammatical structure. Apropos the specific problematic of the science of science, so long as *science* conserves its transitive orientation and takes an objective genitive, any reflexively applied science will never fully capture science itself, since the transitive conceptual structure requires some degree of distinctness between its arguments. The structure of a meta-concept is subtly different from that of ordinary reflexive constructions. The difference may be treated schematically as follows:

Meta-concept: $(x_{\text{subject}})[R_{\text{verbal idea}}[(x_{\text{object}})[R_{\text{objectified verbal idea}}]]]$

Reflexive construction: $x_{\text{subject}}[R_{\text{verbal idea}} x_{\text{object}}]$

The bracketed subject in the scheme of the meta-concept signifies that a subject is at least implicitly present. Each reflexive iteration of a meta-concept will therefore also generate a slightly altered instance of the subject. The subject that applies a science of man is therefore formally distinct from the subject that applies a science that does not include himself and is only directed towards what is other than man. This distinction determines the modern subject as a unique creation: 'Man emerges not merely as both subject and object of knowledge, but even more paradoxically, as organizer of the spectacle in which he appears.'¹¹⁷

The philosophical maxim 'Know yourself' is in this way programmatic of the philosophical project as an enquiry into the preconditions of the determining subject. It generates an abstracted sense of 'know' and with it an abstracted sense of the subject, differentiated from its other senses. What Charles Kahn has written of the Heraclitean fragment 'I went in search of myself', that it can only make sense 'if my self

in a chain of self-awareness. This one act is no small thing but the very *ground* of the possibility of all knowledge, the subject *qua* subject. See Jopling (1986) 76.

¹¹⁶ *Met.* 1074b33–34.

¹¹⁷ Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) 29.

is somehow absent, hidden or difficult to find',¹¹⁸ equally concerns the Delphic inscription: knowing yourself cannot merely mean being able to differentiate oneself from any other person, which is a condition of life in general and given, almost tautologically so,¹¹⁹ in every situation. This knowledge must rather be contingent, and its object must be complex and difficult to know. This complexity is generated precisely by the transitive reflexivity that differentiates different parts or senses of the subject. Inwood expresses moderate scepticism towards Kahn's position, arguing that it is overblown:

Can I not somehow need to investigate myself without having a concept of a normative self that is distinct from the enquiring human being or a quasi-Platonic division within one human being? Why should enquiry into myself divide me or alienate me any more than feeding myself, scratching myself, or loving myself does?¹²⁰

In light of the discussion thus far one could reasonably answer negatively to the first question, provided that all that is claimed is a certain division within the human being. Whether the distinct self created by such a division is necessarily normative, or whether the division is necessarily quasi-Platonic, is a further matter. To reiterate Kahn's point, if the Heraclitean fragment is not meant in a trivial and absurdly tautological sense (as in the expression, 'I went looking for my hand'), then the searcher and what is searched for must in some way be distinct. As to the second question, feeding myself and scratching myself *do* divide the person, just in a way that is so grammatically ingrained, cognitively familiar and everyday that it passes beneath our notice. These expressions make use of what I will call folk dualism, borrowing Lakoff's term. The dualism inherent in these expressions, theoretically stated as a minimal non-identity of the agent and patient, is easily demonstrated.

I scratched my arm → I scratched myself → *my arm scratched myself/itself.

The agent and patient are not completely interchangeable, and thus *not* identical. If they are non-identical, and both contribute to the constitution of the person, the person is divided. It is interesting that there is an asymmetry in degree of substitutability and its direction. The patient is not substitutable for the agent, but 'I', in so far as it is identical to 'myself',

¹¹⁸ Kahn (1979) ad loc.

¹¹⁹ The pronouns already refer to entities in a primary differentiated sense, so that their usage entails this ability to differentiate.

¹²⁰ (2005) 328.

can substitute for 'my arm'. This asymmetry derives from the inanimacy of body-parts, and indeed the body as a whole, in normal contexts. They cannot be selected as volitional agents by verbs that require them, except when the implication of such expressions is an exclusion of the pronoun or noun it stands for as the author of the act. I do not say 'my arm raised itself', unless I mean that it did so without me as a being distinct from my body consciously initiating it to do so, as might happen if I have suffered some kind of spasm. Pronouns and the nouns they replace are higher on the agency hierarchy than the body and its parts, which accounts for the infelicity of 'my arm raised itself' in unmarked contexts where it would simply be equivalent to 'I raised my arm'.

But the division inherent in statements such as 'I went in search of myself', or 'know yourself', on the other hand, is remarkable in that it divides the person not simply from her body but, paradoxically, from what she really is. Operating in the concrete domain, a verb such as 'search for' selects volitional, highly animate agents and objects in the perceptual world of phenomena. But when the volitional, highly animate agent, in its capacity as a subject of consciousness, directs this action of 'searching for' towards itself not as a body, but as just that, a subject of consciousness, the degree of distinctness between agent and patient required by the transitive relation splits the subject. The dualism between mind and body is replicated within the subject herself.

This division often assumes a normative configuration that also makes ontological claims. The person is divided between an ignorant searching subject and a hidden true self marked and differentiated by αὐτός in the compound reflexive. We have seen already how αὐτός as an intensifier may mark the essential form of a thing stripped of its more peripheral relations, limiting the extension of a term in a manner similar to restrictive adjectives, and this semantic function doubtless prepares the passage from αὐτός as an intensive adjective of essence to its nominalisation as the essence of the human being, the *self*. The ontological function of αὐτός within the reflexive is confirmed by the paraphrase of knowing oneself as an indirect question, a transformation in which the reflexive pronoun is moved to the subject position and becomes a pronoun plus αὐτός as intensifier. It occurs in 1 *Alcibiades*,¹²¹ where Socrates argues

¹²¹ The authorship of this dialogue is an ongoing controversy, for which see Denyer (2001) 1–26, who himself favours Platonic authenticity and a date circa 350 BC. Again, authorship is not a substantive issue for us as we are primarily concerned with the ideas themselves which were being canvassed in the Classical period. Nonetheless, a late date

that care of the self cannot proceed without first coming to grips with what this self is, that is, without knowing oneself:

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τίς τέχνη βελτίω ποιεῖ αὐτόν, ἃρ' ἂν ποτε γνοῖμεν ἀγνοοῦντες τί ποτ' ἐσμὲν αὐτοί.

ΑΛ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν δὴ ῥᾶδιον τυγχάνει τὸ γνῶναι ἐαυτόν, καὶ τις ἦν φαῦλος ὁ τοῦτο ἀναθεῖς εἰς τὸν ἐν Πυθοῖ νεών, ἢ χαλεπὸν τι καὶ οὐχὶ παντός;
(*Alc.* 1 128e10–129a4)

SOCRATES: Well then, could we ever know what art makes a person better if we are ignorant of what we *ourselves* are?

ALCIBIADES: Impossible.

SOCRATES: Then does knowing *oneself* happen to be easy, and was the person who inscribed this dedication on the temple at Delphi an imbecile, or is it something difficult and not within everyone's grasp?

Thus the accusative construction 'to know ourselves' can be transformed into another which implements an indirect question, 'to know what we ourselves are', where 'we ourselves' means 'we in our essence'. During the transformation, the αὐτός morpheme in the complex reflexive follows its focus into the nominative case, where it pops up as the intensifier. Finding out what we ourselves are consists mainly in distinguishing oneself (ἐαυτόν) from one's most personal possessions (τὰ ἐαυτοῦ) and is investigated at length in the dialogue through a number of comparisons. It yields the important generalisation that we care for a thing itself with one art, but for the things which belong to it with another—just as we might care for our feet with athletics but with what belongs to our feet with shoemaking.¹²² Here too the essence is separated from its possessions through the intensifier. Socrates goes on to make clear that the body and its parts also belong to the category of personal possessions and not oneself: what one uses must be distinguished from that which uses, and since one uses the body, one must be other than the body.

Elsewhere in Plato the distinction between ἐαυτόν and τὰ ἐαυτοῦ appears more negotiable. Indeed the possessive and non-possessive forms of the reflexive are often phrased together as coordinate arguments of a verb to create the rhetorical and conceptual effect of polyptoton.

for this dialogue might further support our developmental argument since its interest in reflexivity seems to reach new historical heights.

¹²² *Alc.* 1 128d3–4.

We have already seen that the two are partners in an ancient proverb, paraphrased in the *Timaeus* at 72a and given above.¹²³ Conventional idiom would normally have us read τὰ τε αὐτοῦ with πράττειν and ἑαυτὸν with γινῶναι, since these are popular maxims by themselves. But the phrasal structure inclines the expression to a reciprocal reading in which τὰ αὐτοῦ and ἑαυτὸν alternate as arguments of both verbs. This reading might translate as ‘to discern and know oneself and one’s property/affairs/interests, and to act accordingly, belongs to the wise man alone’. The thought/action binary is a staple of Greek thought; it is wisdom to bring these opposed notes into a harmonic chord.

A lengthy excursus is ideally required here which would continue the discussion of τὰ αὐτοῦ begun in previous chapters, but we must stay within the argument’s latitude and be brief. It would pertain to the involvement of the category of private property in the construction of personal identity and the self, and its connection to the processes of urbanisation and colonisation in early Ancient Greece, culminating in the great city states of the Classical age. Τὰ αὐτοῦ and ἑαυτὸν are manufactured as a double, such that a sense and definition of self needs a set of things that belongs to it. It may of course be observed that Plato far from endorses the institution of private property. Bound in his own historical conditioning, he is unaware of the extent to which the material conditions of society, and more particularly that of private property, indirectly or directly mould his notions of the self, and even provide the basis for an idea such as self-cultivation to take shape in the first place.¹²⁴ Indeed it is arguable that the notion of a soul or self takes the concept of the *proprium* to an extreme.¹²⁵ In 1 *Alcibiades*, for example, Socrates invokes a scale of entities proper to the subject, on which the self ranks highest, followed by its possessions, followed by things yet more removed than its possessions:

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πάλιν ὅστις αὖ σῶμα θεραπεύει, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἀλλ’ οὐχ αὐτὸν
 θεραπεύει;

ΑΛ. Κινδυνεύει.

¹²³ P. 225.

¹²⁴ He belies himself by his interpretation of the parts of the soul as τὰ αὐτοῦ and his frequent rhetorical combination of αὐτοῦ and ἑαυτὸν. See *Cra.* 386e3, 440c4; *Ly.* 209c6; *R.* 443d1, 553b2; *Grg.* 481a4, 509b8; *Leg.* 739b6, 913a8, 927c6, 932b1.

¹²⁵ Seneca (*Constant.* 6.3) makes the move explicitly by making oneself one’s only true possession: *unus idemque inter diversa sit nec quicquam suum nisi se putet, et se quoque ea parte qua melior est.*

ΣΩ. "Οστις δέ γε τὰ χρήματα, οὐθ' ἑαυτὸν οὔτε τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι πορρωτέρω τῶν ἑαυτοῦ;

ΑΛ. Ὑπομιγε δοκεῖ.¹²⁶

(*Alc.* 1 131b10–c2)

SOCRATES: Then again whoever tends to his body tends to what belongs to *himself* and not *himself*?

ALCIBIADES: That's likely.

SOCRATES: And whoever tends to his money, tends to neither *himself* nor what belongs to *himself*, but to what is even more remote than what belongs to *himself*.

ALCIBIADES: It seems to me.

In terms of degree of propriety, one's soul ranks higher than one's body, and one's body higher than private property. The scale shows that the self may be understood comparatively as a demarcation of essence that divorces it from metonymy with its other-directed predicates such as possession, and its logic is again indicative of a *conceptual* theory of the human being: an ontological wedge divides the possessor from the possessed just as the abstract concept is divided from the concrete objects that compose it.¹²⁷

Yet in Plato, and indeed in all of extant Greek philosophy (with the exception of the covert signs of the impending nominalisation of the reflexive morpheme that we have been considering) ψυχή is the favoured term for the agentive essence of the human being. Indeed, when Socrates seeks to identify the entity that is the focus of reflexive cultivation, the person and reflexive pronoun are simply equated outright with the soul.¹²⁸ Nevertheless, Socrates' framing of the question which he thinks might help pinpoint the reflexive's reference appears to nominalise the reflexive morpheme, if only in passing. For following the passage cited above, in which it is concluded that I cannot begin to work out what will make me into a better person without first knowing what I myself am, the answer to the identity of the person is seen to hinge upon the denotation of the reflexive/intensive morpheme:

¹²⁶ Cf. *Ap.* 36c5–d1 for the distinction between ἑαυτόν and τὰ ἑαυτοῦ and the precedence of the former.

¹²⁷ This way of thought also leads to what Barthes calls the ideology of the person, the belief that the individual remains as an atomic residue after all predicative classifications have been removed.

¹²⁸ *Alc.* 1 130d8–10: οὐκοῦν καλῶς ἔχει οὕτω νομίζειν, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ προσομιλεῖν ἀλλήλοις τοῖς λόγοις χρωμένους τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν.

Φέρε δὴ, τίν' ἂν τρόπον εὐρεθείη αὐτὸ ταῦτό; οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἂν τάχ' εὕρομεν τί ποτ' ἔσμεν αὐτοί, τούτου δ' ἔτι ὄντες ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ἀδύνατοί που.
(*Alc.* 1 129b1–3)

Come then, in what way could the *itself itself* be discovered? For by this method we could perhaps discover what we ourselves are, but so long as we are in ignorance of this, we will be incapable of doing so.

The phrase αὐτὸ ταῦτό is sometimes translated 'the self itself'. The logic is that if we can find out what 'ourselves' refers to, we can find out what 'we ourselves' are. But knowledge of αὐτὸ ταῦτό is more demanding than just this. The addition of the intensifier to the nominalisation makes it clear that the search is looking for the general form of the αὐτό, not merely one particular self among others, in accordance with typical Platonic usage. In the words of Denyer:

Thus 'to discover the itself itself' would be to find a formula which spells out the common feature of those cases in which the expression αὐτός can rightly be applied. This formula would explain the common feature that entitles us to speak of e.g. the *Oresteia* itself (as opposed to e.g. its various productions and performances), of Athens itself (as opposed to e.g. her various territories and inhabitants), and in particular Alcibiades himself (as opposed to e.g. his various possessions and organs).¹²⁹

Denyer translates αὐτὸ ταῦτό as 'the itself itself', and so eschews any false associations with consciousness and reflexivity that the word 'self' would import. His interpretation is cited approvingly by Inwood, who criticises Foucault's insistence that the phrase is to be read with precisely these associations.¹³⁰ What Foucault is claiming, in Inwood's words, is 'that the relation of reflexivity involved in taking care of oneself is itself an independent object of enquiry, the 'subject' or the 'self' in a robust sense.'¹³¹ I think the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Foucault is too eager to see modern notions of the self in this text, Inwood and Denyer too reluctant.

On the side of Foucault, a number of points can be made. Though, according to Inwood, very little argument is offered in support of this reading, Foucault's underlying intuition seems to me correct. Inwood's criticism relies on an overly rigorous separation of αὐτός as intensifier and αὐτός as reflexive marker. I hope that the argument of this work so

¹²⁹ Denyer (2001) 212.

¹³⁰ Inwood (2005) 335–336, critiquing Foucault (1981–1982) 52–60.

¹³¹ Inwood (2005) 335.

far has weakened the grounds for just such a separation. The complex reflexive is after all a combination of pronoun and intensifier, and in situations of self-fashioning the intensive semantics of αὐτός are retained: 'know yourself' is equivalent to 'know what you yourself are'. The play of substitution throughout the relevant passage between αὐτός as intensifier and αὐτός as reflexive marker more than demonstrates their conceptual affiliation. Indeed it is a central aim of the enquiry to address the question of the reflexive's reference in the idea of care for oneself. And even if one for the moment accepts Inwood's point that the nominalisation is of the intensive, not the reflexive, a more thorough investigation of how the intensive works in ontological contexts to distinguish subjects from properties will eventually lead us back to the reflexive. Used in its ontological sense, αὐτός marks the essence of a thing and abstracts it from its external relations, placing it in relation with itself, καθ' αὐτό.

Nevertheless, some deflation of Foucault's argument is in order. Nowhere else in Plato is αὐτός nominalised (and a gendered form is not found until Aristotle), so that the novelty here appears more attributable to the vagaries of passing context than to any systematic interrogation. If this question was a matter of central concern, it surely would have surfaced elsewhere. But perhaps most tellingly, at the point where the dialogue begs and seduces the modern mind into anticipating the materialisation of the reflexive subject, named ὁ αὐτός and sealed to the reflexive pronoun, Socrates is quick to bring the argument back into his philosophical comfort zone. Where he diverges from the modern is precisely where he equates the reflexive pronoun, and the human subject, with the soul. Thus, what for a moment appeared to be a relation between the subject and itself has shifted to one of increased disjunction by becoming a relation between the subject and another entity, the soul.

Perhaps then Foucault's exaggeration and Inwood's understatement can be bridged. While Inwood denies that there is anything ontologically new in the idea of self presented by 1 *Alcibiades* and in the writings of his other concern, Seneca, he does think that a novel sense of self can be generated by the use of certain literary techniques—in Seneca's case, by 'his self-assertion as an independent thinker, his readiness to use himself as an *exemplum* or as particularly persuasive evidence, his peculiarly dialogical technique in the letters and in at least some of the dialogues'.¹³² He is unsure, however, 'whether we may reasonably regard such literary

¹³² (2005) 352.

artefacts as philosophical innovations.’ Yet his difficulty may be overcome if we realise that there exist processes which transform the one into the other diachronically and compress the contextual innovation of literary artefact into the innovation of philosophical ontology. As previously suggested, through semanticisation a word internalises over time meanings triggered by common contextual environments as an induction from contingent to essential semantic properties.¹³³ It then carries these meanings even in other settings where that context is absent. Because this process alters, albeit gradually, the entity in its *essence*, an ontological shift does take place, but in such a way that it takes a long time to manifest as an overt lexicalised category.

Such a view is beneficial, for it does not overstate ontological change in the language of personhood, yet does not understate the importance of innovation in the literary contexts in which the entities of personhood are deployed, since these contexts may eventually be semantically absorbed by such entities as ontological change. Our point is that the increasing deployment of these entities in *reflexive* contexts provides the basis for a reconceptualisation of the self as an inherently reflexive structure. During the unfolding of the history of philosophy, the frequent association of reflexive language and the subject saw reflexivity assigned to the subject as an essential characteristic. Before the subject can be essentialised as reflexive, its predicates must, with sufficient frequency, be reflexive, either directly or indirectly, from which a general abstract reflexive relation may be induced that is then inextricably attached to the subject as an essential property.

If we zoom out with our historical telescope for a moment, it appears that reflexive contexts in general, and the theme of self-knowledge in particular, are especially conducive to terminological innovation and the move away from a substantialist understanding of selfhood. In his *Adversus Colotem*, Plutarch defends the role of the search for oneself in life, and in the process offers an interesting paraphrase of the Delphic dictum:

Ἀλλὰ διδόντες αὐτῷ τὸ μηδὲν οὕτως ἄχρηστον εἶναι μηδὲ φορτικὸν ὥς τὸ ζητεῖν αὐτόν, ἐρώμεθα τίς αὕτη τοῦ βίου σύγχυσις ἐστίν ἢ πῶς ἐν τῷ ζῆν οὐ δύναται διαμένειν ἀνὴρ ὅτε τύχοι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀναλογιζόμενος ‘φέρε, τίς ὦν οὗτος ὁ ἐγὼ τυγχάνω;’

(Plu. *Adv. Col.* 1118f8–1119a4 Pohlenz-Westman)

¹³³ Cf. above p. 24.

Still, conceding to him that nothing is so frivolous or cheap as the quest for knowledge of *oneself*, let us ask him how it can lead to the collapse of this life of ours, or how a man cannot continue to live who at some moment or other falls to reasoning with *himself* 'Let me see now, what am I in fact, this thing called I?'¹³⁴

Just as at *Alc.* 1 129b1–3, the interpretation of self-knowledge is made to turn on the identity of an abstract pronominal element. This prompts an extraordinary nominalisation paralleled only in Aristotle's *Magna Moralia*, which as it happens also crystallises out of a reflexive background, the construction of friendship as an extended self-relation.¹³⁵ Yet the articulation of ἐγώ here, and its catapulting to conceptual prominence by the demonstrative οὗτος, is truly nonpareil.¹³⁶ Gone is virtually any trace of the dictum's traditional heritage, which situates the self in dialogical exchange with the other beings composing the tissue of society. It has been replaced by the phenomenological perspective of first-person consciousness. However again like the passage from 1 *Alcibiades*, at precisely that point at which Plutarch's argument might have led him into contemplation of the missing subject, the traditional categories of Greek anthropology reassert themselves. The options for the identity of this 'I' are soul, a compound of body and soul, or a body endowed by its peculiar composition with those functions mistakenly thought to belong to a non-existent soul. Nonetheless, the terminological innovation, when appraised within a broader diachronic framework, should not simply be cashed out as the surface play of *façon de parler*. For the reasons outlined above, just as in the case of the reflexive, the emerging role of the 'I' in reflections upon human identity and self-consciousness begins to generate those capillaried networks of linguistic connection upon which the overt concept formations of later philosophy depend.

To wind up this section we may reformulate the diagram given above for the science of science to express the idea of care of self:

¹³⁴ Trans. Einarson and De Lacy (1967). Note that I have adopted their punctuation of the Greek, which omits the commas around ὅτε τύχοι.

¹³⁵ See above pp. 40–41 for this passage and further examples of reflexivity's relation to novel ontological terminology.

¹³⁶ Outside of a grammatical discussions, this is the first example in extant Greek literature. It later occurs in Plotinus at *Enn.* III 7.12.39 Henry-Schwyzzer: Τίς οὖν ὁ ἐγώ; "Ἡ καθ' ὃν ἡ μέτρησις.




Figure 4. Care of self.

In learning to care for himself, Alcibiades has brought himself within care's scope, and with that his former preoccupation with τὰ ἑαυτοῦ is brought into perspective. He may thus distinguish himself from his interests, but in the process becomes a different type of subject.

This reflexive recursive engine may even be interpreted as an historical principle whose operation extends well beyond Plato. As discussed above, its repeated philosophical application produces ever more transcendental forms of the subject, which in turn become new objects of knowledge and new terms of human ontology.¹³⁷ The procedure is often implied by the developmental analysis of intellectual historians. For example, while he rejects ontological novelty in Seneca's philosophy, Inwood does claim that his interest in the self and the practice of self-formation is 'second-order' in comparison to the character-shaping ethic of traditional Stoicism. However Seneca stops short of theorising this practice as such, which would have demanded that he consider a new entity, the will, that stands behind this practice and makes it possible.¹³⁸ Inwood is right in tracing the appearance that such a new category is present in Seneca to his heightened reflexivity, since a particularly *internal* application of the PRS will produce a second-order subject via the conceptual separation of a determining and a determinable self without it necessarily being named.

¹³⁷ Instances of reiterated reflexive processes have arisen in the work of continental philosophers, for example in Derrida (1998) 73 n. 27, who appropriates the biological concept of auto-immunity which 'consists ... in a living organism protecting itself against its own self-protection by destroying its own immunological defenses'. This is a form of self-self-protection, in which the self lets down its own defences and exposes itself to an encounter with a dangerous other.

¹³⁸ Inwood (2005) esp. 143–156.

6. *The (Im)possibility of Holistic Reflexivity*

In the latter part of 1 *Alcibiades* we gain a rare insight into the nuts and bolts of Plato's interpretation of self-relation in a way that appears to broach the issue of the possibility of reflexivity itself. Socrates seems to break down the Delphic dictum and analogue the reflexive act of knowing oneself to seeing oneself in the mirror. He seeks a mechanism in knowing oneself that performs the same function as the mirror in seeing oneself. If you could find such thing, then looking into it you would know yourself. He first points out that there is a little mirror inside the eye such that an eye looking at another eye may see itself. This little mirror is the best part of it (ὅπερ βέλτιστον αὐτοῦ), where the essential mechanism of sight is located (ἐν ᾧ τυγχάνει ἡ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ ἐγγιγνομένη), from which it is reasoned that if the soul is to know itself it must look into the best part of soul, that is the part which is most divine and where the faculties of knowing and having wisdom are located. Socrates concludes as follows:

τῷ θεῷ ἄρα τοῦτ' ὅκειν αὐτῆς, καὶ τις εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνούς, θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίη μάλιστα.
(Pl. *Alc.* 1 133c4–6)

Therefore this part of it is like god, and anyone gazing into it and coming to know everything divine, god and wisdom, would in this way also gain the best knowledge of himself.

Socrates analyses the reflexive act into a relation of parts. In fact elsewhere he rejects holistic reflexivity as laughable since it leads to logical contradiction. If the reflexive and its antecedent are identical, then an expression like 'he is more powerful than himself' entails that the same person is both more powerful and less powerful than himself. He instead argues that it means one part of the soul has control of another.¹³⁹ One might make a similar analysis of reflexive expressions such as 'The building fell on itself', in which one section of the building collapses on another. This would be an entirely different thing from one part falling on the same part, and we might think this impossible from the mechanics of motion. Is this strict reflexivity also impossible in the case of psychological beings? What part is doing the knowing in Socrates interpretation? Is it some mysterious and elusive subject above and beyond that part of the soul that is its object, or is it rather identical with that part because it

¹³⁹ Pl. *R.* 431a ff.

alone contains the very faculty of knowing? But if it is the same part, then his analogy, built as it is on a separation between observer and observed, begins to fail.

Socrates has in fact walked into a dilemma that would later perplex the sceptic Sextus Empiricus and lead him to reject the possibility of any reflexive knowledge since its two possible analyses both yield an infinite regress. According to Sextus, there are only two possible ways in which the intellect could know itself, either *qua* whole or *qua* part. *Qua* part, we may quote Crystal's remarks:

In the case of the intellect apprehending itself in terms of one part grasping another part, one falls into an infinite regress because the subject-part will become identical with its object when it apprehends it. As a result, another epistemic subject will be needed and so on *ad infinitum*.¹⁴⁰

Qua whole, we may quote Sextus himself:

Now it will not be able as a whole to apprehend itself. For if as a whole it apprehends itself, it will be as a whole apprehension and apprehending, and, the apprehending subject being the whole, the apprehended object will no longer be anything.¹⁴¹

The second possibility may also unravel in an infinite regress if it is maintained that some object exists that is not nothing. If it is not nothing, then there is something that is not included in the whole and thus the whole is incomplete and not whole at all. If it absorbs this object in an effort to become whole, then it will need another object if it is to know itself, whose existence will again render it incomplete, and which it must again absorb, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Sextus' dilemma is indeed a difficult one, and it will be seen that it derives from the cognitive scheme of transitive reflexivity. This attempts to force subject/object disjunction, whereas the syntactic marker of reflexivity attempts to force subject/object identity. The interaction of these two competing claims and contradictory forces gives us our dilemma. For instance in case of one part of the intellect knowing itself *qua* another part, Sextus wishes on the one hand to maintain that the subject-part becomes identical with its object (by force of the co-referential requirement of the reflexive pronoun), yet on the other requires another disjoint epistemic subject to fill the slot of knower in a transitive act of knowing (by force of the transitive conceptual scheme). In the case of

¹⁴⁰ Crystal (1998) 26.

¹⁴¹ Sext. Emp. *Adv. Log.* 1.311–312, tr. Bury (1935).

the intellect *qua* whole knowing itself, a complete holism of the subject means there is nothing different left to be apprehended as required by the transitive conceptual scheme, while at the same time, if such a different thing did arise, the whole would seek to incorporate it by dint of the reflexive pronoun's claim to identity with the subject.

There is, of course, an alternative view, that perfectly holistic reflexive knowledge is in fact possible, but it must propose some emergent property of mind which precedes the subject-object disjunction and which does not seem to be present in the material world. One could accordingly argue that Sextus' empiricism, and by extension our empiricism, since we adopt his dilemma, has lead us both astray in that we are wrongly trying to understand the reflexivity of intellect on the model of the behaviour of the empirical world. This model leads us to consider 'I know myself' as a version of 'The building fell on itself', and thus assumes reflexivity as a part-part relation. Against this one could simply say that self-transparency is an inherent property of consciousness that is irreducible to and finds no analogy in the empirical world. Be that as it may, if such complete reflexivity can exist, then it is almost certainly different from intellectual reflexivity, which as a consequence of its perceptual mode requires subject-object distinction.

Perhaps one will propose the transparency of everyday emotional life as an example of complete reflexivity, arguing that 'I am angry' normally entails 'I know that I am angry'. But the latter includes an intellectual attitude, 'I know that ...', directed towards an object, 'I am angry', while the former is simply an ascription of a state. The two 'I's of the latter are not completely identical, which can be confirmed by observing what happens when one starts adopting intellectual attitudes towards emotional states. Usually the emotional states begin to distance themselves. Through reflection on anger, for instance, that anger often dissipates or changes in quality. Similarly, an embodied feeling of happiness is often ruined by excessive intellectualisation. No matter how transparent mental life is, we do not normally in the course of an affective state stop to note to ourselves that 'Yes, I know that I am in such and such an affective state'.¹⁴² We might say that such a note to self is nearly always possible, and we do indeed exercise this possibility in certain moments

¹⁴² Note the important exception of certain schools of Buddhist mind-training which encourage the self-conscious analysis of any simple experience 'I am x' into the form 'I am aware that I am x' for the express purpose of disentangling and removing the I that is aware and witnesses from the endless parade of sensations.

of reflection. But such reflection is typically marked by a disjunction, whether temporal—reflection typically occurs after the fact, so that the experiencing ‘I’ is temporally displaced from the intellectualising ‘I’—or existential, the experiencing ‘I’ appearing across a certain phenomenological distance.

The question of self-knowledge becomes especially critical to the German idealists. Since the self is understood, after the manner of Plotinus’ *voũs*, as inherently reflexive, a detailed account must be given of its founding act of self-reflection. But here they ran aground on a permutation of the very problem we have been discussing. If the self is constituted by the act of self-reflection, and this act transpires discursively as a relation between a subject and an object, observer and observed, then some distance and difference between these two will always obstruct their complete equation, compromising the act’s unity and coherence. The subject will always withhold a part or mode of itself which cannot be made an object of reflection:

For me to be aware of myself I must distance myself, make myself an object of my reflection; but in the sense that the same I is both doing the reflecting and is that which is reflected on presupposes a more direct acquaintance with the I that cannot itself be a matter of reflection.¹⁴³

Fichte goes on to create a theory of self-intellection that seeks to correct Kant’s doomed attempt at deriving a unified form of self-knowledge from a discursive (or in our terminology, a transitive) act of self-reflection. Seigel, following Heinrich and Frank, sketches the problem and Fichte’s proposed solution as follows:

Kant suffered from the fallacy that spoils all attempts to ground the self in pure reflection, namely that they posit the moment of self-reflection as the original source of self-knowledge: the self first knows itself by reflecting on itself. The trouble with such claims is that they do not ask how the self that encounters itself in reflection can know that what it sees there is indeed itself. To do so it must already have some prior acquaintance with itself, independent of the act of reflection; only on that basis can it know the image in the mirror as the self it is seeking.

Heinrich and Frank offer Fichte’s intellectual intuition as the first self-conscious recognition of this problem in modern thought, and the basis of a solution to it. By identifying activity as prior to reflection, and specifying it as a moment when the ego knows itself directly in an act rather than in an instance of reflective consciousness, Fichte points to the necessity that

¹⁴³ Pinkard (2002) 138.

the self possess a pre-reflective acquaintance with itself. Only if the self already knows itself in some way can it recognize itself in the glass it holds up; it follows that the self it knows is not created by the act of reflection, but exists prior to it.¹⁴⁴

Here it is proposed that pre-reflective self-knowledge gives the self its original unity and acquaintance with itself that reflective self-knowledge failed to deliver. It has the structure of middle rather than transitive reflexivity.¹⁴⁵ But how does one consider pre-reflective acquaintance-with-self *philosophically* (i.e. reflectively) without making it an object of thought and it back into the transitive structure as just another instance of reflective self-knowledge. There is a thorny contradiction in the notion of reflecting on something that is putatively pre-reflective. It seems to me that if there is a pre-reflective self-knowledge it is beyond the reach of detailed philosophical analysis.

7. Conclusions

Plato adapts the phrase αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, employed by earlier philosophers to characterise transcendent entities, to denote the thing-in-itself. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that this signifies the birth of *conceptual* philosophy, a mode of thinking that affects both parties to the epistemological relation: as an object of thought, the thing-in-itself takes another thing-in-itself, the soul, as its subject. I have argued that the philosophical object *qua* thing-in-itself is a reflection of the subject's own reflexivity, which is in turn partially explicable as a social construction. Analogously to the form's abstraction from a phenomenal web of particulars and as a result of various socio-economic developments, the individual has been extracted from some of its other-directed activities and brought into relation with itself and what belongs to itself (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ). Following Havelock and Ong, I suggested that the technology of literacy promotes the emergence of the thing-in-itself as a category because it presents signs removed from the context of particular referents and thus poses the question of what these decontextualised signs ultimately refer to.

¹⁴⁴ Seigel (2005) 366–367.

¹⁴⁵ Note the preference for *acquaintance with* rather than *knowing* since it projects a less transitive structure and therefore a more immediate sense of self-relation.

Plato carries on the process of reflexivising other-directed relations, especially those which are socio-political, and replacing objective participants with subjective instances of the self. His internalisation of *προᾶξις τῶν ἑαυτοῦ* unfolds a new interpretation of care of self which overlaps with that advocated by Democritus: care of self becomes care of one's soul. The turning of ethical attention inwards opens an internal space *in the subject*, rather than in one of her internal organs: like the year as *ἐνιαυτός*, conscious experience takes place within oneself as a (problematically) unified totality. Again in agreement with Democritus, the state of what is within oneself—whether it is thought as soul, character, etc.—rather than what is external is taken to ultimately determine the life of the individual.

The idea of the soul as the real person and an entity of inestimable value supports a new true-self model, though this is relatively impersonal. One can be a friend or enemy of oneself, sin against or do good to oneself, depending on whether an action assists or impedes the realisation of this ideal psychic state. Informing this idea is an ontological interpretation of *αὐτός* within the complex reflexive: the real person is a person's *form*.

Plato follows the Presocratic philosophers in characterising cosmological *ἀρχαί* as paradigmatically reflexive. Insofar as these characteristics represent an idealisation of man, they indicate his own desire for self-foundation and autonomy as both personal and social goods. Moreover they suggest that to some extent he already possesses these attributes: the reflexive mortal thinks reflexive gods. The good man is obliged to cultivate intellectual and psychic unity (*ὁμολογία ἑαυτῷ, τὸ ἑαυτῷ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν*), which brings him close to the divine.

Reflexivisation of the transitive conceptual scheme is also used to generate meta-ideas, specifically *Charmides'* 'science of science'. This is a technique that becomes popular in later philosophy, and which is crucial to the construction of transcendental subjects which are beyond objectification and initiate a variety of epistemological puzzles.

Plato's Socrates momentarily nominalises *αὐτός* in 1 *Alcibiades*. The move is inspired by his prevalent use of it in the intensive and reflexive senses and materialises from a background rich with reflexive relations. Though this event might have led him away from seeing human essence as objective substance to seeing it as intensive/reflexive subjectivity, he remains within the mould of ancient philosophy in preferring the more concrete term 'soul'.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

This monograph has demonstrated the consequence of reflexive concepts to the various developing discourses of Greek culture. The Greek relationship with reflexivity will come to condition the evolution of the West, and especially modernity, for which the definition of the individual as a reflexive agent, a self, becomes a guiding *cynosure*.

The pervasiveness and transference of reflexive categories from one sphere to another is such that one may even talk of a (symbolic) economy of reflexivity. This economy distributes reflexivity to a privileged place in each of the discourses, where its value—with the exception of discourses such as tragedy which seek to problematise important categories—is positive. Thus in the fields of ontology and cosmology reflexive relations (and connected relations of identity) define the beings that sit atop their respective hierarchies, for example Parmenides' Being and Anaxagoras' *Noûs*. Similarly, the highest principles in the human field, *ψυχή* or *voûs*, are characteristically reflexive. Human ontology mirrors cosmic ontology through the macro-microcosmic analogy: we apply to the foundations of the universe, often thought as divine beings, qualities we possess or would like to possess. These reflexive categories also have a logical allure, since a reflexive *ἀρχή* halts a potential infinite regress. The self-justifying good in ethics, the self-affirming hypothesis in epistemology, the in-itself in ontology—each materialises as the key to its respective domain. Just as the in-itself grounds the phenomenon and supplies it with a stable origin, so the subject heavily marked as *αὐτός*, and objectified as soul, serves as a unitary origin of individual human action.

In ethics self-sufficiency becomes a definitive property of gods and also a human ideal, both of individuals and collectives. This concept overlaps with another, political autonomy, which also shows the same economy of transference from individuals to collective and vice versa: as a state should be autonomous, so should an individual; as a state should rule itself, so too should an individual. But doubtless the most important development of reflexivity in ethics is the notion of care of self and its complex of associated practices, including knowledge of self. The ethical

fulcrum shifts towards the self as Greek culture develops. From here arise the competing claims of unbridled self-interest and the interest of the soul; thinkers are united in their conviction that the first duty of care is to oneself, but divided in their take on what sort of self one should serve—the appetitive self that seeks power and the satisfaction of its passions, or the self ruled by reason and harmony that brings one closer to the divine. The shift of reference means that altruism too is best justified in terms of self, so that arguments must be brought back to its interests as a foundation: one refrains from harming another because in harming others one harms oneself, whether ‘oneself’ means one’s interests, one’s soul, or a friend spiritually identified as another self.

The idea of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ and its encoding in the institutions of a developing urban society in which individual practice should, on balance, take this as its object, is the most culturally embedded category of the family with comprises the technologies of care of self. It points towards the way in which the city-state constructs persons as αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ποιοῦντες and αὐτοκράτορες ἑαυτῶν καὶ τῶν ἑαυτῶν—individuals for, in charge of, defined by, and engrossed in themselves and what belongs to themselves. In an important sense this idea precedes philosophy; it is philosophy which takes the notion of προᾶξις τῶν ἑαυτῶν and through internalisation develops it into theory of the human form and essence. As the Greek comes to understand this category as including one’s τρόπος and φύσις, popular references to the obligation to criticise and improve oneself before others flourish.

Democritus’ idea that one should feel greater shame before oneself than before another, and conscience as knowing with oneself, are also concepts that respond to wider changes in the socio-political structure of Greece. Within the individual’s sphere of praxis as τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, the sanctioning gaze of the other is absent, and the subject is left to its own devices. An inalienable new sanction, rooted in the self itself, must be introduced to cover this gap. A man is urged to review his own actions as if he were another, and in this way subject himself to reflexive judgement. He should become a self-regulator. There is a sociological conclusion to be drawn here. The problem of regulating action within the private sphere does not reach a significant level of urgency in a culture where actors are less absorbed in τὰ ἑαυτοῦ. On the other hand, the thought experiment of Gyges’ ring becomes a pressing and resonant issue where society is a patchwork of private spheres delimited by τὰ ἑαυτοῦ. Emphasis on the category of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ is likely fuelled, though somewhat indirectly, by the liberalised economic markets of city-states

in which one partakes as an individual and procures and looks after one's own interests.

Indeed essence and property are mutually dependent, so that the differentiation of an individual requires the differentiation of what belongs to it, and in an important way the differentiation and determination of the former takes place through the latter. This conceptual affiliation often materialises as a rhetorical juxtaposition of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ and ἑαυτόν. The private relation between the reflexive as a thing-in-itself and its property is not *superficial*, and may be thought in terms of Hegel's logic. The relation of my self to my property is an extruded or external mediation in which I relate to myself as to an other—we might think of an *appropriated* other—and this external (though still reflexive) relation constitutes my determinateness; my property collapses into me. As he puts it:

The thing-in-itself, therefore, has the determinateness, not in a relation (external to it) to another thing-in-itself, and of this other to it; the determinateness is not merely a surface of the thing-in-itself but is the essential mediation of itself with itself as with an other. The two things-in-themselves which are supposed to constitute the extremes of the relation [in our analysis ἑαυτόν and τὰ ἑαυτοῦ], since they are supposed not to possess in themselves any determinateness over against one another, *intact collapse into one*; there is only one thing-in-itself, which in external reflection is related to itself, and it is *its own self-relation as to an other* that constitutes its determinateness. This determinateness of the thing-in-itself is the *property of the thing*.¹

This collapse is elegantly captured by Plato's internalisation of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ as the property of the soul, a hypostatisation of the reflexive. With this movement soul gains determinateness and is given an account, and the subject's practice becomes truly περὶ ἑαυτόν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, a reflection in which the self and its properties, ἑαυτόν and τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, are minimally distinct. Indeed the collapse amounts to a mediated synthesis of the imperatives προὔσσει τὰ σαυτοῦ and γινῶθι σαυτόν insofar as these practices are the normative articulation of the *self* and its *properties*.

Tragedy takes the new reflexive categories and turns them on their head. Agency, autonomy, self-knowledge and being-for-oneself all degenerate into various shades of self-destruction. This denaturing of reflexivity evokes Horkheimer and Adorno's dialectic of enlightenment. The enlightened self of the city-state, represented by tragic figures such as Oedipus, regresses back into a state of heteronomy in whose grip

¹ (1832) § 1055.

autonomy may only express itself as self-destruction. Tragedy's attempt to reconcile old and new discourses—those of heteronomous myth in which the human is determined by the gods and autonomous civilisation in which the human determines itself—posits the new idea of self as a problem and itself as a new means of solving this problem.

The second arm of this monograph has considered the grammaticalisation of the complex reflexive and the expansion of the reflexive's semantics. Given the frequency condition on grammaticalisation, and in the reflexive's case intensification of the pronoun with αὐτός to signal a violation of pragmatic expectation, the formation of the complex reflexive suggests a semantic environment in which other-directed structures are being reflexivised with increasing frequency. The data is far too patchy to reward a thorough statistical analysis of this trend, yet the clear dearth of pronominal reflexivity in Homer compared with later writers is telling. I have argued that this environment may be plausibly linked to a transformation in Greek culture that sees it moving its centre of orientation towards the self.

I have also argued that the pronominal reflexive system does not grow as a mere syntactic alternative to middle reflexivity, as it has different semantic properties. These semantic properties became of increasing interest to speakers, who found them well suited to the expression of their particular communicative needs, among which we may include an adequate expression of the self shaped by their society. One very interesting semantic product of the PRS that I have theorised is the generation of a transcendental subject more or less beyond objectification, which determines itself through the practice of care of self. This implies that many of the problems of later philosophy concerning the nature of the subject and the self are informed by the cognitive structure of transitive reflexivity. Another product of pronominal reflexivity is the possibility for the complex reflexive to semanticise new meanings as it takes part in different models of self-relation. I have argued that it acquires many of these meanings through semantic interchange with the developing concept of soul as the real person. This process will eventually lead to the nominalisation of αὐτός as self in Aristotle, just as happened in English.

When gathered together, our results prove a necessary amendment to Gill's account of the objective-participant model of Greek personhood. Greek thought's partiality to reflexive concepts as ontological, epistemological and ethical foundations uncovers a developing movement towards a subjective-individualist model insofar as self-relations remove

other participants by replacing them with an instance of the subject. The individual that was suspended in a network of relationships with others effectively isolates itself by privileging relations with itself. It becomes a thing-in-itself, and so do the objects of its thought. The socio-economic basis for this transition is in many ways amenable to the terms of classical sociology. Social actors experience greater individuation as the Greek city-state develops, which filters into the terminology and method of a new ontology that considers subjects and objects as beings *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*, a phrase which essentially individuates its focus and abstracts it from a network of relationships.²

I have listed below the reflexive concepts that emerge in the course of this transition, under the categories of ethics, epistemology and cosmology/ontology. Some straddle more than one category, and indeed the spread of reflexivity in general recommends that we may even think of the three together as a single system of reflexive thought.

Ethics

τὸ ἑαυτὸν γινῶναι· τὸ ἑαυτῷ συνειδέναι· τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν· τὸ ἑαυτὸν αἰδεῖσθαι· τὸ κρείσσων ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι· ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ· τὸ ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν/παρέχειν ὡς βέλτιστον· τὸ ἑαυτῷ φίλος/ἐχθρὸς εἶναι· αὐτάρκεια· αὐτονομία· αὐτοκράτεια· τὸ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ ἔνεκεν αὐτοῦ αἰρετὸν καλόν.

Epistemology

ἡ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν νοοῦσα [ψυχὴ/νοῦς/ἄνθρωπος]· τὸ [νοοούμενον] αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό· ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς πρὸς ἑαυτήν· ὁ ἑαυτῷ ὁμολογῶν λόγος/ἄνθρωπος.

Cosmology/Ontology

τὸ ἑαυτῷ αὐταρκέστατον ὄν· τὸ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό ὄν [ψυχὴ, νοῦς, τὸ ὄν, etc.]· τὸ ἑαυτῷ ταῦτο εἶναι καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν· τὸ αὐτοφυές/αὐτογενές· ἡ ἑαυτὴν κινοῦσα ψυχὴ· τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ πῶς ἔχειν.

Figure 5 draws together the linguistic and conceptual diachronic trajectories in a parallel schema:

² In this way we apply Durkheim's (1964) notion of individuation, used to differentiate pre-modern from modern societies, to differentiate Archaic from Classical Greece. In the words of Craib (1997) 65–66, in the traditional society '[t]he individual is absorbed into the *conscience collective*—one is either 'in' a society or 'outside' it; one cannot be an individual in society ...'




Figure 5. Parallel development of heavily marked reflexive system and reflexive ideas.

The *direction* of causality between these two movements is a classic chicken-or-the-egg conundrum. The functionalist account I have posited sees the linguistic system adapting to the cultural system so that it may more efficiently encode its categories; in this case, causality begins from culture. Alternatively, it is possible that the new cultural and conceptual categories are a *by-product* of an independent, language-internal syntactic development. This latter option is comparable to a phenomenon

of biological evolution, in which an organism may find a new use for an inherited trait that had never been adapted to this purpose but had evolved independently of it. Similarly, the Greeks may have been exploiting the incidental semantic properties of the PRS without it having evolved as an adaptation to this use. The by-product argument is the weaker of the two alternatives and obviously more amenable to generativism since it preserves the autonomy of syntax. However, though more controversial, the functionalist explanation should not be ruled out of hand given the clear semantic stimulus for heavy reflexive marking. Whether causally related through by-production or adaptation, our first point is that causality exists. Though I favour the functionalist account, a comprehensive demonstration of its truth exceeds our purview—it would require a mammoth cross-linguistic study.³

Beyond its contribution to the ongoing debate over the nature of ancient selfhood, my study also bears on Foucault's history of subjectivation by embedding the notion of a transcendent self in a set of immanent, socially endorsed practices. It also suggests that the idea of a divided self which has so enthralled contemporary philosophy is written, as it were, into the very structure of heavily marked reflexivity. These sorts of reflexive act divide the subject in such a way as to produce an unbridgeable alienation: this alienation forbids the consummation of being oneself absolutely, leaving the subject to relate to itself across a schism and motion to itself with the pledge of the *for*. In addition, considering the eventual development of αὐτός as a noun from contexts in which it is used as a reflexive marker, and comparing the similar development of *self* in English, I have proposed that this particular variety of selfhood emerges as the nominalisation of a reflexive structure. We could formalise this relation between self and reflexivity as follows:

Where R is a set of argument relations (including those that are transitive or indirect) characteristic of human agents, and v is any relation, then

$$\forall x[\forall v \in R(\diamond v(x,x)) \Leftrightarrow \text{Self}(x)]$$

In plain English, if any entity can partake in each of the characteristic set of relations reflexively, then that individual is a self; vice versa, if an individual is a self, then it can participate in each of the characteristic set of

³ It should be said that a bidirectional or feedback model which combines both alternatives is also possible. For example, widespread exploitation of the semantic by-product of the new PRS, which might first arise independently, could then in turn reinforce that system's development functionally.

reflexive relations. On this view the self is constructed from a generalised participation in reflexive relations. Another way of representing the same idea would be to derive the statement ' x is a self' as an induction from various instances, or possible instances, of ' $x \vee self$ ':




Figure 6. Induction of selfhood from reflexive acts.

I think that such a logical structure, provided it is understood dynamically, underlies the transition to a reflexive understanding of personhood and the overt realisation of this understanding in language. Increased use of the reflexive makes it a more influential factor in the construction of the subject, which by induction then generates the concept of an essential connection between the subject and the reflexive. The diachronic vehicle for this induction is what I have termed the reflexive reduction: the dialogical participants with which the subject engages, who are originally beings in their own right, are in time replaced by the reflexive as another instance of the subject. The reflexive is now a *necessary* constituent of personhood, and the potential for reflexive praxis therefore a necessary implication of being a self.

This formulation may also help us understand why philosophy would eventually move away from a *substantial* interpretation of the subject. As Kierkegaard seems to have presaged, the modern self is constituted only in the very relating act of self-relation and does not have a thing-like existence outside of this act. Ancient Greece contributed to the formation of such a self by developing the different varieties of self-relation explored in this monograph and fastening them in a more essential way to the agency of the human subject, now individuated as αὐτὸς ἑ-κασ-[σ]τος ἑαυτῷ.

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INDEX LOCORUM

The following index gives all classical passages cited in this work. For fragments, consult the text for the editions I have used.

AESCHYLUS		ANACREON	
<i>Agamemnon</i>		<i>Fragmenta</i>	
835–837	141	405	72
<i>Choephoroi</i>		ANAXAGORAS	
922–924	145	<i>Fragmenta</i>	
<i>Fragmenta</i>		B6	91n20
139	144n9,	B12	91
	189n104	ANTIPHON ORATOR	
<i>Prometheus vincetus</i>		<i>Orationes</i>	
189–195	164	5.93	130
309–310	120, 155	ANTIPHON SOPHISTA	
437–438	159	<i>Fragmenta</i>	
920–921	144n9	B44a	220
1012–1013	165	44(a) I. 12–23	99, 100n40
<i>Septem contra Thebas</i>		44(a) V. 7	99n39
405–406	144n9	49 II. 19–32	94
750–752	144	58.8–14	96
928–929	141	58 II. 11–12	97n35
1053	166n50	58–59	221
<i>Supplices</i>		59	97n35, 98
8	166	APOLLONIUS DYSCOLUS	
AËTIUS		<i>De constructione</i>	
<i>Placita</i>		2.58	45
1.3.8	196	2.98–102	43n1
1.7.4	182n91	2.99	45n10
4.2.3	111	2.101	45n10
4.12.1	214	2.102	45n11
ALCAEUS		2.107	68
<i>Fragmenta</i>		<i>De pronominiibus</i>	
317a	70, 71	69	185
317b	70	80	68
363	70, 71	113	185
378	70, 71		

APOLLONIUS RHODIUS

Argonautica

1.460-463 65

ARISTOPHANES

Acharnenses

377-378 188

1017 72n18

Equites

432-433 190

756 190

Fragmenta

299.3 187

Lysistrata

115-116 191n107

131-132 191n107

Nubes

88 183

192-194 183

404-407 184

478-480 191

695 183

842 183, 188

960 191n108

1296-1297 186

1454-1455 183

Pax

32 70n32

Plutus

56-57 188

83 185n98

Thesmophoriazousai

172 72n18

Vespae

196 186

999-1000 184

ARISTOTLE

Athenaion politeia

39.1 169

De anima

404b27-30 111n66

404b30ff. 111

406a11-15 111n65

408b11-15 217

408b32ff. 111n66

425b12-28 243

429b5-9 213

430a3-4 214

Ethica Nichomachea

1094a18-22 112

1166a1-2 40

1166a31-32 41

1169a12 223n76

Magna Moralia

1212a29 223n76

1213a13 41n77, 253

Metaphysica

982b24-28 181

1014b16 113n71

1072b18-21 214

1074b33-34 244

Topica

100b17-21 112

CATULLUS

Carmina

22.20-21 119n86

CHRYSIPPUS

Fragmenta moralia

4 229n86

CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS

Stromata

1.14.60.3-4 120n93

COMICORUM ATTICORUM FRAG-

MENTA

ad. 560 189

ad. 564 189

ad. 664 187n101

CRITIAS

Fragmenta

3 173

4 174

19 100n40

DEMOCRITUS

Fragmenta

B33 176

B41 180n87

B61 176n78

B84	101	5	185n98
B88	223n73	158.4	79n35
B119	172	264.1	79n35
B146	104, 115	275.1-4	111n67
B170	105n51, 229n86	277	198
B174	104	279.2	79n35
B175	115n79, 229n86	295.2	79n35,
B176	114		173n71
B181	180n87		
B189	105n53	EPICLETUS	
B191	105n52	<i>Enchiridion</i>	
B215	105n52	33.12	179n85
B234	115	<i>Epicteti dissertationes ab Arriano</i>	
B235	105	<i>digestae</i>	
B244	101	1.14.12-15	103n47
B252	108	1.17.1-3	113n70
B253	107	1.20	103n47
B264	101, 102n43,	2.22.35-36	235n98
	177	4.2.3-4	41
B297	135		
DIO CHRYSOSTOM		EURIPIDES	
<i>Orationes</i>		<i>Alcestis</i>	
4.55-59	57n38	685-686	94n29, 153,
			229n86
DIODEGENES LAERTIUS		<i>Fragmenta</i>	
<i>Vitae philosophorum</i>		452	222n71
1.40	120n93	634	175
1.80	80	818c	179n85
3.12	198	862	174
8.22	116n80	874	144n9
9.18	76n28	908c	152, 180
9.19	76n30	913.2-3	175
		963	89n14, 175
		964	179
EMPEDOCLES		1026	171
<i>Fragmenta</i>		1086	235
B17.34-35	198n7	<i>Hecuba</i>	
B21.13-14	198	736-737	161
B29	89n13	<i>Helena</i>	
B110.4-5	199	998-1003	222
B115	63n48	<i>Hippolytus</i>	
B134	89n13	395-397	144n9
		948-957	178
EPICHRMUS		1029	178n83
<i>Fragmenta</i>		1045-1048	178
B4	113	1078-1079	158
B52	118	1080	178

Medea

24-33	151
49-52	151
85-87	222
872-879	150
873	161

Orestes

395-396	128n4
634-635	155
696-701	162
1229	144n8
1617	145

Supplices

429-432	164
---------	-----

GALEN

De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis

4.7.8-9	179n84, 179n86
---------	----------------

De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione

26.9-14	101n41
---------	--------

HERACLITUS

Fragmenta

B45	83, 84n2, 121, 122, 122n98
B51	86
B101	34, 121, 122, 122n98
B115	84
B116	120, 122n98
B119	229n86

HERMIPPUS

Fragmenta

3	125n107
73	173n71

HERODOTUS

Historiae

1.9.2, 1.12.1	235
1.119.6	156n28
2.93.6	69n10
2.173.2	98n36
5.78.1	109

HESIOD

Fragmenta

45	67n3
245	71n17

Opera et dies

265-266	67n3, 78n34, 190
293, 296	67n3

Theogonia

126-127	67
767	72

HOMER

Hymnus ad Mercurium

239	67n3
565	74n25

Iliad

1.3-4	59
1.130, 150, 345	
	56
2.301	57n36
2.819	57n36
3.32	55n30
3.195-196	54
4.127	57n36
4.257	59
4.497	47
5.416	57n36
6.439	55n30
8.292	55n30
10.234-239	55n30
10.295	57n36
10.307-308	51
10.378	47
10.388-389	55n30
12.1	57n36
12.230	57n36
13.29, 32	57n36
13.673	57n36
14.27	57n36
14.162	51
14.292	57n36
15.43	55n30
15.220	57n36
15.592	57n36
15.599	55n30
15.603-604	55
15.696	57n36

16.46-47	69, 78n34
16.548	55n30
16.600	55n30
16.659	57n36
17.130-131	50
17.140	57n36
17.319	57n36
17.551	69
19.302	54n27
20.54-55	49
20.171	47
20.309	57n36
22.346	55n30
22.351	59n41
23.65	59
23.591-592	56
23.602-603	56
24.558	56n32
24.589	56n32
<i>Odyssey</i>	
1.33-34	171
1.409	54n29
2.125-126	48, 50
2.138	55n30
4.37-38	47, 51
4.244	47
4.247	47, 50, 67n3
4.561-569	60
4.643-644	53-54
4.712	55n30
7.217-218	47, 51
7.263	55n30
8.211	53
9.302	20n21, 213
10.303	175
11.369	54n27
11.433	47n16
11.601-603	59
14.251	50, 51n24
15.262	54n28
17.387	51
20.213-214	51n24
22.218	53-54
<i>ION</i>	
<i>Fragmenta</i>	
55	120

<i>ISOCRATES</i>	
<i>Orationes</i>	
1.14	119
1.14, 21, 34, 38	116n82
1.15	116n82
1.16	129
1.35	117n83
1.45	125n107
1.49	223n74
2.13	125n107
2.13, 20, 29	116n82
2.20	98n37, 116n82,
	229n86
2.24, 38	119n88
2.29	116n82, 118n85
2.38	119n86, 119n88
3.8	230n88
3.26	114n76
3.34, 38, 45, 51, 63, 69	98n37
3.59	131n9
3.61	119n86, 119n88
4.81	119n88
5.150-151	147n14
11.13	172n66

<i>JULIANUS IMPERATOR</i>	
<i>Orationes</i>	
6.5.30-43	121n96

<i>JUVENAL</i>	
<i>Saturae</i>	
1.13.12-13	80n39

<i>LUCIAN</i>	
<i>De saltatione</i>	
81	139

<i>MARCUS AURELIUS</i>	
<i>Meditations</i>	
2.13.1, 2.17.2, 3.12.1, 3.16.2,	
7.17, 12.3.2	229n86
8.40.1	41n77
8.50	237n104

MENANDER

Epitrepontes

1092-1099 103n47

Fragmenta

64.5-7 190n106

307 225n79

333 204n21

500.3-10 115n79

634 223n73

687 172n65

709 171

710 119n86

717.2 179n85

744 119n86

745 131n10

844.5-8 170n63

1137 131n11

Monostichi

132 94n29, 229n86

404 115n78

471 117n84

485 117n84

571 189n103

741 78n34

931 117n84

MIMNERMUS

Fragmenta

7 74

ORACULA SIBYLLINA

3.11 114n75

ORPHICA

Argonautica

424 112n69

Fragmenta

245.8 114n75

OVID

Metamorphoses

3.344-346 148n16

3.467-468 142n4

8.72-73 94n29, 229n86

PARMENIDES

Fragmenta

B3 90, 90n17

B8.25-30 88

B8.46-49 88

B8.57 89n13

PHILO

De Abrahamo

30 239

De aeternitate mundi

74 239n107

De agricultura

9 215n51

De virtutibus

9 238

In Flaccum

159 51

Legum allegoriarum libri i-iii

2.46 239

Quod deus sit immutabilis

58-59 238

Quod omnis probus liber sit

19, 21, 22 226

PINDAR

Nemea

6.5 176n76

Olympia

13.53 81

Pythia

2.34 80, 200

PLATO

Alcibiades 1

128d3-4 247

128e10-129a4 247

129b1-3 250, 253

130d8-10 249

131b10-c2 249

133c4-6 255

Apologia

17a3 157

23c8 235n98

36c5-d1 229,

249n126

<i>Charmides</i>		100d4	165n45
161b6	225, 240	107b2	165n45
166a3-b6	241	<i>Phaedrus</i>	
166e5-6	240	229e5-230a1	
167a	240		229n85
169a1-7	242	241a3	208n30
<i>Cratylus</i>		249c ff.	116n80
384a2	208n30	255d2-6	224
386e3-4	204,	271e4	179n85
	248n124	276e6-277a4	
410d1-e1	174		85n4
440c4	248n124	278a7	208n30
<i>Gorgias</i>		<i>Philebus</i>	
481a4	248n124	34b6-8	207
482b7-c3	234	38d2	231n89
491e1	208n30	38e7	208n30
509b8	248n124	39c1	208n30
<i>Hippias Major</i>		<i>Politicus</i>	
286d4	235n98	273a7-b2	238n105
<i>Leges</i>		<i>Protagoras</i>	
645b5	208n30	339d8	235n98
693b3-4	220n64	<i>Res publica</i>	
739b6	248n124	351e9-352a8	
907c5-d1	235		219
913a8	248n124	363a	180n97
927c6	248n124	367a-e	180n97
932b1	248n124	367a2-4	228
959a ff.	216	391c4	236
<i>Lysis</i>		391d6-7	236
209c6	248n124	391e4-7	236
<i>Meno</i>		409c7	208n30
71b2	235n98	430e ff.	221
85d6	208n30	431a ff.	255
81b-c	116n80	433e12-434a1	
<i>Parmenides</i>			225
130d	197	435c6	208n30
134d-135c	203	440b2	208n30
135c	203	440d3	165n45
<i>Phaedo</i>		442c7	208n30
64a ff.	119n89	443c9-444a2	
64e-65a	217		227
74b ff.	116n80	443d1	248n124
79d ff.	211	443d2	208n30
80e4-5	203n19, 239	443d4-5	221n69
83a7-b2	203	456d5	165n45
85d5, 90d3	235n98	477c9	165n45
93c6, 8	208n30	486c11	235n98

- Res publica (cont.)*
 500c 211n38
 523a6 165n45
 524e5 207
 529a10 165n45
 553b2 248n124
 554a6 165n45
 558d4 208n30
 572a 217, 217n62
 575c8 208n30
 589e 177n80
 590c4 208n30
 619c4 235n98
Sophista
 250c10 165n45
 263e3-5 207
Symposium
 200a2 165n45
 211b1 197
 222a4 208n30
Theaetetus
 145e9 165n45
 150e2 235n98
 154a6-8 205
 161d3-e3 202
 166b7-9 205
 168a2 235n98
 168a5 235n98
 170d4 165n45
 176b 124n106
 178b5-6 202
 186a10 207n29
 189e6-190a6 207
 189e6-190c2 231
 201e-202c 203n17
Timaeus
 29e2 114n76, 202
 33b2-d3 237
 34b4-8 237n102
 37a2-b8 208
 40a8-b1 233n93
 42d-e 171n64
 51b6-c5 199
 51d-e 200
 72a4-6 225, 248
 72a5 225n79
 77b6-c5 209
 PLOTINUS
Enneades
 3.7.12.39 253n136
 5.3.7.26 213n46
 6.8.16.17 214n49
 PLUTARCH
Adversus Colotem
 1108d11-e1 235
 1110e 235
 1118c1-11 121n96
 1118f8-1119a4 252
Demosthenes
 13.5.3 181n89
Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum
 1096d3 104n50
Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus
 81a 75n26
 81b 104
 PORPHYRY
Vita Pythagorae
 40 116n80
 PROCLUS
Chrestomathia
 141-143, 199-200, 327-330 60n43
In Platonis Alcibiadem I
 5.12-14 122n99
 <PYTHAGORAS>
Carmen aureum
 11-12 101n41
 14 116
 21-23 116
 54 171n64

SAPPHO

Fragmenta

5.1-4	69
26.11-12	70, 81, 133
100	69
165	69

SCYTHINUS

Fragmenta

2	173n71
---	--------

SENECA

De clementia

1.1	176n78
-----	--------

De constantia

5.4	115n78
5.7	228n83
6.3	248n125

De providentia

4.3	124n102
-----	---------

Epistulae

120.21, 22	84n14
------------	-------

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

Adversus logicos

1.311-312	35n57, 256
-----------	------------

SIMONIDES

Epigrammata

26a	72n21
-----	-------

SOLON

Fragmenta

4.15	128
------	-----

SOPHOCLES

Ajax

1366-1367	222
-----------	-----

Antigone

49-52	143
705-706	154
821	166
875	166

Electra

282-285	152
---------	-----

Fragmenta

350	144n9, 171
-----	------------

Oedipus Coloneus

309	222n71
-----	--------

Oedipus tyrannus

130	71
137-138	142n6
379	142n6
744-745	143
819-820	143
914	72n19
1058-1059	148n17
1069	148
1230-1231	171
1380-1383	143

Philoctetes

874	175n74
902-903	156, 175n74
950	156
1310	175n74

Trachiniae

676-678	149
---------	-----

STOBAEUS

Anthologium

2.33.14	220
3.1.108a	83
3.1.172	119, 176
3.5.57	97
3.20.66	96
3.21.11	118
3.31.6, 10, 11	101n41

THEOGNIS

Elegiae

480	77n32
503-505	72
539-540	78
865-867	78
895-896	78, 82, 154,
	183n94
955	77n32
1009	77n32
1185-1186	72n19
1218	77n32
1241-1242	72n19

THUCYDIDES

Historiae

2.37.2-3	106
2.40.2	108
5.18.2	168
6.12.2	108n59

TIMOKLES

Fragmenta

6.18.20	140n1
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TRAGICORUM GRAECORUM FRAG-

MENTA

ad. 327	181
ad. 573	144n9

XENOPHANES

Fragmenta

B8	76
B25	93n26
B45	76

XENOPHON

Apologia Socratis

24	131
----	-----

De republica Lacedaemoniorum

3.4	176n79
-----	--------

Memorabilia

1.2.6	226n81
1.2.61	228n84

INDEX NOMINUM ET RERUM

Note that modern authors are included only where their views have been significantly addressed and are instrumental to the argument. For a more complete index of classical authors, consult the Index Locorum.

- Aboriginal Australia
 - devaluation of self-involvement, 154n25
 - no reflexive idealism, 236
- absolutism, reflexive articulation of, 200–206
- Aeschylus, 120, 144–145, 155, 166, 189n104
- Aëtius, 111, 182n91, 196, 214
- Adkins, Arthur, 7–8
- agency, amplified by reflexivity, 29, 39, 56n33, 57, 73, 98, 110, 117, 146–147, 166, 172, 192, 218, 229n86, 68
- Alcaeus, 68–71
- Anacreon, 72, 74
- Anaxagoras, 88, 90–93, 170, 174, 179n86, 183, 197–198, 212, 239, 261
- anomie
 - in tragedy, 152
 - relation to individualism, 103n46, 152–153
- anthropology
 - comparative, 1, 38–39
 - dividual selfhood models in, 14n9
 - relevance to Homeric psychology, 13–15
- Antigone, self-determination, 166–167
- Antiphon, the orator, on conscience, 130–132
- Antiphon, the sophist, 94–100, 153, 189
 - complex self-relation in, 94–96
 - diversity of self-models in, 97
- Apollonius Dyscolus, 69–70, 72, 133, 185
 - reflexives emphatic, 45, 68
- Apollonius Rhodius, 65
- apragmosunē*, 107–109, 119
- Arbman, Ernst, body vs. free souls, 61–62
- archai*, reflexive, 83, 110–115, 142, 172, 181, 183, 260–261
- Aristophanes, 71, 182–188, 190, 193
- Aristotle, 110–111, 113n70, 169, 216, 223, 243
 - nominalisation of *autos* and pronouns, 2, 12n3, 40–41, 251, 253, 264
 - reflexive *archai* in, 112, 181
 - reflexive friendship, 40–41, 224
 - self-thinking mind, 213–214, 244
 - soul not subject, 217–218
- ātman*, 28n38, 62–64, 120–123
- auto kath' eauto*, thing-in-itself, 88, 90, 92–93, 110, 123, 169, 183, 195, 211, 212n40, 214, 259, 261
- dialectical necessity of, 203
- genealogy of, 196–200
- autonomy, 219, 260–264
 - individual, 37, 96, 102, 106, 107n58, 125, 129, 132n14, 152, 164–170, 177, 226–227
 - political, 9, 146n12, 153, 164–170, 227
 - problematisation of, 147, 163–172, 192–193
- autos*, 39, 250–251, 264, *passim*
 - as reflexive, 49–50, 67n3, 77–81

- combination with reflexive, 79, 82, 142, 193
 - comedic forms of, 185n98
 - Homeric semantics of, 54–61, 66
 - in complex reflexive, 1, 230–231, 251, 260
 - in reflexive compounds, 39n72
 - nominalised, 2, 41, 247, 249–251, 260
 - philosophical/formal use of, 66, 79, 195, 198–199, 246, 251
 - relation to identity, 88, 210
- being
 - relation to thinking, 90n17, 92–93
 - self-subsistence of, 88
 - self-identity of, 88
- Bolling, George, reflexives in Homer, 1n2, 46
- Bremmer, Jan, body vs. free souls, 61–63
- Brugmann, Karl, 44–45
- Carawan, Edwin, 170
- Christianity, 12n2, 215n51, 233
 - conscience in, 135–136
- Chrysippus, 214
- Claus, David, 62n46, 63n48, 215n52
- comedy, 67, 141, 182–191, 193
 - test of reflexivity's currency, 185
- concepts
 - reflexive, 4, 29, 32n49, 64n52, 122–124, 172, 193, 226, 261, 264–265 (see also meta-concepts)
 - relation to literacy, 213, 259
 - vs. complexes, 20n21, 79, 212–213, 249
- concord, *homonoia*, 219–221
- Confucius, self-care, 124, 131n9, 229n85
- conscience, 101, 127–137
 - connection to other reflexive ethical acts, 235–236
 - importance in legal rhetoric, 130–131
 - in Christianity, 135–136
 - parody of in comedy, 184–185
 - reflexive articulation of, 127–128
 - relation to soul, 130–131
 - role in moral regulation, 127, 262
- consciousness, see self-consciousness
- constantia*, 89n14, 177
- Critias, 169, 173–174
- Crystal, Ian, 256
- Delbrück, Berthold, 44–45
- Delphic dictum, 19–22, 120–122, 124, 139–140, 155, 244–247, 252, 255
 - as a snowclone, 116–117, 188–189
 - essentialised interpretation of, 121, 195, 216
 - problematised in tragedy, 140–141, 148
 - traditional interpretation of, 121
- Democritus, 75, 99n38, 100–109, 114, 119, 123, 125, 127, 129–130, 135, 168, 172, 176–177, 180, 225, 228–229, 260, 262
- Denyer, Nicholas, the itself itself in 1 *Alcibiades*, 250
- Derrida, Jacques, 206
- development, defined, 7–8
- Empedocles, 63n48, 89n13, 198–199
- Epicharmus, 49, 79n35, 111n67, 113–114, 118, 198
- eschatology
 - influence on human ontology, 59–61
 - developmental connection to personhood, 60n54, 63, 215
- Euripides, 89n14, 100n40, 145, 149, 153, 155, 158, 161–164, 171, 173–175, 177–180
- Evans, Nicholas, 5–6, 16n14, 23, 24
- existentialism, in tragedy, 95n30, 149, 153, 161, 192
- Farenga, Vincent, 107n58
 - transcendental subject in Antiphon, 95–96

- Feuerbach, Ludwig, man's self-objectification, 114n76, 240
 Fichte, Johann, self-knowledge, 258–259
 forms, 142, 183, *passim* (see also *auto kath' eauto*)
 Foucault, Michel, 109, 133
 reflexivity in 1 *Alcibiades*, 250–251
 reflexive spirit of modernity, 2
 subjectivation, 267
 foundationalism, reflexive concepts in, see *archai*
 friendship, *philia*, 40–41, 219, 227

 Gantar, Kajetan, 1n2, 188n102, 195n1, 228n84
 bond between subjectivity and the reflexive, xviii
 reflexivisation of shame, 101
 self-love, 221n70
 Gerson, Lloyd, 217n58
 Plato's reflexive idealism, 235
 Giddens, Anthony, reflexive spirit of modernity, 2
 Gill, Christopher, 1n1, 5, 18n19, 128, 264
 development, 7
 models of personhood, 36–40
gnōmai
 reflexive constructions in, 115–120
 god(s), *passim*
 as human self-objectification, 93, 110, 114 & n76, 260–261
 as marked selves, 57
 as moral sanction, 103, 105, 129, 228
 as reflexive foundation, 111–112, 114n75, 121n96, 182n91, 238–239 (see also Plato, reflexive characterisation of divine beings)
 human conception of, 89n13
 human independence from, 55, 115, 125, 147n14, 166n47, 172, 223, 229n86, 264
 goods, autotelic/self-justifying, 112, 180–181, 261

 grammaticalisation
 functionalist theory of, 22–24, 266–277
 of reflexive, semantic motivation for, 24–30, 71, 264
 guilt, as internalised shame, 128–129

 Hahn, Adelaide, reflexive pronouns, 43–45
 Haiman, John, weak and strong reflexives, 27
 Havelock, Eric, 1n2, 20, 182–183, 212n40
 Hegel, G.W.F.
 reflexive absolute spirit, 123
 property and the thing-in-itself, 263
hekastos, etymology of, 110
 Heller, Agnes, conscience, 132–133
 Heraclitus, 83–87, 120–122, 224
 Herodotus, 67, 172n66, 235
 liberal self-interest, 109–110
 Hesiod, 67, 72, 77, 113, 145, 189–190
 Homer, 171, 215, *passim*
 cases of marked selfhood in, 55–57
 dialogical model of personhood, 46, 85, 176
 no psychological reflexives, 18–19, 46, 52, 65–66, 207, 264
 non-conceptual/complexive nature of soul words in, 212–213
 Horkheimer, Max, and Adorno, Theodore
 tragic self-sacrifice, 192, 263
 Odysseus as enlightened subject, 95n30

 idealism, epistemological mediation of, 92–93, 204
 Ilongot, psychology of, 15
 intellect, see mind
 inward turn, 154–158
 Inwood, Brad, 245
 reflexivity in 1 *Alcibiades*, 250–252

- second-order reflexivity in
 Seneca, 251, 254
- Ion, 120
- Isocrates, 119
 conscience, 129
 self-care, 116n82, 125n107,
 223n74, 229n86, *passim*
- isomorphism, macro-/microcosmic,
 35n59, 89, 92–93, 114n76,
 169n58, 220, 261
- Judaism, psychology of, 14n9, 60n44
- Kahn, Charles, 101–102, 122n48,
 244–245
- Kant, Immanuel, 4–5, 36, 38, 177,
 206, *passim*
 transcendental subject, 31–32, 96,
 203n17, 244
 self-knowledge, 258
- Kemmer, Suzanne, 5, 32, 73, 77, 81
 conceptual difference in reflexive
 encoding, 26–28
- Kierkegaard, self as reflexive
 relation, 2n6, 268
- Krohn, August, 217–218
- Lackoff, George, 5, 29, 223
 self-models, 16–17
- language
 constructs experience, 13, 136–
 137
 relation to thought, 11–13, 29–30,
 252–254
- Lehmann, W.P., 2n7, 30n45, 64n49
- logos*, 232–234, *passim*
 semantic development, 84–85,
 87
 reflexivity of, 84–86, 113n70
- Lucian, 139
- lyric, subjectivity of, 134, 152
- MacDonald, concepts vs. complexes,
 212
- Marcus Aurelius, 109n60, 117
- mask, see persona
- McKim, Richard, 242
- Medea, 149–151
- Menander, 117n84, 170n63, 171,
 186, 190n106, 229n86
- meta-concepts, 260
 logic of, 244
 relation to reflexive concepts, 244
 schema of, 243
- metaphor, sailing, reflexivised, 162–
 163, 190–191
- middle voice, 46, 49
 different from heavy pronominal
 reflexivity, 26–29, 73
 weak reflexive-marking, 26
- Mimnermus, 74–75, 79
- mind/intellect, *nous*, 93, 183, 197–
 198, 212, *passim*
 as the real person, 215–216
 as reflexive, 170, 174, 214, 261
 itself by itself, 90–91, 170, 212,
 239
- morality
 shame-to guilt-oriented, 132–
 133
 self-centred articulation of, 74–
 76, 99, 119, 178, 189–190, 195,
 262
- Most, Glen, 151–152
- Nancy, Jean-Luc, subjective
 reflexivity of world, 112
- Narcissus, tragically reflexive, 142n4,
 148, 176n78, 224
- nature, *phusis*
 as reflexive *archē*, 113–114, 184
 internalisation of, 156–157, 175–
 176, 199, 222
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, 157, 242
 existential danger of self-
 knowledge, 140
 self-creating world, 112n68
- nominalisation, conceptual
 significance of, 12n3, 30n45, 136–
 137
- Oedipus, tragically reflexive, 142–
 144, 148
- Ong, Walter, 213n44, 259

- Parmenides, 88–90, 92–93, 196, 232, 261
 Patočka, Jan, 206
 Pendrick, Gerard, 94, 221
 Pelliccia, Hayden, 11n1, 150n20
 persona/mask, different from true self, 140, 162, 177n81
 personhood, 1, 5, 8–9, 11, 14–15, 21, 43, 64n51, 195, 215, 217–218, 252, 264, 268 (see also self, models of)
 dividual, 14n9, 38
 Philo, 52, 135n20, 181, 226–227, 238–239
Philoctetes, true self in, 156–158
 Pindar, 80–81, 175, 200
 Pinkard, Terry, 258
 Plato, 79, 92, 97, 130–131, 165n45, 169, 174, *passim*
 differentiation of *ἑαυτόν* and *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ*, 229, 247
 importance of self-identity in, 205, 210–212, 260
 internalisation of the reflexive's reference, 121, 225–228
 invention of generic thing-in-itself, 197
 reflexive characterisation of divine beings, 233, 236–238
 reflexivisation of other-directed relations, 195, 218–221, 224–228, 235–236, 260
 reflexivity of love, 224
 reflexivity of soul, 203–204, 206–212, 227–228
 self-care and its primacy, 75, 229, 260
 self-relating soul and self-relating objects, 203–204, 259
 Plato comicus, 185
 pleasure, reflexive, superiority of, 104
 Plotinus, 213n46, 214n49, 253n136, 258
 Plutarch, 75n26, 104n50, 109n60, 181n89
 nominalisation of *ἐγώ*, 252–253
 self-contradiction, 234–235
 politics
 ἀπραγμοσύνη vs. πολυπραγμοσύνη, 105–108
 dependence on self-care in Plato, 227, 229
 reflexivised, 218–220, 226–229
polupragmosunē, 107
 post-colonialism, influence on cross-cultural psychology, 13
 praxis, reflexive, see *ta heautou*
 Procopé, J.F., 102n43, 103, 177
 pronouns, construct identity, 15–22, 246, 252–253
 property, see *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ*
 Pythagoras, 63n48, 101n41, 111, 116–117, 119n89, 124n106, 196, 215n52
 recursion, 4, 32, 34n55, 160, 223n75, 241–244, 254
 reflexive
 complex/heavily-marked, 65–71, 75–77, 78n33, 80–81, 86n6, 144, 191, 229–231, 245, 247, 251, 260, 264
 development of, 2, 30n45, 65, 67–68, 191, 264, 266 (see also grammaticalisation)
 in psychological prepositional phrases, 79–80, 154–157, 165, 202, 207–208, 230, 236, 260
 internalisation of reference, 65, 101–102, 104, 109, 121–122, 191
 nominalised, 41, 190–191
 PIE, 45
 Sanskrit, 2n7, 28n38, 63–64
 semantic content of, 17–22, 24, 45, 81, 230–231, 247, 251, 260
 simple pronouns as, 44, 69, 89
 typology of in Homer, 46–54
 reflexivisation
 comedic, 186–187, 190
 developmental influence on selfhood, 25, 29, 67n1, 71, 81, 195, 229

- of other-directed relations, 25, 52, 78, 98n36, 100–101, 120, 125, 127, 145, 190, 193, 195, 264 (see also Plato, reflexivisation of other-directed relations)
- reflexivity, 125, 170–172, 174, 189, 192–193, 195, 197, 201, 204, 206, 215, 220, 239–240, 250, *passim*
 - as holistic relation, 256–259
 - as part-part relation, 255–256
 - logic of, 111–114, 238, 255
 - importance for modernity, 2, 244, 261
 - importance for philosophy, 4, 83
 - morphological encoding of, 24–29
 - parody of in comedy, 182–186
 - reduction of dialogical personhood, 9, 25, 35n59, 40, 71, 83, 142, 215, 268
 - relation to personhood, 1, 3–5, 8–9, 22, 25, 29, 36, 40–41, 83, 85, 93, 96, 110–111, 133–134, 218, 245, 252
- relativism, reflexive articulation of, 80, 200–206
- representation, 160n38, 179n85
- Robb, Kevin, soul's reflexive *logos*, 85
- Robinson, T.M., 217–218
- Sappho, 69–70
 - reflexivisation of *sunoida*, 81, 127, 133–134
- Sartre, Jean-Paul, 94–95, 153
 - consciousness as for-itself, 34n54, 110, 112n68
 - reflexive ontological categories in, 201n13
 - self as reflexive, 2n6
 - substantialist fallacy, 3n8
- science
 - of man, 244
 - of science, 240–242, 260 (see also meta-concepts)
- Seel, Otto, 29n42, 128n3
 - reflexive's appropriation of psychic roles, 40
- Seigel, Jerrold, 259
- self
 - connection to identity, 177, 210
 - construction of, 4, 83, 129, 133, 169, 252, 259
 - dialogical representations of, 38, 128
 - differentiation from the subject, 94–95
 - in modernity, 2–4
 - in old Judaism, 14n9, 60n44, 66
 - induction of, 3, 268
 - logical representation of, 267–268
 - models of, 97, 156, 181–182, 223
 - nominalisation of in English, 1–3
 - relation to psychic organs, 19–22, 30–31, 40, 150
 - relation to soul, see soul
 - true, impersonal, 216, 260
- self-address, 149–154, 192
- self-care, 95, 124–125, 152, 175, 178–179, 195, 261–262
 - schematic representation of, 254
- self-consciousness
 - connection to conscience, 133
 - pre-discursive according to Fichte, 258–259
 - self-transparency of, 214–215
- self-consistency, 86, 205, 211, 232–234, 260
- self-destruction, 148–149, 152, 166–167, 192, 264
- self-difference
 - as feature of the modern subject, 31n46, 34n54
 - in Heraclitus, 86
 - produced by transitive reflexivity, 31, 73
- self-evaluation, 104, 235–236
- self-generation, of mind or time, 174
- self-identity, 88–89, 233
 - as an ethical imperative, 89n14, 177, 210–212
- self-interest, 83, 106, 108–110, 127, 222 (see also *ta heautou*)
 - primacy of, 98–99
 - spiritual interpretation of, 98, 99n38

- self-legislation, 102, 166, 177–179
- self-love
as a spiritual virtue, 222–224
as self-interest, 222
- self-knowledge, 255–259 (see also Delphic dictum)
- self-mastery, 96–97
- self-regulation, 103n46, 109, 129–130, 228, 262
- self-respect, 177
connection to other reflexive ethical acts, 102
role in moral regulation, 100–103, 125
- self-subsistence, 88, 198–199
- self-sufficiency, 219
as an ideal, 110
of divinity, 238–239, 261
of nature, 114
of the soul, 105
- semanticisation, 24, 252
- Seneca, novel reflexivity in, 30, 251, 254
- Seven Sages, 117–120
- Sextus Empiricus, impossibility of reflexivity, 256
- Sinar, Beck, 25
- Snell, Bruno, 3, 7–8, 11–15, 29n42, 128n3
- Socrates, 1n2, 83, 85n4, 99n38, 120, 122, 131, 182–184, 246–249, 255–256, *passim*
- Solon, 128
- Sophocles, 149–150, 156, 165
- Sorabji, Richard, 1n1
increased interest in subjectivity in late antiquity, 39
- soul, *psychē*, 8, 11, 177, 195, 229n86, 259, *passim*
as concept in post-Homeric thought, 212–213
as real person, 215–218
body-soul vs. free-soul, 61–62
different from subject/self, 2–3, 18n18, 157–158, 217, 218
life-force, 12n3, 18n18
non-psychological sense in Homer, 61
reflexivity of, 85, 123, 203–204, 227–228
relation to reflexive, 61–64, 105n51, 127
self-moving, 111, 208–210
semantic development of, 61–64, 67
speech acts, reflexivised, 230–232
Stoicism, 89n14, 103n47, 122n99, 124n102, 135n20, 154, 177, 210–211, 227n82, 228n83, 254
subject
appropriation of independent roles, 25, 71, 195, 260, 268
immunity to complete objectification, 32, 35, 243
non-substantial, 3n8, 41n77, 252, 268
omitted in ancient psychology, 217–218, 253
partial identity with the reflexive, 31, 158–159, 230, 245–246, 256–257
reflexive characterisation of, 39–40, 81, 213, 252, 264, 267–268
transcendental, 31–33, 35, 83, 96, 160, 218, 244, 254, 260
subjectivation, 195, 260, 267
suicide
as expression of agency, 145–147
connection to self-care, 147
- ta heautou*, 153, 193, 202, 217, 240, *passim*
categorical importance of, 68, 170
connection to the city-state, 99, 105, 248, 262
defines subject's sphere of praxis, 75, 99–100, 187, 190, 262
different from self, 121
Plato's internalisation of, 109, 195, 225–230, 262–263
relation to thing-in-itself, 263
- tanū-*, 28n38, 63–64
- Taylor, Charles, 13, 134, 154
- Thales, 90, 123
- thea*, *theōria*
as mode of self-knowledge, 139–140, 192

- reflexivisation of, 139, 158–162, 180, 192
- Theognis, 77–79, 82, 154
- thing-in-itself, see *auto kath' eauto*
- Thucydides, on autonomy, 106, 168
- thumos*
 - complexive nature of, 212–213
 - non-identity with the reflexive, 20–22
- time
 - reflexive characterisation of, 173
 - reflexive etymology of, 173–174
- totalities, reflexive characterisation of, 89, 173, 237
- tragedy
 - as mode of self-sacrifice, 192
 - authenticity in, 146–147, 152, 192
 - reflexive philosophical ideas in, 172–182
- tragic reflexivity, 78, 115n79, 141–149, 192, 235, 263
 - in comedy, 189–190
- transitivity
 - constructs transcendental subject, 30–36, 264
 - effect on the reference of the reflexive, 31, 73, 258–259
 - relation to heavily marked pronominal reflexivity, 29, 73
- truth to oneself, 18n19, 75–76, 156–158, 182
- Upaniṣads, onto-cosmological priority of the reflexive self, 123n100
- urbanisation, influence on selfhood, 60n44, 64n50, 83, 99, 102, 225–226, 259, 265
- verbs, subcategorisation for reflexive-marking, 24–25 (see also reflexivisation)
- Vernant, Jean-Pierre, developing language of agency, 30
- Vygotsky, Lev, concepts vs. complexes, 212
- Wackernagel, Jacob, 44–45
- Whorfianism, 5
- Wilkins, Eliza, 19n20, 120–122
- Williams, Bernard, development, 5
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, subject as a limit of world, 243
- Xenophanes, 76–77, 93
- Xenophon, Socrates' free conscience, 131
- Yājñavalka, imperceptibility of the subject, 35
- Žižek, Slavoj, subject's inscription in the object, 93